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THE INTERNATIONAL
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OCTOBER, 1911.

THE RELATION OF THE MORAL IDEAL TO REALITY.

FELIX ADLER.

THE moral ideal as defined in a previous paper[1] is characterized by parity of the elements of plurality and unity.[2]

By what steps is this ideal reached? By extending in thought the factors of manifoldness and unity to infinity, the manifoldness presenting the totality of possible deviations from identity, the unity between the diverse modes of existence being complete, or organic. Since 'moral ideal' and 'rational ideal' are used synonymously, the question with which this paper is concerned may at pleasure be stated as that of the relation to reality of the rational ideal. But before meeting the challenge of

[1] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July, 1910.

[2] It may be asked, How, then, are we to explain the predilection manifested for unity versus plurality, in past thinking,—in antiquity, in the Middle Ages, in the monistic systems of the present day? Imagine a series of concentric circles, each wider circle covering a considerably larger area than the interior ones. The smallest circle represents a manifold, successfully unified. It is, of course, preposterous to speak of a unity, except as the unity of something,—*i. e.*, of a manifold. In contemplating this smallest circle, the mind is at rest.

To pass beyond this into the field of unintegrated differentiæ is irksome. Detached phenomena, between which no connecting tie has been found, are a chaos. The mind strays to and fro among them like a ship adrift. The notion of plurality, therefore, comes to be associated with mental disquiet, the notion of unity with security. This, of course, holds good only until the wider manifold has again been successfully integrated. Then within

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this fundamental inquiry, it will be helpful to trim the fringes of the phrase just used. The reader is asked to bear in mind that the salient characteristic feature which marks the construction presented,—the equal rank of plurality and unity,—penetrates as a distributive principle into the inner nature of the rational ideal and makes the difference between the ideal as proposed, and other conceptions, such as the absolute of Hegel, the individualistic 'Ideal der Vernunft' of Kant, (a 'critical' survival of the *ens perfectissimum* of the Scholastics), the *monas monadum* of Leibniz, etc. It should also be noted that by the parity of the two factors, the rational ideal is relieved of the strain put upon it when drafted in ontological speculations to account for the origins of things. With the problem of origins the rational ideal has simply nothing to do. An individualistic God, in whom, in one-sided fashion, the principle of unity is conceived to be alive, may possibly be regarded as somehow the author of multiplicity, the creator, or the source of emanation out of which the rich and varied world has emerged. But an inclusive totality, embracing in idea all that is and possibly can be, cannot be treated as the starting-point of a process of becoming, nor as a stock from which other being buds. The rational ideal, as

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the new circle there is again found mental ease; but the plurality that remains beyond, unvanquished, is once more a source of trouble and unrest. The psychology of the predilection for unity does not seem difficult to understand. In the rational ideal, however, which is based on the conception of the *perfect* interpenetration of the two factors, the reason for this one-sided preference would disappear.

Again, if the very notion of unity implies a manifold of which it is the unity, how did it happen that unity has been embodied, as it were, in a single separated entity? The reason for this is probably political. The monarch is the visible incarnation of the state. The laws, though in fact depending for their observance on the consent of the people, are regarded as his edicts. The maintenance of public order and safety depends on his will. The influence of the monarchial example on philosophy and religion is evident in Aristotle's discussion of the ideal state and in the Hebrew conception of the Deity as both ideal Patriarch and King. These influences combined have left their impress on the thought of Western humanity down to our own age.

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here set forth, arises in the ethical field. It is postulated in response to ethical demands. The object in view is primarily to satisfy ethical needs. It cannot, indeed, on that account, I am well aware, be violently dissociated from the work and operation of the reason in other fields; there must be a connection between the ethical and the scientific ideals; but all inquiries into the nature of this connection should be deferred until the validity of the rational ideal within the ethical province, where it finds its first and chief employment, shall have been established. As students of ethics, we are to remain on our own ground. Attention is to be resolutely fixed on ethical phenomena and their ultimate implications. We are not to begin by borrowing biological or any other principles such as may have been found useful in other fields. We are to penetrate, if we may, to the first principles of our own subject, and only thereafter consider what the connection may be between these and the first principles that obtain elsewhere.

So much, then, as to the demarcation of the conception here submitted. Let us now turn to the internal structure of the rational ideal itself, the meaning that belongs to it within its own borders.

The inner constitution of the rational ideal is to be described as organic. The rational ideal is that of perfect organization. But here we come upon a term which stands in need of studious care in definition,—all the more because there is hardly a word in the language that is used more loosely or with greater license of vagueness. The ethical theory to be presently outlined is based upon a certain view of the organic relation and of the precise signification to be attached to the term 'organism.' An organism is commonly defined as a system the members of which are reciprocally dependent. X is an organism of which A, B, C, D, and E are parts, or members. The relation between them is organic because A is necessary to B, C, D, E, etc.; as they in turn are necessary to it. The organic relation is one of mutual indispensableness.

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Or, as it is sometimes put, A 'sustains' each and all of the others; and they in turn 'sustain' it. Those who use such expressions seem to be satisfied that they have said something that is intelligible to other minds, as well as satisfactory to their own. Striking metaphors are also sometimes used to express the organic relation, carrying with them a profound emotional appeal,—such as the phrase that one is to live 'for and in others'; or that we are to regard ourselves as 'members of one another.' Underneath these metaphors and the colder phrases quoted, there lies the naked logical idea of reciprocal dependence.

But what does 'reciprocal dependence' mean? The only kind of dependence with which we have acquaintance, and of which science and everyday experience afford examples, is the dependence of effect on cause, of consequent on invariable antecedent. And in order to take hold of the abstruse and subtle notion of reciprocal dependence, we are at first tempted to construe it as equivalent to reciprocal causality. Kant has attempted something of this kind when he bids us take our stand first at A and, looking forward toward B, regard the latter as the effect of A; and then to change our station to B and, reversing the process, look back on A as the effect of B. But this device (Kant himself does not propose it as a real solution) is of little avail. The sort of dependence implied in causality as we understand it, and the notion implied in reciprocity of dependence, are clearly repugnant to one another. Cause is invariable antecedent. To say that A is both the cause and effect of B were tantamount to saying that A is both the antecedent and the consequent of B; that that which precedes at the same time succeeds,—a contradiction in terms. The category of causality, therefore, cannot be used to explicate what is implied in the idea of reciprocal dependence. (In the physical sciences, a relation of successive action and reaction is postulated. But this is not the organic relation at all. A influences B, and B in turn

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reacts on A. The shuttle of change moves swiftly to and fro. In the physical sciences, the tendency is to dispense with the organic idea altogether and to interpret organic change in terms of physical and chemical sequence.)

And yet the strict organic idea exists in the mind. It is employed in common parlance quite as freely as the notions of space and time and cause and effect. Is it a delusion? Or is there a field in which it finds its appropriate application (aside from its possible ulterior significance in science)? And where in the mind is its locus? What is the metaphysical lair to which it may be traced? Did it enter into common thinking and common speech like a bolt out of the blue; or has it perchance its origin in some idea derived from the rational nature itself? My answer to this question embodies a theoretical contribution which this paper is designed to make the epistemological foundation of ethical science. The answer is that the organic idea is primarily a spiritual idea; that it originates in the rational ideal itself. Assume for a moment that this ideal were realized; that a perfect universe were actually given,—that is, a universe which would be constituted by the complete integration of its infinite differentiæ. Then we should agree that in such a universe, each distinctively modified member would be necessary to all the others, as they to it. Each would be dependent on all the others, as they on it,—namely, *with a view to the completing of the totality.* Reciprocal dependence is a telic idea. There is only one organism, the infinite organism, the perfect universe. Only in such a universe, for the sake of constituting its completeness, is the notion of reciprocal dependence credible. It is illegitimate to speak of any one thing or any group of things as an organism. In the strict view, one can speak of a thing or of a group of things only as a member or members of the infinite organism. The notions of organism and infiniteness go together inseparably. When we apply the word 'organism' to a thing, we envelop it ideally with the whole sphere of the infinite spiritual

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universe, we think of it as included in that sphere, we regard it as one of the rays into which a white light is broken,—a light composed, not of seven, but of an infinite number of diverse colors.

From what has been said, it will be evident that the relation of the rational ideal to reality, which we are discussing, must be a relation to the kind of reality that obtains in the ethical field, and in order to exhibit this relation it will next be necessary to draw out some of the practical ethical conclusions which may be deduced from this conception.

In the first place, then, the rational ideal validates the notion of the worth to be ascribed to every man. When we ascribe worth to a man, we regard him as one of the constituent members of the infinite organism, as being induplicable, indispensable in his place, not to be spared, necessary to complete the perfection of the ideal universe, as the rest of the spiritual world is necessary to his being. We surround his head with this aureole. We regard him as the possessor of a nature not exhausted in its space and time aspects, harboring within itself a non-temporal nature.

The notion of worth is to be sharply distinguished from that of value. It is customary to speak of ethics as a 'science of values.' It should be called the 'science of worth,'—that is, the science which concerns itself with the fact that human beings possess worth, with the implications contained in that fact and the consequences to be drawn from it. It is an empirical truth that every human being has needs for the satisfaction of which the faculty or power resides, not in himself, but in some other or others. And upon this is commonly built up the notion of human society as an organism, in the inexact use of the word above referred to, and of ethics as a system of mutual dependence for the satisfaction of needs. An ethics of this kind might conceivably be developed into a science of values, but it would leave out of account the essential feature of worth. Value is a

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strictly relative term. Value applied to human beings, is the property which one human being has of satisfying the needs of another. Worth is the intrinsic preciousness, or worthwhileness, which a human being possesses on his own account. It is an absolute, not merely a relative quality. It is both absolute and relative, *i. e.*, social, as we shall see later on. Aristotle signalized this truly characteristic ethical trait, and in our ethical constructions we may not lose sight of it.

Worth is ascribed to all human beings whatsoever, quite irrespective of their value: to the Hottentot; to the lowest type of negro; to criminals and degenerates; as well as to supermen if such there be. Yet millions of human beings have lived and perished without making any contribution, so far as we can see, to the cause of civilization: the hordes of Central Asia, for instance, the nameless tribes of Africa, and of the Southern Seas. And in the centers of European and American civilizations, no less countless multitudes exist who go and come without leaving behind them an appreciable trace of their existence. Hewers of wood and drawers of water they may be, and, in so far, useful: but not indispensable. For their places could readily be filled by other human 'spawn' which the prolific proletariat is able to furnish. On grounds of value, I fail to see how, with respect to such as these, the doctrine of the sacred rights of every human being, the basis of our ethics and especially of our democracy, can be maintained. But worth we do and should ascribe to every man. Worth is something potential in the man. Whether there be any actual gleams of value or not, we assume that there is some unique distinctive excellence latent in every man; we affirm that there is. How can we assume, or affirm, what we do not know? What entitles us to require of ourselves and others always to act on the basis of such expectation; always to presuppose in the man the existence of something of which we have no adequate tangible evidence; to approach even the lowest of our race,—the

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anti-social members of society, who seem mere drags on the wheels of progress,—with this invincible expectation in mind, this confident assumption that the effort to awaken a dormant better nature, if only persistent enough, will be crowned with success? It is the idea of worth, and this alone, that justifies us. As rational beings, we cannot but acknowledge in conduct the sovereignty of the ideal that springs from our rational nature. We ascribe worth to others in virtue of the rational ideal within which, as rational beings, we include them. For one thing, we claim worth for ourselves, and we cannot claim it for ourselves without according it to our fellows. For worth, while it is an absolute quality, is also social. The organic relation as it has been explained guarantees that this is so. (And if it be asked, Why should we hold sacred the life of man and not also of the inferior animals; in other words, where are we to draw the line in applying the rational ideal? I answer, that the circle is to be drawn so as to comprise all those who show, or are capable of showing, resentment against an injury done to them, not as a harm, but as a wrong. For this kind of resentment, which we meet with even among primitive peoples, is a sign of the operation in them,—however unconsciously,—of the idea that they are the possessors of a nature deserving of respect on its own account, of a nature that possesses worth. We are to ascribe worth to all those who are capable of reacting to the idea of worth.)

Let us now consider the chief ethical rule to be derived from the organic ideal. This rule may be formulated in a more popular fashion as follows: So act as to elicit the best in others, and thereby you will elicit the best that is in yourself. As a practical illustration, may be mentioned the dealings of the parent with the child. The parent is the superior whose office it is, in virtue of his intellectual and moral superiority, to educate the child, to raise the child to his own level; or rather, so to act upon it, by his more developed nature, as to put the child into possession of an independent self, distinguished

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from his own. But no parent, to begin with, really is a true superior in this sense. In a measure, he attains to this superiority in the very effort to prompt his child's development. In the attempt to win out of it the best that is in it, namely, that which is most individual in it, or personal in it, he is compelled to become more and more of a personality himself.

A stricter formulation of the rule is: So act as to develop the unique, distinctive self of another, and thereby develop thine own unique and distinctive self.

A still more precise formulation, finally, is this: So act as to evoke in the other the efficient idea of himself as a member of the infinite organism (a unique and distinctive being in this sense, organically related to all other beings), and thereby corroborate in thyself the same efficient idea with respect to thyself. For the aim of all development is not the development as such,—that is, the finite, petty fruits of it which we are capable of achieving,—but the lifting into prominence of the idea of ourselves as members of the ideal universe of spirit.

Next as to the manner in which the ethical rule is deduced from the organic ideal of unity in infinite differentiation. The kind of differences which here we have in view are *toto coelo* unlike those encountered in the domain of physical experience. The moment we say 'totality,' or 'perfection,' we find ourselves forthwith taken out of the time and space world. The space and time manifold is incapable of being totalized. It cannot be caught in the mental net. It reels itself off endlessly, back and forth. It is prolongable *ad indefinitum,* without ever touching infinity.

But on leaving space and time behind and passing in thought into the world of pure ideas, what meaning can we any longer attach to the term 'difference'? When we speak of any physical thing as differentiated from another thing, we mean that the two things differ quantitatively, not substantively. The tendency in all the exact

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sciences is to reduce seemingly qualitative to quantitative differences.

What, then, are 'qualities' in a noumenal world, color, sound, feeling, etc., being excluded. What does quality mean, and what does difference mean in a world of pure ideas, in an infinite universe? The only meaning we can attach in this highest abstraction to difference, or otherness, is that it shall be just otherness, absolute, intrinsic, substantive. And the only bond there can be between things apart which yet are to be conceived as united is that the very respect in which each one is distinctive shall be the condition on which depends the distinctiveness of all the others. And this turns out to be the very sense of reciprocal dependence, and from this relation is derived the ethical rule. The ethical rule is nothing but the application to the actual distinctions existing between human beings,—as of age, sex, mental endowment, and so forth,—of a directive derived from a pattern laid up in the world of ideas.

Ethical systems are to be judged by their fruits. A formula, when stated in its nakedness, may appear forbiddingly abstract, and yet when translated into rules of conduct it may become a very wellspring of power,—just as the prescription of a physician when read may seem a mere abracadabra of empty symbols, while the ingredients when compounded may restore a life.

Let us attend therefore to some additional practical aspects of the rule proposed. It settles the conflict of egoism and altruism, by transcending both. It lays down that the ends of others and the ends of self shall be pursued jointly, the one never sundered from the other. (This is possible only when the end in each case is the infinite end. In regard to all finite objects there is ever an inconcinnity between the ends of others and of self: the one or the other must give way.)

It gives point and theoretical foundation to the common injunction that we are to live in the life of others, that we are to regard others as part of our very selves;

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an injunction which at present has merely the force of well-meant advice, but is unconnected with any basic principle. From the standpoint of the ethical ideal, indeed, a certain precedence in conscious endeavor is given to the altruistic side: the end of others must primarily be the objective held in view. This is the case because all activity is outward-going, and because we are volitional beings through and through. Even our most solitary thoughts have a positive bearing on the well-being of others. And yet egoism and altruism are reconciled inasmuch as the growth of self is the inevitable incident (and is known by us as such) of our efforts to promote the growth of others. And this being remembered, the whole sphere of moral relations now reveals itself as a scene in which the attempt to live in and through the life of others, through our radiation on the life of others, becomes the single all-inclusive aim, the various duties being descriptions of the method by which the influence is to be exercised, modified according to the requirements of the different relations in which we are placed and the specific idiosyncracies of the persons who enter into this relation with us.

Thus, a distinctive ethical theory of marriage emerges from what has been said; also a theory of social reform; also a distinctive conception of the state.

I. From the standpoint of ethical teleology, marriage is an institution designed to perpetuate and at the same time to enhance rational life on earth. The relation is a triangular one,—that between two persons of opposite sexes, and between these conjointly and their offspring. The object of marriage is, first, to bring to bear the peculiar influence of sex upon the development of the unique personality of each; and secondly, to let the *process* of growth, as it takes place in the two personalities, provoke the successive stages of the growth of distinctive personality in the offspring.

Ethical science, as viewed from the standpoint of the organic Ideal, is a science of reactions. The means used

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to produce the reactions are different in the family, in the vocation, and in the state. The various duties are formulated by considering the specific sort of reaction, and also by taking into account the particular nature of the persons in question.

II. The ethical theory of social reform, especially with respect to the labor problem. The principal empirical difference in human beings, aside from that of sex, is mental bent or aptitude. The calling or vocation is, or should be, that channel through which the mental aptitude discloses and at the same time realizes itself. There ought to be a calling corresponding to each aptitude. The springing-up of new businesses and trades and professions which is witnessed at the present day is a sign of progress in this direction. The different callings,—agricultural, mechanical, commercial, professional,—are to be regarded ethically as so many organs of the social body, each performing a certain function. The strictly social view of the functionaries as a group should be taken first, before we come to speak of the individuals belonging to the group. The object of social reform is the increasing perfection of the services, the more and more adequate functioning of the organs. None of the vocational groups, not even those esteemed the highest, are as yet satisfactorily performing the service they are expected to render,—neither physicians, lawyers, artists, nor merchants, farmers, nor, in truth, any. Inefficiency is the common blight of all. The object of social reform, then, is the perfection of the services. But it is on the method of social reform that the ethical view I am here submitting lays its stress. The perfection of each calling is to be achieved by means of its reaction upon other related callings. Not by following one's own specialty with grim exclusiveness, nor merely by drawing on other specialties, parasitically, to feed one's own strength: but, teleologically, by keeping in view as the end the stimulating effect upon other specialties, is the particular calling to be perfected. The thing we are doing is never

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worth while on its own account. *All unser Wissen ist Stückwerk, und all unser Können ist eitel.* To till the soil and produce food, or to cure the sick, may seem worth while. These seem to be tangible achievements. But from the standpoint of final appraisement, when we stop to consider the sort of life that is led by those whose hunger has been appeased or whose bodily infirmities have been healed, the intellectual incompetency that remains, the moral infirmities that persist, we may well doubt whether any effort we can make, measured by any results outside of the effort itself, is worth while. Nothing, indeed, is worth while except the effort, the activity.

Now, the inter-connection between the different callings, their effect in reciprocal stimulation upon each other, is, of course, well known, but this aspect of the vocations is usually left to take care of itself. It is not held up as the object for the sake of which the calling should be exercised. But this is precisely what should be done from the standpoint of the organic ideal. This is precisely the change in men's attitude which the ethical theory here advanced should bring about. The flourishing of the fine arts has advanced the handicrafts; and conversely, the crafts supply the soil in which the fine arts must get their footing. The progress of the manufacturing and mining industries and of agriculture has been enormously furthered by the discoveries of science, and, conversely, the physical sciences have been prodded on and the knowledge they have accumulated sifted and controlled by attempted application in the field of the practical utilities. The contention here put forth is that what has hitherto been incidental should be treated as the essential aim. I do not, indeed, intend to imply that those who follow any one calling should intrude with half-knowledge into the callings of others, and prescribe for them the line of effort they are to follow. We have enough to do, each of us, and more than enough, to become in some slight degree, masters in our own field. But I do mean that the sign of achievement in our

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own field, *i. e.*, the proof that we are actually perfecting the function assigned us, is the provocative effect upon the exercise of function by others in other lines. For the only test of right activity is that it elicits new activity. The only norm of right functioning is that it calls out the enhanced exercise of related function; life sparkles at the point of fertile contact between mind and mind.

The object of social reform, then,—to take the industrial group as an illustration,—is to bring about a state of society such that the members of this group will regard themselves as the executives of science and art, promoting the progress of science and art by the applications they attempt to make of their results, and to bring about such conditions in respect to hours of labor, share of the product, and democratic internal organization of the group as will best conduce to this result; and finally, to provide that each individual member of the group shall be trained by education and encouraged by the expectant attitude of his fellows to contribute his distinctive individual share to the general result.

Sex is one of the agents supplied by nature to be employed in the process of ethical reaction. The mental aptitude underlying the mechanical, artistic, scientific, and other occupations, is another agent. The calling or vocation is to be regarded as one of the great opportunities for the working out of the distinctive personality of the man. The business of the world is ideally to be remodeled from the point of view of this conception. This is social reform. That there is a far cry from the present situation to any such re-formation, need not discourage us. We are looking for a clue, a principle, to point the right direction.

III. The conception of the state. The object for which the state exists is to facilitate by collective measures the mutual reactions of the vocational groups. The vocational group is the political unit. And it is furthermore the aim of the State, in and through such reactions, to bring about the fullest expression of the national genius

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or character, or of what may be called the personality, in every department of activity.

IV. The conception of international relations. Humanity as the largest earthly organism is related to the state, as the state is to the vocational group. The aim of humanity is to secure the reciprocal interaction of the national personalities, types, or civilizations, represented respectively by the different nations, to the end that each type may clarify and more completely affirm itself;—that is, may develop the utmost excellences of which it is capable by fostering and assimilating the discrepant excellences of the other types. There will never be lasting peace among the nations until they understand that, in a precise sense, they are nationally members of one another.

V. The conception of the church. The church is that institution whose office it is to incorporate the sub-organisms of the family, the vocations, the state, and humanity into the universal, spiritual organism—that is, to lend them organic significance in the only way in which it is possible to do so (*vide supra*), by treating them as included in the unity of the infinite plurality which alone is the true organism.

The point has now been reached where a brief answer may be given to the question at the head of this paper: The Relation of the Moral Ideal to Reality. The ideal is real, morally speaking, in so far as it supplies the motor force for the development of distinctive personality along the lines just sketched. The moral ideal is real in so far as it supplies the basis for the conception of worth (of the potential nature the presence of which we postulate in every man), and for the unfolding of that worth through the series of reactions just described. The moral ideal is real in so far as from it is derived the impulse to organize our lives. To ethicize and to organize are synonymous terms. Conscious organization implies the idea of organism as a pattern; the idea of organism and the rational ideal are identical.

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If this paper had not already surpassed the usual limits, I should have liked to dwell on certain other practical corollaries from the ethical system here presented. But at least the brief mention of a few may be permitted. For instance, in the exposition of the fraternal relation, the emphasis will be on the difference, rather than on the sameness,—the tie of consanguinity between brothers is an opportunity afforded by nature for the earliest possible adjustment of the unlike to the unlike.

In the doctrine of friendship, in contrast to the Pythagorean, Aristotelian, Kantian, and Emersonian treatment of the subject, the emphasis will be on the office of the friend, by insight, to divine the latent, unexpressed worth of the friend, rather than on the reciprocal interplay of excellences already achieved.

In regard to the love of enemies, there will be a special extension of the commandment to one's intellectual enemies:—that is, recognition of the obligation to endeavor to understand and do justice to writers and thinkers from whose views one is by temperament repelled.

In regard to self-discipline or moral asceticism (in the literal sense), it goes without saying that every ethical system will accentuate certain kinds of preliminary training, rather than other kinds, and will stress certain types of spiritual suffering, rather than others. The preliminary training here required is positive, rather than suppressive. The spiritual suffering is that involved in mental, as well as volitional, shortcoming. We remain ignorant of that central distinctive self, the idea of which never ceases to haunt us, which to use a Kantian expression is never *gegeben,* but always *aufgegeben.* We remain ignorant of the true self of others. We remain ignorant of the interior complexities of other callings which yet we are to promote. We are and remain utterly ignorant of those vast, outlying regions of the infinite organisms that envelop the puny human groups in which and through which we live. The weight of the totality pressing upon us as infinitesimal, fractional parts is the

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tragic element of our existence, the source of the tragic spiritual pain. The consciousness that,—fractional and infinitesimal though we be,—we are none the less indispensable members, is the sublimely reconciling thought that has 'healing in its wings.'

The following also must be stated before I close.

The ethical end includes all other ends whatsoever. It is not confined to one aspect of life, that commonly called 'social.' It is truly social, but as such, organic, and, as organic, all-inclusive.

The ethical life is the life of highest freedom and unhindered exercise of faculty. It does not manifest itself in obedience to rigid, hard-and-fast rules; but informs and ever seeks to transcend these rules by reverting to the principle from which they are derived. It is highest freedom because it is the utterance of the highest faculty in man, the rational faculty in the ideal field of its infinite extension.

The life of man, ethically viewed, is not to be described by the simile of a hill, along the upward slope of which man travels until he reaches the middle period of life, whereupon he descends the downward slope until he falls into the ditch at the bottom. The life of man, ethically viewed, is to be likened to a series of terraces, one rising above the other, the wayfarer ascending to higher and higher levels as his relations to others ramify, as the reactions become more and more complex and significant, until at the end he passes into the unknown from the summit:—as Emerson passed out of the sight of Carlyle, who stood at the threshold of his cottage and saw his friend ascending a hill before his door, saw him reach the top, and thus disappear.

It also follows from this as a distinctive feature of the organic ethical system that the ethical code will not be a horizontal code,—the same duties for persons of all ages,—but, as it were, a vertical code. The successive periods or stages of life are to be carefully studied as to their ethical requirements, as to the successive contri-

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butions toward the growth of distinctive personality to be expected in each, the ethical note to predominate in each, the peculiar ethical lesson to be acquired in each.

And finally, as to the outcome of it all, as to the future? Is it an earthly millennium, is it the realization of the ideal, to which we are to look forward? Not the realization of the ideal, is our earthly goal, but the realization of the reality of the ideal. To the rational nature, only the rational can be real. The data of sense are real to us so far as they are rationalized. They can never be wholly rationalized. There always remains an irreducible residuum of the irrational. But the mind will not therefore relinquish its demand for the real as rational, and the rational as real, a demand founded at bottom on the belief of the mind in itself. Ethically, the rational ideal manifests its reality in so far as it proves itself to be an actual motive force in conduct, in so far as there is that in man's nature which responds to his ideal of his nature.

As the human race advances, as the animality in it becomes more quiescent, this kind of response becomes more frequent. Also, the meaning of the ideal, its implications, are made more and more explicit through attempted applications, and in this way the reality of the ideal is realized. By realizing the reality of the ideal, I understand realizing the force and the content of it.

At the beginning of his "The Religion in Greek Literature," Lewis Campbell quotes a remark of Tennyson's, made in answer to one who had said, "My chief desire is to leave the world happier than I found it." Tennyson answered, "My chief desire is to gain a new vision of God." The purpose of human life, taken both individually and collectively, may be stated in analogous fashion, from the standpoint of the organic ethical conception. It is to get new vision! Not sterile, contemplative vision, but such as prompts new activity in consonance with itself, the new activity to lead to newer vision, and this again to renewed activity, and so on without end.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. FELIX ADLER.

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THE NEW JESUS MYTH AND ITS ETHICAL VALUE.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

GERMANY is experiencing a fresh religious sensation. Compared with it the Babel-Bible storm was but a gentle breeze. It has spread from place to place, aroused an incredible amount of excitement, and appears to be far from having exhausted its strength. There is probably no other country where it would be possible to stir the minds of scholars and common folk alike to such a degree by a religious problem. But the conditions apparently require that the moving force shall not be clerical. The German mind responds very quickly to a discussion of vital questions that gives the impression of being free from prejudice, is frank, earnest, and courageous, and seeks to go to the roots of things. But with all its respect for the authority of the specialist, it is inclined to be distrustful of the theologian *ex professo*. The unnatural relation of church and state is in part responsible for this, in part the apologetic attitude of the sectarian, whether his sect be great or small. Christianity is the official religion of the empire, supported at public expense. Not only the pulpit orator, but also the theological professor at the university, is expected to be a Christian of a definite type, and in spite of the prevalent freedom of academic teaching is in wide circles held to be in honor bound to defend the religion of the state. Hence even the greatest erudition, the most valuable services to science, and the most liberal tendencies of thought cannot quite free him from a suspicion of intellectual disingenousness that, as a rule, is wholly unjustifiable.

The theologian who is simply a trained student and a competent interpreter of the religious phenomena of man's life, without any necessary ecclesiastical affiliation,

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is almost unknown in Germany. Many an eminent contributor to the science of religion, therefore, prefers to be known as a philologist, historian, or philosopher; and the multitudes estranged from the creed and cult of the church, are apt to listen to the theological opinions of a man accustomed to scientific investigations, though less thoroughly at home in the realm of theology, with greater confidence than to a theologian who, with superior training, ampler resources, and a surer method, may be suspected of prepossessions due to life-long habits of thought and the restrictions of his calling. Nor is this popular instinct altogether wrong. Theology owes a heavy debt to the coöperation of scholars reaching over from their various specialties into its peculiar field. An intimate acquaintance with some branch of science is by no means a guarantee of capacity to take broad surveys, occupy new view-points, and make valid generalizations. It is quite possible to be a distinguished specialist in the Old Testament or the New, and yet to be nothing but a dilettant in comparative mythology.

The agents of religious unrest in the present case are laymen. Most prominent among them is Professor Arthur Drews. He holds the chair of philosophy in the Technische Hochschule at Karlsruhe. Rightly or wrongly, that raises a presumption in favor of untrammeled search after truth and freedom from undue theological bias. Yet he writes with the fervor and fierceness of a prophet, and cannot be regarded as an enemy of religion. For he is an ardent advocate of a religious monism, a mystic pantheism, that is strongly opposed to the current materialistic monism of Haeckel. He is the author of a work entitled "Religion as the Self-consciousness of God," and though hostile to the Christian church, and particularly to liberal Protestantism, cherishes large hopes for a Christianity freed from any relation to Jesus as a human personality. He is the apostle of the movement, the preacher of the faith, whose theses, public disputations with the theologians, addresses be-

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fore vast audiences, and popularly written works have left the deepest impression. Without him no sensation is likely to have been created. His book "The Christ-Myth," which passed through several editions in 1910, sums up, in a comprehensive manner, the construction of history that has caused so much discussion. It affirms that Jesus of Nazareth never existed, accounts for the origin and growth of Christianity, including the contents of the gospels, by the general religious development of the period, looks upon the Christian church as a Gnostic sect, and declares that Jesus was a deity worshiped before the Christian era.

These positions were promptly attacked by the theologians who had been challenged, and a considerable number of brochures and articles have appeared in quick succession during the last twelvemonth. Professors Von Soden, Bornemann, Johannes Weiss, Hauck, Beth, Dunkmann, Juelicher, Weinel, Windisch, Zimmern, and others, have undertaken to vindicate from different points of view, the historical character of the Galilean prophet. Many of these studies have been of decided value by broadening the outlook and emphasizing the need of stricter methods on all sides. But Professor Drews complains, not without cause, of the tone assumed by some of his critics. Unfortunately, it has to some extent affected his own. Even his species of *odium theologicum* grows by what it feeds on; and there are many who like the din and fray of battle, the defiant challenge, the onslaught on the enemy, and the shout of victory. Schweizer remarks that "a life of Jesus can be written even in hatred, and the greatest have been written in hatred, those of Reimarus and David Friedrich Strauss" ("Von Reimarus zu Wrede," p. 4). This is scarcely true of Strauss, and of course wholly inapplicable to Renan and Keim, Albert Réville, and Wrede. The attitude of men in this respect has undergone a marked change. An increasing number of thoughtful and independent people think it proper that historical questions should be settled

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by calm, patient, painstaking and disinterested investigations, that religious problems should be discussed with reverence, delicacy, and a touch of genuine sympathy, and that a Life of Jesus, if it is deemed possible to construct one, should be written *con amore*. If a more excellent way has been found than that which many have been induced to follow by the example of the gentle Nazarene, it would commend itself by casting out the bellicose, self-satisfied and disdainful spirit that has too often disgraced the discussions of these serious questions.

Professor Drews had his precursors, and he has his followers. He rightly calls attention to the services rendered by such early mythologists as Dupuis, Volney, and Nork. Pioneer work is not as easy as repetition. In all fairness, however, he should also have given credit to the liberal theologians for the excellent use they have made of most of the mythical material on which he relies in elucidating the ideas and practices of early Christianity. It is largely their merit that it is not necessary to-day to prove the ultimate ethnic origin of some of the formative ideas of the first ecumenic creed, with its emphasis on the divine paternity and the virgin birth, the death and the resurrection, the descent to hell and the ascent to heaven. They long ago recognized that not only the dogma, ritual, and polity of the fully developed Catholic church, but also the most characteristic Christian conceptions and customs found in the New Testament, naturally developed from previously existing Jewish and pagan thought and usage. The indebtedness to Bruno Bauer is freely acknowledged. This subtle and profound thinker was almost the first to perceive the genetic connection between Christianity and the Hellenistic world of thought in which it grew up. It is not necessary to adopt his conclusions in order to recognize the duty of seriously considering his arguments and the value of placing oneself at his point of view. The attitude of such Dutch theologians as Pierson, Loman, Meyboom, and Van Manen does not seem to have been observed by Professor Drews.

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There can be no doubt that he has been much influenced by A. Kalthoff's attempt to understand Christianity as an expression of a peculiar social rather than individual consciousness, the aspiration and upward movement of the Jewish slave proletariat in Rome, and not unmoved by the endeavor of Professor Peter Jensen, the distinguished Assyriologist of Strasburg, to prove that Moses, Jesus, and Paul are three variants of the Babylonian god-man Gilgamesh, as well as by that of the late Professor Karl Vollers, of Jena, another eminent Orientalist, to explain the relation of Christianity to the other great religions without the assumption of an historical founder. His most important teachers, however, were Mr. John M. Robertson, member of the British Parliament, and Professor William Benjamin Smith, of Tulane University. In a series of works, marked by wide reading, a broad outlook, an earnest purpose, and a courteous manner, rather than by a critical mastery of the material, Mr. Robertson expressed his conviction that Christianity is to be interpreted as a crystallization of mythical conceptions in a Gnostic sect, having nothing to do with Jesus of Nazareth. But the most startling and to his mind apparently most significant idea Professor Drews owes to the American scholar.

Professor Smith is a noted mathematician, the author of many works on geometry and calculus; for a number of years he taught physics, and in 1906 he was transferred from the chair of mathematics to that of philosophy in the foremost university of the South. Theology has been his avocation for a long number of years, and his familiarity with New Testament criticism is such as to inspire even specialists with sincere respect. He possesses a mind of unusual keenness and versatility, subtle, penetrating, and resourceful, as nimble in treading new paths, as it is assiduous in defending every step taken. It is not easy to conceive of his ever abandoning a position once occupied; this innovator is a consummate apologist. Withal he has a playful, if somewhat caustic, humor, is the master

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of a brilliant style, and takes a manifest delight in the conflict. In 1906 five essays of his were translated into German by Pastor Lehmpfuhl and published under the title "Der vorchristliche Jesus." A just, appreciative, and discriminating preface by Professor Schmiedel helped to give the book the attention it deserved. In this work Professor Smith announced his discovery of Jesus as a pre-Christian deity. He had found the evidence chiefly in four places, *viz.*, a passage in Epiphanius (d. 403 A.D.), a formula of conjuration in a Paris papyrus of the fourth century, the Naasene hymn in Hippolytus (d. after 235 A. D.), and the phrase "the things concerning Jesus" in Acts 18:24-28. A new collection of essays has been translated into German, probably by the same excellent hand, and sent out in 1911 under the title "Ecce Deus."

Among the other leaders of the movement, F. Steudel and S. Lublinski deserve special mention. In his pamphlet "Zum Kampf um die Christusmythe," the former shows himself possessed of much critical acumen, moderation, and insight. Lublinski, who recently passed away, was a literary critic, philosopher, and poet of considerable power, and his two volumes on "Der urchristliche Erdkreis und sein Mythos," which assume the correctness of the views of Smith and Drews, are as reverent in spirit as they are beautiful in style, and will help to pave the way for a cheerful acceptance of what is true in the contentions of this group of scholars. Nor should it be overlooked that Professor Cheyne, of Oxford, the famous Hebraist and editor of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, has given at least a qualified approval to the theory of a pre-Christian Jesus cult, holding that "the god-man, whose cult in certain Jewish circles was probably pre-Christian, was called by a name which underlies Jeshua" (*Hibbert Journal*, July, 1911, p. 891).

It is worth while inquiring,—even if it does not seem possible to attach as much significance to the question as some of these scholars do,—what weight can be given by disinterested historical research to the evidence that has

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been adduced to prove the existence of the worship in Jewish circles of a god Jesus before our era. Professor Smith was unquestionably right in passing by without comment the suggestion of Mr. Robertson, adopted by Professor Drews, that Joshua, the son of Nun, and Joshua, the high-priest in the time of Darius Hystaspes, were the objects of divine worship. Professor Cheyne has not yet made known what name, in his judgment, underlies that of Jeshua, or what indications he has found of the cult of the god-man in the Judaism of pre-Christian times. Professor Smith assigns much importance to the description of the Nazoræans by Epiphanius. According to this church father, the Nazoræans were a Jewish-Christian sect living "in Beroea, about Coele-Syria, and in Decapolis, about the regions of Pella, and in Basanitis that is called Kokabe," who were formerly known as Jessæans, either from Jesse or from Jesus, and were identical with the Essenes. He also mentions a Jewish sect, the Nasaræans, living in "Gaaladitis, Basinitis and the region beyond the Jordan," which existed before Christ and did not know Christ, and differed from other Jews only in regarding the law of Moses they possessed as more accurate, refusing to offer sacrifices, and abstaining from animal food. Now Professor Smith assumes that Epiphanius made a distinction where there was no difference, that the Nazoræans existed before Christ and were then called Jessæans because they worshiped a god named Jesus, and that the term Nazoræans has nothing to do with the town of Nazareth, which did not exist in the first century, but is derived from an epithet of Jesus designating him as a divinity who "protects."

But there seems to be no good reason for assuming such a confusion on the part of Epiphanius. If he can be trusted in his statement that the Nasaræans existed before Christ, which is perfectly natural in the case of a Jewish sect, why should his accuracy be questioned when he distinguishes them from the Christian Nazoræans, or the significant addition be overlooked that the

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former did not recognize Christ? The recently discovered documents relating to the covenanters of Damascus, published by Dr. Schechter, come from one of the Jewish sects that flourished in the region beyond the Jordan, and help us to understand the attitude of the Nasaræans, and possibly also that of the Jessæans. Those who entered into the new covenant and took up their abode in Damascus and the neighboring region about the middle of the second century B. C., after the overthrow of the old high-priestly family, departed so widely from the Pharisees on important points of interpretation and practice as easily to suggest that they had a different law, refused to enter the temple to kindle the altar-fire and offer sacrifice, and looked for a Messiah, not of the seed of David and the tribe of Judah, but of Aaron and Israel. The kinship to the Nasaræans of Epiphanius is unmistakable, even if the Damascene dissenters were not vegetarians. If their Peræan neighbors before they embraced Christianity, by way of protest against an Aaronid and Israelite Messiah, emphasized the Davidic descent of the coming deliverer, they may well for this reason have called themselves Jessæans, after Jesse, the father of David. The most probable meaning of Nazoræans is Galileans. The plain is called Genesar or Genosar, the Galilean lowland; the district immediately west of the lake is named Gennesar or the Galilean garden; the lake itself is designated as the water of Gennesar. In the Talmud, Jesus is called *ha-nozri* and his followers *ha-nozrim,* and in the New Testament the corresponding terms Nazoræan and Nazoræans or Nazorenes are used, indicating, no doubt, that they were Galileans, or natives of that part of Galilee which was particularly famous for its luxuriant vegetation. It should not have been necessary for Professor Cheyne to point out that, in Hebrew, "the Guardian" would be *ha-nozer,* not *ha-nozri.* But though *ha-nozri* probably designates Jesus as "the Galilean," not as a native of Nazareth, it is not strange that there should have been a Galilean town by that name. It does not happen to be mentioned by

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Josephus or in the Talmud; but Eusebius knew it, the evangelists obviously believed in its existence, and it is hard to understand why any one should have invented such a place-name. A pre-Christian god Jesus cannot be proved from Epiphanius.

Whether the Naasenes, or Ophites, existed before the appearance of Christianity in the world or not, they are likely to have been a religious society before they became Christians. It is certain, however, that for a long time they were a Christian Gnostic sect. The occurrence of the name Jesus in an undated Naasene hymn quoted by Hippolytus (Philosophumena, v. 1) cannot, therefore, be adduced as evidence. Before it can be used, it will be necessary to show that in its present form it antedates the contact of the sect with Christianity.

More puzzling is the formula: "I conjure thee by the god of the Hebrews, Jesus," found in the great Paris papyrus published by Dr. C. Wessely in the *Denkschriften d. k. Akademie d. Wissenschaften,* Wien, 1888. This papyrus, in the judgment of the editor, comes from the early part of the fourth century, but contains much older material, the sources being sometimes quoted, sometimes not. The ancient collector to whom we owe its present form was a pagan, living in Egypt, probably in Alexandria, and gathering from every quarter prayers to the gods, Hermetic revelations, magic formulas, charms, and incantations. In ll. 3007-3085 he quoted a 'Hebrew formula,' preserved "among pure men," particularly useful in the case of those possessed by the demon Pibecheus. The late Dr. Albrecht Dietrich thought that these 'pure men' were the Therapeutæ on Lake Mareotis described by Philo, and that "the main part" of the charm ultimately came from them through the Ophites to the author of the papyrus (*Abraxas,* 1891, p. 143). However that may be, it is certain that it has been copied more than once, and that it teems with errors of transcription. The hand that wrote 'Osrael' for 'Israel,' and made the three demons 'Ebusæus,' 'Chersæus,' and

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'Pharisæus' out of the 'Jebusite,' 'the Girgashite,' and 'the Perizzite,' should not be too implicitly trusted when attempting to copy the names of the god of the Hebrews. 'Jesu' may very well be a blunder of the copyist for 'Jeu,' the divine name in the Gnostic works Pistis Sophia and The Books of Jeu, and is apparently followed by 'Yahwe,' 'Father of living spirits,' 'El Elohe,' and other titles. The pagan copyist may even have ignorantly imagined Jesus to have been a name of the god of the Hebrews; in ll. 1231 ff. he records a Coptic formula: "Hail spirits of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Son of the Father (who is) above Isasphe or Isasphiena (Joseph?), Iao Sabaoth, let your strength mock at this until ye have cast out this impure demon Sadan." It would be hazardous indeed to base an argument upon the accuracy of this late pagan scribe.

It certainly cannot be looked upon as incredible that Apollos should have heard some of the things concerning the historic Jesus, and himself taught, without knowing any other baptism than that of John. The synoptic Jesus himself knows no other baptism, the present form of Matt. 28:19f. being of very late origin; and Apollos may have heard in Alexandria very much concerning Jesus of Nazareth without any word reaching him as regards a distinct water-baptism in the name of Jesus, or a spirit-baptism giving special powers. There were evidently many different types of teaching attaching themselves to the names of John and Jesus among the Jews of the dispersion before Paul appeared with his gospel. We do not know what Apollos preached concerning Jesus before he came under the influence of Aquila and Priscilla, not even whether at that time he regarded him as the Messiah. It is perfectly gratuitous to assert, as Professor Smith does, that "he knew nothing about the teacher, his life, his personality, his death, his resurrection and ascension, for if he knew anything of this, he must have known all." Why must he? Is it so necessary to picture Apollos as learning his doctrines through

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gospels and catechisms, so impossible to conceive of news concerning a prophet traveling in the East without the completeness of a full biography or the redundancy of every type of legendary embellishment, that the only alternative is to think of Apollos as a missionary, proclaiming, before he became a Christian, a certain god Jesus never mentioned in a pre-Christian document? Nothing necessitates, or commends, the interpretation of 'Elymas bar Jesus' as 'Elymas, worshiper of the god Jesus' rather than 'Elymas, son of Jesus.' Jesus was a common name among the Jews; it was borne by several persons in the Old Testament; Jesus ben Eleazar ben Sira was a well known author; Jesus bar Abba was the murderer released in preference to Jesus of Nazareth; Jesus, called Justus, is mentioned in Col. 4:11; Elymas bar Jeshu is as natural as Simeon ben Jeshua in Ecclus 50:27; 51:30 twice (Heb.), probably the author of The Ode of Famous Men.

Professor Smith seems to have succeeded only in building up a new Jesus myth. He has painted before our eyes a hitherto unknown divinity, with colors borrowed from pagan and Christian myths. But he has not shown us a shrine, a priest, a worshiper, an oracle, or the slightest trace of the presence of this god in the minds of men. Nor is his case strengthened by the statement of Professor Drews that there existed "a syncretistic religious system, composed of Babylonian, Persian, Jewish, and Greek ingredients, which ruled the whole of western Asia in the last centuries before Christ, and whose followers called themselves Adonaei, after the name of its supposed founder, Ado," that Christianity was only a Gnostic sect, and that Jesus of Nazareth never existed.

In regard to the Adonaei, this name was unknown until Pognon some time ago published a Syriac work by Theodore bar Choni, written possibly as early as the sixth century. Speaking of the Mandæans, he says that they may also be called Adonaei after their founder Ado. In their own sacred books, the Genza, the Qolasta, and oth-

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ers, they only call themselves Mandæans, or Gnostics, and no such person as Ado is mentioned. They, or some kindred sect, were known to Muhammed as Sabians, or Baptists. Like Elkesai who flourished in the time of Trajan, Ado may have been the founder of a similar sect, and Theodore may have confused it with the Mandæans. There certainly is not the slightest evidence that either Mandæans or Adonaei existed "in the centuries before Christ" as followers of a syncretistic religious system ruling the whole of Western Asia. We know of no Mandæans outside of Babylonia, and have no documents that could possibly be assigned to a higher age than the third century A. D., and positively no means as yet of dating the earlier material that may have been incorporated in our oldest texts.

Gnosticism was once regarded as nothing else than a Christian heresy. That was a mistake. While all the great Gnostic systems known to us came from Christian Gnostics, and all the eminent Gnostics, men like Valentinus, Basilides, and Marcion, were ardent Christians, the tendencies of thought that prepared the way for them had unquestionably been in the world for a long time. Whether Mandaism existed as an organized cult-community before Christianity or not, it no doubt existed before it came in contact with either Judaism or Christianity, and it always remained essentially pagan. Unfortunately we do not know at present when this sect first appeared, and we are likewise unable to say whether the Naasenes existed as a sect in the first century A. D. Yet though we have no definite information as to any Gnostic system of that century, the reputed Gnostics of the period, Simon of Gitta, Menander of Kapparetæa, and Cerinthus of Alexandria, are tantalizingly elusive personalities and all connected by tradition with Christianity, and references to Cainites, Nicolaitans, and the like are very vague, there seems to be enough ground for supposing that Gnosticism existed, and we may conjecture at least what the early stages must have been. But there is absolutely

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no warrant to look upon the Christianity of Paul and the synoptic gospels as a sect, or branch of an organized Gnostic church, and we must carefully avoid the current error that Gnosticism had only one root. Originally distinct products of life and thought in the Hellenistic age, they met, and Gnosticism received from Christianity that which gave to it its greatest importance, and in its turn transmitted to Christianity much that was of real value.

That Jesus of Nazareth never existed is the thesis defended most strenuously by Professors Smith and Drews. This is, of course, a purely historical question to be decided by evidence carefully sifted and accurately weighed. It has been considered more or less earnestly in all recent attempts at presenting a biography of Jesus. Naturally the attention has first turned to Jewish and pagan literature. That the passage in our present text of Josephus is a Christian interpolation cannot be doubted. There is room for a suspicion that it took the place of something the Christian copyist did not care to preserve, characterizing the appearance of Jesus as another calamity to Israel, but the suspicion is not capable of verification. The references in the Talmud all depend on the gospels or on invention. Seneca's silence has a tendency to show that Rome cannot have been much stirred in the days of Nero by the new Oriental faith. No argument of weight, based either on style or subject-matter, can be adduced against the Tacitean authorship of the chapter in the Annals dealing with the Neronian persecution; but there is good reason for questioning the historic accuracy of the account. If we had no other sources than the material drawn from pagan or Jewish authors, it would be quite impossible for an historian to affirm that Jesus of Nazareth had ever lived.

But the contention that all Christian testimony may without ceremony be waived out of court does not appear reasonable. It has often been said that Islam is the only religion born in the broad daylight of history. Yet it may well be asked what we would know concerning Mu-

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hammed's life or the origin of his religious reform, if all Muslim testimony were barred out. All the facts accepted by the historian are vouched for by Muslims; though the historian does not accept all that early Muslim tradition presents. The fact that a man became a Muslim did not render him unfit to bear witness or to transmit a reliable tradition. Nor can a fair criticism adopt the principle that an author's Christian faith is presumptive evidence against the trustworthiness of anything he may relate. After all, it is not strange that the adherents of a new religious faith should be more interested in knowing the truth concerning its founder than the ignorant, indifferent, or hostile world outside. It may not be easy, however, for a believer to gratify this desire for truth. His sources may be scanty or flow too copiously; he may accept what he hears without discrimination and transmit without accuracy; his lack of critical judgment may be equaled by his imagination; his habits of thought may force him to see things in a wrong perspective; his historic appreciation may be affected by his own ideal and his vision of reality by his love of speculation. Add to this the difficulty of a later generation in recovering his words through differing codices and varying versions, and the duty of a searching criticism must be seen to be imperative.

It is universally admitted that the Fourth Gospel is later than the synoptics and depends upon them. Its peculiarities are such that critical students generally abstain from using it as an historical source, while recognizing its spiritual value. Even if the recent studies of Schwartz and Wellhausen should render it probable that the author had before him a document akin to Mark, containing some historically important material, though already affected by the 'Johannine' style, this judgment would not be essentially changed. Textual criticism has conclusively shown that the present text of the synoptics differs to a considerable extent from the original Greek form. But after the additions have all been removed,

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Luke still appears to be the latest of these three gospels, and is so regarded by most scholars. There is a difference of opinion as to whether priority should be assigned to Mark or the source of Matthew and whether this source was a mere collection of sayings or a combination of words with narratives, such as primitive Matthew probably was; but there seems to be absolute agreement in regard to the general progress from Matthew-Mark to Luke, and from Luke to John. This is of some importance; for if the theory of Professors Smith and Drews were correct, one would expect a gospel like that of John first, and then, as the process of humanizing the divinity advanced, Luke, and last Matthew-Mark.

The transliteration into Greek, in our earliest gospels, of Aramaic words put upon the lips of Jesus naturally suggests that all his sayings have been translated into Greek from what must have been his vernacular, if he was a Galilean Jew. It is a manifest duty of the student of the gospels to test every alleged utterance of Jesus in the form it is likely to have had in the Galilean dialect of the Aramaic. In the case of characteristic words, expressions, and brief sayings this can be done with a close approach to certainty. Thus, to quote an especially significant instance, the Greek term translated 'The Son of Man' can only be a translation of the Aramaic *bar nasha* which always designates 'man,' and cannot possibly have been a Messianic title. When this generic meaning of the Aramaic word used in the original is borne in mind, the saying: "Man was not made for the sake of the sabbath, but the sabbath was made for the sake of man; therefore man (*bar nasha*) is also lord of the sabbath," is not only seen to have a sense and cogency it never possessed when supposed to refer to the authority of the Messiah, but also suggests the astonishingly radical and far-reaching idea that man has authority over the institutions created for his good. The same holds true of other sayings. With the disappearance of this supposed self-designation, the only plausible reason is removed for

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imagining that the man whose Aramaic words, weighty with strikingly original thought, lie behind our Greek texts, looked upon himself as the Messiah, or wished to become the Messiah, or hoped that he would after death gain the position of the Messiah. The importance of this line of reasoning was already set forth by the present writer fifteen years ago, but most fully in his book "The Prophet of Nazareth" (2d ed., 1907).

Even in some circles where the necessity of going behind the Greek to the vernacular of the Galilean teacher is not yet realized, the feeling prevails that our synoptic gospels are a sort of palimpsest, showing beneath the upper text the traces of an older hand. This feeling led Professor Schmiedel to lay down his nine 'foundation-pillars.' They are passages so out of harmony with the general conceptions of Jesus, manifestly held by the evangelists, as to preclude the possibility of their having been invented by them. The genuineness of some of these sayings may be questioned without affecting the force of the others. Professor Smith has tried, in his last book, ("Ecce Deus," 1911), to invalidate their strength by the observation that the evangelists would not have recorded words indicating ignorance or other limitations on the part of Jesus, if they had considered them inconsistent with the character they ascribed to him. But it must be admitted that it is far easier to believe that they preserved these things because they were too strongly entrenched in tradition to be left out and they were able to square them in some way with their dominant ideas, than that they deliberately introduced these features in an imaginary life on earth of the divine personality whom they worshiped. Too much importance, however, is assigned to these 'foundation-pillars,' when the whole structure is made to rest on them. They are valuable because they point to some phases of an early tradition in which Jesus had not yet been raised above the level of humanity. The evidence, furnished by a resort to the original Aramaic, that in this early tradition Jesus did not regard or pro-

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claim himself as the Messiah is at least of equal worth, and the peculiar style of teaching characteristic of this early stratum of tradition likewise tends to strengthen the impression of historic probability.

Parables bearing a certain resemblance to those ascribed to Jesus have been found in Midrashic and Talmudic literature. But they cannot be proved to be earlier than his time; they are scattered in heaps of material of an entirely different nature; they seldom have the same simplicity, artistic beauty, and pointedness of thought. The most perfect parables and the most striking apothegms in the synoptic gospels do not give the impression of being culled from books, but of coming from a rich and fertile mind, more familiar with nature and human life than with literature, and more concerned about the fundamental questions of right and love than with formulas, ceremonies, celestial mysteries, or a scheme of salvation. In view of the beatitudes found in the *Slavonic Enoch,* it cannot be said to be impossible for an unknown writer to place upon the lips of a hero who never existed thoughts of unusual significance. But it is certainly easier to understand the marked difference between parables and sayings that may be assigned to the earlier tradition and the expansions and additions that manifestly represent a later time by supposing that the former come from one original teacher than on the theory that all is either the work of the evangelists themselves or a florilegium from Jewish and Gnostic sources. The original Aramaic gospel is lost. Whether a copy of it still exists on the earth or under the surface of the earth, we cannot tell. Through our Greek gospels and other sources we may be able to catch glimpses here and there of its contents; but it can only be conjecturally restored. It is permissible to believe that the material allows us to trace, though it be in barest outline, a tradition that antedates the fall of Jerusalem and even the appearance of Paul.

How far the Pauline letters can be used as evidence of the existence of Jesus as a man, is not easily de-

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termined. Even if five of the epistles be regarded as genuine, though with many interpolations, on grounds that seem substantial, and the lack of personal acquaintance with Jesus is urged, the silence concerning every event in the life of Jesus, save the closing tragedy, and concerning every word uttered by him, save the eucharistic formula for which a special revelation is claimed, is, to say the least, very strange. It can be understood, in a measure, by the paramount interest in the death and the resurrection of Jesus, the inner revolution caused by the acceptance of a crucified Messiah and the apparent corollary, the abrogation of the law, the new turn of speculation, and the absorbing concerns of practical missionary work. It may be pointed out, not without force, that the great ecumenic creeds are likewise silent concerning the life and teaching of Jesus, though of course their framers were perfectly familiar with the gospel story. There seem to be insurmountable obstacles to the supposition that Paul proclaimed the death and resurrection of a god who had never lived as a man on earth. Regularly recurring cosmic events symbolized in the experience of a deity may excite the worshiper to self-inflicted suffering and ecstatic joy in imitation and fellowship, but are not likely to produce the burning sense of shame, of national guilt, and of danger to the ancient legislation, so manifestly connected with Paul's thought of the cross. This attitude, peculiar as it is, can be better comprehended, at any rate, if a man had actually been crucified, or impaled, by the Jewish authorities, in obedience, as they thought, to the law of Moses, but whom, for some reason, Paul came to regard as the true Messiah. It should be observed also, that Paul does not seem to have looked upon Jesus as a god, or the one God appearing in human form, but as the archetypal, celestial man, the Messiah existing before his birth and after his death, but always inferior to God, the divine name never being applied to him; and that there is not the slightest evidence in pre-Christian literature of a suffering Mes-

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siah, not to speak of a crucified and risen Christ. It remains most probable that before the middle of the first century Paul heard of the Galilean prophet who had been put to death in Jerusalem and believed him to be the Messiah. Yet the still unsolved problems in connection with the Pauline literature are so great that it is not wise to insist. The balance of probability appears to the present writer to be very strongly in favor of the historic existence of a prophet by the name of Jesus living in Galilee and dying in Jerusalem in the first half of the first century A. D., while he can find no testimony that even plausibly suggests the existence of a god named Jesus worshiped in Jewish-Gnostic circles before our common era.

But this endeavor to eliminate Jesus, the man, and to prove the existence of Jesus, the pre-Christian god, has an ulterior object. Especially in the case of Professor Drews it is evidently undertaken for the purpose of removing what seem serious stumbling-blocks in the way of sound religious faith and genuine moral integrity. "The chief obstacle," he says, "to a monistic religion and attitude is the belief, irreconcilable with reason and history, in the historical reality of a unique ideal and unsurpassable redeemer." He wishes to persuade men to turn away from a human personality with whom they are too apt to associate the highest ideal of moral perfection and the final authority in the realm of religious thought, to "transfer the sinking fire of religion to the ground of pantheism," and to recognize "the real Christian doctrine of redemption" which he describes in these terms: "To think of the world's activity as God's activity, of mankind's development, filled with struggles and suffering, as the story of a divine struggle and passion, of the world-process as the process of a god who in each individual creature fights, suffers, conquers and dies so that he may overcome the limitations of the finite in the religious consciousness of man and anticipate his future triumph over all the suffering of the world."

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It may be seriously questioned whether this pantheistic Christianity without Jesus would serve the world's religious needs better than the ideas and ideals, the aspirations and efforts, the inspiration and example of the prophet of Nazareth. It is not much that we know of 'the living universe' beyond the bounds of our own little planet. The impression of grandeur and beauty, of immutable order and marvelous adjustment, is indeed of great worth. But the things that appeal most strongly to our moral nature, making us most dissatisfied with our ignorance, sinfulness, and unavailing efforts, and most eager in the pursuit of truth, righteousness, and harmony, are not to be found among the stars. They are seen preeminently in human life, in the history of the race and the individual. Whatever value the story of the gods possessed was due to the human qualities with which they were imbued. They were made in man's image, and the more truly they reflected what was noblest in that image, the more beneficent was their influence. The same is true of the mediators. Just in proportion as the Christ of the church was clothed with the best human qualities men's thirst after the ideal could conceive, worship and imitation had an intrinsic moral worth. Our idealizations of historic personalities are not without their value. Every man who helps to free us from the bondage of ignorance and unrighteousness, to purify, strengthen, and enrich our moral life, is a redeemer. If we are held by a theory that allows him no imperfections, the discovery of certain limitations may have a tendency to diminish his influence for good over us.

Professor Drews is right in maintaining that the conception of prophetic infallibility is a check to healthy moral and religious growth. But, precisely in this respect, the liberal theologians, Catholics as well as Protestants, have rendered a very great service. They have gently removed the robes of impeccability and revealed a humanity "of like passions with ourselves," subject to the same experiences from the cradle to the grave, and

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the same limitations of birth, environment, and subjective traits; yet they have also eagerly and reverently sought to disengage the elements of permanent spiritual value from what is perishable in the life-work of even the best of men. Before a judgment that combines true docility with fearless inquiry the danger disappears. The normal thing for a human being is to admire what seems worthy of praise, to learn, imitate, and emulate, without denying, glossing over, exaggerating, or apologizing for what appears less commendable. In this spirit generations to come will, no doubt, ask what manner of man Jesus of Nazareth was, and what helpful lessons may be drawn from his life and teaching, when all interest shall have ceased in the question whether he was a god or a man, or in the effort to improve morality by removing his inspiring personality from the realm of history.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE PROBLEM OF DESTITUTION: A PLEA FOR THE MINORITY REPORT.

JAMES SETH.

THE debate as to the comparative merits of the two Reports of the Poor Law Commission is sometimes deprecated on the ground that the agreement between them is so extensive that the wise course would be to unite in a single concerted effort for legislation on these common lines. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance, at the outset, to understand how far the agreement extends, and how far the differences are fundamental.

One thing seems clear. The destructive parts of both Reports are in essential agreement; it is in their constructive policies that they differ. As the Chairman of the Royal Commission has said:

> So far as the review of the system and practice of the existing poor law administration is concerned, there is little difference in substance between the two reports. They practically condemn the same things, notably

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the general workhouse, the absence of classification, and the lack of curative and restorative methods of treatment, the general inadequacy and want of investigation connected with outdoor relief; both are equally emphatic in condemning a system of mere deterrence, and both urge that in the new processes of treatment to be adopted, relief should be associated with a continuous attempt to strike at the sources and roots of pauperism and destitution. . . . It is upon the organization and machinery which is to replace the existing system of administration and to give effect to the new policy and processes of treatment that the real difference has arisen. (Statement appended to the *Minority Report for Scotland.*)

This statement, however, suggests at once an underestimate and an over-estimate of the amount of actual agreement between the two Reports. They agree to a considerable extent in their constructive proposals, in the new machinery which they propose, as well as in their destructive criticism of the present Poor Law. This is especially true of their proposals regarding unemployment. Both are in favor of national Labor Exchanges, which have since been established; of the regularization of governmental work; of insurance against unemployment by state subsidizing of the trade unions' out-of-work benefits; of a more efficient system of education, especially technical; and of Labor and Detention Colonies. As regards the other forms of destitution, both favor a discriminating and curative treatment, and the transference of the Feeble-minded from the Poor Law to the Lunacy Authority (at least in England). Both recommend the change of area from the Union to the County, and a closer coöperation between voluntary and public agencies.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that there is a fundamental difference between the two Reports even in their destructive criticism of the present system. While the Majority Report condemns the administration, the Minority Report condemns the system itself. It is this difference that is at the root of the fundamental difference in the constructive proposals of the two Reports. The Majority hold that the defect, being one of administration, can be remedied by an improved authority, by a reconstruction of the Poor Law; the Minority, hold-

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ing that the defect is integral to the system itself, find the only remedy of the admitted evils in the abolition of the present system or the "Break-up of the Poor Law." In this policy they claim that they are only carrying out to its logical conclusion the principle of specialization of function or division of labor which is accepted in all other spheres, and which underlies the criticism of the present state of things offered by the Majority and the Minority alike, as well as the positive proposals common to both Reports.

Nor is the difference between the rival proposals merely one of machinery. As the Chairman says, "Though apparently the difference between the Minority and Majority is merely one of machinery, in reality it is one of far-reaching principle." The question is, as I have indicated, no less than this: whether there shall be a new Poor Law or no Poor Law; whether destitution is to be regarded as a disease, which can be diagnosed as belonging in all cases to the same type, however different the symptoms may be, and which ought therefore to be treated by a single authority, whose experience has made it an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of this moral malady; or is an effect as manifold as its causes, which can therefore be successfully dealt with only by a number of different authorities, each qualified to deal with a special kind of need by its acquaintance with that special type of need,—by the Education Authority, by the Public Health Authority, by a National Employment or Labor Authority, etc.

That this is the issue of principle between the two Reports is clear from the whole drift of their recommendations, but is focussed in such a statement as this from the Majority Report:

> There was a scheme brought to our notice known as the "Breaking up of the Poor Law." Its ideas appear to be the foundation of the alternative proposals recommended by certain of our colleagues who dissent from our Report. Under this scheme the whole existing machinery of Poor Law administration would disappear with the abolition of the guardians, and the work previously performed by them would be broken up into sections

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and transferred to existing Committees of County and County Borough Councils. Though we had the scheme fully before us, we do not propose to criticise it in detail. It seems clear to us that the idea upon which it is founded is faulty and unworkable. The question at issue is, whether the work of maintaining those members of the community who have lost their economic independence can be safely entrusted to authorities whose primary duty is something quite distinct,—such as that of education or sanitation,—or whether it is essential that there should be an authority devoting itself entirely to the work. We consider that the many and subtle problems associated with public assistance, especially when it is a family rather than an individual that requires rehabilitation, cannot be solved by the simple process of sending off each unit separately to a separate authority for maintenance and treatment (p. 602).

Although, therefore, the Majority propose to change the name of the authority, and also the mode of its appointment, the new Public Assistance Authority is the same kind of authority as the present Poor Law authority. No fundamental change in the present system is proposed; and accordingly the Majority Report is immensely more popular with Poor Law officials as a class than the Minority Report. As Mrs. Bosanquet says:

The fact that success and failure are so mingled [in the present system] suggests that the defects to be remedied must be sought more in the administration of the law than in the law itself; hence it is the administration which the commissioners in their recommendations mainly seek to improve. If all Boards of Guardians had been working as well as the best, there would probably have been no demand for an inquiry, and little need of change. But . . . we shall see how very far that is from being the case, and what imperative need there is in many places to find administrators who will be more distinterested, more honest, and more intelligent (The Poor Law Report of 1909, p. 8).

Two reasons are alleged in the Majority Report for the treatment of destitution by a single authority: first, that the common element of destitution is best dealt with by an authority specializing in this common element in all its varied forms; secondly, that the interests of economy are best consulted by the concentration of all questions of public relief in the hands of a single relieving authority, which will check its instincts of relief, and even of cure, by the consideration of cost, actual and potential, to the community. The first reason is that of

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efficiency, the second that of economy. Let us consider these two reasons in turn.

1. The common element is not really need or destitution in itself; for this is a mere abstraction until reduced to the several concrete needs,—the need of nurture and education, the need of health, the need of employment, etc. And if it is said that all alike need relief, we must reply that the real need lies much deeper than that, that it is a need of that which will make relief unnecessary by removing the cause of the destitution itself. If our treatment of the evil is to be curative, as both Reports agree that it ought to be, then it must attack and remove the causes; and these causes are manifold, not identical. This brings us to the real difference of view between the two Reports at this point. The common element in all cases which come before a Poor Law Authority is the existence, in all of them, not of need, but of the disposition to apply for relief. It is an element of character, a moral quality, in dealing with which a Destitution Authority is supposed to have acquired the wisdom of experience. This implies the further view that *the* cause of destitution itself is a moral one,—defect of character. This view is very explicitly stated by Professor Bosanquet:

> The antagonism cannot be put too strongly. The Majority proceed upon the principle that where there is a failure of social self-maintenance . . . there is a defect in the citizen-character, or at least a grave danger to its integrity; and that therefore every case of this kind raises a problem which is 'moral,' in the sense of affecting the whole capacity of self-management, to begin with in the person who has failed, and secondarily, in the whole community, so far as influenced by expectation and example. This relation to a man's whole capacity for self-management, his *morale*, is a distinctive feature, I take it, which separates the treatment required by the destitute or necessitous from anything that can be offered to citizens who are maintaining themselves in a normal course of life. (Article on "The Majority Report" in *Sociological Review*, April, 1909.)

In reply to this diagnosis of the cause of destitution, the Minority Report for Scotland very pointedly suggests that "two-fifths of all the paupers are infants or

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children of school age," in whose case the hypothesis of defect in citizen character is obviously absurd; that "something like another two-fifths of all those who, in Scotland, apply for maintenance are not merely 'disabled' in the technical sense, but are definitely suffering from some specific disease or chronic infirmity of body, for which they have to be medically treated," and that in their case "the question necessarily arises, whether there is any ground for dealing with any neglected sick persons who need medical treatment, in any different way from that in which we have now decided to treat phthisis patients,—whether we have any more grounds for assuming the coexistence of a 'defect in the citizen character' or 'grave danger to its integrity,' along with cancer, rheumatism, lead poisoning, hernia, or varicose veins, than along with pulmonary consumption; and that in the case of the aged, "who make up the bulk of the remainder of the pauper host," "by the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908, the community has, even whilst we were deliberating, definitely declared against" any deterrent treatment. The only case to which the hypothesis of a moral defect as the cause of destitution can possibly be applicable, therefore, is that of the adult able-bodied destitute. While the Minority hold,—I think with justice,—that "it is invidious and unwarranted to assume that such unemployment is, in any particular case, wholly or even mainly the result of any 'defect in the citizen character,' " they agree with Mr. Beveridge's conclusion that moral causes explain the incidence, though not the volume of unemployment.

The suggestion that "where there is a failure of social self-maintenance . . . there is a defect in the citizen character or at least a grave danger to its integrity," is, in any careful analysis, seen to be true, if at all, of the able-bodied and of the able-bodied only. . . . It is exactly because we realize the overwhelming importance to the character of the community of stimulating, in all sections of the able-bodied, the desire and faculty for self-maintenance, that we urge the necessity of having an authority dealing with the able-bodied, and with the able-bodied only. (*Minority Report for Scotland*, p. 65.)

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It is only right to add, with reference to the 'moral factor' in the causation of destitution, that such obvious moral defects as intemperance and idleness are, to a very large extent, themselves effects which demand for their explanation such causes as neglected childhood, insufficient nurture, and unemployment. To take the last of these causes, few things are so demoralizing as unemployment or under-employment; and the Minority Report traces in a convincing way the gradual process of deterioration by which, under our present system (or rather lack of system), the efficient workman of good character passes, gradually but surely, from the stage of unemployment to that of unemployableness. We cannot really separate the moral from the economic causes of destitution; they act and react upon each other in the most intimate way. While the Majority Report would isolate the moral cause, the Minority Report insists that we must treat the problem as a whole, and deal with the 'moral factor,' where it actually exists, and whether it exists in the destitute individual himself or in some other individual or individuals, as an effect, no less than as a cause of unemployment and, consequently, of destitution.

2. The second reason which is adduced for treating destitution as a single problem, to be dealt with by a single authority specializing in it, and governed by the principle of deterrence, is the economic one. This was the dominating consideration in the minds of the 1834 Commission; it is the famous 'principle of 1834,' the principle of 'less eligibility.' Even the Commission of 1834, it is to be observed, insisted upon 'classification' of the destitute; they had no thought of applying the principle of deterrence or less eligibility to the non-able-bodied; and there was then no alternative to the single authority, the various specialized authorities for the sick, for the children, for the aged, etc., being of comparatively recent origin. Moreover, they were thinking only of relief; a destitution authority is a relief authority. If you can only relieve, and if destitution is

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ultimately to be traced to moral rather than to economic causes, the principle of deterrence, as well as the single authority, is inevitable. Since relief, as such, is economic waste, and tends to perpetuate and extend its baneful moral influence in the production rather than the diminution of pauperism, it is necessary, in the interests of public economy, to discourage and deter, as far as the philanthropic or humane feeling of the community will permit.

If, on the other hand, it is possible to prevent the occurrence of destitution and, therefore, the necessity of relief, it is obviously more economic, as well as more humane, to do so. Now "the investigations of the Royal Commission indicate that at least nine-tenths of all the paupers arrive at pauperism along one or other of three roads,—the road of Neglected Childhood, the road of Sickness and Feeble-mindedness, and the road of Unemployment" (Webb, "English Poor Law Policy," p. 305). In proportion, therefore, as you succeed in preventing child-neglect, sickness, and unemployment, you will prevent destitution; if you could eliminate these causes, you would eliminate nine-tenths of the existing destitution. In so far as this preventive method is successfully applied, you not only economize by saving the amount now spent in the relief of the destitution which results from these causes, but you increase the economic efficiency, and therefore the wealth, of the community. But if success along these preventive lines is to be achieved, it is necessary that we frankly and deliberately,—*in the interests of economy,*—abandon the principle of deterrence, and substitute for it the method of searching out the cases which call for this other kind of treatment; that we not only encourage, instead of discouraging, application for treatment, but force this treatment even upon the most unwilling.

This is, according to the Minority, the lesson of experience in dealing with the problem of destitution. Within the period which has elapsed since 1834 the work

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has been gradually taken out of the hands of the Poor Law Authority, and undertaken by a series of specialized authorities dealing with it on these new preventive and non-deterrent lines. The Poor Law Authority has been gradually superseded; it has been left with a mere residuum of the business of education, care of the sick, the feeble-minded, etc., on its hands. The able-bodied, or unemployed, who have never been legally entitled to relief under the Scottish Poor Law, are now being looked after by Distress Committees and Labor Exchanges. What the Minority propose is simply to complete this "break-up of the Poor Law," and to stop the waste and inefficiency which result from the over-lap between the new specialized authorities and the old, and now antiquated, Poor Law Authority.

The extent of the change in the situation in 1834 and at the present time, and the significance of the change for the solution of the problem of destitution, is admirably brought out by Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb in their "English Poor Law Policy" (p. 278):

> To the Royal Commission of 1834 the single all-embracing destitution authority was not a matter of principle at all, but a necessity, which no one questioned. Throughout the whole country there had been only one kind of local authority which gave any sort of public assistance to the poor, and that was the Poor Law Authority. The 1834 report could, accordingly, take it for granted that all sections of the persons to be relieved at the public expense on the ground of their necessities must be dealt with, as destitute persons, by one and the same authority. In 1909 the position has become quite different. There have grown up, since 1834, other public authorities in each district, which provide, independently of the Poor Law, this or that form of public assistance to persons who require it, sometimes to all who apply, sometimes to those only who prove their need. The Local Education Authorities, the Local Health Authorities, the Local Lunacy Authorities, the Local Pension Authorities, and the Local Unemployed Authorities, are, in fact, spending in the aggregate on the children, the sick, the mentally defective, the aged, and the able-bodied unemployed, in their several forms of public assistance, out of the same fund of rates and taxes, *more than twice as much every year as all the Poor Law Authorities put together.* To the Royal Commission of 1909 the retention of a general destitution authority, dealing with all sections of destitute persons as destitute persons, was, therefore, not a necessity. It was a deliberate choice, and we find them erecting in it into a principle.

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What the Minority propose, on the contrary, is not the creation of a series of new authorities or institutions, but simply the complete utilization of the existing authorities by handing over *all* the children to the Education Authority, *all* the sick who require assistance to the Public Health Authority, *all* the aged to the Pension Authority, *all* the unemployed to the Unemployed Authority. The only novelty they propose is the creation of a National, instead of a Local Employment Authority; and even this authority is already, since the Commissioners reported, in existence in an undeveloped form in the National Labor Exchanges of the Board of Trade. If we once exchange the old ideal of relief for the new ideal of prevention, we are committed to the acceptance of the new specialized authorities which, experience has taught us, are alone qualified to deal effectively with the special problems to which they devote their whole attention, and which deal with those problems on preventive and non-deterrent lines.

The Majority Commissioners confess the inadequacy of the Destitution Authority to deal with the problem in a preventive and curative way, in their recommendation that the work of the Public Assistance Authority be supplemented by that of a Voluntary Aid Council and Committee. "Side by side with this new organization," says the Chairman, "was to be established in each area a combination of local charities and social workers, who were to help and watch over those who from various causes were slipping downwards in the social scale. To stop this downward progress and to combat the incipient development of destitution and distress was to be the main function of this additional organization. It was to work in coöperation with the public authority, but in a separate sphere of action; and its disbursements were to be solely derived from endowed and voluntary funds." These Voluntary Aid Committees, once constituted, are to work independently of the Public Assistance Authority; the work is to be divided between them and the

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statutory authorities, certain cases being allocated to the one and certain cases to the other. The Minority rightly, in my opinion,

object to the proposed establishment, under official auspices, of a non-elective Voluntary Aid Council and a network of Voluntary Aid Committees in every burgh and county, to serve, not as a supplement to the work of the Town or County Council, or Local Education Authority, but as a substitute for this work. . . . We cannot approve this proposed assumption, by irresponsible philanthropic committees, of the work of the public authorities to which Parliament has entrusted the duty of looking after the various sections of the population needing public provision. . . . And, above all, we object to the recommendation, definitely set forth in the Majority Report (section 70 of Part V), that rules should be made *requiring* certain classes of applicants for public assistance to apply, not to the public authority, but to the Voluntary Aid Committee, whether they like it or not, and debarring the public authority from dealing with such cases. In particular, it is laid down that 'a first application for assistance or an application for temporary help due to non-recurrent causes, should, generally speaking, be made to the Voluntary Aid Committee.' We think that the workman for the first time in distress from unemployment will rightly protest against being deprived of his right of access to the Distress Committee, or other public authority charged to deal with his case; and relegated, whether he likes it or not, to an irresponsible committee of charitable workers dispensing the alms of the benevolent in whatever way, and subject to whatever inquiries they think fit. The proper sphere of voluntary work is, in our judgment, the *supplementing* of the visiting and the provision made by the various public authorities. We utterly object to this voluntary charity being compulsorily forced on the poor, in any one case, as a *substitute* for the public provision. (*Minority Report for Scotland*, pp. 44, 45.)

As a supplement, though not a substitute, for the provision made by the public authorities, the Minority recognize not merely the value, but the indispensableness of the work of voluntary and philanthropic agencies. Private institutions of all kinds, such as now exist and do such a beneficent work, should, they think, be utilized by the public authorities, as should also "the personal services of voluntary workers in the homes of the poor." The new Local Authorities have already adopted this course.

With the new principle of 'searching out' the beginnings of what will eventually produce destitution, and trying to deal with every case in its most incipient stage, the Local Health Authorities in many towns of Great

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Britain . . . are already organizing definite corps of health visitors, mostly voluntary workers, who act as the eyes and ears of the medical officer of health, and regularly visit in a helpful way the families committed to their charge. Similarly, with the new duties connected with medical inspection and treatment, the Local Education Authorities are organizing, under one name or another, their own volunteer Children's Care Committees, the members of which are individually charged to keep in friendly touch with all the families in which there are ailing or necessitous children of school age. . . . It is indeed already plain that each of the several preventive authorities, dealing with the several sections of the population, needs for the effective discharge of its duties, not only its own salaried staff, but also an extensive fringe of volunteer workers, specialized to its particular service and gradually acquiring a certain training in its work, with which to maintain the necessary touch and personal contact with all the families of the city. . . . We look, therefore, for a great expansion in the sphere of personal benevolence and voluntary service; not by way of irresponsible alternative to the action of the public authority, but by way of supplementing and informing this, and supplying the 'human element' (*Ibid*, pp. 40, 41).

JAMES SETH.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

GODWIN AND POLITICAL JUSTICE.

A. K. ROGERS.

THE name of William Godwin is one which, I am afraid, arouses but little enthusiasm in the breast of the modern student of literature or politics. Even before his death he had for the most part lost his vogue, and he has never had the fortune to be rehabilitated in any large degree, although he possesses claims that are at least respectable in two widely separated fields; his novels can still be read with a tolerably lively interest. But his reputation as a man unequal to the rank he had temporarily usurped has followed him, and rather unfairly handicapped his just claims.

An estimate of Godwin's philosophy cannot be altogether separated from his personal characteristics, to which a few words are due. The most obvious thing about him, which stands out on the least acquaintance, is that in him the intellectual qualities were developed

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at the expense of the emotional. Through life he was governed by a rational deliberateness which has its laudable side, but which must frequently have been to the less perfect mortals who surrounded him distinctly aggravating. He had a rooted distrust, both theoretical and practical, of anything like impulsiveness, of giving himself over to the current of spontaneous instincts however generous and human. On the whole, one can hardly avoid the judgment that he was a good deal of a prig. He has the prig's formal perfection of good habits, his unshaken confidence in the superiority of his own motives, his insatiable desire to live on a pinnacle, to serve as guide, philosopher, and friend to his associates, to be forever instructive and condescending. "I am in every respect," he says of himself, "so far as I am able to follow the dictates of my own mind, personally indifferent to all personal gratifications. I know of nothing worth the living for but usefulness and service to my fellow-creatures. The only object I pursue is to increase so far as lies in my power the quantity of their knowledge and goodness and happiness." "For years," he writes again, "I scarcely did anything at home or abroad without the inquiry being uppermost in my mind whether I could be better employed for the general benefit." There is something to be admired in this no doubt, but there is also visible more than a touch of the prig. No one can test continually the details of living by a self-conscious philanthropic standard without tending to become abnormal, and developing an undue sense of the importance of philanthropy and his own philanthropic self. In Godwin there is continually cropping out the defects of his virtue. "You may grieve me, but you cannot inspire me with anger," he writes to a youth with whom he had quarreled; and we can detect in his words the assumption of conscious virtue and reasonableness condescending to weakness, which is of all things most maddening to the ordinary sinner.

As Godwin's philosophy is relatively unfamiliar, it

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will be necessary to start with a sketch of its main features, before I can turn to the points to which I wish chiefly to call attention. Men come into the world without any distinctive character, but with the potency of an unlimited development. This development is the outcome of certain simple laws. External impressions are made upon us; these are found to be connected with various pleasures and pains; and this system of interconnections, or associations, determines the complex of our characters and our lives. All our conduct is determined in the end, therefore, by ideas which have got associated with pleasurable or painful feelings, and which consequently lead to efforts to obtain the one and avoid the other; our acts are due, that is, to *opinions,* or reason, since reason is nothing more than a utilitarian recognition or calculation of consequences. It follows that human happiness or misery will depend very largely upon what it is that gives rise to these opinions. Now a vast number of them, and these the most highly important, are not formed through direct and first-hand experience, but are the indirect product of our social surroundings, of the institutions under which we are brought up. The first business therefore of the philosopher who desires the good of mankind, is to determine what is, and what is not, the desirable form for government, or social organization, to take. Or, since every one admits in some sense that government should be just, what is the nature of justice?

Godwin's answer is, that justice is that principle of conduct which in every act keeps clearly in view the best possible interest of the whole. That we should be no respecters of persons, that in every judgment we should put ourselves in the place of the perfectly impartial spectator,—such expressions represent the essential quality of justice. If, for example, it is a question which of two men I am to prefer when there is a benefit I cannot render to both, then I should ask myself without prejudice in whose hands it will accrue to the largest advantage to

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the race. This will exclude all preference based on inherited prejudice, prescription, the accidents of circumstance or birth. It excludes, too, the principle of self-seeking. Reason recognizes that I am but one unit among many, with no superior claims except as I happen to be a person of superior virtue; and therefore I shall give not the slightest preference to myself simply because I happen to be myself. In like manner it has no place for private gratitude; and the same thing is true of those other more permanent ties, of country or of family, which are commonly held to occasion a superior force of obligation.

Since now man in his true nature is a creature of reason, it can be set down that the best form of government is that which most completely recognizes his claims as an autonomous being, governing his own life voluntarily by conscious rational principles. That a monarchy or an aristocracy has on the whole no tendency to produce such a character, but rather places a premium upon mental insincerity and inertia, and a fawning and servile spirit, Godwin attempts at some length to show. Of all existing forms, democracy is indisputably the best. But even democracy is not ideally perfect, for to the searching eye of philosophy there remains a flaw in the very notion of government itself, which therefore any conceivable form of government must share.

The defect is this, that government at its best makes use of coercion, and coercion is always an evil, alike because it rests upon an infliction of pain, and because, more fatal still, it takes the place of the one right motive for action,—rational understanding and choice. No man is moral who does not freely will benevolence for its own sake. Government may be a necessary evil for a long time to come, but still it is an evil. Godwin's own ideal is that of a loose confederation of small parishes, each managing its own affairs, and sending when necessary delegates to an Amphyctionic Council with an advisory power simply. Internal disputes are to come before a

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jury which decides each case as equity demands,—for there will be no legal codes,—and which, too, can gradually shed its coercive power as men grow in reason, until in the end we may look to see it give place altogether to a voluntary submission to the judgment of him whose greater wisdom the sense of the community recognizes.

About this doctrine of philosophical anarchy center the most characteristic articles of Godwin's creed. Obviously, for one thing, it does away with punishment. But there are other forms of slavery in society beside that of penal law. The boy, for example, is also a human and rational being, and must be freed from the tyranny of the school and schoolmaster. Promises and contracts furnish another and more subtle way in which liberty can be restricted. We are not to be handicapped by our own past desires and opinions, and so a promise is immoral. This is one of Godwin's chief indictments against the institution of marriage. It may be added that marriage is a monopoly, which is always odious; and as an attachment to an individual without reference to merit, it is plainly unjust.

While Godwin, accordingly, upholds the principle of democracy on its negative side, as a denial of all monopoly and privilege, he is equally keen to remove any suspicion that he is giving countenance to a communistic restriction of individual initiative. Indeed he is for going to the other extreme, and getting rid not only of compulsion, but of voluntary coöperation even, as interfering with the sufficiency of the rational self. The peculiarity of his attitude, in its opposition to the existing ideal of monopolistic society and to communism alike, comes out most sharply in his doctrine of property. From the principle of justice it is no far cry to his conclusion that property belongs where it is most needed, as a promoter of individual and social good. I have thus no rights to a thing which is not demanded by my real needs. To withhold the superfluous loaf of bread from my starving neighbor marks me plainly as unjust; to

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give it is no act of voluntary and praiseworthy charity, but only what the law of justice itself requires. But now this does not lead, with Godwin, quite to the issue which it might seem to imply. On the surface it would appear to take away all philosophic ground from the institution of private property. But before we fall back on a communism of goods, we have to consider how this could at present be brought about and maintained. And clearly it would require some measure of coercive regulation. Differences in accumulated property are bound to be the outcome of differences of circumstance, ability, and application, unless they are restrained by positive law. And so in distribution for use. I have for whatever reason in my possession some article which my neighbor could also apply to his needs; what shall decide between us when we both claim it? Godwin's answer is, that the principle of justice makes it binding on me to give up to him the article if on impartial survey he seems to me to need it more than I, but that it does *not* give *him* a right to take it by force when I fail to allow voluntarily his claim. Justice in property is a moral principle, and not a social regulation, a duty rather than a right. Rights, in Godwin's philosophy, are never fundamental; they are grounded indirectly on this preëminent fact of the moral obligation of each individual to meet the demands of justice. Politics, that is, is a mere phase of individual ethics. The consequence is, that for practical purposes, until it comes about that we are all perfectly wise and perfectly generous,—when no disputes will arise,—the present institution of private possession is justified on the ground of expediency. The real basis of private property is, accordingly, the right of private judgment, which will not allow any one to force a man to share with others that which he wishes not to share. If everyone were to enforce what he considered his own right, it would not only violate the claims of reason as the sole adjuster, but it would bring about a state of anarchy fatal to human happiness.

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It would have been very easy, were one maliciously inclined, to have touched up the sketch of Godwin's opinions in a way to make them appear even absurdly futile. As it is, I should not be greatly surprised if the impression given was that of a mere doctrinaire and visionary, busied with Utopian schemes quite removed from actual human facts and motives. But the better acquainted one becomes with Godwin and his writings, the less plausible does this judgment seem. As a matter of fact, he is on the whole a very shrewd, careful, and sometimes subtle reasoner, extraordinarily painstaking in following out the ramifications of his argument, and fertile in anticipating objections, with a keen eye for sophisms, and possessing, within rather well-defined limits, a wide and not unpenetrating acquaintance with the workings of human nature. It is true that Godwin knows men rather externally and mechanically. His novels are remarkable examples of what may be done in the way of such an elaborative deduction of character, without much help from a sense of the more intimate and non-rational springs of conduct. Below a certain level he is indeed quite at a loss. This is commonly the case, for instance, when he touches upon the facts of the religious life, as distinguished from religious creeds and history. Thus Paul's cry, "I am chief of sinners," is to Godwin as a genuine expression of experience a blank impossibility; and he proceeds to render it intelligible by suggesting that it is a profession Paul conceived himself in duty bound to make, as a doctrinal consequence from Jesus's commendation of lowliness of spirit among his disciples. We need not be greatly surprised, therefore, to find him incapable of seeing in religion anything but the "nightmare that has pressed down all the exertions of the human mind," and talking with some condescension of Jesus's "extraordinary ignorance of the nature of man." But at least it is to be said for him that, whatever he may miss in the significance of his topic, he always does have some real point to make, some real meaning in his

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mind, which one may suspect is not always true of more profound philosophies. And usually, too, the more one considers it, the more there is to say for Godwin even where he departs farthest from the safe and sane. Take his depreciation of gratitude. What Godwin has probably chiefly in mind to speak against is, as we have come to recognize, one of the very great dangers in public life. When personal favors, influence, pull, are made the basis of political action, gratitude does become immoral. So of his strictures on education. Perhaps few persons nowadays are ready to go the length of abolishing systematic education altogether, or to be impressed by the awful tyranny that is involved in any constraint upon the inclinations of the younger generation. But if anything is clear, it is that Godwin's views on education are far and away ahead of his time. Indeed I doubt if there could be found a single English writer prior to the latter half of the century just past, who has so firm a grasp on the principles which are at present leavening educational methods. That even the boy has rights which are infringed when there is forced upon him a mass of facts out of relation to his childish needs and interests; that sympathy with child nature is the soul of education; that study with desire is the only real activity; that the knowledge when and how to ask a question is no contemptible part of learning; that a good share of the boy's really valuable training comes through his sports, when he really thinks instead of laying up materials for thinking, whereas much that goes on in the schools is pure waste and futility; that the aim of education should be to test the individual in a variety of interests in order to discover where his talent lies—this, the modern doctrine of interest, is enforced by Godwin, particularly in some of his later writings, with a really considerable power and insight.

But these after all are details, and they leave the main business untouched. So long as Godwin's fundamental premises,—the omnipotence of reason, and the principle

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of universal benevolence,—are set aside as the sentimentalisms of a shallow age, which our own profounder day has exploded, he can have no special claim upon the present. But I am not convinced of the adequacy of this modern disposition to treat men as mere representatives of a bygone period, which our academic formulas have definitively summed up and pigeon-holed. It might be very well could we depend on finding each new age formula fully just to the preceding one; but more commonly, I suspect, it is only the substitution of one shibboleth for another. Godwin thought that the wisdom of all time had been embodied in the doctrine of the association of ideas. We smile at his simplicity, but it does not prevent us from talking as if we ourselves of the century of evolution and physical science had a final formula of our own. It will not be superfluous, then, to ask whether the rational benevolence of the eighteenth century deserves quite the scorn that is now so frequently meted out to it.

Godwin's doctrine that reason is the sole effective engine of reform may be split up into three propositions which sufficiently express its nature. First, men do, with unimportant exceptions, act normally upon opinions, good or bad. In the second place, no permanent betterment of society can take place which is not based upon right opinion, generally diffused throughout the body politic. And, finally, when we trust to reason rather than to secondary motives, we actually do find men recognizing it and responding to it in the long run.

Now putting the gospel of reason in such terms as these, it is not too much to say that it coincides with the point of emphasis in the movements that are taking place in American democracy to-day. One of the obvious signs of the times is the rapidly growing doubt about the efficacy, on the one hand of political organization, and on the other of mere legal enactment. That we are overloaded with legislation, a very large part of which no one thinks seriously of enforcing, has become a common-

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place; and at least one main reason for its ineffectiveness is the fact that it is not backed by enlightened public judgment. The time was when Godwin's proposal that legislatures meet only one day in the year may have seemed the height of anarchistic folly; to-day there are, it is safe to say, a great many very respectable members of society who would jump at the suggestion. One large class of the failures which the enemies of democracy are continually bringing up against it, is due to this endeavor to force public opinion rather than enlighten it. Even so apparently extreme a notion as that all legislation be given merely an advisory power, and that we trust to the reasonableness of the public to back it rather than to force, has its counterpart in the rather general modern tendency toward arbitration of a more or less non-compulsory sort. One thing at least is certain, that upon what Godwin calls the power of right reason, the faith that mankind when it really thinks about a thing has a tendency to think right in the end, the whole possibility of democracy rests.

Now, theoretically, Americans always have recognized this; but practically they have placed their main reliance in a very different direction,—upon organization, namely, or party. It is only within the recent past that we have begun to try systematically, and with some distinct consciousness of what we are about, the one remedy that goes logically with the theory of democracy. And publicity, and independent political judgment on the basis of it, are a pretty direct translation of Godwin's political teaching. Godwin does not say that all men are capable at present of acting according to reason and justice. What he does say is this: that until they are so capable, no free institution has a secure foundation, and that the only way to make them open to reason is to give them a fair chance at it. And when they are given the fullest possible basis for judgment, Godwin affirms that they will prove themselves ultimately equal to their obligations. Whether or not this proves to be justified,

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we are beginning to suspect, at any rate, that as yet the remedy never has had a fair trial. One of the most significant of modern political movements is the incipient attempt to see what would happen if it were made a fact; and incidentally it is justifying Godwin the philosopher of reason. What *rôle* parties are to play in the politics of the future it is too early to attempt to prophesy. Supposedly they are not likely soon to be discarded. But as between the principles of party allegiance and regularity, and independency, there can be slight doubt to which the future belongs. We have come to see by hard experience that the emphasis on regularity leads straight toward undemocratic institutions; and one main reason is that on which Godwin is constantly insisting,—that it dulls the individual's power of judgment instead of sharpening it, and so delivers him bound into the hands of interested self-seekers. We shall doubtless have new parties in the more or less immediate future, to meet new issues; but it is not in them as parties that our real hope lies, but in a sufficient number of voters who refuse to hand over their opinions in the lump to any organization, but who limit their allegiance to the actual present issue, which they endeavor to decide as sensibly as they may, by the use of their own impartial reason. There is throughout in Godwin a refreshingly clear-headed insight into the romanticism through which officialism and partisan ambition combine to becloud the simple issues of government. The average man seldom stops to consider how large an element of quackery there is in the professional side of the business of running a nation. The habit of throwing about public affairs a veil of solemn and portentous secrecy, and the "trick of a mysterious carriage" in those who deal with them, is largely responsible for the prevalent notion that such matters are too high for ordinary folk. Godwin is probably right in affirming that the professional soldier is greatly overrated, by himself and others, in comparison with the capacity for the business of war of the untrained

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mind of good intelligence; and certainly this is true of the esotericism of legislation or diplomacy, which last in particular, in its traditional claims, is rapidly sinking to its proper level as a moderately successful subject for third-rate novels of intrigue. Indeed the claims of the expert, from the field of medical jurisprudence to the tariff, are fast becoming discredited by reason of the wholly false and superstitious basis on which they have been wont to place themselves. Contrast with all such indirections the simple and pregnant words of Godwin: "Truth is the proper element of the human soul, and frankness its becoming habit." This is the real inner spirit of his rationalism, which no philosophy of society can safely outgrow.

It is hardly possible to separate sharply in Godwin between reason and benevolence, because the outcome of reason is with him always disinterestedness, and service to mankind. And in what has just been said there is a reference to the humanitarian side. But now in this special connection there is another reason for a certain discredit into which Godwin's type of social philosophy has fallen at the present time. It is no longer fashionable to talk about the love of man and universal benevolence. We are for being very cool and scientific. We will profess no emotional enthusiasms in our reforming, and will count on none in mankind generally to help us out. Things happen according to law, and particularly according to economic laws, which are for the most part grim and practical affairs, and leave little point to the vaporings of our humanitarian sympathies. Let us get down to bed-rock. Men are creatures engaged in a life and death struggle with the forces of nature, not kindly souls dispensing Christian charities to their neighbors. Recognize this. Recognize that you can move them only by making it worth their while, and to this end study first of all to know what are the laws of the universe on which the satisfaction of their material needs depend.

I should be the last to deny that this modern turn for

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realism is on the whole most salutary, or that it hits Godwin in perhaps his weakest point. There is in him a notable lack of sense for the significance of the material basis of life. This shows clearly in his psychology, where the mind is omnipotent, and the body negligible. Thus rather than allow the dependence of ability upon the brain, Godwin would explain the larger size of the wise man's skull, supposing that really it is larger, on the ground that it was stretched by the greater activity of the mental processes in childhood; fainting, to quote another instance, is to be avoided by thinking more clearly rather than by attending to the bodily machine. So in his schemes of reform, he never will see that the laws of the material and economic world may have something to say about the perfectibility of the species; almost the only place where physical law enters at all into his dreams, is in connection with the light-hearted anticipation of a perfection of mechanical invention which shall so harness the forces of nature as to place the most extensive operations in the hands of a single man, and free him from the need of coöperation with his fellows. That Godwin can suppose this, without feeling it incumbent upon him even to put the question whether this complicated machinery is itself to be built and transported also without coöperation, indicates the very casual nature of his glances at the material side of things. And furthermore, Godwin in his zeal for vindicating benevolence as a real principle of human nature, is much too inclined to deprecate any less disinterested motive as a positive moral defect to be ruthlessly excised, until we are left with a world of men each busily looking out for everybody else with no thought of himself, all engaged in taking in one another's washing, but doing it gratis. For all his individualism, Godwin's emphasis is so little on self-development and fullness of personal life, that he even thinks it necessary to justify the claims which a man's private interests have upon himself, on the ground that he is a part of that whole which alone should

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occupy our endeavor. It has already appeared that Godwin in his notion that the highest and most indispensable duty of man is to study and promote his neighbor's welfare, has some family resemblance to what the uncharitable might call a busybody. In like vein he argues strongly against any compensation for public officials; it would be too unendurable a thought to the truly good man,—the suspicion that a partially selfish motive might be mixed with his public zeal. And it is very characteristic that when asked how else the citizen who did not happen to possess an independent income is to support himself in office, he replies that he should trust to private benefaction, in other words, find a patron.

But when all is said, there still remains something on Godwin's side. There is no inconsiderable risk attending on the modern preference for social realism and materialism. I will not stop to consider the tendency of science to make of itself a final end, and to think slightingly of those further interests to which the practical mind desires to apply its results. Especially in the science of man and man's life, it is not well to become too engrossed in the mere desire to know, too much in the habit of looking on human beings as a subject for brochures and theses. So we see the anthropologist becoming very vexed and voluble when it is proposed to spoil his raw material through attempts to better its conditions. We have the sociologist insisting that he is a scientist and nothing more, and rather pluming himself on making no pretence to an ability to be of the least assistance in solving human problems. Even the professed philanthropist is showing some tendency, not merely to become the investigator, which is altogether to be applauded, but to adopt the mental habits of him who is an investigator before everything else. But these consequences are trifling when compared with others more positive. There is a distinct tendency on the part of this modern protest against sentimentalism and idealism, to transform itself into an apology for things as

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they are. Since Malthus was able to allay the uneasiness of the solid men of property in his generation, by assuring them that there was no danger of any such calamity as a general extension of prosperity, since the eternal law of the universe, under the guise of the law of population, is inexorably opposed to benevolence and universal happiness, there has been a constantly recurring disposition to assume that an affinity exists between human misery and economic truth, that to be indifferent therefore to schemes of regeneration is the mark of the real, unimpassioned truth-seeker, while hopefulness and enthusiasm are the mawkish product of a weak hold on realities.

I am not proposing, however, to refute the man who denies the validity of ideals of social improvement, but simply to raise the question whether the fascination of the new scientific grounds for progress has not unwarrantably thrust aside the simpler aspect for which Godwin stands. Godwin's great lack is one of practicable method, and this a thoroughgoing knowledge of the material bases of society alone can supply. But at least the supposition that we are safe in trusting wholly to this trend of natural forces is scarcely to be regarded as well advised. It is no more than the old doctrine of an acquiescence in the ways of Providence, with all the presuppositions removed that give any reasonable ground for imagining that the world is going to pay the least attention to our wishes. If we want anything in this world, we had best make up our minds that it is coming to us only because we want it, and so that back of the possible ways of going to work there must be a sufficient motive power to get the right ways chosen. And we may also as well make up our minds that no motive is going to bring about a regenerated society which is not, whatever else it may be, too, that same motive of a love for the common good, and a disinterested hatred of injustice, to which Godwin gives the name of benevolence. There is no real security for justice in society until, as Godwin puts it, men when "under the influence of generous sentiments

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will feel that they are at home." So long as they are seeking every one the main chance, and are incredulous of the possibility of a more generous temper, of a service that looks to no immediate selfish reward, any permanent social good is a contradiction in terms. So long, for example, as a revolt against the methods of organized capital has its backing in the less successful, who would do just the same things themselves if they were only smart enough, it is reasonable to suppose that there will always be a sufficient number of reformers who can be seduced from their allegiance when they become formidable, to keep the magnates from any serious cause for apprehension. If socialism is nothing but a personal desire for better wages and an envy of the rich, there is not the slightest reason to think that it will ever have sufficient solidarity to be formidable to shrewd and resourceful opponents. There is a large element of political wisdom in Godwin's dictum that the end of politics is gradually to wean men from contemplating their own benefit simply in all they do; taken not as a statement of what we can actually expect of men at a given moment, but as something which political institutions ought to have in view as a part of their outcome if they are to show any principle of progress in themselves, this is far truer than the philosophy of the practical politician, who sees in the selfishness of human nature an eternal bar to any idealistic form of social organization, and would therefore reinforce it by fitting institutions deliberately to such lower motives, and declining to take any chances with the others. It may well be that Godwin is inclined to talk too much about benevolence and virtue, to trust too exclusively to preaching, exhortation. Certainly the degree in which he is inclined to divorce benevolence from self-interest is bad tactics. Indeed we are coming gradually to see that only then can we look for the best social results when, instead of the spirit of benevolence, that at best tends to stand out separate from and superior to its task, there is substi-

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tuted that fellowship which works for a common end, mine and my neighbor's alike, and which is too much interested in the outcome to consider very particularly whether it is working out of altruism so-called, or just because it finds the work worth while. But unless the reality of a social end and interest be there, and be there as a potent and fundamental source of action, democracy may look to see itself bankrupt in the near future.

If one were to ask for the reasons why Godwin's own treatment in the Political Justice fails quite frequently to carry conviction and impressiveness, it might perhaps be found in two considerations. He has, to begin with, rather too easy a sense of the requirements of right reason. These principles of justice seem to him to be,—and in a sense they are,—so very clear and simple, that he can hardly conceive it possible but that, were I to buttonhole my neighbor, and carefully and systematically pour into his ears my argument, he should become a convert. With no adequate conception of the instinctive basis of human nature, Godwin fails to recognize that putting a verbal argument into a man's head is not very effective, unless you can be sure of attaching it to some real and vital impulse; and therefore that all sorts of byways of experience may be required to make of logic a living force. The possibility, for example, that punishment under right conditions may succeed in touching springs of self-revelation and motivation which argument is powerless to reach, is something which in his discussion of penal law lies quite beyond his range of vision. And Godwin fails to appreciate, too, the confusing and disheartening way in which the considerations of naked justice are implicated in the very complex system of relationships under which they have to be applied. Many a man will in the abstract admit that he ought to be ready to do his neighbor good, who is sincerely at a loss to see how this is to be put in practice under actual business conditions. And to reiterate the principles is not to solve his problem. Now Godwin's

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answer is this: The principles, you allow, are simple; then reduce the social conditions to a like simplicity, and you will have no trouble. But this is the second and the main reason for Godwin's lack of appeal. For him the relationships of society are merely the sum of uncomplicated relationships between innumerable pairs of individuals. This anarchism,—in the philosophical sense,—is presupposed in nearly every side of his philosophy; and almost invariably it weakens the force of his argument. If his doctrine is translated out of personal into social terms, it gains largely in force.

What I mean may be illustrated again in his conception of reason as the only true motive. I have interpreted this in terms of the value of social publicity, and the development of a social conscience and sense of responsibility. But Godwin does not stop here; thinking as he does of human relationships as first of all personal and particular, it goes to justify to him also his own peculiar belief in his vocation as a missionary. Each man, that is to say, is to make himself personally responsible for all of his acquaintances, help them regulate their conduct by reason, be "the generous censor of his neighbor to tell him in person, and publish to the world, his virtues, his good deeds, his meannesses, and his failures." It is a matter for congratulation that few men have so sensitive a conscience as Godwin's in this direction, or life would scarcely be tolerable. Godwin is temperamentally quite lacking in reticence. He would have everyone "make the world his confessional," "utter nothing that is false, and withhold nothing that is true." Witness his demand that sexual matters, since they are as much facts as anything else, should be as freely talked about in society. But in public dealings the value of publicity stands on a quite different plane, and Godwin loses through failing to distinguish.

Of course, in his own ideal society this distinction rather falls to the ground, through the absence of any save a modicum of public business. But this points to

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the final and practically most important query to which Godwin's political theory gives rise. He fails almost entirely, that is, to recognize the problems that grow out of the industrial organization of society. To those who have less faith that life in the modern world can be lived without organized activity, it is becoming the supreme question whether this is to be left to chance, and the shifty grasping of opportunities by clever individuals, or whether society to protect itself is not bound to take some charge of its own interests. But with such a tendency Godwin's anarchism is far less out of sympathy than would appear on the surface. At most it is a question of judgment and not of underlying motive. The laws required for industrial efficiency are laws indeed, but they are of a quite different sort from those of retributive punishment. They seek a positive rather than a negative end; they are not restrictions first of all, but creative of opportunities. The whole intent of such regulations is in reality the same as Godwin's,—to substitute justice for the current ideas of property, legal status, established authority, which are interested in checking the extension of an equality of opportunity to the advantage of those who are already in possession, or who have the peculiar gifts and deficiencies that promise success in a general scramble. Godwin denies the need of organization, and thereby loses his chance to make any contribution to the special problems of the present. He had only to change this intellectual conviction, and by the whole movement of his thought he would have passed from the Anarchist to the Socialist.

A. K. Rogers.

University of Missouri.

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FRATERNAL BASIS OF SOCIALISM.

WALDO L. COOK.

THE fraternal ideal, in its simplest ethical aspect, is embodied in the Golden Rule; and in its social aspect, in the 'brotherhood of man.' In the history of human thought, it may be traced almost to the infancy of the race. It has been formulated by Chinese sages, by Buddha, by Hebrew prophets. It has permeated the greatest of religions. It has ennobled at least one of the pagan philosophies of the classic era. The mental conception of it, in any period during the past three thousand years, has not been difficult, but the realization of it in practice has not hitherto been rated one of the triumphs of civilization. However one may conceive of it,—as a principle affecting the ethical relations of individuals, the social relations of groups, the commercial and political relations of nations, or as a principle of association, of coöperation, or of collectivism in any sense whatever, ancient, medieval or modern,—one is constrained to admit that the amplest and highest development of the ideal in practice is yet to come.

Sketching briefly the historical development of the subject, it is enough to go back to the Stoics of antiquity. Stoicism brought into prominence the doctrines of natural law and cosmopolitanism; in their view of man's social relations, the Stoics were greatly in advance of preceding philosophical schools. "The circumstances of the time," writes one authority, "such as the decay of Greek city life, the foundation of large territorial states under absolute Greek rulers, which followed Alexander's conquests, and afterward the rise of the world empire of Rome, aided to develop the leading idea of Zeno's 'Republic.' There he had anticipated a state . . . in which all differences of nationality would be merged in the common brotherhood of man. This cosmopolitan citizenship remained all

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through a distinctive Stoic dogma; when first announced, it must have had a powerful influence upon the minds of men, diverting them from the distractions of almost parochial politics to a boundless vista. There was, then, no longer any difference between Greek and barbarian, male and female, bond and free. All were members of one body, as partaking in reason, all were equally men."

Stoicism was a practical philosophy. Its ethical doctrine tended to take a practical form. The Stoic's conception of world citizenship developed so far that his cosmopolitanism expanded into humanitarianism. It was under the Roman rule that political and social conditions came to correspond most nearly to Stoic ideals. In the earlier constructive work of the Romans in conquering and administering the world, Stoicism played no part compared with the legions. But in the social adjustment during the stable days of the empire, Stoic doctrines exercised a far-reaching influence. "Preached by Seneca . . . and Marcus Aurelius, the emperor, the universal brotherhood of man necessarily became more than a sterile abstraction." And with Stoicism propagating this principle among the upper classes of Rome, the spread of Christianity up from the classes below was made the easier by the prevalence of Stoic concepts. And, finally, "the oneness of humanity, which had been conceived as centering in the Stoic cosmopolis, received a much more definite and attractive realization in the promise of the Christian heaven."[1]

The merger of these Stoic principles, or ideals, with Christianity would have been a disaster to civilization, possibly, had not the Roman empire collapsed. For Stoicism was more concerned with this world than with another beyond the grave. So is the fraternal ideal, which is a corollary of the Stoic cosmopolitanism. If one considers pragmatically 'the fatherhood of God' and 'the brotherhood of man,' both essential principles of Chris-

[1] Prof. Dunning's "Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval," p. 154.

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tianity, it is evident that 'the brotherhood of man' will, in practice, get for a hungry, penniless wanderer food and shelter sooner than 'the fatherhood of God.' But great was the fall of the Roman empire, and in the ensuing anarchy of government and social chaos, during the centuries which are now grouped as the dark ages, the average human creature was doubtless in deep need of that promise of heavenly bliss beyond the grave which Christianity held out to him. Viewing the situation under the inspiration of the late Professor James's philosophy, one would say that the great emphasis which Christianity then placed upon 'heaven,' as the place where the poor, the unfortunate, the persecuted, and all the miserable wrecks of humanity could hope for final comfort and happiness,—one would say that it 'worked' in practice. And, surely, every age is bound to have a philosophy of life that 'works.'

But the church, in placing the greater emphasis upon 'heaven,'—and, in this connection, perhaps, 'hell' should not be ignored,—necessarily let the fraternal ideal slip into the background. No slight or perfunctory tribute should be paid to the church's organization for charity, philanthropy, and the maintenance of social order, in the thousand years following the break-up of the empire, through its monasteries, convents, religious orders, places of worship, and asylums, and also through its majestic spiritual authority over the minds of temporal rulers; but all this, even, was the less effective because, in the ecclesiastical view, the main task was to prepare human souls for eternity. The Stoics of antiquity had developed a humanitarianism which caused them to use their influence for the mitigation of the cruelties of human slavery; and it must be believed that, in time, their fraternal ideal would have made them attack slavery's very existence. It was largely under the influence of the Stoics, also, that the use of torture to extract confessions in criminal trials had nearly died out in the later period of the Roman empire. The Christian church's view of slavery

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and torture affords a fair test of its reactionary attitude, in this respect, during the dark and middle ages. For St. Thomas Aquinas, who entirely recast the logical basis of the theology of the Roman Catholic church in the thirteenth century, and who was undoubtedly the most advanced churchman of his time, calmly justified human bondage on the ground that it was designed by God to stimulate bravery in soldiers, who would be enslaved if vanquished in battle! And when the church became dominant, it "gave torture a new vitality, found cogent reasons for it, and introduced it in a far more cruel form and to a far greater extent than had ever been known under Greeks, Romans or barbarians."[2]

Hastening by the Protestant Reformation, which shattered the ecclesiastical hegemony and intellectual tyranny of the Papacy in Christendom, one quickly confronts the French Revolution. By that great convulsion, at the close of the eighteenth century, the fraternal ideal was definitely emancipated for the present and future work in the world. The war cry of the French Revolution was 'liberty, equality, fraternity.' The time was certainly ripe for the revival of the conception of the brotherhood of man, for the centuries had hammered Europe into political and social order, had created a strong state system of fairly large territorial aggregates, and had greatly developed international commerce and intercourse by improved methods of transportation on sea and land. Manufacturing and trade, stimulated by the earlier discoveries and inventions in the dawning age of science, were rapidly creating and diffusing wealth among the people; and there was a rapidly lessening need, pragmatically speaking, of that emphasis upon 'heaven' and 'hell' which the church for ten centuries had mainly relied upon for its influence and service to mankind. Europe was now ready, economically, politically, and socially, to think less of the

[2] See the essay on Thomasius, in "Seven Great Statesmen," by Dr. Andrew D. White.

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future life and more of the possibilities of making a paradise of this one. It was no accident that the blow for emancipation was struck in France, for France in that day was the most prosperous and advanced of European countries.

The leading ideas of the Revolution rested upon the rationalistic doctrines of Natural Law making for terrestrial content and happiness. "It was this theory which . . . altered the whole complexion of social activity. When it was denied," as the French philosophers of the eighteenth century did deny, "that life here below was merely a preparation for another world; when it was declared that, on the contrary, it was a strictly mundane business, having to do with the best possible arrangement of individual and social relations *here,* revolutionary action received its inspiration and justification."[8]

The primary aim of the Revolution in France was a new distribution of political power. The attack fell upon a political absolutism, to which was joined an ecclesiastical despotism; and right here it may be noted that the ethical justification of the old regime that collapsed with the storming of Bastille was paternal as contrasted with fraternal service in behalf of the people. The highly centralized, absolutist monarchy of the Bourbon kings, like that of Frederick the Great, did things *for* the people, but never *by* the people.

While the revolutionists delivered their original assault in the name of liberty, which was considered the first and most important of the rights of man,—for the chief interest of the eighteenth century had been to establish the civil, political, and religious freedom of the individual,—it is a significant and important fact that, as soon as the Revolution became a going concern and undertook the practical business of government, the fraternal principle began to contest with individualism for predominance. "Passionate as was the love of liberty and the desire for

[8] Peixotto, "The French Revolution and French Socialism."

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personal freedom . . . the principle that the wellbeing of the whole social body took precedence of the individual well being, gradually got the upper hand." And, finally, it came about that "the whole tenor of the revolutionary doctrine and practice was less to stimulate an individualistic movement than to arouse a sentiment in favor of a sense of social duty, a sense of fraternity."[4] Nor was this development to be wondered at. In France, particularly, the old-time political absolutisms had been markedly paternalistic in practice. The Revolution had simply introduced the new principle that the political mastery of the state was inherent in the people, and the old idea of the state as a developing, regenerating, and rehabilitating agent had naturally survived. In brief, the fraternalism inherent in democracy had come forward to displace the paternalism of political absolutism.

To prove this by ample illustration drawn from the history of the French Revolution would be needless, but attention may be called to the cosmopolitan spirit of the Revolution and its treatment of the question of property, as showing the tendency referred to. The revolutionary enthusiasm for spreading the 'blessings of liberty, equality, and fraternity' over all Europe helped to involve revolutionary France in the foreign wars which were her undoing, yet it was an enthusiasm honestly based on the idea of the essential solidarity of mankind. In the Revolution's treatment of property, notably the landed estates, confiscated so extensively from the aristocratic émigrés, there was a distinct tendency for a time toward communistic theories, and there was immutably established the principle of state control of private property, as manifested in laws of confiscation, inheritance laws, a progressive income tax, and laws limiting the size of fortunes. In much of the later revolutionary legislation, too, there was a marked extension of the sphere of state activity toward the modern collectivist or socialist ideal.

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[4] Peixotto, "The French Revolution and French Socialism."

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The development of the fraternal ideal in the French Revolution was checked by the political disasters which overtook that great democratic movement when it passed so unfortunately under the despotic and militaristic sway of Napoleon. On a much smaller scale, it was a disaster not unlike that which buried the fraternal ideal in the ruins of the Roman empire; but in the modern instance the recovery has been exceedingly rapid. The reaction against the Revolution, intensified by the Napoleonic struggle for universal empire, was a reaction against all of the principles of the Revolution, and it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that conditions again began to be favorable to the realization in practice of the fraternal ideal. The revival was enormously helped by certain epochal events,—the application of steam power in manufacturing, the introduction of the steam railroad and the steamship into transportation, the invention of the electric telegraph, and, not least by any means, that finishing blow to medieval theology dealt by the biological theories of Darwin and by the philosophy of evolution.

With science now beginning a series of wonderful conquests, no wave of reaction could long persist after the downfall of the Napoleonic empire. It turned out that by 1840 there was a new wave of social reform sweeping over western Europe and America. Every new line of railroad, every mile of telegraph wire, every additional steamship brought mankind into closer relations, gave ampler scope to cosmopolitanism and spread abroad the ideal of human solidarity. And the popularizing of the evolutionary conception of life quickened the feeling that the 'heaven' and 'hell' of traditional Christianity had had their day, and that, in the new working program of humanity, the leading place should now be given to the economic improvement, and the social and moral uplift of terrestrial existence.

It is necessary to pass by, almost without notice, the utopian social reformers of the earlier and middle portions of the nineteenth century,—those enthusiasts and

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idealists who founded isolated communities for social regeneration on communistic or semi-communistic lines. In substantially every case, they were futile experiment stations for the realization in practice of the fraternal ideal. The French Utopists, such as Saint Simon, Fourier, and Capet, the Englishman Robert Owen and the American Adin Ballou, were fervent in their desire to try out their social reform theories in practice, and the result was the communities founded by them or their disciples, many of them in this country,—communities which lived a few years, then languished, and died. Idealists of that stamp performed a noble service to humanity in keeping alive the tradition of the fraternal ideal, but they failed in practice because they attempted to isolate themselves, under ideal conditions, on little sociological islands, which could have no real existence, in the vast ocean of everyday humanity. The unerring Emerson satirized them in his gentle way in writing to Carlyle in 1840: "We are all a little wild here," he said, "with numberless projects of social reform. Not a reading man but has a draft of a new community in his waistcoat pocket." Yet that period of intellectual and social ferment is to be credited with at least two great achievements in the United States alone; it saw the beginnings of the emancipation of women, and it witnessed the successful struggle for the emancipation of the slaves,—both of which were movements profoundly humanitarian and fraternalistic in their significance.

Nor may one ignore the monumental fact that with the publication of the Communist manifesto, in 1847, the modern movement known as scientific, or Marxian, socialism began. Through the publication of Marx's "Das Kapital," in 1867, the aggressive socialism of the present day was supplied with a text-book and a definitely formulated creed just as the old utopian schools of social reform were passing away.

It must be agreed, at this point, that the history of the fraternal ideal, which, inadequately perhaps, has been

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traced down to our own time, shows clearly that three primary conditions are essential to the highest development of a society based on fraternal principles. First, and most elementary, the physical limitations of time and space upon human intercourse must be overcome; that is to say, good roads, quick transportation, unimpeded communications between the scattered populations of the earth must be established and maintained. This element has been notably present in the problem since the conquests of Alexander the Great; and it is pertinent to say, in this connection, that wireless telegraphy and the recently invented machines for human flight are destined to exercise upon the future realization of the fraternal ideal an influence whose scope and power no one could now undertake to measure. The second condition is that the human mind must be freed from the superstition that this world's interests are nothing compared with those of another world. And, third, there must be democracy in government, for we could never get fraternalism out of the most benevolent of political absolutisms.

As one confronts the present situation in human society, deplorably lacking in the attributes of perfection as modern life may be, one cannot fail to see that the three essential conditions referred to now exist as never before in the annals of mankind. This is so completely self-evident that neither argument nor illustration is needed to reinforce the bare assertion. It is a commonplace to say that we live in a democratic era. No intelligent man of character now fails to respond to that insistent demand for social reform and social justice which has become the spirit of the age. And, certainly, we have not stopped marveling at the unending procession of the triumphs of science over nature, during the period of which we live.

The consequence is that we are living in a time when the movement toward the realization in practice of the fraternal ideal in society takes on an unheard-of speed. The movement may be faster even than we can believe

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to be possible. For our conceptions of the rapidity of human progress are formed by the study of history, and, until within seventy years, the physical conditions essential to the development of fraternal ideals were still antique. Physically speaking, the world we live in to-day, with its wireless messages across the Atlantic, its four-day steamships, it twentieth-century expresses, and its aeroplane flights across the English channel and the Alps, is in effect twenty centuries removed from the world our grandfathers knew in their childhood. It is necessary, therefore, that we radically revise our ideas of the rate of modern progress and allow to it a possible speed hitherto deemed incredible.

One of the contemporary evidences of this speeding up, it appears, is the extraordinary development in practice of the principle of associated effort. Association, in fact, offers a necessary method for the advance of fraternal principles. The word 'fraternal' itself, in its simplest meaning of brotherliness, implies the existence of two or more individuals, and we cannot conceive of the most elementary fraternal relation except as one associating in some way two or more individuals with each other. While, therefore, the fraternal spirit has always manifested itself in the simplest human relations, in the form of pity, generosity, hospitality, succor in time of need, charity and benevolence, the fraternal spirit is dependent for the growth of its power and effectiveness in ever-widening circles upon the united effort which comes from association. In order to connect intimately the social movements of our time and of the future with the fraternal ideal, one must place no small amount of emphasis upon the indispensable connection between associated effort and our glorified goal of human endeavor.

The principle of associated effort, it has been said, is being applied to an extraordinary degree in our time, and this fact is an evidence of the speeding up in human progress to which attention has been called. What better proof could there be of the soundness of this statement

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than the present tendency toward combinations in all departments of human activity? It is unnecessary to cite for purposes of illustration the familiar combinations in business and industry whose growth has shaken the politics of our day almost into hysteria. Business and labor combinations, however, while fairly illustrative of the tendency toward associated effort, are not, as yet, fraternalistic in the highest sense. Let us observe, therefore, the perfect craze, one might say, for association now existing outside the field of the production and distribution of wealth.

Not to mention thousands of social, educational, friendly, benevolent and 'uplift' organizations, having local scope, one may pause to consider the innumerable associations nowadays formed, mainly from altruistic motives, for the promotion of some public cause or the general advancement of the common weal. No one can fail to be impressed by the large number of national and international congresses which are convened somewhere every year for the consideration of subjects bearing exclusively upon some aspect of the great problem of man's condition on the earth. Peace congresses, interparliamentary union conferences, and the like, the world has become familiar with. But there are many other congresses, or conferences, whose gathering assumes a special significance. In the year 1910, there were held, in Europe or America, the following: The national conference on the white slave traffic; the international congress on the white slave traffic; the national conference on the prevention of infant mortality; the national conference on public health; the international prison congress; the international coöperative congress; the international congress of public relief and private philanthropy; the international socialist congress; the international congress on industrial diseases; the international town planning conference; the international congress on unemployment.

The international congress of the races, which was held

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in London, during the summer of 1911, and participated in by delegates from some fifty nations, certainly deserves to be added to the list, since it discussed the most fundamental ideas of cosmopolitanism,—the meaning of race and nation, general conditions of progress, peaceful contact between civilizations, special problems in interracial economics, the modern conscience in relation to racial questions, and positive suggestions for promoting interracial friendliness.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the only international congresses ever held were ecclesiastical or diplomatic. To-day there are such things as international congresses on industrial diseases and on idle workmen. Can it be doubted that these international congresses, constantly increasing in number, covering almost every conceivable aspect of social reform, will enormously strengthen, within a comparatively short time, the tendency toward world unity and the brotherhood of man? National lines are almost sure to weaken and ultimately disappear before such a stream of cosmopolitan forces, every year in the future gaining in bulk, speed, and power.

This principle of association affords the clew to the truly effective work in our time for the realization in practice of the fraternal ideal. Whether the field of effort be international, national or local, there must be cooperation, organization, team work, in order to achieve results permanently beneficial to society as a whole. The stronger the team work, the more comprehensive its grasp upon the situation to be dealt with, the more solidly enduring becomes the final achievement. Isolated effort, consequently, is more and more regarded as futile in attacking social evils and in remedying social wrongs. Private charity is increasingly under suspicion as a system of social amelioration. Private benevolence is seen to be little more than a sorry makeshift, by reason of its ill-regulated, spasmodic and often unintelligent attacks on the disorders and distempers of society. Political action for reform is now more and more condemned as inade-

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quate if it is confined to small areas. This growing passion for unity, to be brought about by the mobilization of social forces making for progress, is the natural outcome of the modern development of associated effort; and no one need be struck with amazement if finally the idea becomes prevalent that the greatest, the most powerful, if not the most efficient, of all associations in existence should be used as the direct agent of the social revolution yet to come. That association is the state itself.

One can conceive of an individualism, epicurean in ideals, regarding all human relations as resting wholly on individual self-interest, which, for imperative reasons of protection from spoliation and anarchy, would support an extensive system of charities, benevolences, and religious worship for the benefit of the masses of the people, while all the while it viewed with positive aversion interference in affairs by the state, for the promotion of the common welfare. But one cannot easily conceive of a society, where flourished the fraternal ideal, being indifferent to the aid that government might afford in the progress of the world.

The truth is that government will be used for all it is really worth in the process of realizing in practice the fraternal ideal. We are experiencing to-day, even, an impressive demonstration of this two-fold tendency. What has been well called 'social love' is manifesting itself in numberless practical ways, as never before in human history. The increasing emphasis placed upon the idea of private wealth as a trust, the passion for altruistic service beyond the pale of the church, shown in social settlement work, the enormous private benefactions for education and research and charity,—these are manifestations of the flowering of 'social love' in our time. But there is also to be noted a very rapid extension of state activity and state functions along the lines of public service; and the question that many would like to have answered is, how far will this extension of the powers and activities of the state proceed?

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Mr. Edward Bellamy wrote "Looking Backward" in 1886. About a quarter of a century has elapsed, and one cannot now read the best utopian romance of our time without testing here and there his imaginative forecast of the future state of society by actual social tendencies since the book was first published. In certain respects, the passing of the years has already shown the author to have been in error; in other respects, the years are apparently vindicating him,—to what extent, another half century must determine. Mr. Bellamy was entirely wrong in assuming that the movement toward the establishment of the collectivist commonwealth would be more rapid in the United States than in any other country. France, Australia, and New Zealand are moving more swiftly than America in that direction, and their progress in the next fifty years promises still to be much greater than our own. A reason for this is that individualism in this country was very far developed by the pioneer conditions of our early settlement, economic growth, and political constitution; and the decentralization inherent in our federal system of states probably will remain for no short period an obstacle to socialist experimentation on a large scale. Australia, on the contrary, began as a penal colony, and from the earliest days of white settlement, at first through the despotic government of a military officer appointed by the crown, and later through crown colony governments paternalistic to a marked degree, its people became familiar with the frequent exercise by the state of its organized power in order to overcome the critical difficulties of colonization.

This unavoidable variability in socialistic development in different parts of the world, because of varying local conditions, should not be ignored, for it reminds one that the realization in practice of any system of universal reorganization, worked out theoretically in some idealist's brain cells, can never be possible. Nothing seems more absurd than the idea that the socialist commonwealth, or any utopian state whatever, as conceived by any human

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mind, could ever be realized in practice with complete fidelity to the scheme originally elaborated. No such state ever existed, or ever can exist, inasmuch as all social and political organizations must be the resultants of conflicting forces. It is not a perfect earth on which we live. The heat and cold are very badly distributed. There may be too much salt water, and there is surely too little land surface susceptible of cultivation. Indeed, the physical earth is exposed to almost as serious criticism as the Republican or the Democratic party in America. To suppose that, in any future age, any human society whatever could approximate ideal conditions is to deal in stuff and nonsense.

Let us observe, too, that no form of social organization could ever be regarded as final, unless society should petrify. Conditions will not only be different in different regions; they will change in the same regions as generation follows generation. No social system can work in practice unless it is adapted to its surroundings and answers to the special needs of the people who may happen to live on the earth at a particular period. It follows, in the most comprehensive view of the situation, that what is commonly known as scientific, or orthodox, socialism,—that is, the system based on the anti-capitalistic writings of Karl Marx,—is nothing but a militant rallying point for the army of the discontented who are eternally pressing onward in the unwearied endeavor to realize in practice the fraternal ideal. Marxism in itself has no finality. Like Rousseau's theory of the "Social Contract" and John Calvin's theology, it is chiefly important in that it serves a propagandist purpose in one of the militant ages of advancing democracy. It is the fighting edge, one may say, of the advance guard of social reform. When it becomes dulled in conflict, as no doubt it must, a new and sharper blade will replace it. For theories are little else than weapons caught up in behalf of causes which far transcend in significance the weapons of the hour. They become obsolete and are discarded.

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But back of them, sometimes, are world forces which, century after century, sweep on mysteriously perhaps, yet majestically, to their goal.

What will actually develop in society within the next few centuries may involve so radical a transformation that the conventional socialist ideal of to-day would then seem a paltry conception, so far short would it be of the consummate reality. On the other hand, the hard physical limitations of human existence, the possible persistence of race conflicts, the still doubtful ability of democracy to carry an ever increasing burden in administration and government, may long keep the social organization far away from the Utopia of contemporary socialist thought. It is neither possible nor desirable to lift the veil covering the distant future; but it may at least be assumed, with confidence, that changes of real magnitude will come and that, in so far as they materialize in times not remote, they will follow well-recognized lines of progress toward the realization of the fraternal ideal.

The strength of modern socialism is its simple inheritance of the world-old spirit of fraternalism, which has thus far survived all civilizations and which cannot die while man endures.

WALDO L. COOK.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

ETHNIC MORALITY.

C. W. SUPER.

ONE of the problems that historians of antiquity have thus far been unable to solve may be stated thus: How was it possible for states to rise to a high degree of corporate efficiency, to evolve a civilization that embodied many of the elements of permanence and yet be unable to maintain themselves permanently? So far as the Grecian commonwealths are concerned,—to confine our survey to Europe,—the proximate causes of this decay

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are not undiscoverable. A number of states appear on the historic scene almost simultaneously. Although most of the time at war with one another, and in spite of the fact that many of the wars ended with the subjugation of the weaker, two groups were ultimately evolved that possessed considerable internal strength, and around which the rest crystalized. When, however, in the course of events these two groups came to blows with one another, they were nearly equal in resources and ended by so weakening each other that when Philip of Macedon and after him his son, Alexander the Great, took a hand in affairs to subjugate them, the result was inevitable. An absolute monarch who is also a competent military captain will always make head against diversified leadership. Few episodes of ancient history make more painful reading than the account of the extraordinary efforts put forth by Demosthenes to arouse his countrymen against the invader from the North, since to us the outcome is plain from conditions which in the nature of the case he could not understand. His labors were doomed in advance.

There were many factors in the internal conditions of Greece that made its conquest by an outsider comparatively easy, conditions which were paralleled in Rome some centuries later. The growth of the imperial city can be traced in its main outlines with tolerable distinctness. Although mainly a military state, from its inception it was based on tillers of the soil and not on mercenaries as were many of the Greek states. After all its rivals had been overcome, the subjugated commonwealths were generally made a part of the government and accorded the privileges of a modified citizenship. Rome never had a rival sufficiently powerful to jeopardize its existence; for the final outcome of the contest with Hannibal, uncertain as it at times seemed to be, was never really doubtful. The civil wars did not greatly relax the efficiency of the government against external foes. As long as the state continued to grow and to expand out-

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wardly, it was strong internally,—in fact, impregnable. But as soon as expansion ceased, the germs of decay began to get the mastery of those essential to growth. For a time the two forces were in equipoise, then the death-dealing agencies slowly got the upper hand, continuing their work of destruction until it was complete. It is as certain as anything can be that if the soldiers of Rome had continued to be as valiant in the post-Christian centuries as they were before, the scattered and ill-organized barbarians, who had hardly anything to rely on except their personal prowess, could never have prevailed against them. Rome was not destroyed by barbarians; Rome was destroyed by Romans mainly. This is evident, among other things, from the well-known fact that the Eastern empire continued to exist for about a thousand years longer than the Western, or at least until the sack of Constantinople during the fourth crusade; yet it was equally assailed by barbarians. Its government, in spite of its corruption, at times displayed remarkable vigor, not only holding its own, in the main, against external and internal assailants, but sometimes even gaining notable advantages over them. Yet the fighting was done by Greeks, or at least under Greek leadership, by men of the same race who were not often enrolled in the armies of Rome because they were less efficient and less trustworthy than barbarians. The difference is perhaps due to the fact that so long as they were fighting for what they conceived to be their own cause, whether under a republic or under an empire, they were at their best, while in the Roman armies they were merely hirelings or conscripts.

It is an almost unique fact in economic history that the Roman empire was unable to recuperate. This retrogression is directly counter to the experience of every modern state. Pliny, writing before the end of the first century, says that large estates ruined Italy and were ruining the Provinces. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that France during the Hundred Years'

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War lost half its inhabitants: that its internal condition was deplorable must be taken for granted; nor is there any doubt that the peasants suffered most severely. Yet one hundred and fifty years later, it had again become fairly prosperous. The Thirty Years' War deprived Germany of more than half its population,—some districts lost four fifths;—yet in less than two centuries it had completely recovered economically. Similar changes have been repeated more or less closely elsewhere. The soil is inexhaustible. This is not only proved by current experience since science has come to the aid of tillage, but by the experience of mankind before anyone thought of applying scientific methods to the cultivation of the soil. Germany and France, to say nothing of our own South, had their large estates, as they still have, no less than the Roman empire, but the country suffers no detriment from that cause. Notwithstanding the testimony of Pliny, there is reason to believe that the civilized world was very prosperous during the greater portion of the second century. Gibbon goes so far as to say that this era was happier than any that preceded or followed. The destruction of the Roman nobility toward the close of the Roman republic will not account for the retrogression, since the same fate befell the optimates in France during the revolution, without inflicting serious harm upon the state. There was, moreover, from some recondite cause a great moral revival during the period just referred to among the more thoughtful citizens. To what extent it affected the common people we have no means of knowing; probably very little.

After citing these few facts, which are, moreover, sufficiently well known and are here touched upon merely for the purpose of bringing out the contrast with what follows, let us turn our attention to the Hebrews. Their religious and moral development is without a parallel. This went hand in hand with the evolution of a pure monotheism, although not wholly conditioned by it. To the more thoughtful Greeks, good men were better than

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the gods; not so to the Hebrews. Probably as early as one thousand years B. C. men appeared upon the scene in Palestine who not only proclaimed moral doctrines and a religion that were at variance with the popular creed, but rules of conduct as well, that were at variance with popular practice. In season and out of season the prophets preached justice, righteousness, and mercy. They did not philosophize upon motives; they proclaimed the results of their observations in an oracular way. They seem scarcely to have been conscious themselves of the methods of their reasoning. The popular belief regarded God as sanctioning and encouraging massacre, theft, and other unholy and criminal deeds; they taught the opposite. Although these preachers of righteousness may have produced little effect upon their contemporaries, their vaticinations were preserved among the sacred Books of their countrymen and probably began to be read in the temples soon after they were uttered. Herein lies the great advantage that a book-religion has over one that is merely traditional: if it likewise embodies a congeries of moral truths, it has a constantly increasing elevating influence. The mystery is how this monotheistic creed was engendered and kept continuously growing in distinctness. It is well established that the Hebrews were among the late-comers in Palestine, and that in what is called civilization they were far behind all the nations that preceded them. It is no wonder that the Jews in after times began to discern a supernatural factor in their early history and to regard themselves as God's chosen race. This written creed and the morality it commends became their rallying cry and bond of union during the Diaspora, and has remained so to the present time. Their sacred volume begat a feeling of kinship which made the Jews helpful to one another, however widely they might be scattered over the face of the globe. It is not surprising that the nations among whom they dwelt despised them for their pretensions, seeing that they were of no political conse-

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quence and had never played a prominent part in the world's drama. They cared nothing for art in any of its forms, despised all religions except their own, and were clannish in the extreme. One needs but to read the works of Josephus and Philo to be convinced of the loyalty of their leading men to the ancestral faith.

The genesis and development of the idea of sin is peculiar to the Hebrew dispensation and performed an important part in their moral development. If we examine the word *sin* apart from the subsequent theological subtleties that obscured its primitive meaning, we find it based on the assumption of the existence of a God who is holy and of an innate moral law. In so far as a Greek or Roman conceived the possibility of committing sin, it signified nothing more than an error of judgment. When the Jew sinned it was generally due to a weakness of the will. This point is forcibly insisted on by Joseph when he says: "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" Although this story may be relatively late, its moral is in harmony with other passages in the Old Testament. The Old Testament conception of the consequences of sin is more rational than that of the New in that it makes the sinner bear the consequences of his acts: he cannot shirk the responsibility. There is more room for moral growth in the mind of a man who is willing to admit that he has done wrong willfully than if he holds that his evil deeds are due merely to ignorance. In the latter case he is only in need of wider knowledge; in the former, his knowledge is sufficient, but he needs a stronger will in order to be able to resist temptation. The term *sin* and its congeners occur very often in the Old Testament and in more than half the Books. In "Ecclesiastes" it is used but once and in the injunction: "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin; neither say thou before the angel that it was an error." Although the Hebrew words translated 'sin' are not all the same, there appears to be no difference in the concept that underlies them. While

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ritual purification from sin fills a large place in the Old Testament, it finds little favor with the prophets.

It was around the Judaic nucleus that Christianity was first formed. It represented a higher type of morality than the Greeks ever attained to, though they were more susceptible to this partly new religion than the Romans or probably than any other nationality. They were naturally of finer mental fiber and less cruel than the Romans, more ready to listen to new doctrines, less concerned with politics, and mentally more alert. The names of many Christians recorded in the New Testament are clearly Greek. The Jewish prophets with their constant preaching of righteousness, of justice, of a judgment to come, were the precursors of the Christian missionaries in apostolic times; in fact the latter seem in most cases to have begun their ministry in the temples. Probably such peripatetic orator-philosophers as Dio would also have called themselves preachers of righteousness; but they rarely remained long enough in one place to found a school or a society; nor was this their object. Besides, they were far more concerned to excite admiration for their fine words than for their noble deeds. No matter how deeply a Jew might be immersed in Greek thought, he could never quite forget God, nor regard conduct as a thing of no importance. The Preacher, after expatiating at great length upon the vanity and fruitlessness of all human endeavor, ends his meditations with the exhortation: "Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment." Very different would have been the advice of almost any Greek or Roman who professed the same philosophy. The Arabs eventually developed a rigid monotheism, doubtless under the influence of the Old Testament; but their morality always remained on a far lower level. It was exceptionally lenient toward sexual irregularities, a point on which the Jewish code is particularly rigorous. To no other people of antiquity would the story of Joseph

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have appealed strongly. The episode of Bellerophon in the sixth Book of the Iliad is partly parallel; but the hero, instead of attaining to riches and honor "came to be hated of all the gods, then wandered he alone in the Aleian plain, devouring his own soul, and avoiding the paths of men." Æschylus, whom his countrymen were wont to revere almost as a god, was the author of many noble sentiments; but their potency was greatly lessened by an admixture of fatalism. Sophocles was too well satisfied with himself and his fellow-citizens with him to take a bold stand for any consistent views of a nobler life. Euripides could see little in the world around him to encourage the practice of virtue.

The Hebrews held God to be an all-pervading and omniscient spirit, although in its earlier form their creed is tinged with anthropomorphism. The more thoughtful Greeks and Romans considered him an indwelling spirit that was hardly more than a deification of the human reason. The Hebrews conceived God as higher and holier than any possible mortal attainment; not so either Greeks or Romans. Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," has collected many passages which prove this. I quote a few. Seneca says: "In one respect the sage is superior to God. God owes it to his nature not to fear, but the sage owes it to himself." Epictetus declares that "it is the characteristic of a wise man to look for all his good and evil from himself." Conversely, there are many passages in Epictetus, in Cicero, in Plutarch, in Seneca, and in Marcus Aurelius which clearly express man's dependence upon God. Neither the Old Testament nor the New is more explicit on this point. This inconsistency weakened the force of the doctrines enunciated and left every man to choose for himself that part which accorded most nearly with his preconceived views or with his natural temperament. To the man who is morally strong the doctrine that he is in all respects the equal of the deity is stimulating and ennobling; but such men are rare. Lecky further says:

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"Ancient Rome produced many heroes, but no saint. Its self-sacrifice was patriotic, not religious." A saint may be defined as a man who devotes himself to the good of his fellow-men without hope of earthly reward. He seeks his own salvation by the practice of altruism. While this definition is not wholly in accord with that of the Romish church nor with the practice of those who retired wholly from the world for selfish, albeit unconsciously selfish reasons, it agrees with the ideas of the early and the patristic church. There can be no saints under a polytheistic dispensation, nor under any system in which a future life is not a controlling motive. The conception of sainthood in the Old Testament differs considerably from that of the New; but the underlying thought is the same: that of acceptability to God gained by exclusive devotion to his service. That the Jews would fight fiercely and suffer terribly when their country was identified with their religion, was demonstrated at the siege of Jerusalem under Titus where three factions were animated with an inexpressible ferocity toward each other and with a willingness to suffer more than human nature could bear. They fought one another as stubbornly as they fought the heathen outside of the gates, each party claiming to represent the true faith. While it may be that the prophets were merely political agitators, as Hugo Winckler maintains in his "History of Israel," it remains, nevertheless, true that here for the first time we find a class of men who persistently insisted on the importance of moral conduct in national affairs. For as J. T. Sutherland declares: "There is abundant evidence to show that more earnest, more honest, more intensely real, more intensely natural and human utterances of greater moral power, or of more permanent religious significance to the world, were never penned, than some of these prophecies of ancient Israel."[1] These utterances were not only at variance

[1] "Origin and Character of the Bible." Boston, 1909.

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with the beliefs of most of those to whom they were addressed; they ran counter to the faiths of all antiquity. The disasters that Israel suffered from time to time cannot have been the only cause that inspired this belief, because other nations suffered equally great calamities. When the Greeks began to lose faith in their ancestral gods, their faith in themselves went with the decadence. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans ever quite outlived the belief that the performance of outward rites would secure the favorable interposition of their gods. When disasters befell or were impending they were especially assiduous in the traditional ceremonies of their religion. To the last the Roman armies either refused to fight or suffered defeat if the auspices were unfavorable; to the last they believed that the coöperation of the gods could be compelled by persistent effort. Xenophon was a representative Greek and withal a man of more than average intelligence; yet he was thoroughly in accord with the popular belief. He enters upon no undertaking, fights no battle without first making sure of the favor of the gods. Both Greeks and Romans, however little they might care for the popular religion, conformed to its requirements. There are few passages in either Greek or Roman writers that reduce religion to the simple formula prescribed by the prophet Micah: "What doth God require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" The gods of the ancient peoples were often angry both with individuals and with larger aggregates of men because they were slighted or neglected; very rarely because their votaries did wrong. Greek and Roman writers do not seek to impress upon their countrymen the relation of prosperity to right living, although some of them teach that it is man's duty to be just. So far as I recall, not one of the speakers whom Thucydides brings upon the scene advocates a policy because it is right; it is always shallow expediency. A pagan never becomes a missionary of righteousness like the prophets and the early Christians.

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That a monotheistic creed is an indispensable prerequisite of a high morality, although it does not of necessity predicate a high morality, is evinced by the history of the Christian church. With the admission into its pantheon of a multitude of semi-divine men as saints, its morals degenerated. This difference is strikingly shown in the lives of the people of northern Europe compared with those of the south, although both profess the same religion. This salient fact is strikingly brought out by Trede in his "Heidentum in der roemischen Kirche." He saw about him almost daily the evidence that the Neapolitans expected to gain the aid of the saints by the same methods which the Romans employed to constrain the help of their gods. Many persons whose lives stood on a moral level hardly higher than that of the Thugs of India, believed that they could obtain the help of some saint in undertakings of the most nefarious character. The 'walk and conversation' of the votary is not supposed to have the slightest bearing upon the success of the petition. "Help me and ask no questions; if you do the latter and fail to do the former, I shall put upon you some indignity," is the thought that was often in the mind of the ancient Roman, and it is equally often in the mind of the modern Italian.

The four or five centuries that elapsed between the close of the Old Testament canon and the first promulgation of Christianity were an important period in the history and mental development of the Jews. Although chiefly concerned with their own affairs, they had open minds with regard to what was going on around them. As soldiers in the armies of Alexander and his successors, they were of little value. Nothing else could be expected. How could they consistently fight for any cause that did not recognize the one true God? The apocryphal books are sufficient evidence that the thinkers among them had open minds to the mental development of the heathen. We have here, side by side with some puerilities, a noble and notable collection of moral precepts.

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Nowhere are wisdom and the moral virtues more highly extolled or viewed under a greater number of aspects. While many of the Greeks and Grecians were shedding their blood in factional strife or as mercenaries, the Jewish thinkers were meditating upon the fundamental problems of social life. While the Greek thinkers were accumulating knowledge of a certain kind, chiefly in Alexandria, or teaching philosophy after a fashion, the populace were spending their time listening to 'some new thing,' or to something old presented in a new form. That the comedies of Menander were favorites in both Greece and Rome is evidence of the frivolity of a large portion of the citizens. So seriously did the Jews take life that neither art, nor science, nor philosophy in the usual acceptation of the term, nor military glory had any interest for them. Everything that lay outside of the province of a monotheistic religion or seemed to be in conflict with it was deemed unworthy of serious consideration.

Nor was their intellectual and practical activity relaxed under the Greek emperors and the caliphs. This is not only evident from the works produced by Jews in the East, but also from the interest they exhibited in the moral and medical sciences in Spain and Africa. At times there was hardly a city in the known world in which there were not Jewish scholars engaged upon some department of human knowledge. Not until Europe became Christian, did they fall into the background. Doubtless the circumstance that they were always and everywhere in the minority except in Palestine and in the main remained aloof from politics, kept their morals relatively pure. The vitiating influence of politics is not only evident in our own times, but was strikingly shown in the development of the early church. In politics, even at its best, what is right and just is always to some extent made subordinate to what is supposed to be expedient and pecuniarily profitable. That the Jews are now more numerous than ever; that they are the only people

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who can truthfully be said to have a history extending back at least three thousand years, is not a mere accident. It is the natural consequence of their high moral standard, their altruism, their feeling of kinship with one another, their aloofness from the people around them, and their abstention from war ever since the Diaspora. The foundation for this permanence was laid by the writers of their Sacred Books. Theirs is not only a remarkable record; it is a record that is well worthy of our contemplation and our admiration.

C. W. Super.

Athens, Ohio.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. By G. W. F. Hegel. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by J. B. Baillie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. 2 Vols. Pp. xliv, 823. (Paged continuously.)

Professor Baillie has conferred a very great boon upon students by this masterly translation of the most remarkable, if not absolutely the greatest, of Hegel's works. As he observes in his introduction, "Alike in its style of thinking, its manner of expression, the comprehensiveness of its survey, and the wealth of its material, it can hardly be said to have a parallel." It is an attempt, we might say, to show mind, on the great stage of history, transforming itself under the spell of logic, before and until it has detected the source of the wizardry. When once the enchantment is unmasked,—and throughout it is gradually unmasking,—mind can use the spell for itself; but then we are beyond the sphere of Phenomenology,—of mind immersed in matter,—and can deal directly with the leading principles of mind and the world; and this achievement is called absolute knowledge. But the Phenomenology deals with man's nature as a whole, with the needs, situations, emergencies, by which its powers are solicited and its principles evoked. It is therefore in the true sense 'genetic.' It is the great drama of consciousness, and goes, as Professor Baillie well points out in his introduction, through necessary steps to an inevitable outcome. Absolute knowledge might be compared with such an alteration in the human outlook as is embodied in the idea of the claims and interests of mankind as a whole. It is a standpoint the attainment of which is a great and, in one sense, a final achievement. But it is not the end of everything, nor a completed revelation of the reality of the universe. Like the idea of humanity, it is a revelation which marks an epoch, one from which we shall not go back, and which forms the medium in which further experience will develop. It is the recognition, clear and scientific, no longer a guess or a piece of poetry, that in the universe mind meets only with itself, and that when it thinks the universe it is thinking itself. And so far

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it is a revelation of reality. But no one says or thinks that reality is exhausted in the statement or even in the abstract development of such a principle. It is a new starting point, and that is all.

Thus it seems natural that the account of Absolute Knowledge in this treatise should be short and somewhat summary. It is really in the Logic and in the Philosophy of Religion that we have to look for its development. The business of the Phenomenology was only to take us so far, and indicate where we have got to.

Hence I a little deprecate the tone in which Professor Baillie reinforces Hegel's modest apology for his work, in the letter to Schelling. All that is said in the introduction about Hegel's relation to his publisher is quite true,—that he had to keep his day with a man he could not trust, and that this tended to hurry the completion of his work, independently of the battle of Jena, to which Hegel himself refers. Yet it seems almost as if Professor Baillie had mixed up what Gans said of the roar of the cannon of Jena with what Hegel said, merely of his completing his book on the day before the battle. All sorts of disturbance had begun in Jena on that day, and it was wonderful that he could write at all. But one can well understand his not wanting to wait, not only because of his engagement to the publisher, but because he could not be sure how soon he might be able to return to work. In any case, however, I do not suppose he meant to give a systematic account of Absolute Knowledge.

But I strongly welcome the Translator's Introduction, the short introductory notes to separate sections of the treatise, and the information given in the brief but exceedingly serviceable footnotes. Hegel's course of thought is undoubtedly hard to follow, especially when, as in the present work, he has a great many things in his mind to which he does not refer by name. Translation, introductory notes, and footnotes, all seem to give the reader fixed points at which he may collect and with which he may compare his own impressions of the meaning. The rendering is exceedingly careful and well thought out, and the presentation of the work in this form is a very considerable event in the philosophical world. English readers may confidently rely on the author's meaning being accurately conveyed; and readers familiar with German will, I believe,

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feel it a great help to study the translation and the original side by side. There are a few passages which I should have rendered otherwise, one or two of which I will refer to in a footnote. But there is nothing which seriously interferes with the apprehension of the author's meaning.

Of special importance in the present philosophical situation are the chapters on sense and perception. I do not think that the line of criticism which they represent has ever been stated more broadly or more pregnantly. Say, as Mr. Case says in the Encyclopædia, that you begin not with ideas or sensations, but with beliefs about objects. What does it matter? The question is what your beliefs come to if you let them go forward in their own right and by their own logic and methods. It is merely necessary to look on and let the thing work itself out, and you see, as is now really a commonplace, that as you go into science you go away from sensation, and into a huge complex of laws, relations, systems, and series. And then from this you must go further. I do not know any statement in which it becomes so clear that the realism which assumes objects apart from mind means artificial arrest of the natural process of knowledge; while realism which is true to the natural development of natural beliefs is simply the progress toward completeness which is the spring of idealism.

Another important point is the relation of the ethical system of a community to the morality of the Kantian type. The relation as given in the Phenomenology is reversed in the Philosophy of Right; and perhaps some discussion of this change, or at least a reference to it, would have been useful. I take it that the effect of the reversal is to give the system of ethical custom and observance a more universal and commanding place in the interpretation of life, and to treat as more remote from reality and from religion the standpoint of any morality which very strongly and in principle opposes the 'ought' to the 'is.'

It is further interesting to note how near Hegel's idea of the notion came to Bergson's view of 'life,' only without its limitations.

"As to time . . . it is the notion itself in the form of existence. The principle of quantity, of difference which is not determined by the notion, and the principle of equality, of abstract lifeless unity, are incapable of dealing with that sheer restlessness of life, and its absolute and inherent process of differentiation. It is therefore only in an arrested, paralyzed form; only in the form of the quantitative unit, that this essentially negative activity

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becomes the second object-matter [besides space] of this way of knowing [*viz.*, the mathematical], which, itself an external operation, degrades what is self-moving to the level of mere matter, in order thus to get an indifferent, externally, lifeless content.'' Philosophy is different. ''The abstract or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion. It is the process that creates its own moments in its course'' (Translation, p. 43).

This is a good specimen of the translation, as well as of Hegel's argument. I subjoin in a note some details with reference to the translation:

NOTE:—The translation has been carefully thought out, and conveys the meaning with remarkable success. It uses some circumlocution, and a good deal of freedom in the rendering of single terms. This is often very serviceable, but in places alarms me a little. *E. g.*, I am afraid of all usage of 'concept' and 'conceptual' in connection with *Begriff* or *begreifen* (see pp. 6, 7, 64; 789, 793; here, *e. g.*, 'bare concept=*reiner Begriff*,' 'conceptually'=*seinem Begriff nach*). It must be understood that no touch of meaning allied to 'conceptualism' is intended. So, surely, something is lost when ''*die Anstrengung des Begriffs*'' becomes ''the strenuous toil of conceptual reflection, of thinking in the form of the notion'' (p. 56).

Note also p. 65: ''exclude everything which is not grasped conceptually, and is a conception.'' Is not —''nor is a conception'' the meaning?

P. 81: ''Anxiety for the truth'' should be ''shrinking from the truth.''

P. 135 (a difficult passage about force inciting and force being incited): Each, Hegel has said, is purely through the other, ''that is to say, their being has purely the significance of disappearance'' (Tr. rightly). Below comes ''*Ihr Wesen ist dies schlechthin, jede nur durchs andere, und was jede so durchs andere ist, unmittelbar nicht mehr zu seyn, indem sie es ist.*'' Tr. says ''rather their true nature is simply and solely to be each through the other, and to be in the first instance no more than just what each is thus through the other, since it is just that.'' Surely it is ''for each to be only through the other, and in virtue of such being immediately to cease to be what it thus is through the other.'' The meaning is practically that of the sentence cited above.

P. 731: I suppose the translator read '*vereinigt*' where I find '*gereinigt.*' But is not '*gereinigt*' right? The soul is one with being in the purification attained through the cultus (p. 725-6).

P. 732: 'Selfless' should surely not be carried on affirmatively with the last clause. Is not the meaning: 'The absolute Being, at this stage, has not the selfless reality of an outcast nation, but the reality of a nation whose self is acknowledged''?

P. 768: ''Consciousness does not . . . start from thought and enclose the thought of God along with existence.'' ''*Zusammen schliessen*'' seems to me to mean conjoining extremes by inference in a middle term; consciousness does not start from its own inward thought, and conjoin the thought of God with outward existence in its own thinking [as a middle term]; ''but sees God directly in the outward existence.''

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P. 788: "Those apparently repugnant moments . . . are not inseparable": read "are not separable."

These points are mostly trivial, and I do not think that there are any amendments of greater importance to suggest.

B. BOSANQUET.

Oxshott, Surrey, England.

MATTER AND MEMORY. Henri Bergson. Authorized translation. By Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1911. Pp. xx, 339. (Library of Philosophy.)

In view of the great interest recently aroused in the English-speaking countries by the work of M. Bergson and the laudation bestowed on it by Professor James, the publishers are to be thanked for following up the translation of "Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience" with this version of what is in some ways M. Bergson's most remarkable performance. In the main the translators may be congratulated on their accomplishment of the extraordinarily difficult task of reproducing a French work in readable English. I would note, however, as minor blemishes, several cases in which undue adherence to the phrasing of the original has led them to produce sentences where the grammatical subject is placed after its predicate. This is a type of structure common in good French prose, but rigidly eschewed by writers with a sense of English style, and the places where it occurs should be modified whenever the book comes to be reissued. It is one of the chief rules which a careful translator ought never to forget that the ideal of translation is to be not only faithful, but idiomatic; no construction should be allowed which compels the reader to remember that what he has before him is a version and not an original work. I note also one or two unfelicities in vocabulary which might readily be removed. 'Back and forth' is, to the sense of the British reader, at any rate, a provincialism for 'backwards and forwards'; on pages 214, 216 the verb 'to accrue' is used in a transitive sense which is, I believe, unknown to our language, and the same thing is true of the sense put upon the verb 'to interest' at the end of the first paragraph of page 293. You can say in good English that the mathematical concept of absolute homogeneous space is 'of interest for' our practical interaction with the material world, but to say 'it interests a

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being which acts on matter, but not the work of a mind which speculates on its essence' is to perpetrate an ugly grammatical ambiguity. It is not permissible English to speak of a concept as 'interesting the work of a mind.' It will, I hope, be taken as a compliment to the excellence of the translation as a whole that a reviewer should think it worth while to call attention to these few incidental lapses.

The appearance of the translation is hardly the proper occasion for a detailed criticism of the theories contained in the work translated, especially when it happens to be already so well known as M. Bergson's "Matière et Mémoire," but I may perhaps be allowed to make one or two general remarks about the worth of the line of thought which has M. Bergson for its most brilliant exponent among our contemporaries. In particular, I should like to say that the more I read M. Bergson's utterances, the more surprised I find myself by the acceptance he has won from our Pragmatists. Apart from his tendency to exaggerate the differences which separate the speculative from the operative attitude towards the material world, it appears to me that Bergson's philosophical position involves all the positions of Mr. Bradley against which Pragmatism holds itself specially bound to protest. Thus, in place of the pragmatist identification of truth with utility, Bergson offers us the definite view that because of the supposed antithesis between knowing and acting, we must turn our backs on the one if we would succeed in the other. When we have to act we must forget all the refinements and distinctions which thought has created in its endeavor after science, and put ourselves back at the supposed level of primitive 'immediacy' which had to be abandoned as the first step to the formulation of reasoned knowledge. All the distinctions introduced by thought vanish in an indescribable and unanalyzable 'continuum.' On the fundamental point that the real is an absolutely undifferentiated One, continuous in some sense of which it can only be said that it is *not* the continuity which the understanding can grasp and analyze (the continuum of Cantor and of pure mathematics generally), and that all analysis and abstraction involve falsification, Bradley and Bergson are really in complete accord. For all Bergson's insistence on change and motion, it is only the want of rigid precision in his expressions which conceals the fact that he is at heart as much an Eleatic as Mr. Bradley. He speaks, indeed,

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in the book before us, with an undeserved contempt of the famous 'sophisms' of Zeno, but the truth is that these 'sophisms' were immediate deductions from his own thesis of the "indivisibility' of real movement. In fact, the Monism of Bergson is much more fatal to the validity of science than that of Mr. Bradley. For Mr. Bradley has always held that the return to the 'immediacy' of feeling which would remove the element of error from our apprehension of reality is to be somehow combined with a retention of the results won by the discursive understanding in its devious wandering. In the *visio beatifica*, which is the goal of philosophy, we have an 'immediacy' of a higher order than that of primitive undifferentiated 'feeling'; the results of the progressive differentiation which is science are all to persist, though no doubt 'transcended' in a mode of apprehension which cannot be described in language intelligible to reason. But what Bergson demands as the condition of apprehending reality seems to be rather the absolute sacrifice of all the results of thought, a mere return to a mental condition of pure unintelligence, more rudimentary, it may well be, than that of the mollusc. And thus for him it should be a more real difficulty than for Mr. Bradley why, since this condition of bare feeling (the condition assigned by Leibniz to the naked monad) of itself gives us reality whole and indivisible, we should even have committed the *peccatum originale* of trying to escape from it. Mr. Bradley does not at least hold that *vanitas vanitatum* would be an adequate epitaph for the grave of human intelligence; M. Bergson ought to hold it, if he really means what his metaphors always imply, and what, on the rare occasions when he can resist the temptation to let a metaphor usurp the place of a reasoned exposition, he says in so many words.

What has always seemed to me the fundamental defect of M. Bergson as a philosopher, though it is, no doubt, a 'defect of his qualities,' is his lack of thorough grounding in epistemological criticism. It is probable that his very fertility in imaginative metaphor makes the work of steady logical analysis of the problems and assumptions of science distasteful to him. But the consequence which is likely to follow from this peculiarity is that his merits as a philosopher will appear far less to future generations of critics than they do to contemporaries. It is natural for us to give a very high place to

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a writer who has thrown out so many striking suggestions and hinted at so many 'points of view' which look novel and promising, but the real court which will have in the end to pass its verdict on M. Bergson's claim to rank as a great philosopher will be more concerned with the coherency and permanent value of an interpretation of life than with its temporary freshness and suggestiveness, and I am not sure that it may not go harder with him before that court than any of us to-day would naturally expect. Many of his most striking suggestions will, I fear, be found of little lasting worth, just because they arise out of an uncritical formulation of the problems which demand our solution. Thus it sounds on first hearing as though the distinction between 'real duration,' with its innumerably various 'tensions' or rates of progress, and the unreal scientific 'scheme' of an absolute time which, in Newton's phrase, "flows equably," were an utterance of profound genius and probably only required to be developed in order to solve all the difficulties which philosophers have raised about the relation of the time-process to 'reality.' Yet when we find that the differences of 'tension' are themselves afterwards spoken of as variations of 'rapidity,' we cannot help asking whether 'absolute time' and its 'equable flow' are not being tacitly retained as implicit in the very concepts by which we were to escape from them. So it seems at first illuminating to learn that the uniform three-dimensional space and homogeneous motions of physical science, which appear to stand in such pointed contrast with the infinitely various qualitative differences of the sensible world are only a diagrammatic Schematism which science mistakenly insists on taking for a reality behind the veil of appearances. But when we come to study the actual use made by science of these concepts, we do not find them figuring in the character of a reality behind the veil, but modestly functioning as a system of invariants *within* experience, and in this quality they reveal themselves as not only harmless, but indispensable. We may reasonably ask ourselves whether the alleged difficulties and contradictions of our intellectual scheme of categories do not arise merely from misconceptions which the intellect itself is progressively removing as the task of detecting the way in which our categories actually function in scientific work is executed by philosophical criticism. It may be that all the alleged contradictions can be trusted to vanish if we will only

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be absolutely faithful to the principles of a critical philosophy, and that we have no motive to seek to undo the work of science by attempting the impossible task of plunging back into the 'immediacy' of unintelligent feeling. That "percepts without concepts are blind," that no intelligent experience can possibly be 'pure' in M. Bergson's sense of the word, are lessons which, I should have supposed, we had all learned long ago from Kant, and I cannot conceive that later thought will ever forget the lesson for long together. It is time we asked ourselves once more whether the antithesis between 'thought' and 'action' which some of our most brilliant contemporaries seem to regard as absolute is not in the end purely fallacious, whether we are not coming perilously near forgetting the significance of the great idea of a 'practical *reason*.' M. Bergson is, I feel, at least on the verge of a serious error when he insists on distinguishing the man whose memory and imagination are enslaved to the demands of the adaptation of the bodily mechanism to its immediate environment as the 'man of action' from the 'dreamer,' the man of free memories and imaginative vision, and when he similarly makes absolute the severance of the needs of speculation from the needs of life. Is speculation then not also life? Must we take it that after all man *does* live by bread alone, and that art and religion, no less than science, are but 'dreams'? At least, let us not forget that they are the visions of men dreaming greatly, and that the secularism which would rule them out of the life of action may unwittingly be denying to life just that which gives it its value.

Probably the most fruitful thought of the present volume will be found in the theory it propounds as to the relation of brain to mind. The suggestion that the exclusive function of the brain is to act as a center for the coördination of motor responses does seem to add a new alternative to the list of previously existing theories of psychophysical connection, and one which may prove of very great value when thoroughly thought out. But it is not equally clear that M. Bergson has thought out his theory with the requisite thoroughness. On his theory we still have to ask what precisely the psychological character of perception is. Granting that, from the physiological side, the cerebral concomitant of a perception is simply the establishment of a motor reaction on stimulus, it should be clear that at least the cerebral processes by which the re-

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sponse is established are not the object of the perception, and there thus remains the necessity of a psychological, though not of a psycho-physiological theory of perception. What I fail to find expressed with any clearness is M. Bergson's answer to the question whether the immediate object of cognition is a physical thing or a presentation, and, if it is the latter, whether a presentation is or is not an internal state of the soul? M. Bergson, I fancy, partly blinds himself to the fact that he has not answered this question by confusing it with an entirely different one which he has attempted to answer: the question why some of the objective relations between things are perceived by us while others are not. Yet it should be clear that even the fullest answer to *this* problem leaves the more ultimate question what it is that we do when we perceive unsolved. And I am not clear that M. Bergson has said the last word even on the question he does answer. We perceive, he says, those relations in which we are interested. If this meant merely that we perceive what we must react on if the life of the organism is to be preserved, it would clearly be an inadequate statement, since so much of what we perceive has but little significance from this biological point of view, and so much that is of moment is normally imperceptible. If we understand the formula in a wider sense, the retort seems obvious that in many cases we appear to be interested because we antecedently perceive, and not *vice versa*. I am interested in things because I find them here; I do not find them here because by some inexplicable free choice I have resolved that I will be interested in them. A philosophy which shuts its eyes to this fact is inevitably driven, however sorely against its intention, to reproduce the central absurdity of the scheme of Schopenhauer, the doctrine of the generation of a purely contemplative intelligence from a blind impulse which we honor too much when we dignify it with the names of 'will' and 'action.' So much it seems relevant to say here, not in disparagement of M. Bergson's many and brilliant gifts, but by way of a plea for a more thorough and systematic criticism of the categories alike of scientific thought and of ethical and social valuation as the indispensable preliminary of an abiding philosophical synthesis. The late William James did good service to philosophy by preaching to us all the necessity of faith; what is needed to-day is that the message should be completed by one who will preach

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not merely faith, but faith in reason as the condition of philosophical 'salvation.' In so far as the revolt against the recently dominant forms of Hegelianism means a return to a genuine theism and a real teleology I for one cannot but sympathize with it; only I would say, let us beware of the suggestion that the way to behold the 'Father of lights' lies through putting out the eye of the soul.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The University, St. Andrews, Scotland.

RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. Pp. xxvii, 478.

This is a partially revised edition of a book which first appeared twenty years ago. In his preface Dr. Schiller explains and apologizes for republication; he was impelled, he says, by a sense of duty towards the public which demanded it. If the reader wants to know to what extent the revision represents Dr. Schiller's present views on metaphysical questions, his curiosity will remain unsatisfied. We are told, indeed, that "the central doctrines are essentially maintained and may be taken to attest the stability of the author's personality"; but it would be a mistake to suppose that when Dr. Schiller says that his central doctrines are maintained he means that he thinks them quite true. For he says: "I now wholly disbelieve in the possibility of framing a system that can . . . lay claim to absolute truth and certainty." We may take it, however, that he still attaches some value to his system over and above the fact that it proves his personality to be stable, for otherwise he would scarcely have felt it a duty to undergo the labor of revision. It is, therefore, incumbent on a reviewer to try to estimate its value.

The central positions which he wishes to establish seem to be as follows. The world can only be properly understood if we regard it as in process of evolution. And its evolution takes place in a finite period of time; *i. e.*, the world must have had a beginning and will have an end. The goal of this process, which will some day be reached, is a perfect society of perfect individuals. Further, evolution, thus understood, "proves irrefragably that no evolution was possible without a preëxistent Deity" (p. 197). And it can also be proved that God, who

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is the first cause of the temporal process of evolution, is a person, is intelligent, and is finite. This conception of the universe is confirmed, Dr. Schiller thinks, by the first chapter of the book of Genesis (p. 416).

But when we try to fill in the details of the scheme insuperable difficulties arise. What precisely is the nature of the difference between the world as it was when it began and the world as it will be when it ends? We must distinguish, he says, between the 'phenomenally' and the 'ultimately' real; and neither matter nor our phenomenal selves (*i. e.*, our selves as they appear to us) are ultimately real. As to the Self, it is only the phenomenal self that is real now (p. 276); there is a Transcendental Ego which will be the sole reality when the goal of evolution is reached and the time-process ends. And similarly with matter, or the 'objective world'; it is not ultimately real, but has that kind of reality which may be expressed by saying that it has "some teleological significance." Whatever that may mean, it seems plain that both matter and our minds, though at present merely phenomenal, are to be conceived as having some sort of reality: both the psychical and the physical worlds are, he says, different aspects of the same fact. We nevertheless find that these two aspects are by no means on an equal footing. Spirit can be reduced to matter (p. 270); and the objective world in space and time "represents merely a state or condition of our minds" (p. 273), though whether of our phenomenal or of our transcendental selves we are not told. The reduction of matter to terms of spirit is as follows: Matter can be resolved into force, and force is spirit; the atom (or electron) which science postulates as the ultimate constituent of matter is finally defined as "a constant manifestation of divine force or will exercised at definite points" (p. 272). Moreover, there is no such thing as space as distinguished from the matter occupying it (p. 246), and space is 'subjective' (p. 254). These assertions seem inconsistent with the ascription to the physical world of any reality at any point of time. Yet his view of the world-process often seems to be that at the first moment of time, when evolution began, nothing was real except God and matter, and that as spirit is evolved matter grows less and less real, until the process ends with nothing being real except God and a harmony of perfect individual spirits. On the other hand, some of his views contradict this;

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e. g., that in the 'pre-cosmic state' (*i. e.*, before time and evolution began) spirits existed in 'timeless solitude' (p. 414). Did they cease to exist when God created the world?

It would be tedious to set out in detail the inconsistencies involved in this theory; most of them seem capable of being traced to Dr. Schiller's failure to notice the ambiguity of the phrase 'ultimately real.' He is anxious to avoid the usual implication of this phrase, which is that the world, as it appears in space and time, is an illusion, and therefore he often uses 'ultimately real' in the sense of what will be real when the end of the world comes: to say that my mind is not ultimately real now does not mean that it is an illusion, but merely that it is different from what it will be some very large but finite number of years hence; *e. g.*, it is less highly evolved, less of a perfect individual than it will be then. But in his discussion of the phenomenal world he constantly slips back into the other meaning, according to which what is not ultimately real is mere hallucination. A good example of this confusion is his treatment of time. He is positive that the evolution of the world takes place in a time which is both real and finite; for a process must as such have a real beginning and a real end in time (p. 206). At the same time he holds that the notion of time is self-contradictory: this is in fact his only tangible reason for supposing that it will at some distant date be 'transcended by eternity (p. 297). His solution of this contradiction consists in saying that time must be called 'a corruption of eternity.'

Apart from the question whether Dr. Schiller's theory is true, two points may be noticed as to the kind of arguments by which he supports it. In the first place, he frequently appeals to the contradictions supposed to be involved in the notion of infinity. Thus the positions that space and time are finite, that God exists (since an infinite regress of causes is impossible), that God is finite, that the world must have had a beginning, all depend largely on these contradictions, which, however, are never stated with even moderate precision. Dr. Schiller would have done well to revise his views in the light of the work of the mathematical logicians, who, since they claim to have shown that the notion of infinity involves no contradictions, have made precision in these matters more than ever necessary. As it is, a remark which he makes against Mr. Bradley may be retorted upon himself: such proofs are hazardous because the alleged con-

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tradiction may always be ascribed to "insufficient knowledge or inadequate conceptions" (p. 156). In the second place, many of his arguments consist of an appeal, more or less explicit, to passion or prejudice, which usually takes the form of accepting a belief on the ground of its pleasantness. Thus it is suggested that a conclusion may be rejected because it is "repugnant" or "does violence to our best instincts"; or another may be recommended as "satisfying our aspirations." This method of course is connected with the humanist theory of truth: "A truth may be as surely attested by feeling or will as by the most vigorous demonstration" (p. 264).

Finally, it seems necessary to say something about the general tone of Dr. Schiller's writing. He has a large audience outside professional circles, and consequently a great opportunity for securing for philosophy the respect of the plain man. Unfortunately, his style has qualities which must repel not merely the fastidious few, but any person of common sense. Instead of the sobriety and plainness which the subject requires, it is uniformly flabby and pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric. I will quote two specimens: "It [agnosticism] calls up Scepticism from the abyss of negation, and is absorbed by a greater and more powerful spirit of evil. Scepticism, in its turn, can establish its case only by allying itself with Pessimism, and in Pessimism the last disguise is thrown off, and Chaos once more swallows up the Cosmos" (p. 14). "We can still see even now that the happiness that reflects is lost, that comparisons are odious, and creep into the soul upon the wings of the Harpy Doubt when it has sullied the unsuspecting transparency of its virgin feelings" (p. 421). These are models of what English ought not to be. Dr. Schiller says that he has toned down the book; but the process might have been carried much further. He will perhaps plead the exuberance of youth. The fact, however, is that the vices of his style seem to depend on a temper of mind that the years have not cured. The philosopher's passionate conviction of the truth of his doctrines and his desire to convert the world are among the noblest of emotions, provided that he avoids that strain of personal arrogance which, in the man of science, is generally recognized as unbecoming. And it is equally essential to avoid all taint of querulousness. Dr. Schiller's enthusiasm is spoiled by both these faults, which his style

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faithfully reflects. There is a characteristic passage in his preface (p. vi) where he says that philosophers have "exaggerated the importance of their functions," and that in private they do not take their views seriously enough, thus accusing his fellow-workers in one breath of insignificance and dishonesty. This kind of self-conscious swagger is much to be deplored. I would not have made these remarks were it not that Dr. Schiller challenges such criticism by his view that metaphysics must be "intensely personal" (p. vii). There may be some sense in which this is true; but preoccupation with one's own personality may take such forms as to hamper the serious pursuit of truth.

Cambridge, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

A BEGINNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: VOL. II. MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Herbert Ernest Cushman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. Pp. xx, 377.

The second volume of this text-book is not open to the most serious of the strictures passed upon the first (this JOURNAL, xxi, p. 352). It seems to be, to the degree in which that may be demanded in a text-book, a fresh and independent piece of work; and the author in some cases successfully realizes his announced purpose of relating the history of philosophy in an interesting and illuminating manner with the history of general literature and of affairs. The volume has one good quality which some better-written and more scholarly works lack: it keeps clearly before the student's mind the relative dates of the actual currency and influence of doctrines,—which are often quite distinct from the dates of publication of the treatises in which those doctrines are expressed. The movements and the sequence of intellectual fashions of the European mind are exhibited, as well as the succession of technical systems,—the two being, in a considerable measure, independent variables.

It is this above all which an elementary history of modern philosophy should do for its readers; and in at least attempting a sort of *Phänomenologie des occidentalischen Geistes* Professor Cushman has set a good example. Yet I cannot but think the book in certain important respects decidedly ill-adapted to the use of the class of readers for whom it is intended. In the first place, in a praiseworthy effort to bring out the broad outlines of the story, the author repeatedly propounds

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extraordinarily wild generalizations,—which are the more misleading because they are set down in so bald and matter-of-fact a manner that the unwary reader is sure to take them literally. Thus he will learn (p. 231) that German philosophy *überhaupt* has just "three characteristics": one of these is that to its representatives "political life offered no attractions. The soul of man was by them regarded as too noble to be engrossed in external things." He will learn again that "to despise the ignorant masses of the people" was "the common teaching of the early part of the Enlightenment." Throughout the book the outlines are much *too* broad, too hard, too lumpish; the facts are, as it were, chopped out with an axe and driven into the student's mind with a sledge-hammer. When, into the bargain, what is driven in is *not* a fact, the result of the pedagogic operation cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Again, Professor Cushman's exposition is simplifying rather than clarifying. His sentences are concise and seemingly precise; but they are not sequential, and their way of putting things is frequently either highly abstract or virtually meaningless. What clear idea is a college student to get from such a vain repetition of mere catch-words as this? Schelling and Hegel

> stood for the realization of a spiritual realm of free spirits. They sought not a factitious and imaginary condition but tried rather to discover the essentials of the spiritual life. They would reclaim reality spiritually.

Finally, there is (quite apart from debatable questions of exegesis) a number of sheer inaccuracies. I note a few at random. Kant was censured by the Prussian government in 1794, not 1788. It is (as Riley has shown) probably untrue that Jonathan Edwards' idealism came to him through Samuel Johnson from Berkeley. Herbart's system should not be classified as "metaphysical idealism" (p. 232); it is grossly misleading to summarize Nietzsche's teaching in a sentence, as an "extreme statement of pessimism" (p. 542); the deists did *not* "get their clew from Locke's identification of the moral law with the law of nature" (p. 165); "Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Tetens (1736-1805)" were scarcely "contemporary with Leibnitz" (p. 221), who died in 1716; Thomasius should not be bracketed with Wolff as having "developed and transformed" the system of Leibniz (p. 221). By an amusing inversion, Hobbes himself is represented as the one who "looked upon the London fire as

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a divine penalty, on account of the impurity of the English court" (p. 51).

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

Johns Hopkins University.

PROTESTANT THOUGHT BEFORE KANT. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp. 254.

It is difficult to speak of this book without heaping up the superlatives. No adequate impression of its excellence can be given in a review; to be appreciated, it must be read. To read many books is to suffer many disappointments, and it is certainly pleasant to meet with one which fulfills high expectations. The reader is conscious from the beginning that he is in the company of a scholar, a man of learning, who could, if called upon, support his statements by a multitude of evidences which, for the sake of brevity and clearness, are not set forth in this book. The author is evidently a master in this field, and as a writer has the great merit of being able to outline the main features of the course of Protestant thought before Kant, while leaving out the non-essentials. It is like looking at a relief map, or surveying a landscape from a high point. One sees the mountain ranges, the course of the rivers, and is able to get his bearings. If desired, the guide could in this case supply accurate information as to special regions, for it is evident that he knows the details. It is the chief fault of specialists that they tend to lose the sense of proportion, and are unable to show to the beginner or the layman the significance of their researches. But this writer has the instinct of the artist, and he has not spoiled his picture by unnecessary detail.

A careful reading of such books by all who have the intelligence and education to appreciate them would contribute to the amount of broad-mindedness, tolerance, and real charity in the world. To survey the great movements of human thought, to understand their relations to one another and to know something of the genealogy of present religious ideas, is to orient one's self, to get one's bearings, and to answer in some fashion the question, Where are we now? What o'clock is it in humanity's great day?

Although Dr. McGiffert paints with a broad brush, his pic-

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ture is not impressionistic. For instance, in contrasting the mediæval and the modern views of the world, he shows in each case what is fundamental. In the former the foundation was the conviction that the natural man was corrupt and depraved and fallen. Being without merit and bearing the burden of infinite guilt, man's salvation must be a pure gift of God. The logic of this conviction was all-determining. "The deity of Christ being the essential element in the doctrine of the Trinity, that doctrine, too, rested ultimately upon the belief in human corruption and helplessness, and would not have become a part of the faith of the Church had man been thought of in a different way." Upon this estimate of human nature rested the mediæval view of the church, the ascetic ideal of life, and that *contemptus mundi* which made science impossible. With the growth of the modern view of the dignity and worth of human nature there has come an alteration in doctrine and in religious conceptions. There is a changed ideal of life, nature is thought worthy of independent study, science flourishes, and social service is becoming one of our chief interests. The felt needs of men clearly determine their theories.

The spiritual portraits given in this book of Luther, Zwingli, Melanchthon, and Calvin are masterpieces. The general relation of each leader to his time is set forth, and how the new and the old were blended in their thinking. Again and again we are shown how confusion in thought may weaken a great movement. Thus Luther's "doctrine of salvation was not in the least mystical; it moved wholly in the sphere of personal relationships. The adoption of mystical conceptions and forms of speech, whether due to the influence of Paul or of Catholic tradition, worked only confusion, and prevented his gospel from being fully understood and appreciated by those who came after him." The acceptance of views inconsistent with his controlling thought tended "to obscure his gospel and limit its influence."

Although Protestant thought is shown to have undergone a natural and intelligible evolution, the influence of the peculiar make-up of great religious leaders is here given its full significance. By their strength we are uplifted, and by their defects are we troubled. Like other men, they have been prone to generalize from single instances. The author is vividly aware of this, and speaks of the "vicious consequence of universalizing

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an individual experience. Because one man feels his need of divine grace, therefore all men must need it; or because one man feels sufficient to himself, therefore all men are. The history of theology is full of this kind of thing, and many of the most serious controversies and misunderstandings have resulted from it." If we could always remember this, and could in addition realize the danger to clear thought from the use of capital letters and abstract nouns, there would be far less confusion and resulting disorder of life than there is.

Observe the case of Luther. According to Professor McGiffert, "the impulses which controlled him were never those of the scholar, the scientist, or the philosopher. He cared little for clearness and consistency of thought. A satisfactory and adequate world-view was none of his concern. Of intellectual curiosity he had scarcely any; of interest in truth for truth's sake none at all." He was not a theologian or institutional reformer, his supreme interest being in the practical religious life. Driven to a monastery by fear of the wrath of God, resolutely facing the ultimate consequences of the old estimate of man, seeking in vain to secure peace of mind by meritorious works, he underwent a profound religious experience, and found happiness in the sense of God's forgiving love. His experience differed from that of Paul in that the interest of the latter was primarily moral. For Paul, salvation meant salvation from sin, while Luther's sin "troubled him, not on its own account, but solely on account of the wrath of God which it entailed." Luther himself put this clearly: "As wrath is a greater evil than the corruption of sin, so grace is a greater good than the perfect righteousness which we have said comes from faith. For there is no one who would not prefer (if this could be) to be without perfect righteousness than without the grace of God." It would be unjust to Luther not to remember in this connection that in the end the resulting Christian life was not very different from Paul's ideal. For having been delivered from wrath, the child, happy in his father's house, could give himself to loving service.

But we see how inevitable was the transformation which Luther's gospel had to undergo when transmitted to others, *e. g.*, when expounded by Melanchthon, even though the latter was a devoted disciple. Not having had Luther's religious experience, being a humanist in spirit, and moved by "a pedagogic

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moral concern for the moral welfare of his readers," his master's position was by him nominally maintained, but really abandoned. The inevitableness of this and its profound significance for us all need no comment.

The nature of German Pietism and English Evangelicalism, the New England Theology, and the course of the Rationalistic movements in England, France, Germany, and America have been admirably set forth. The ordinary view of the Deistic movement is shown to be erroneous, and the increasing interest in ethics and in social service explained as a result of the new estimate of man characteristic of the modern world. The movements of thought which are here traced through several centuries are seen to lead naturally to the trying situation in which many have seemed to face the unwelcome alternative: "Either a mediæval man and a Christian or a modern man and a sceptic." "Mediævalism or irreligion, this was the alternative offered by consistent Evangelicals, and accepted by consistent rationalists." In closing, the author simply states, what it will be the task of later volumes in this series of "Studies in Theology" to show more fully, that the future belonged neither to the rationalism or pietism which were disputing the field when Kant began his labors, but that "new conceptions of religion have emerged and have resulted in forms of Christianity congenial to the temper and discoveries of the modern age, so that it has become possible for a man to be fully in sympathy with the modern spirit and yet remain a Christian."

St. Louis. GEORGE R. DODSON.

MONTE AMIATA E IL SUO PROFETA (David Lazzaretti). By Giacomo Barzellotti. Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1910. Pp. xv, 359.

The author of this interesting and important work is already known to English readers through his "La morale nella filosofia positiva" (1871), of which a translation was brought out (1878) by C. P. Somerby, New York, as "The Ethics of Positivism," as well as through the pages of this JOURNAL. The volume in hand bears a title that is musical enough, but does not woo by any hint of weighty contents even the cultured layman to read it. Mount Amiata may be known to him commercially as a center of quick-silver industry, the mines there dating back to a remote antiquity. In geography he may have learned of

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it as the apex of Tuscany, a huge volcanic cone cast up five thousand six hundred and eighty-nine feet, whose fires were long since quenched, an Alpine fragment solitary amid the Sub-Apennines; and perhaps he may have descried its form on some leisurely tour through the Sienese and Umbrian regions. The New Testament student may be reminded of the famous Codex Amiatinus, with its remarkable capitulation of the "Epistle to Romans," so clearly revealing that the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters are later additions wedged in between the fourteenth and the Doxology at the end. But neither such nor other less immediate suggestions would arouse interest in the volume.

The sub-title referring to 'its prophet (David Lazzaretti)' would most likely merely mystify. This 'David' has not yet found recognition among the minimal, let alone among the minor prophets. One seeks for him vainly in the lists of notables, in the Index of Names, in the Annual for his death-year (1878), in the vast encyclopedias, the deep Dead Seas of knowledge. The Britannica knows him not, nor the Konversations-Lexikon of Meyer, not to mention others less omniscient though hardly less omniloquent. Certainly Lazzaretti is unlike other prophets, being quite without honor outside of his own country. Nevertheless, his biography is well worth reading, and its subject-matter undoubtedly deserves the pains-taking psychologic-philosophic treatment it has received at the hands of the Italian savant.

Who then was this latter-day prophet, this David Lazzaretti "called the Saint," this "rapt one of the godlike forehead," whose noble features, yea, whose wooden shoon even, are figured in this volume? He was a Millenarian, a kind of nineteenth-century Savonarola, to whom he stands related about as Siena is related to Florence. Born in Arcidosso, November 6, 1834, he toiled in youth with his father amid the death-dealing swamps of the Tuscan coast (the Maremma), where on April 25, 1848, the Vision of a Brother appeared to him, saying, but forbidding him to repeat to a living soul, "Thy life is a mystery that one day shall be revealed to thee." Twenty years amid his native hills he led the uneventful life of a cartman, driving three mules always neat and well-kept, though on occasion the objects of his vigorous blasphemy. Not wholly uneducated, he loved his Dante and his Tasso, and would entertain his com-

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panions with long and frequent quotations, especially from the *Divina Commedia,* which has left its deep imprint on his own numerous writings. Precisely a score of years after the first vision came the second (April 25, 1868), whence dates his 'conversion,' the birth of the new man. He now repaired to Rome, where with difficulty he obtained audience with Pio Nono. Advised to withdraw into a convent, to meditate upon his mission, he retired to one in the Sabina and there dwelt in a cavern named after the 'Blessed Amadeo,' where, of course, through both eye and ear now opened, he received supernatural communications in number. At length returning to his mountain home, he found the fame of his visions had outrun him and had prepared his simple-hearted compatriots to receive him as the 'man of mystery' and even above his own self-valuation. Taking deeply to heart the distraught condition of Church and State, he set before himself ever more determinedly the formidable task of reforming both, and that in a high and holy sense, in fact, of inaugurating the Era of the Spirit; of the third Person in the Trinity, the reign of Right as a further and final development from the reign of Grace. (It seems a far cry from Lazzaretti to Hartmann, yet the notions of the Saint and the philosopher at this point present a strange rapprochement.) Once he withdrew for prolonged fasting (out-doing Tanner) and meditation and communion with heaven to the rock-mass of Monte Cristo, rising abruptly from the Tyrrhene Sea, about thirty miles south of Elba. Repeatedly for much longer periods he dwelt in France, under patronage of Du Vichat, and there brought forth some of his most important productions. Able ecclesiastics gave him sympathy and encouragement, edited, revised, and even interpolated his visionary writings, and seemed at first not unwilling to use him as an instrument to foment a reactionary movement, presumably in the interest of the Legitimists. But gradually his aims and claims burst all bounds of Catholic tolerance, he came finally into conflict with the Church, whose Sacred Congregation placed all his writings on the Index. But his fellow-mountaineers he overmastered completely by the force of his personality, inspired with his own ideals of life and society, organized into a miniature kingdom of the skies, with an elaborate hierarchy and officialdom, and he was himself unhesitatingly accepted as a Second Messiah, as Son of God, as 'Christ the Leader and

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Judge.' For ten years and almost to the very last he seems to have had no warlike or other evil intent, but hoped merely to effect a peaceful revolution in the minds and hearts of all men, especially his Italian countrymen. Finally, however, perhaps impatient of the long result of time and spurred on by his more zealous followers, on August 14, 1878, he assembled round his Church and Tower and Hermitage (upreared with endless toil by the loving hands of the Lazzarettists) on Monte Labbro (3,894 ft. high, a satellite of Amiata) an excited throng of three thousand 'God-intoxicated' believers, whom he held there four days in a state of religious exaltation that bordered on frenzy, but pliant to his slightest word or beck or look, till the morning of the 18th, when in expectation of heaven-sent miracles they all began the long-promised 'Descent,' men, women and children, preceded by David and some three hundred officials variously and most picturesquely garmented. Half way down, on the main street of Arcidosso, they were met by two civil authorities (the Delegate of Public Safety and the Syndic) with eight carbineers, and as rioters were commanded to retire and disperse. A colloquy ensued between Lazzaretti and the Delegate, De Lucca. The former was not disposed to violence, but was prepared rather to die than to retire, doubtless clearly seeing that any backward step in such a presence would end his 'Mission' and bury him beneath universal contempt. At a gesture from him, his followers raised the cry of 'Viva la repubblica,' and a shower of stones fell upon the Delegate. Some one called out 'Fire!'; instantly came the sharp report of carbine, then another and another, followed by a volley wrapping all in smoke. Lazzaretti fell, mortally wounded, his head pierced by three bullets. Immense confusion arose, in which the soldiers fired upon the defenceless peasants cruelly and needlessly. Severe blame for the whole tragedy rests upon the Government, at that time in the nerveless hands of Cairoli, whose Minister of the Interior, Zanardelli, practised *laissez faire* to a degree, openly declaring it his policy "to repress but not to prevent."

Lazzarettism, however, did not die with its founder. *No disciple's faith was shaken.* Scarcely diminished in numbers, they still keep up the cult, they patiently await the return of the 'Saint,' legends begin to flutter round his name, which more and more attracts the attention of thinkers, and an increasing

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throng of visitors make pilgrimages of curiosity or sympathy to the theatre of his action.

Such in barest outline are the facts forming the subject-matter of our author's careful study. The question is, What is the scientific value, the philosophic interest of the whole incident? The author himself asks plainly, 'Is it worth while?' and answers decidedly, 'Yes!' No one indeed can fail to perceive a marked resemblance to the Gospel account understood as history, so marked at points as to suggest imitation, and it is this resemblance that Barzellotti has always in mind and that has prompted him to such a minute investigation. He is not indeed the first nor yet the last to perceive and to stress this obvious aspect of the whole matter. The finest French intellect of the past generation, Ernest Renan, writing with enthusiasm of Barzellotti's earlier *précieux volume,* "David Lazzaretti di Arcidosso"[1] (1885), declared it "a model of the manner in which such investigations should be pursued. It is a document infinitely precious for the critical history of religions. In particular, upon the Galilean movement of the first century of our era and the Umbrian movement of Francis of Assisi it throws a very vivid illumination, etc." Even more emphatic is the Danish savant, Dr. Emil Rassmussen (author of "Jesus: a Study in Comparative Psychology"), who spent many months in Arcidosso, in minute and exhaustive examination of all the pertinent literary and historical facts of the case, and in 1904 published in Copenhagen a critical treatment of the whole in a volume of two hundred and thirty-three pages, entitled, "En Kristus fra vore Dage: italiensk Kulturbillede," of which there has appeared a second edition. The Dane, who espouses in general the psychopathic theory of the rise of religions, is an open and ardent admirer of Lazzaretti, whom he regards as the parallel and counterpart of Christ, as not clinically an epileptic, but subject to a chronic "condition of epileptic oppression, combined with frequently systematic religious delirium. . . . We must recognize that the greatness of the mind depends often on its malady." At the same time Rassmussen dissents emphatically from the alienists, such as Lombroso, Morelli, and others less known, whose pages overflow with discussions of

[1] Summarized with eloquence, but without suspicion of the significance of the whole, in the *Athenæum*, 1885, I, 628*ff*. See also *Spectator*, 58, 1235.

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David as the perfect type of half a dozen nobly-named varieties of mania. The more careful Dane pays full tribute to the moral character of the 'Saint' as pure, altruistic, disinterested, full of good faith, of patriotism, of family affection, and singularly free from the affective abnormalities that commonly characterize the 'religious genius.' In general, it must be admitted that the moral and social aspects of Lazzarettism have stood successfully the severest scrutiny of the most unfriendly critics.

As to the scientific value of Barzellotti's and similar works, and the importance of the spirit and method of investigation which they exemplify, we shall not raise any question. But at one point of vital significance we must register a wide dissent and the most emphatic protest. Even though one accept with very slight reserve the analysis of the general religious consciousness and of many of its most notable active manifestations in the genesis of cults and sects and orders, even granting that the pre-Christian and proto-Christian religious consciousness must be measured in some dimensions with the one universal standard, it still remains true that the parallel, whether express or implied between the *Saint* and the Jesus, is wholly imaginary and misleading, and that any and every attempt to interpret the Origin of Christianity in terms of Lazzaretti or St. Francis or any and all human personalities must fail henceforth as hitherto, flatly, hopelessly, and ignominiously. For all such interpretations begin and end with a strange neglect of the central and pivotal fact of proto-Christianity, namely, that it was a monotheism, begotten, born, and reared in an intensely monotheistic consciousness, directed squarely and firmly against the prevailing polytheism, which was the one supreme religious fact of the day and of necessity formed the point of attack for any religious movement emerging from Greco-Jewish circles. It is this one overshadowing fact that separates the Christian and the Lazzaretti movements as far apart as the poles, that thrusts them asunder by the whole diameter of being. In the presence of this broad and decisive diversity, the multiplied similarities in detail that appear in connection with the current superficial and systematically false interpretation of the Gospels, must all sink into insignificance, while the deeper and correcter interpretation shows them to be but shadows, void of any substance whatever. Let one illustration suffice. The strength of Lazzarettism lay in the personality of David. In

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what his charm consisted it is superfluous to inquire. Suffice it that few of his fellows could resist the spell, still less could any one break it once cast upon him. So far forth he was indeed the exact counterpart of the 'Jesusbild,' as it flourishes in the fancy of liberal critics. But now mark the difference. Naturally and necessarily, since it was the personal fascination exerted by David that won him disciples, these latter were found from first to last in the circle of his immediate acquaintance. Says our author (p. 339): "Not everywhere on Mount Amiata, but in Arcidosso and in the neighboring hamlets, in those nearest to Mount Labbro in the fields that face the Maremma, where the prophet found from the start the majority of his followers, there remain still faithful nearly all the survivors of the societies founded by him, his apostles and some of the younger disciples, of those called later to the faith." Beyond this charmed circle of his own personality the faith of the Lazzaretti has never extended, and we may safely say can never extend itself perceptibly. Not only is this precisely as it should be, it seems precisely as it must be. Now had the Christian propaganda resembled Lazzaretti's in its origin, had it welled out from a single pure-human source, as the critics maintain, then surely something similar would have happened. The region of the personal influence of Jesus, the fertile and populous shores of Galilee, would have formed the radiant focus of his Gospel mission, thence it would have spread itself in widening waves, and always at the front we should have found the historic names of the immediate primitive disciples. However, in the case actually presented all this is exactly reversed. Galilee is practically unknown in the early preaching. The primitive churches or groups of disciples spring up in remote regions, in Damascus, in Antioch, in Crete, in Libya; we find Epistles to Corinthians, to Galatians, to Romans, to the Dispersion, and to many others, but none to the saints in Capernaum, or in Chorazin, or in Bethsaida, or in Nazareth, or even in Jerusalem. Neither are the historical primitive propagandists the friends, fellow-citizens, and personal disciples of the Jesus. Saul of Tarsus, Ananias of Damascus, Apollos of Alexandria, Prisca and Aquila of Rome, Barnabas of Cyprus, Stephen the protomartyr, Philip the deacon, and various other missionaries,—none was ever acquainted with a human Jesus. The twelve Apostles stand forth but as shadows of mighty names. The earliest traditions

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find nothing for them to do, can tell nothing of their activity. This is notoriously true of eleven, and is, in fact, also true of the one apparent exception, Simon Peter. Thus the supposed similarity between the two origins of the two movements turns out to be a dissimilarity and contrast so complete as of itself to show the impossibility of explaining the two similarly. Since Lazzarettism was admittedly an emanation from a pure-human focus, we have no choice but to admit that primitive Christianity was not such an emanation in any such sense. So far then from corroborating and verisimilating the modern critical theory of Christian Origins, the example of David must shatter and disprove it utterly. Barzellotti and his peers have indeed rendered a great service to science by their intense study of this recent religious phenomenon, but in a sense exactly the reverse of the intended. They had builded better than they knew.

Coming now to our author's mode of treatment, we are vividly reminded of Taine (whom Barzellotti cites and has translated, and has even critically appreciated in a volume "Ippolito Taine," 1895) and his three moments, and in less degree of Reich and his geo-political factors. The suggestion lies near that these determinants have been rather overworked, and that they do not contribute so very much to our understanding of any exceptional individuality. At most, they might help us to understand some type, some organic complex of modes, but surely not the *deviation* from the type or mode. Now it is precisely this deviation that constitutes the individuality, the distinctive personality of such a one as David, and after all of Barzellotti's profound and interesting prolegomena on the art, history, topography, and climate of his hero's 'ambiente,' one finds oneself not far advanced towards understanding the hero himself.

Such a 'religious genius' may after all appear almost anywhere, in any *milieu*,—in New England or in Chicago, as well as in 'Unknown Tuscany.' But the reader of these nearly two hundred preliminary pages is well repaid by the beauty of the author's style and the picturesque finish of his descriptions. Some of these, for example, the pathetic sketch of the Lazzarettist family at supper, would seem to invite urgently the pencil of the painter.

It seems noteworthy that Barzellotti, in quoting the close of the Hymn composed by David and sung by the women on the

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'Descent' from Labbro, fails to remark that it is a virtual translation of the last stanzas of Jacopone da Todi's "Stabat Mater."

On the whole, our author has produced a highly entertaining, instructive, and illuminative volume, which deserves far wider attention than it is likely to receive beyond the borders of Italy.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

Tilton Memorial Library, New Orleans.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JANUARY, 1912.

WAR AND CIVILIZATION.

R. M. MacIVER.

DOES an institution die when it has lost its meaning, when the conditions that made it intelligible or necessary have given place to conditions in which it is no longer intelligible? If it did, then to-day the institution of war would indeed be dead, the corpse of an institution with no animating breath. The process of the world has brought an age in which it is strictly and simply without meaning. The social conditions out of which war arose have been transformed into social conditions which leave no place for war. It were well if we could understand this transformation and so rid ourselves of the body of this dead thing.

To understand it we must understand how the significance of the 'state' has been gradually, almost imperceptibly, changing since first modern states arose on the ruins of mediæval empire. A process of social differentiation has been going on, the details of which have often been pointed out but the full meaning of which is almost wholly ignored. The result is that our political thinking is at many points archaic, and far behind our actual progress. Questions of great moment are coming up for settlement, arising naturally out of the new conditions, and we are discussing them in terms of the old. Our notions about the state are derived from a world where quite different conditions held, a world where the new questions could never have arisen because then a state was some-

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thing quite different from what a state is now. We cannot answer the new questions until we understand the new conditions.

If we ask the average man who thinks or writes or talks about the state, "what then is the state?" he would be put to no little perplexity. "War," say the publicists, "is a relation between state and state." True, and there was a time when war had a very clear meaning as the hostile relation of states. At that time states were not only independent but separate, and separation makes hostility possible. At that time it was not merely states but communities that were separate and independent; and state and community were one. The state *was* the community. When the state went to war the community went to war. It was the people, the tribe, the city, the nation, and not merely the state that entered into war. But can we say to-day that the state is the people or the nation? Are the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the rest, states and nothing more? We speak as if they were and thereby show our blindness to one of the most remarkable and far-reaching movements of modern civilization. While we are thinking in terms of the old world, we have all the while been unwittingly building up a new world and a new civilization. And the new civilization is in one respect totally unlike any the world has seen before. It is so new that we do not yet understand it. When we do we shall see that the new civilization has made war unintelligible,—except as a survival.

I hope to show from two sides that to-day the state is not the same as the community or the society over which its legislation extends. On the one hand the life of the community is far too wide, complex, and spontaneous to be wholly included within the sphere of state-action; on the other the life of any community is part of the life of a far greater community. These are the two sides of a single development of civilization, which is transforming the character of the state, and in doing so is destroying the meaning of war.

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To-day it is the state and not the community that goes to war, for there is no community which is separate and independent to-day. A war to-day between civilized peoples is essentially 'civil war,' because the peoples are all to-day *inter*-civilized. It is the breakdown of existing community and not the assumption of hostility *between* communities. That war should have meaning at all it is essential that the state should be co-extensive with the community, that a people should be as independent of any other people as a state is of any other state.

In the true military age this was the fact,—it was the fact for every civilization of the past. In the early civilization of the earth men generally lived in tribes, often on a very communistic plan, and the tribes lived in isolation from one another. The tribal system alone bound the members of the tribe together and in turn a man's place in the tribe determined his whole life. Within the tribe one essential sentiment of unity prevailed, the sense of tribal kinship, strictly confined to the circle of the tribe. Society was bounded by that narrow circumference for each. No community and no moral relation bound tribe and tribe. "The only place where the peoples could become acquainted with one another was the battlefield." (Eötvös.) That age of isolation was the heyday of war.

Even when the peoples grew civilized and the limits of community became larger, there was yet little intersocialization. Society and the political organization of society were not yet distinguished. When the state arose and took a definite name it claimed to sum up the whole of the social life within its borders. The state specially granted the right of intermarriage or commerce with members of other states, when such rights were not denied altogether. There was a religion prescribed by the state and a state-god, the God of the race, who was often also the God of War. The king or chief was the defender, with the political sword, of *the* faith, the faith of the people. On every side the state included the whole life

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of the people and thereby isolated it from every other people. For a state must be independent and separate. It must have definite frontiers to which its law extends and no further. Its members must obey no other law than its own. Therefore when society and state are one, each community stands in isolation. The Jew had no dealings with the Samaritan. The stranger is the enemy,—the same word generally denoted both. In the Roman phrase a man is a wolf to a man he does not know. Each tribe or race felt that community was possible only when the member of another was adopted into its own, and took on its race and, often, religion. The unity of the tribe meant its severance from other tribes, because it depended on those things which separated it from other tribes, its race and its race-religion.

One form of early community deserves special notice in this respect, because it was the most advanced in civilization, and because its legacy of thought determines our thought to-day. Many of our political thinkers of to-day derive their doctrine not from the actual conditions of our civilization, but from the political theory of Athens. Yet in this matter the city-community of Greece belonged to the ancient world, belonged to a past civilization and not at all to ours. In the city-community of Greece men have indeed become citizens instead of tribesmen. The bond of community is widened,—it is now not common kin or common religion, it is common life, the life of the city, or rather of the citizen, for by no means all within the walls are distinguished as citizens. But citizenship here claims the whole life of man, as kinship did elsewhere. The limit of the city is still the limit of community. Socrates was accused of 'introducing' other Gods. "The city," said Aristotle, "decides what sciences are to have place within the community, and what kind the individual citizen is to study, and to what extent." In a word, state and society are one. Accordingly the life of the city, as of the tribe, is exclusive. The alien is either refused entrance altogether or is admitted on

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suffrance, without legal standing, often only on payment of a special fee. He is admitted at most within the walls of the city, not within the circle of citizenship. The life of the city, as of the tribe, is exclusive. The sentiment of race or religion vainly stimulates occasional movements towards inter-community of city and city. No real unity is achieved, except for a moment in face of the barbarian. For the city was the state, so far as a state existed, *and where the political society is co-extensive with and equal to the whole social life of the community, that community is thereby essentially cut off from all others.* The result is the same in ancient Greece and in mediæval Germany and Italy,—the incessant warfare of independent city with independent city, only ending in their being all alike submerged in absolutism. The cities of Greece and Germany and Italy were like quarrelsome children, shut up at last, as they deserved to be, in the school of despotism.

By almost insensible steps men learn to pass from old into new worlds. The new civilization, our civilization, did not appear when the modern territorial states came into being. Each considerable country was still a separate society no less than an independent state. To be an Englishman was practically to be the enemy of the Frenchman. Nor was any true distinction drawn between political and other social forces. The state still claimed the whole control of society, not recognizing that it rests on and is itself an expression of the will of society. In France Louis XIV ordained that every Protestant must change his religion. In England the monarch or parliament once and again imposed political disabilities on those who did not believe the faith for the time-being established.

Yet slowly within the limits of each state a significant difference was revealed between the old and the new. The country state of modern Europe was the first large free state in the history of the world, the first large state whose political order was not imposed upon it. This

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characteristic, itself due to the widening of the circle of realized community, made a new distinction inevitable: the distinction between society and state, between the whole complex of social forces working in a community and that definite organized political order we call the state. The modern state has during these centuries been slowly realizing its nature. It is only after centuries of strife and bloodshed that, for instance, states have ceased to impose upon their members a state-religion, and have come to admit in practice if not in principle that some aspects of social life are beyond their control.[1] Slowly the place and meaning of the state is becoming clear. The process is yet incomplete, nor can we prophesy the form of its consummation, though the ideal is that every social attribute, however extensive or however limited,—common race, common temperament, common speech, common culture, common religion, common humanity,—should find a society adequate to the degree and kind of community it involves. This is yet far distant, but meantime two lines of the social evolution, interdependent and very significant, have been revealed. For (1) within the state, with the growth of 'freedom' it has become manifest that society is more than the state and expresses itself in many forms and has a multitudinous spontaneous activity which is largely undetermined by the political order. It has become manifest that the state, the political organization, is created by a social will which manifests itself in other ways as well. Modern representative democracy is a recognition of the basis of the state on a social will that is more ultimate than and prior to the political will, to the 'sovereign' that it creates. (2) This social will is not only more ultimate, it extends further than the political will. It is not bounded by the frontiers of states. It extends as far as felt community extends, and need only cease where community ceases. Therefore it crosses the boundaries of states and unites the members

[1] In England up till 1829 a whole church,—the Roman Catholic,—was disqualified from political service.

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of independent states in a single society. Let us remember that war is the breaking down of all community, and ask what right the state has to carry on warfare, *when, as is now the case, the state is not co-extensive with society.*

Men are beginning to see that there is something more ultimate even than the state, that the state is not the whole expression, or the widest expression of the common will of man, that it is one fundamental institution created by society, in a word, that society is greater than the state.

What then is society, and for what end does it maintain the state? Society exists wherever and in so far as human beings recognize any sort of community with one another and in any way organize themselves for the sake of common life or the furtherance of common ends. It includes an infinite variety of forms and infinite degrees of community. *No one form is all inclusive,* because none is sufficient for man's sociability. To meet one social need the church arises, to meet another the family, to meet another the city. Civilized life vibrates with social instinct. Beside the greater societies a myriad lesser ones are everywhere forming and reforming, dissolving and being created. Wherever men recognize a common interest, great or small, in religion or in the study of earth-worms, wherever they realize a common possession,—be it a land or an idea,—there a society springs into being. First the common interest, then the common will which it engenders, the will of the society whatever it be, directed to the maintaining and furthering of the common end. The greater our individuality, the more societies does it demand for its satisfaction.

The greater permanent societies stand for the great permanent ends, the societies of the state, the church, the family, the societies of production and exchange, the societies of learning and art. The state is *one among other societies,* fundamental, necessary, and the most authoritative, but neither alone fundamental nor alone

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necessary. The unity of the social world is not to be found in the state, but in the social will on which the state rests and which does indeed lend the state a certain authority over the other societies.

It is on this matter that the current ways of thinking are misleading and confused. The source of this perplexity is easily pointed out. For, on the one hand, the state does by its law control other societies to a certain extent, does, and with justification, legislate for other societies, including even family and church; and on the other hand, we feel dimly that there are limits to this control, that these societies have a life of their own, spontaneous and free, not merely a part of the state life. We feel that when extreme socialists claim that these should be simply state-institutions, they are devitalizing these societies. A man is more than a citizen. Men do not worship God because they are citizens of England,—the God-of-the-nation day is past,—nor do they bring up families and earn their livelihoods for the sake of the state. The welfare of the state, for all its fundamental importance, is a totally inadequate ideal. The tribe was the small and single society of the tribesman, the city was the almost all-comprehensive social center of the Hellene, but for us the state is neither tribe nor city,—it has grown and differentiated in growing. For us history has been defining the place and the purpose of the state, and the process of its definition has been the record of our freedom. We have learned through centuries of strife that neither common race nor common faith nor common life is a necessary requisite of citizenship. A state, a political order, stands not for the whole of human life within its borders, but for a definite end or rather for all those ends which can be secured by established law and the central controlling organization that is primarily the executive of law. Here the state stands supreme. Whatever good enacted law can secure, it is the purpose of a state to secure: whatever a central organization backed by law can do, without hurting the spon-

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taneity of social life, to secure any common good of its members, that it is the duty of the state to undertake. Each state seeks these things within its borders, and with the means at its command; beyond these it cannot go; beyond these the other social forces work out their ends.

In doing so these social forces have outpassed the boundaries of states. Society gaining freedom within the territorial state of the modern world passes also beyond its borders. For society has no frontiers, no limitations. It has only one condition, the recognition of common interest. It rests on the common will engendered by the knowledge of common good. The greatest social phenomenon of the present age is the expansion of society beyond the limits of any one state. It is perhaps the greatest distinction between the modern and the ancient world, but we have as yet failed to bring our political thought into accord with this development. Some of our accredited thinkers even speak as if we were still living in the little Greek city, whose life was rounded by the circle of its walls. Some still call the state, after Aristotle,[2] the "ethical whole" and say it "includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, from the trade to the Church and the University." It is less wonder if our popular writers often fail to distinguish, say, between the German state and the social world of Germany. The German state is, as every state must be, independent and self-complete. Its law reaches to a frontier and no further. In conferring German citizenship it rightly denies to its members the citizenship of any other state. But the social life of Germany is bound to ours by a thousand ties

[2] There was a better justification for Aristotle, because he spoke not of the 'state' at all, but of the 'city.' It was significant of Greek thought that the one word 'politikos' stood for 'civil,' 'political,' and 'social' all in one. Similarly is it not significant of the backwardness of *our* thinking that we have only the term 'citizen' to express membership both of a state and of a city?

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of commerce and culture and ideal. Or rather there is a continuous social order in which German and Englishman meet, uncreated by government or political system, and eventually indissoluble by political power. Government can foster or retard it, but it is more ultimate than government, because society is greater than the state.

If we once realized how the civilized world is being transformed from separated, isolated, independent societies into a single continuous society, international questions would at once appear in a new light. We should see, *e. g.*, that the cessation of war does not depend on federations or treaties arbitrarily entered upon by independent self-sufficient states, not on the mere fiat of high contracting parties, not simply on the convenience of governments or the intrigues of diplomacy or the relations of monarchs, but on the silent widening social will that ultimately all governments must obey. The mass of society, the great working mass of every people, have an interest in peace and not in war. Their interests are one in every state; they form a single common interest. Common interest when recognized begets common will. It is on this common will that the world's peace is based. In particular the united peaceful industrial society of Europe, which has absolutely no desire for war and no interest except in so far as it pays for and suffers by war, is gradually feeling its unity and finding a voice. Some labor leaders have already threatened that in the event of war between western states, the labor parties would by striking so effectually intervene as to bring the war to an end. Such an attitude may seem a menace to the state, but we must meet the menace in the right way. Hitherto the state has protected, more or less, the societies within the area of its jurisdiction. It has acted, however, as if there were no continuous society reaching beyond its borders. This society the single state cannot of itself protect. What then shall protect this more universal society even against the single state?

The members of western states are already and are

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becoming more and more members also of this greater society. This greater society is becoming conscious of its common interest and in turn will establish, through the coöperation of states, the means for its security. It has already begun to do so by 'international law' and by the recently established international courts. Many people regard 'international law' as law in name only, and international courts as courts in name only. What, they ask, is law that has no force behind it, or a court that can neither summon offenders nor execute its decrees? Is not law without power a shadow or phantom, and the tribunal entrusted with administering it but the vain pulpit of impotent idealists, pitting moral suasion against armed force? Such an objection is ill-founded. 'International law' is not yet law in the full sense of the term, but it is mere ignorance to say that therefore it is futile. You are perfectly at liberty to deny to it the right to the term 'law,' but you must admit its efficacy nevertheless. States do not sign Berlin treaties or agree to Hague or Geneva Conventions without meaning something by it. And there are many rules of international law that no civilized state would dream of violating. Would any civilized state to-day commence hostilities without declaration of war, or shoot down in warfare the ascertained bearers of a flag of truce? The 'law of nations,' which even Napoleon declared to be universally observed by civilized states, has been hitherto concerned more with regulating war than peace, but if it can regulate war, the denial of community, are there not a thousand reasons why it should be still more authoritative to regulate peace?

Force indeed of some kind the law must have. But whence in the first instance does the law acquire its force? From governments or judges or armies or policemen? Simply from the social will to uphold the law, the will to obey it. Without that will not a government or court of law could exist for an hour. It is that will that evokes the force that waits behind the law, to enforce the law

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on any reluctant minority. Government is simply a medium of the will of society.

The assumption that law is only possible within a state is an unnecessary one. There was a time in the history of civilization when there were laws and no states, effective social laws. No legislature had ever enacted them, no chief had ordained them, but they ruled the tribes, were recognized and obeyed, upheld only by public opinion and the power of social approbation and disapprobation. So far as we can discern the dim beginnings of civilized life, first in the history of peoples came the law, never enacted or proclaimed, next the court, the jurisdiction, the 'doom,' revealing but not making law, and last of all the legislature took law into its charge. *International law is following exactly the same course.* The law itself has been growing into being from remote antiquity, the famed 'law of nations,' the "law which all men everywhere obey," dimly realized in the troubled political consciousness of the Greeks, interpreted by the Romans for the peoples within the Empire and after the pitiless wars of the middle ages first formulated by Grotius as a rule for independent states.

Here is the first stage, the slow revealing of the law. The second stage has now arrived. Two permanent international courts have now been called into being, the Hague permanent Court of Arbitration, founded 1899, and the Hague International Court of Appeal for naval prizes, recently established. This is the beginning of the jurisdiction that comes after the law. Lastly will come the international legislature, to take into its keeping, maintain, modify, and enlarge the international law. Why should not such a legislature be as authoritative as, say, a Federal Legislature? It is the fulfillment of the present process of the nations. It would leave the integrity of nations unimpaired, or rather ensure it, for it is war that has always threatened the independence of peoples. It is a means neither to imperialism nor to cosmopolitanism, two false extremes. It would maintain

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the autonomy of states, as law maintains the liberty of individuals. And it would protect society. For while state is totally independent of state, and race, sometimes, clearly defined and separate from race, society is one, and links the nearest to the most remote and makes the most remote indispensable to the nearest. "I say, there is not a red Indian hunting by Lake Winnipeg can quarrel with his squaw, but the whole world must smart for it; will not the price of beaver rise?" If not sympathy or understanding, then at least commerce forms its nexus.

Even were they bound by this strong band alone, it would be enough to make war, the breaking down of community, disastrous both to the warring nations and to the neutral peoples with whom they form one society. This economic interdependence has recently been very strikingly illustrated by Mr. Norman Angell in his book "The Great Illusion." I do not think, however, that the new economic conditions alone are our greatest security against war. War has always been expensive and has rarely paid itself to the conquerors, but this has not prevented wars. The surer safeguard is the growing intercommunity of the nations, of which the economic interdependence is rather a sequel than a cause. It is isolation that sets the peoples to war. "They isolate themselves, expecting war," wrote Bastiat, "but isolation is itself the commencement of war." When nations are isolated, the strength of one is the weakness of the other, the pride of one is the disgrace of the other. When nations are inter-socialized, the weakness of one is the weakness of the other, but the wealth, culture, and progress of the one contribute to the wealth, culture, and progress of the other. For it is an elementary fact that within a society every gain of the part is a gain of the whole directly in proportion to the solidarity of the society.

The civilized world is becoming more and more rapidly an effective society. Each country is becoming more and more bound up in the welfare of each. Every recent advance of science has been a means for the widening of

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the area of community, uniting men in ways impossible before. Railway, telegraph, telephone, Marconi apparatus, even camera, cinematograph, and electric theatre, are they not all bridging the gulfs of isolation, bringing the peoples nearer to one another, and enabling them to realize the common factors of all civilized life? The will for peace grows with the means of community.

It is solidarity that is making war unintelligible: the credit system merely makes it more disastrous. Isolation is the source of all hostility, the alleged causes are mainly pretexts. Nations have carried on schemes of mutual devastation in cases where no possible gain but only loss could accrue, in the interests of dynasties or in the name of religion or of honor. The first two causes, dynastic ambition and religion, need no longer be reckoned with. The world in which they operated, in which men fought and laid countries waste to raise a Habsburg to a throne or 'enforce' a dogma, is also of the unreturning past. Democracy has made the one and enlightenment the other impossible. There still remains 'honor,' and,—if we rule out the idea that commercial supremacy follows military power,—'honor' alone. 'Honor' stands out as the ostensible exception in international agreements. 'Honor' is the last stand of the argument for war. Nearly all the states of the civilized world have been in these days binding themselves by treaty to refer subjects of dispute to the Hague tribunal, but they have all added the words,—"Provided nevertheless that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the high contracting parties." It is thought that the honor of a nation can be entrusted to no international tribunal. It was once thought that the honor of an individual could not be entrusted to the law of the land, and it has recently been pointed out, notably by Mr. Asquith and by President Taft, that the justification of war in the name of honor is the justification of the duel. The reasons which have led civilized men on the whole to reject the duel, the impossibility of vindicating honor by the accident

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of superior swordmanship, the iniquity of a tribunal at which the innocent is as likely to suffer as the guilty, the wronged man as the wrong doer, apply equally to the international duel. They apply indeed with greater force. For indeed no civilized nation ever insults another. A statesman may, a newspaper editor may, an admiral may,—but a whole people,—never! And we are as grossly misled in identifying, say, the editor with 'Germany' and the admiral, say, with 'Russia' as ever Louis XIV was in identifying the state with himself. A people will readily be persuaded that it has suffered an insult, but it never regards itself as having first offered an insult. It never does. "I do not know the method," said Burke, "of drawing up an indictment against a whole people."

Is not to refuse to admit affairs of honor to tribunal the drawing up of an indictment against all other peoples? Would we not otherwise say with President Taft: "I do not see why questions of honor should not be submitted to tribunals composed of men of honor." Perhaps the forthcoming agreement between the United States and Great Britain will be the beginning of the process that shall one day end in the destruction of the last plea for war, when governments recognize at last (in the words of the Hague commissioners) "the solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized nations," the solidarity which is the most striking contrast between our own and all previous civilizations.

There is another very significant aspect of the intersocialization of the nations. Society, we said, was a question of degree. Within it there are groups united by many social ties, others united by few only. The members of a family are bound by the most numerous and the closest social ties; the members of a city have more than the members of a state; the citizens who are also members of a church, of a social order, of a club, of a council, have more ties than those who are not. It is the very nature of society to involve social groups and even strata. This is generally recognized, but what is

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less observed is that the lines of social grouping and stratification tend less and less to conform to political and racial boundaries. There is the society of learning. Its members are of every race and tongue. There is 'society' in the sense of *le haut monde,* again international. There is the organization of labor, threatening even to bring internationalism into politics. Its members have in different countries the same political faith, and a faith not shared in by their fellow-citizens. So the member of the English labor party has even a political community with a German socialist which he has not with his fellow English citizen. And so with a thousand other groupings, artistic, scientific, financial, religious, industrial,—unions of men crossing the line of states. The educated Englishman has more in common with the educated Frenchman or German than he has with his uneducated fellow-countrymen. He is more 'at home,' more in society with him; he prefers his company. Lastly, do not our royal families, the ostensible heads of our states, intermarry with one another alone?

And yet we still talk of 'states' going to war. We talk of 'England's' going to war with 'Germany.' What, in the light of these facts, is 'England,' and what is 'Germany'? Is it the state, or the nation, or the part of society which happens to be divided from another part by the accident of geography, though united by the essentials of intercourse? Is not war between states intelligible only when state and society are one? Is not war unintelligible to-day? Is it not a survival from the time when state and society were one?

The new civilization has made war unintelligible,—it will some day make war impossible. But the unintelligible often has a long life, in politics at any rate. Meanwhile the burden of an inferior civilization retards the steps of its successor. The countless millions devoted to armament, which are least wasted when they are most wasted, could be applied to solving the problems of our day, the incessant problems arising out of man's struggle to make

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nature serve his ends. So the question meets us,—by what means, while the peoples are yet only learning their solidarity, is it possible to set limits to the pace of expenditure for war? It is clear that no matter how unintelligible war may have become, no one of the rival states dare disarm alone. But this fact does not justify a laissez-faire attitude as it is often held to do. There is much that might advantageously be done while the world is only learning the conditions of its new civilization.

For instance, the following immediate steps seem obvious: (1) It is highly important to give to the Court of Arbitration and the Peace Conference, the representatives of the 'society of the nations,' the highest possible dignity, to appoint as members only men of the utmost distinction, and to make such appointment one of the greatest honors a state can bestow. The prestige of the court and of the conference will be in the present transitional stage the measure of its power, and the answer to those who still look on such courts and conferences as utopian.

(2) It is unlikely that the reduction of armaments can be effected by the resolutions of any court or conference. States cannot delegate such power even to their highest representatives. The immediate proper work of the court lies in a different direction. Why in especial should not the Hague Permanent Court take over the work of the Institute of International Law, and prepare an authoritative statement of the Law of Nations, such as all states might accept? This would be of the greatest possible service to the cause of peace. It would be the express declaration of the law of 'the society of civilized nations.' Once declared, the civilized states would in all probability bind themselves to observe it.

(3) Armaments will be reduced not by universal peace conferences, at first, at any rate, but by agreements between individual states. In all probability we shall very shortly see a treaty of arbitration in which the contracting states agree to refer *all* subjects of dispute to an

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arbitral court. If two or more countries agree to submit all matters to arbitration, why should they not make practical use of their agreement? Does it not open the way to some such agreement as the following: "If either or any of the contracting states have a cause of dispute with some non-contracting state, and if, the former offering to refer the dispute to an international court, the non-contracting power reject the offer and have recourse to arms, then the other contracting state or states shall render armed assistance to the contracting state to which international justice has been refused, to the utmost of its power." Such an agreement would be the logical outcome of a thorough-going arbitration treaty, and it would for all defensive purposes put at the service of every state so contracting the armed force of all the states so contracting. It would thus render it possible for these states to reduce their individual armaments. It is very probable that were once such a treaty entered into by any two states, the advantages it brought would cause state after state to follow the example set. Some military powers might and probably would hold out, but the disadvantages of their position, however strong the states might be, are too obvious to need comment. They would be compelled to maintain enormous armies while every other state was reducing its military expenditure in some proportion to the effective united military strength of the contracting states.

(4) Why should not the small states disarm even now? The security of Switzerland, *e. g.*, cannot depend upon its miniature army, which is necessarily inadequate for warfare with the large surrounding states. Are not the small states protected by inter-social interests and by the mutual unwillingness of the large states that any one of their number should encroach on the smaller, far more than by arms? Is it because of their armies and navies that the international credit and the internal prosperity, measured in terms of wealth, of Holland, Belgium, and Denmark stand higher than that of big-armied Germany

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or big-navied England? It is significant that Denmark, which has been foremost of the European states in proposing thorough-going treaties of arbitration, has already actually considered the possibility of disarmament.

These suggestions, haphazard and merely outlined, are here brought forward to show that, apart from any immediate universal action of civilized states it is possible for individual members of the 'Society of Civilized Nations' to take action towards securing the reduction of armaments and that greater internal prosperity which such reductions must produce.

If the argument we have stated holds, the new civilization, bringing to civilized peoples an ever-increasing and altogether new solidarity, is thereby making war more and more a meaningless survival. It is not our doing, we cannot help ourselves. We must accept the happier age, for the forces that are bringing it towards us are stronger than ourselves, stronger than our prejudice, stronger than our Nietzschean atavisms. Some, with eyes sealed to the movement of the age, still declare that war is 'God's test of Nations,' that he still "purges His floor with fire." Doubtless the battle is always to the strong,—to whom else should it be? But if to be most warlike is to be most tested, what people in Europe shall stand beside the Turk? And how shall the United States compare with Chile and Peru? Doubtless the strong nations will be victorious in war as in peace, but the strong nations have found other tests than war. Or, if you prefer it, God has found in place of war the tests of social and commercial progress. And for those who think it a bourgeois substitute,—well, there are still parts of the earth, among Pathans and Dyaks, and Fuegians, and the like, where the 'divine test' is even to-day in fullest operation, as it has been "since the making of the world." Meanwhile those who can read the signs of the times will rejoice that there is being prepared for the nations the healing way of peace, unmenaced by the blind catastrophe of war.

King's College, Aberdeen. R. M. MacIver.

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THE PROBLEM OF AN EFFECTIVE MORAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS *

With Special Reference to Experiments in France.

HARROLD JOHNSON.

IN 1882 moral and civic instruction was substituted for religious instruction in the state primary schools of France. The moral and civic teaching was supposed from the first to include the teaching of 'duties toward God,' but this rather as an excrescence and superfluity than as the soul of the teaching. The teachers, too, finding the subject difficult and delicate to handle, and not being trained to treat so subtle a question, fearing also at first to arouse ecclesiastical susceptibilities, gave the teaching of 'duties to God' a wide berth. The early manuals devoted perhaps a few paragraphs to it, but many of the later ones omit it altogether. It is true that Félix Pécaut, whom M. Compayré ranks, and rightly I think, among the great educators, strove, yet strove in vain, to supply the moral and civic instruction with a religious basis and motive, and endeavored to breathe into it his own vague yet deeply-felt theism; but he failed. His own pupils at the Higher Training College for Women of Fontenay were fired with the glow of his inspiration, but, when the Master was withdrawn, were unable to hand on the torch to others, while, in themselves, the flame often flickered and died. Pécaut had been nourished within a Huguenot stock and had had a scaffolding supplied him from which he could build. He had, however, no scaffolding to supply to others. His teaching lacked, as he himself recognized but too well, an hereditary foundation of revered memories, ideas, habits, sentiments, associations, deep-rooted in the na-

* Part of an address delivered before "The Heretics" at King's College, Cambridge, and at the Sorbonne (University of France), Paris.

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tional life, without which it could not obtain a secure and permanent hold upon public education. Where may we find Pécaut's theism to-day in the primary schools of France?

In substituting a lay moral and civic instruction for the previous religious instruction in state primary schools the first and inevitable problem of the French statesman was to furnish the assurance that the teacher, in giving this instruction, would observe the strictest neutrality as regards especially the Catholic, the Protestant, and the Jewish faiths. In an early circular to the teachers, Jules Ferry makes this abundantly clear. The teacher is to emphasize the duties which *unite* men and not the dogmas which *divide* them. He is forbidden all theological and philosophical discussion in class. He is to teach only that "good and ancient morality received from our forefathers," "those elementary rules of the moral life which are not less universally accepted than those of language and arithmetic," "la petite morale usuelle qui suffit aux petits enfants." He is to avoid all questions of doctrine, theory, root-principles, and foundation sanctions. He is to appeal solely to the 'moral sense,' or 'moral intuition,' of the child. As Jules Ferry conceived this appeal to the 'moral sense,' it was a peculiarly conventional and *bourgeois* one: but, as Pécaut, Buisson and others conceived it, it might have an idealism, a religiosity, and even a mysticism of its own. From the first, however, there was a struggle between the statesman and the seer, and, so far, the statesman and not the seer has triumphed.

It is curious, however, to note that when you drive God out at the door he will, somehow or other, contrive to enter in at the window. There is not wanting justification for the epithet 'godless' the Catholic hurls at the lay school, while the Protestant and the Jew, who from the first, not without qualms, have supported the lay school, are seeing more and more clearly that the strong tendency of these schools, as they exist at pres-

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ent, is to cut away the very theism upon which their own faiths ultimately depend. In helping to protect the state against Catholic domination, they perceive that they have been supporting an agency which, like Catholicism itself, is directed against their very existence. The bridge that was at first reared to link the lay and the religious worlds has broken down.

Nevertheless, over and over again, a certain 'religiosity without God' persists in asserting itself. Duty is sometimes taught with real Kantian imperativeness and awe, and is felt and communicated at times in some such way as Wordsworth apprehended her as the "stern daughter of the voice of God." Teachers have been known to remark: Duty and God,—c'est la même chose! And in such cases it matters little perhaps whether or no the name of God sound on the lips, provided the God of Righteousness be indeed verily there.

But this introduction of a quasi-religious element is even more noteworthy in schools such as the sociological, perhaps best represented in France by M. Durkheim, which pride themselves upon their strictly scientific basis, and yet present us with a society so transfigured and idealized as a motive power for action and a goal for effort that we, too, are tempted to exclaim: Society and God,—c'est la même chose! "I see in divinity," says M. Durkheim, "only society transfigured and thought symbolically." Indeed this 'school' shows goodly promise, if its tendencies are promoted with a rigorous logic, to supply the world with a sociocracy in lieu of the theocracy it desires to supplant, and it is perhaps capable of exercizing a no less inimical tyranny over the minds of men. For some years there was a most scrupulous regard for neutrality in the state schools. How far this was mere statesmanlike maneuvring, called forth by stress of political circumstances, or an ardent desire for justice to all sections of the nation, is a subtle question. However, after a few manuals of moral and civic instruction had been placed on the *Index* and some of them had been burned at

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the stake, there was quiet in the land for a season: the Catholics still maintained their own Catholic schools, and, as regards the comparatively few Catholic children who needed to attend the state lay schools, neutrality was for some years fairly observed in them. But then ensued the separation of church and state, the expulsion of the religious orders, and again war *à outrance* between the two opposing factions which cleave the nation in twain. Following, too, upon the expulsion of the religious orders, a large number of Catholic schools have been closed, and thousands of Catholic children are now of necessity pupils in the lay schools. All the greater need you will say of the strictest neutrality! Unfortunately, however, in a state of war one is not so circumspect. Republicanism and Catholicism have been at death-grips. It has been a state necessity to make the schools serve more and more the republican ideal to which the Catholic ideal, as commonly understood, is essentially opposed. The *history* taught in the Catholic schools is said to be of a kind that turns the mind towards monarchy. The whole tendency of the teaching in these schools is said to be directed against 'la raison.' As a counterblast, the *history* in the lay school is out-and-out republican, out-and-out in the spirit of the French Revolution, out-and-out rationalistic. In a word, the Catholic school is by nature anti-republican, anti-democratic, anti-scientific. The lay school is as strongly republican, democratic, and scientific. The state school has been made a political rather than a purely educational agency, and the child has been sacrificed on the altar of political exigency. A republican state, with an enemy within its borders working incessantly for its destruction, was compelled to turn out children from its schools at the ages of eleven, twelve, and thirteen, republicans, democrats, and free-thinkers. And it did so! The problem has been regarded as a political rather than as a pedagogical one. The question as to how far this particular kind of preparation, and this particular result, are really adapted to children of tender

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years is hardly raised. When, however, the first generation of voters reared in the lay schools went to the polls, the desired product was forthcoming; republicanism was assured, and the separation of church and state was at length speedily effected.

And, with a new sense of security and triumph, the victors have more and more flung neutrality to the winds. Some openly flout it. State monopoly of education is becoming a question of practical politics. School manuals are, in the eyes of the Catholics, more and more contrary to the neutrality to which the state is pledged, and the French bishops selected recently a dozen of these (chiefly *history*) books and forbade the parents of Catholic children to permit them to be instructed out of them. Bonfires are again in vogue. The Government, however, will not yield an inch. It is war to the knife and not a time for parleying.

On the other hand, there are clear indications that even the strongest partisans of the present lay education have grave doubts as to its ultimate efficacy. They would not admit this on the platform or on the floor of the Chamber—that would be to offer arms to the enemy—but the doubt is there all the same eating away like a canker at the very heart of life. And, as frequently happens, the less the faith, the greater the dogmatism, the sharper the sectarianism. So long as this temper lasts, nothing of good can be effected. But the reaction must come—is coming—and whither it may lead in France, no man knoweth.

I stated that the appeal in the moral and civic instruction was intended, at first, to be addressed solely to the moral sense, or moral intuition, of the child. It was soon, however strongly maintained that merely to 'montrer' duties was not enough: it was necessary to 'démontrer' them. The traditional religious education and the lay moral education could not, under the circumstances, but be continually challenging each other and having odious comparisons instituted between them. There were abundant

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champions to justify the religious education, and champions must be no less forthcoming to justify the lay moral education. Lay moral education must be shown to have an autonomy and absolute value of its own. A mere enunciation of duties was not sufficient: a rational demonstration of them was demanded. Thus it was that a decree went forth to the teachers, in the form of an official circular, showing how a rational justification of duties may be brought, by means of the Socratic method, within reach of the intelligence of children. Kantian rationalism was now introduced to supplement and enforce the merely intuitional appeal. So far as I have been able to observe, this appeal to 'la raison' is the main appeal of lay moral education in France to-day. Observe here the difference in mentality of two peoples! The English mother says to her little son: "Be a *good* boy, Tommy!" The French mother says: "Sois sage!" or "Sois raisonnable, mon enfant!" We, in England, have confined our attention, in the main, to moral *training,* to the formation of moral habits. Moral *instruction* as such has, until recently, been regarded by us as of comparatively little account. In France, on the contrary, they have confined their attention mainly to moral *instruction,* to the enlightenment of the mind in moral matters. Moral training has had little attention paid to it. There is lopsided development in both cases. Moral training and moral instruction are both necessary and should be regarded as complementary to each other. Only pedagogical ineptitude will continue to regard them as mutually exclusive.

But neither intuitionism nor Kantian rationalism have seemed to suffice. The scientist and the sociologist are now in search of a science of ethics. The children in the schools cannot, however, wait till this new science is discovered.

Suddenly M. Léon Bourgeois saved the situation by proclaiming the doctrine of social solidarity: "We are members one of another." Each of us owes society a debt,

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and it is our duty to repay it. Of course, one readily admits that this social motive can be made a deeply moving and even compelling one. With certain reservations, it is the motive mainly appealed to in Japan where it appears to have worked wonders of disinterestedness and self-sacrifice. But, unfortunately, or fortunately, it has already been riddled by French critical acumen.

No, one must frankly admit that the widely prevalent attitude of the lay mind in France to-day is one of scepticism as to the ultimately effective value of the motives for the moral life to which it appeals alternately. The appeal to intuition is an appeal to the individual at a particular time and under particular circumstances. There is nothing necessarily authoritative for all time and for all circumstances in the nature of the response to it, though we incline naturally to bow before the intuitions of the greatest seers. Kantian rationalism, too, though its challenge has a universal aspect, appeals in the main to a special and limited order of minds, especially to those with a background of Christian nurture and of liberal tendencies. And "you owe a debt to society, and, until you have paid it, it is wrong to commit suicide" has seldom, if ever, diverted the course of the knife, the rope, or the poison-bottle.

The ideal of social progress, too, is, one will admit, a powerful incentive for many; but is it calculated to inspire by itself alone the utmost disinterestedness for the commonweal? How is 'my utmost for the highest' finally secured from me? To what imperative commands do I bow in utter consecration? What finally induces me to sacrifice my more narrowly selfish interests for universal claims upon me? These are the great questions which France has only just begun to ask in connection with the lay moral and civic instruction in her schools.

The problem has perhaps nowhere been more pointedly and pregnantly stated than by M. Emile Boutroux, when he asks:

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Is there for us, as conscious beings, beyond the individual life, a universal life possible and in some measure already realized? Is our reflective and distinct consciousness, according to which we are external the one to the other, an absolute reality, or a mere phenomenon beneath which lies concealed the universal interpenetration of souls in one unique principle? Have we, then, two existences, the one developed and immediately visible, *viz.*, our individual existence, the other still almost unconscious, but superior, the universal existence? What is the relationship of these two existences, the one to the other, and what method ought we to follow to bring about the full realization of the latter?

Some light has of late dawned in France, and this 'suffering servant' of the peoples, after all her heroisms, may save us yet! Bergson and Delvolvé lead the way. The former has shaken the Goddess of Reason on her throne: that was the first stroke of emancipation. The latter, in his book, "Rationalisme et Tradition,"[1] which appeared early in 1910, has made an invaluable contribution to our particular problem. This contribution I will here boldly outline.

M. Delvolvé, after the manner of William James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience," subjects the traditional Catholic education and the lay moral education in France to a penetrating psychological analysis, as a result of which he arrives at the startling conclusion that the traditional education is in accord with certain fundamental requirements of our psychic nature, whereas the lay education does not meet these essential conditions. On the other hand, however, he holds that the doctrinal basis of the traditional education does not accord with the data of modern knowledge. It follows from this that the lay moral education, in order to become effective, must incorporate in itself what is proven to be psychologically efficacious in the traditional doctrine while it nevertheless abdicates nothing of the rights of reason and of the spirit of science and of liberty.

The great question is, as I have already put it, How is utter disinterestedness secured? How is the individual

[1] "Rationalisme et Tradition: Recherches des conditions d'efficacité d'une morale laïque," by Jean Delvolvé. (Félix Alcan, Paris, 1910.)

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finally induced, in certain eventualities, to give up even his life for the commonweal, or to sacrifice what appear to be his individual interests to universal claims upon him? How is he to be brought to say: "Not my will, but Thine be done?"

The writer considers each of the motives which the lay moral education utilizes in turn, and arrives at the conclusion that they one and all fall short of this ultimately compelling and overwhelming power. On the other hand, M. Delvolvé holds that the traditional religious education does frequently bring about an utter self-surrender by means of its doctrines of God and Christ and the immortal life, its cult and worship and sacraments. The weak spot here is that to many minds to-day, the number of which continues to be rapidly on the increase, these doctrines, at least through the forms in which the Church gives them expression, do not any longer speak with authority and command such general and unhesitating adherence as once they did, but are, on the contrary, frequently confronted by the most ruthless and destructive criticism, since they do not conform with the legitimate requirements of the intellect. In spite of this, however, for those who are still capable of accepting these doctrines they can be shown to have frequently proved effective. To what then, at bottom, do they owe their power?

The author considers what he regards as the three chief ills which "flesh is heir to"—(1) Death, (2) Strife, (3) Frailty, from which men yearn for deliverance. He holds that if these ideas become dominant, life becomes sterilized and withered; that for an effectively moral life only the opposing ideas of life, and brotherhood, and perfection, with the confidence and security attaching to them, are fitted. We have aspirations towards eternal life, towards ultimate universal brotherhood, towards perfection, and only while these aspirations are alive in us do we truly live. But if we regard death as inevitably intervening, we can no longer cherish these aspirations, since we know that, in a limited lifetime, these limitless aspirations are

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incapable of fulfillment. Similarly, if we believe that one day this earth of ours is to become moon-cold and sunless, and that all human life and progress are finally and utterly to perish with it, then the real zest of social reform is blighted. The author is driven to the conviction that only the religious experience of the idea and sentiment of the divine can possibly effect the deliverance we need. Only when we feel we can merge our frail individuality in an infinite and perfect Being, only when we feel that his end is our end and that this end is ultimately certain of attainment, do confidence and security come. Then we enter, even here, into the life eternal; we are with God and no evil can happen unto us; death has lost its terrors for us who have life indeed; brotherhood is the deepest of all realities and strife but a passing phase; perfectness a surely attainable goal and frailty an incident.

The author is of opinion that what is now required is a naturalistic transposition of such religious experience as this into forms which may prove reasonably acceptable to the modern mind and in accordance with the terms of modern science. The conditions of such a transposition of religious experience appear to him to be: (1) We must replace the communication of the soul with a transcendent Being by its communication with a reality which is one with objective nature, and which is not limited to the more or less fragmentary, fixed, and deformed object perceived by the intellectual faculty. Our individual being is really one with all that is. "All knowledge is communion; all contact, penetration." We must acknowledge the homogeneity and real unity of nature with the soul that thinks it. (2) This sense of the homogeneity and unity of being involves the ultimate accord of the purpose of the conscious ego with the purpose of the universe. (3) We must have faith in the power of the Being and in the certain victory of his aspirations.

That we are one with the universe, that the purpose of the individual and the purpose of the universe are one and the same, and that the realization of this purpose

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is ultimately certain,—this is a faith which would remove mountains, and it is a faith, the writer holds, the modern mind can reasonably accept, and is indeed impelled to accept, with the strongest confirmation. This confirmation is arrived at "altogether apart from the arduous ways of the metaphysician through a continuous flood of tendencies, emotions, facts, which it is the task of a psychology of action to establish."

Of the normal tendencies and instincts of human life which would seem to make this faith inevitable of acceptance he cites, among others, the following, analyzing each in some detail where I can only in the boldest way suggest.

(1) The *vital instinct* (love of life). He notes that even the pessimist desires to live. That in adolescence there is an exuberance of life such that the youth is unable to distinguish between his individual life and the universal life which floods him. (2) *The reproductive instinct.* He notes the imperiousness of this instinct which is frequently utterly regardless of mere individual interests. (3) *The social instinct.* He notes how we tend to identify ourselves with various social groups. (4) *Infant mentality.* He notes how in the case of a child the sense of unity precedes that of separateness, how slowly a child differentiates itself from surrounding objects, and how easily it identifies itself with these. (5) *The feeling for nature.* He notes how in the contemplation of nature we are frequently impressed with the oneness of being, our union with all that is, and the universality of ends. (6) *The æsthetic sense.* He notes the identity of the artist with his creation. "The work of an artist or sculptor is neither a reproduction of an imagined objective nature, nor a phantasy of an imagined individual mind, but a new form of being, the fruit of the union of a mind with the object which it rejoins." (7) *The scientific instinct* (curiosity). The desire to relate all things to each other, and thus to break down barriers. And so on.

By such purely natural processes, according to this

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writer, we attain to the sentiment and the notion of the divine.

What has tended largely to atrophy modern thought is that we have relied too strictly and too narrowly upon the merely intellectual faculty as the sole avenue to truth, whereas we reach truth, not through this channel only, but rather as do the creator, the poet, the artist, the musician, through that deep-seated instinct, or rather that illumined insight, which is the bloom and sublimate of all our faculties effectively brought into play and duly balanced and harmonized. Science must in the future take account of facts which it refused at first to acknowledge to rank among facts at all. It must accept as fact every duly-chronicled and vouched-for fact of religious experience, as James and the later psychologists now unhesitatingly do. And in art, in poetry, in the insight of seers, in the realm of psychical research, through the deepest recesses of the subconsciousness as well as upon the broad avenues of conscious activity, must it seek those clues and indirections, those "intimations of immortality," which, more surely than ought else, lead us to the sanctuary of truth. What we touch and handle and weigh and measure and analyze in test-tubes, or compute with the finest mechanisms, are not the only facts nor the only realities. There are intangible things, not so amenable to arithmetic and calculation, which nevertheless, after all, may prove to be the deepest realities; and though, as yet, we may not be able to demonstrate them or secure for them such ready and obvious acceptance as for facts of an apparently solider order, we may nevertheless suggest connections with them which, surely followed, like the remotest thread of a spider's web, will be found to have a hold somewhere. A faith that matters will never be wholly capable of demonstration as the laboratory understands this. But the believer will nevertheless have, or should have, solid ground to stand upon, from which he will launch forth, with sure and certain hope, for the untracked spaces by means of the clues that some have left and he intuitively

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divines, which, like shafts of light, shoot forth through the invisible way and bid him follow after them.

For will anything short of the infinite stir the infinite in man? Will he not ultimately have to take refuge perforce in the Source of All, and must he not feel, if the trust and peace and security (which nothing can mar) are ever to be his portion, that not only the highest interests of the nation and of humanity, but the highest interests of the universe itself (of which he is an integral part, and in which he lives and moves and has his being) call to him unresistingly for his utmost devotion? And must he not learn to cry when the fierce struggle within him goes on between the vaster and the narrower claims: "Not my will, O Universe, but thine be done!"

Ill-stated though they be, these are the questions which confront the educational world to-day. And, under our changed conditions, they have not yet been grappled with. These changed conditions are, that whereas education was originally the prerogative of the priest, it is now, in the main, that of the laity, and that the laity has never yet learned to explore deeply, and, having explored, to trust the deepest intuitions of its own soul.

HARROLD JOHNSON.

PINNER, MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND.

THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION ETHICALLY CONSIDERED.

G. R. S. MEAD.

IT is a somewhat saddening reflection that in spite of the presumable millions of years of human life on this planet, there is no general belief as to whence we come or whither we go, or indeed as to why there is any coming or going at all. The meaning and purpose of life are still beyond the scope of our science; they are matters of faith at best and not infrequently of despair. The pain

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of the world, the transparent ruthlessness of nature, the amazing inequalities of human existence, the seeming grave injustice in the lives of the majority, are, as far as our reason goes, as great enigmas to us to-day in the twentieth century as they have ever been so long as we have any trace of human history. In such a state of affairs we cannot afford to cast aside without a hearing any theory that attempts seriously to throw light on the darkness.

The general hypothesis of preëxistence (under which the special doctrine of reincarnation falls) does not, it is true, solve the fundamental problems, but it pushes back some of the initial difficulties. It furnishes an ampler ground for the development of the individual soul than the cribbed, cabined, and confined area of one short earth-life, and by providing a stage or series of stages for the acts and scenes of the age-long drama of man-soul prior to its present existence, permits us to entertain the notion of a law of moral causation conditioning our present relation to circumstance in a way that does not clash with our innate sense of justice.

This general hypothesis of preëxistence connotes the idea of metempsychosis in prior states of existence, but by no means necessarily includes the special doctrine of reincarnation or transcorporation proper, that of repeated incarnations in physical bodies on this earth. It is somewhat necessary to insist on this distinction at the outset, for the two theories are not infrequently confused in the popular treatment of the transmigration-doctrine, especially in the manipulation of Biblical texts and in invoking the authority of Patristic writers. Many Bible texts require the presupposition of a belief in preëxistence, but very few, and these open to serious question, permit us to suppose a belief in reincarnation. Some of the Fathers again, it is true, are open advocates of preëxistence, but all without exception reject reincarnation, which was in great favor with some of the heretical syncretic schools of the early Christian Gnosis,

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as well, of course, as with the Orphics, Pythagoræans, Platonists, and Hermeticists. Origen, for instance, who is philosophically the greatest of all the Fathers, but whose views were subsequently condemned, while strenuously rejecting the reincarnation interpretation of even the Elias-John the Baptist saying, enthusiastically champions the cause of preëxistence in a theory the main features of which may be outlined as follows:

Souls were originally spiritual, equal, free, the first creations of God whose sole cause of creation was his own goodness. In the beginning there was no ground of difference between them; it was the gift of moral freedom, which included personal self-determination, that gave occasion to difference. The souls had thus bestowed on them the choice either of becoming like unto God by imitation of him, or of declining from their original purity and blessedness in neglect of him. Here the supposition is that the original conditions of all were equal, and thus there can be no question of favoritism or injustice. The declension of the pure spiritual existences into the state of separated souls is supposed to have been due solely to their own self-will. Why, however, they should have preferred to fall away; why they should have chosen something other than God, when nothing other than God's goodness is supposed to have existed to choose from; why the exercise of the liberty of choice which was presumably given them to use, and was the creative gift of a provident all-seeing deity, should have been immediately attended with the constraints of an ever-growing necessity, operated by the same will of God, who is thus represented as taking away with one hand what he gave with the other,—all this is in no way explained, and we are left with the root-problem as far from solution as ever.

The world-process, according to this theory, is regarded as a series of states of cooling and condensation, corresponding with the cooling of the ardor of the primal spirits for the divine goodness, who thus became sepa-

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rated souls falling into ever greater and greater distinction and remoteness from the Divine. We have accordingly the notion of a series of phases of existence from spiritual to material states, the latter of which verge gradually downwards or condense from the extremest subtlety to the gross materiality of our present world, in which the persistently self-willed souls are finally incarnated. This last most narrowly constrained form of embodiment Origen regards as a final beneficent provision of divine wisdom to enable the souls, under the direst necessities of the sternest facts, to move more rapidly toward the accomplishment of their fore-ordained final destiny, which is the regaining of the pure spiritual state of their origin, in which alone they can ever find lasting peace.

It is evident that such a theory leaves out of account all notion of a positive purpose in the world-process in and for itself. The world-process is conceived of solely as a means of rectification; it is brought into operation owing to the mischoice of the souls. The whole process is for the correction of a fault, and not for the divinely purposed production of a positive or novel good. This much, however, is gained, that there is no imputation to deity of starting souls in unequal conditions, as far at any rate as their nature and environment are concerned. Nevertheless, we are asked to believe that our present conditions are self-caused and morally determined by our own original free-choice of the worse steadily persisted in, and we cannot help asking in return in self-defence: What can possibly be the nature of the choice which determines the proclivity of souls in the very beginning; and how can there be, on this hypothesis, any real moral responsibility except for the creator of the power of choosing? The created soul itself cannot of itself be the creator of evil, for that would constitute it a second God. We are thus forced to conclude that, in spite of Origen's optimistic belief that all would eventually be saved, his essentially pessimistic view of the cause of the declension

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of the souls and of the ever-deteriorating conditions of their preëxistence deprives the world-process of all adequate motive and purpose, and leaves us with the problem of justice as far from solution as ever.

But this theory of Origen's and other theories involved in similar theological presuppositions by no means dispose of the doctrine of preëxistence. Coming down to our own days we find that there are those who, while they frankly abandon all questions of ontology as insoluble, and prefer to begin where they find themselves in the world-process, still hold to the idea of preëxistence as the most hopeful hypothesis. Convinced of the fact of evolution, they reject the pessimistic doctrine of a fall, and regard the past of the soul optimistically as a scale of ascent, and the present life as a stage leading to ever superior states of existence either on other planets or in other conditions of life higher than are possible on this earth. This view, however, as far as I am aware, has never been worked out systematically; it is rather an alternative hazarded by those who dislike the idea of repeated incarnation on earth, when brought face to face with traditional views of the theory of transcorporation.

We may then proceed to consider the doctrine of reincarnation proper, in which there has been a remarkable renascence of interest in the West of recent years. Omitting for the moment all reference to the crudest forms of the belief as found among widely scattered primitive folk of the past and of the present, it may be of interest to note that the historic problem of its simultaneous occurrence in systematic form in the comparatively highly cultured nations of India and Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. has recently been submitted to a thoroughgoing methodical investigation in Germany. In a recent work[1] and in a series of subordinate studies, Dr. Robert Eisler has argued, at great length and with an amazing wealth of literary and archæological testi-

[1] *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt: Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Urgeschichte des antiken Weltbildes.* München (Beck), 1910, 2 vols.

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mony, that the sources of Hellenic mystical cosmology are not to be sought in Greek folklore; on the contrary, they are to be traced to a quite unmistakable high cult of a supreme deity of a pantheistic and henotheistic nature (the 'All and One' as the famous *logos* of Heraclitus has it), the philosophical and mystic concept of Endless Time and Boundless Space, with the allied notion of a world-embracing Necessity or Inevitable Law, very distinct traces of which are to be found in all the Ionic philosophers from Pherecydes and Thales onwards. This cult of Chronos-Adrasteia (or of the Æon) of Ionian Asia Minor is from the very beginnings of philosophy found in closest connection with the cult of the Orphic mysteries, which on their side are found to show clear signs of the remains of the Prehellenic religion of archaic Asia Minor and of Crete. Moreover, the essentially fatalistic and pessimistic mood of Orphic-Pythagoræan doctrine,—with its belief in a ceaselessly revolving wheel of Becoming, and an endless series of transcorporations of the World-Soul in ever new world-formations, together with the consequent dogma, essentially interwoven with it, of individual metempsychosis with its mystical, psychological, and moral doctrines,—is shown to be entirely in keeping with the root-notion of this high cult of the God of Eternity. It is accordingly claimed, as a corollary to this demonstration, that the professors of this creed, which was based on the conviction that the whole course of nature was governed by the circular motion of the heavens under the supreme ordering of eternal law, were the first to formulate the indispensable and fundamental presupposition of all research into the laws of nature.

Moreover, Dr. Eisler has traced back the Zervanistic form of the æon-cult, which was so dominant an element in the religion of Mithras, to an early period of Iranian tradition prior to the Persian expansion. It may very probably have been this expansion, with the subsequent conquest of Northern India under the Achæmenidæ, that led to the introduction of this systematized body of doc-

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trine into Indian thought; for it is precisely at this period that we there meet with the Time-cosmogonies together with the allied tenets of the wheel of Becoming and of metempsychosis,—ideas which can no more satisfactorily be derived from the native elements of Vedic folk-faith than they can in the West from Greek folk-religion. A further advantage is that this general thesis is the only one that provides a satisfactory explanation of the admittedly close resemblance between Orphic and Pythagoræan and Indian thought. All the indications of origin thus seem to point in a Central Asian direction. And if this should prove to be really the case, we should be able to link up from the Far Eastern side the in some ways very similar conceptions of the early Taoist thinkers, contemporaneous with the beginnings of philosophy in China, with their notions of a deity beyond space and time, of a universe of order and law, and of perpetual transformations of the soul in a flux of becoming, which have been hitherto generally supposed to be genetically derivable from India.

It would thus appear that the general notions bound up with the conception of reincarnation came into clear and systematic definition with the simultaneous rise of the philosophical spirit in East and West in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. Philosophically considered, the doctrine requires the presupposition of inevitable law in the universe, based on the observation of the natural phenomena of alternation and recurrence, exemplified in times and seasons. The apparent revolution of the heaven with all its host of fixed stars was thought of as a perpetually turning wheel or celestial lathe or circle of necessity, while the sun and moon and planets were heavenly types of other modes of the same inevitable law. If day and night, summer and winter, follow each other and recur with invariable iteration, so must it be, they thought, with life and death. As the sun, the giver of light and life, set and rose again, passing below the fixed, flat earth, on its journey through the invisible spaces beneath, to

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come forth renewed each morning, so was it thought the soul of man at death journeyed through invisible spaces and returned again to live on earth. To-day we know that this is but the apparent motion of the sun, and that it does none of these things; helpful analogies, however, may very well be based on the naïve observations of the senses as well as on the correction of sense by reason.

Though Plato and Aristotle and their followers refused to adopt the Pythagoræan view of the planetary system which in some respects anticipated the results of modern research, they advanced to very lofty conceptions of the nature of the soul, and the psychology of the Alexandrians especially became highly developed. Thus, for instance, among the later Platonists we find Plotinus and Porphyry and their successors arguing that to speak of the soul's 'going to Hades' (or to the 'Invisible') was a complete misunderstanding of its nature, for the soul itself was not a body or something that could go or be moved, but was on the contrary the cause of motion. The apparent going to Hades or dwelling in the Invisible of the soul was referred to a change of embodiment into subtler media than the elements of the physical body, and the soul was thought of not as being *in* a body, but conceived of rather as a principle of vitality, activity, and mentality, energizing through the intermediary of a subtle substance or essence which surrounded every body it might use as a sense-instrument, as it were in an encompassing sphere. The transformations of embodiment were all referred to and thought to take place in this simple continuing essence, which constituted as it were the *seminarium* or psychic matrix of all bodies of the individual soul. This vital formative essence was regarded as the principle of embodiment, or the essential protoplasm, by which every body of the soul was determined, and into which the powers and characteristics and experience of the life of every body were refunded on the dissolution of its elements. Just as in modern times, on the borderland of physics, we have broken up the atom

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into a system of electrons which are regarded rather as 'charges of electricity' than as purely material units, so with the ancient speculations attempts were made to bridge the gap between soul and body, mind and matter, life and substance, between potentiality and actuality, latency and operation, noumenon and phenomenon, idealism and realism.

The idea of a vital substantial continuum, or primal or causal 'vehicle' of the soul (if that which is contained can be called the 'vehicle' of that which contains), the treasury of all the activities and sensations of the many bodies derivable from it as secondary vehicles, is found in a highly developed form in India as well as in Alexandrian psychology. It is this 'spiritual' or 'causal' unitary nature which in conjunction with the subtle and gross elements of the universe develops, from within, the successive bodies of the soul both subtle and gross. In a way these bodies might be compared with the temporary protusions or pseudopodia of the most primitive protozoon known as the amœba or proteus animalcule, the protusions in the case of man being organisms for sense and activity, which vary from the greatest material complexity in the case of the physical body to the greatest simplicity in the case of the primal protoplasm. The physical body is furnished with its appropriate organs of sense and action, but activity and sense are to be referred ultimately to the soul in its primal substantial nature, which is regarded as the true unitary sensory. This primal origin of all embodiments and substantial means of all sensation and experience, is often spoken of as the soul itself, and forms the subject of many a legend, myth and mystery-rite in East and West. It seems to be a necessary presupposition in any theory of reincarnation; nevertheless, the most numerous believers in the doctrine reject it.

The reference is, of course, to Buddhism which has verged to the extreme of negation in its psychology, either in its efforts to formulate a purely dynamic theory, or more probably as the outcome of its intransigent polemic

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with Brahmanic theology, which asserted a substantial continuum between reincarnations, and that, too, in spite of its favorite theory of illusionism or the non-reality of all things as set over against the absolute reality of the Supreme. From the start Buddhism with contemporaneous Brahmanism assumed reincarnation as a fundamental fact. The one object of the Buddha was to teach the means of freedom from the necessity of transmigration, the ceaseless round of birth and death, due to the inevitable concatentation of cause and effect. From the start Buddhism, like Brahmanism, assumed states of existence in invisible worlds. Existence in such states, as well as on earth, was conditioned by the law of karma, the law of the deed. At death every human being (and every other sentient being for that matter) is immediately born into another state of existence, and what that state is, and the nature of his birth in that state, depend absolutely on his karma or actions (deeds, words, and thoughts) in the past life on earth. Nevertheless, we are at the same time asked to believe that the most characteristic doctrine of the Buddha was that of the non-existence of a self whether individual or universal. Put crudely, this non-self notion (*anatta*) asserts dogmatically: There is no soul; there is no God.

Now if the soul has no true being, and if there is no living personal continuum between the phases of embodiment in various states of existence and between two earth-lives, no string, as it were, on which to thread the beads of experience, no substrate of any kind, no ground of persistence, no immortal life to make possible the sequence of mortal existences, it seems somewhat preposterous to speak of karma as a law of moral causation as the Buddhist strenuously insists on doing. It is difficult to attach the idea of moral responsibility to a simple chain of causation, to a 'stream' of activity, or to speak of such a 'stream' incarnating. According to Buddhist notions, an entirely new personality is born, a different person altogether, the 'soul' being as new as the elements brought

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together to form the body, and as perishable as the association of these elements and the rest of the constituents of a non-physical nature combined by karma to form a human life. There is really no entity, no self, no soul, no person of a continuing nature. All that comes over is a complex of activities conditioning a form of existence characterized by the false notion of an 'I.' It is, however, to be doubted whether even the traditionally authentic teaching of the Buddha can be legitimately interpreted in this absolutely negative sense. The answers to the questionings of the disciples on this point seem to leave the matter open, and suggest that the Buddha was averse from being pinned down to a simple yes or no on a matter of such great metaphysical difficulty, seeing that both subject and object can both be regarded as everchanging phases of a unitary self that in final analysis and in its deepest being is one with the universal reality. In other respects, however, and contradictorily enough if the negation of self is persisted in, Buddhist teaching very securely fixes the responsibility on the shoulders of this "false notion of an 'I,' " so that for all practical purposes, as far as the ordinary unsophisticated man is concerned, the metaphysical subtleties of the doctrine fall well into the background, and the popular teaching directly refers the responsibility for all his deeds to the living agent. The defenders of the Buddhist doctrine of absolute negation must thus be left to extricate themselves from the dilemma as best they may, and the battle of the absolute illusionists and comparative illusionists may be left to the lovers of Buddhistic and Brahmanistic metaphysics.

In the West a far more positive view has obtained in the past and holds the ground to-day. This western positive view, however, also agrees that the basic storage of experience should be eventually referred to a deeper and less personal or restricted self than the comparatively, ephemeral and superficial 'I' of one stage of existence only; it asserts a mystic 'I' of practically

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immeasurable possibilities, but it holds that to deny self utterly is to turn the whole scheme of binding and loosing into the absurdity of an essentially purposeless process, and asserts that liberation regarded in any sense as the escape of an illusory self from illusory conditions equally robs the consummation of all idea of a positively purposed design. Perfect freedom, on the contrary, it holds, should connote the idea not only of removing or escaping from any or all limitations at will, but also the notion of the power to assume all or any limitations at will. And, indeed, contradictorily enough, that is precisely the supreme ideal of the northern tradition of Buddhism as represented by the schools of the Great Vehicle. In contradiction to the negative freedom preached by the southern tradition, in the schools of the Little Vehicle, the northern doctrine teaches the grandiose and superb ideal of the Great Vow,—the renunciation of the bliss of freedom so long as one single sentient creature remains in a state of bondage. The consummation of this utter self-sacrifice for the love of all creatures can hardly, one would imagine, be ascribed to a soulless stream of activity or chain of causation; it surely demands the presupposition not only of a supreme reality, but also of subordinate realities actualizing themselves in ascending stages of moral perfectioning; thus giving full satisfaction to the deepest needs of the heart, that look in vain for any comfort to the cold abstractions of the head. Such a sublime ideal, or indeed any lofty ideal of a moral nature, requires the postulate of an immortal progressively responsible entity, though we may all differ as to how the nature and manner of being of that entity should be defined. Responsibility connotes a self-conscious will, and a self-conscious will connotes a personal being; but the idea of personality of a being endowed with the possibility of developing through every grade of self-realization carries us far beyond man, and both christology and buddhology, from different standpoints, have exhausted themselves in trying to grapple

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with the mystery of the superhuman person. It is in man that personal self-consciousness begins; in man that the change from the animal self of exclusion to the moral self of inclusion is gradually wrought; and in man that this evolving moral self-consciousness wins to ever deeper and deeper self-realization until human becomes consciously superhuman, and finally divine. According to this expectation, it can only be when man reaches to a divine state of consciousness that there is any true understanding of beginning and end. For it is the divine spirit alone, which is both the producer and product of evolution, that can reveal the secret of its own being and at the same time be the reason of its own becoming.

Here, in the midst of process, we are forced to begin with ourselves, as did the greatest of the teachers of reincarnation when he contemplated the process and sought to solve the riddle of sorrow and suffering. The ultimate reason he could not give, but its immediate origin he believed was to be found in the persistent clinging to the state of separated existence, which he conceived of as conditioned by a ceaseless concatenation of cause and effect, as it were an endless chain of causation, of which every link was the inevitable sequence of the one before it, and the last of the series the equally inevitable coupling with the first. To this wheel or circuit of separate existence, this necessity of ever-becoming, man was bound so long as he thirsted for this life of separation and persisted in referring all things to himself as apart from the rest of being. But this theory was the outcome of deep philosophical reflection and strenuous moral purification; the simple idea of reincarnation did not arise in this way. In its simplest form the notion of the return of the soul to this earth is found far apart from all philosophical consideration or over-beliefs in widely scattered primitive tribes, and must, it is reasonable to conclude, be due to elementary experience of some sort. It seems improbable that it could have been simply guessed at in so many widely separated cases; to refer it to pure coin-

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cidence in this way is to abandon its origin to chance pure and simple. Seeing, however, that dream and vision and contacts with the invisible of all kinds, low and high, are responsible for so many other religious beliefs, not only among primitive folk, but also among civilized mankind, the origin of the belief in reincarnation also may very well be referred to so familiar a cause. The spirits of the ancestors, it was believed, waited to be born again into the tribe. In dream and vision they were seen waiting, and it then required little effort of the imagination to recognize the individual characteristics of departed worthies or chiefs reappearing in the lives of descendants. The great could be recognized, the little passed again without recognition into the mass. But though it is probable that the germ of the belief is to be sought in this direction, it leaves unexplained why some tribes should have interpreted dream-experience in this manner and not others. Among believers in reincarnation, however, we find innumerable instances of those who claim to remember incidents in previous existences on earth. Indeed, in the highly elaborated psychology of both Brahmans and Buddhists, the power of recollecting past births at will is postulated as one of the definite acquirements of man in his gradual perfectioning on earth, and many saints are said to have attained to this power. The case of Pythagoras in the West will also recur to everyone. In the present renascence of interest in the West, also, similar claims, not only to sporadic memories of this nature, but also in a few cases to purposive recollection of series of past incarnations are being made. Many are inclined to believe that the truth of the doctrine will gradually be established on this basis. But so far such assertions have been submitted to no competent investigation. They have not yet reached the dignity of being included even among the obscurer phenomena of abnormal psychology as recognized material for psychical research. Truth to tell, most of these claims are transparently absurd, and may be safely referred to a mild species of

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megalomania. But apart from these pretensions on the part of obscure individuals to the heritage of the past greatness of others, there is an abundance of material that requires collection and unprejudiced investigation. One thing, however, is clear, without any further investigation, from the fact that the claimants are of every sort and kind, that memories of this nature, even if they are what they purport to be, have nothing whatever necessarily to do with moral character.

Meantime the normal mind being manifestly without such memories, normal opinion in the West at any rate considers that the whole question of reincarnation is entirely disposed of on the ground of lack of memory; and, of course, this is the first objection that must occur to the mind of even a child, and is constantly confronting the believer in reincarnation. Even if by chance an adherent of the normal opinion is forced to consider a case of reminiscence of this kind, he prefers to describe it as an instance of 'ancestral memory,' rather than accept the hypothesis of a popularly so discredited notion as metempsychosis; and this, too, though some famous names in the West in the last two centuries have been associated with belief in the doctrine.

But as to this patent general lack of memory, we must not forget that the normal power of recollecting the impressions made on normal consciousness even in a single life-time, is exceedingly imperfect, and that, too, with the best of memories, and that we cannot be altogether sure that imperfection of memory or even regular lapses of memory is an evil. Every night we experience an enormous loss of memory of our physical selves, though we are most probably by no means unconscious in some other part of our being; and it is precisely because of this lapse of physical consciousness that our bodies are generally refreshed and invigorated. How very feeble, comparatively, the power of recollecting the experiences of waking consciousness is even when the attention has been fixed upon them, needs no laboring, while the vast

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majority of sensible impressions pass us by unnoticed and are entirely beyond the power of even the best normal memory to recall. The most recent researches of psychology have demonstrated that in highest probability every single sensible impression, whether attended to or not, is stored somewhere and somehow in the subconscious, and that complexes of such unnoticed impressions can, under abnormal conditions, be reproduced with such vividness that they seem to be the experiences of a totally different personality. We may thus be persuaded that even in our present life we possess vast stores of latent 'memories' that are immeasurably beyond all our powers of normal recollection. Why, then, should we expect to recollect, except under very extraordinary circumstances and in abnormal or extranormal states, deposits of memory that are *ex hypothesi* stored far deeper than the records of the experiences of our present life?

The lack of power to recall the pictures of detailed incidents of past experience, however, leaves us still in possession of the result of that experience, in the form of increased ability and faculty. The trained musician, for instance, plays with mind free from all recollection of the memory-details of the past labor of learning notes and exercises; his fingers remember, his subconscious mind has stored the experience, practice has given birth to facility, to instinctual capacity. His deeper self has stored away every single detail of his former training; but what advantage is it to have these in his practical mind, when detailed experience is summed up in the now instinctual capacity of his trained body? The recollection of detail by the practical mind would mar the power of execution, if indeed it did not entirely inhibit it. *Mutatis mutandis,* some such process may be thought to take place in the still greater being of the reincarnating entity; the activities of a single life may be regarded as the practice days of the immortal player for the gaining of experience of life and the development of ever increasing ability. Here the recollection that really counts

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is the power to awaken latent faculty and to bring into play the previously acquired powers of understanding. It is not, however, to be supposed that all the detailed faculties, capacities, and powers that lie stored away in the whole man can be brought into play again in a single life on earth; there is not time enough for that. But they are all there latent and can be called into play with far less training of the body than would otherwise be the case if present circumstances should demand their exercise.

But man is not only an intellectual, artistic, fabricative, and executive life, he is also a social and moral being. The arrangements of human society, its sanctions and prohibitions, are presumably gradually evolving toward some clearer reflection of a far more vital economy and of a spiritual estate to which the soul is native. Within this general notion, believers in reincarnation are at one with believers in the one-life theory in holding that the regulative principle of the moral order is summed up in the inspired utterance that man inevitably reaps what he sows. Now this is evidently not the case in a single life on earth, or only to a very limited extent. The reincarnationist then might rest his case solely on the necessity of rebirth into similar conditions, that is, on earth where alone the sowing has taken place, in order to make this law an absolutely effective truth. He, however, holds, together with the adherents of the one-life theory, that human existence is continued in other states of existence than that of earth-life, and that these states are states of immediate result in which the harvest of the past life is fully gathered, the grain threshed out and winnowed from the chaff, and stored in the treasury of moral experience. It is a searching process of internal transformation, in immediate vital personal experience, in which the great lesson is learned of how intimately the life of the individual is bound up with the life of his fellow-creatures, with the life of the universe, and with the divine life. This theory then, as well as the one-life

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point of view, assigns to the human soul states of purificatory processes and of bliss and refreshment in after-death conditions, but it knows nothing of the dogma of eternal punishment.

We may, however, dispense with any consideration of the traditional mythological settings and symbolical picturings of such states, which still in both East and West stand as the age-long legacy of prior popular crudities, nor need one stay to discuss the conceptions of modern spiritism which for the most part are of an exceedingly secular and bourgeois nature. It is enough to suggest that, in modes appropriate to the nature of the operations of the soul of things, clothed upon with the personal reminiscences of the past life, the soul undergoes, as it were, the psychical process of digesting the intake of its recent experience of earth-life. In a state of extended and enhanced sensitivity, in which any or every past deed or word or even thought can be represented in vivid consciousness, with the added experience of sympathetically realizing its effects on others in a way that is quite impossible on earth with a body limited by the normal sense-modes, the soul learns the moral lesson of the inevitable nature of the law of action and reaction. The various stages and modes of this internal process of self-analysis and moral purification presumably differ very considerably, as they must be *ex hypothesi* of an intensely personal nature; but the main idea is the expansion of the nature so as to include a consciousness of the complement or result of the deeds of the past life. The stages of moral schooling include states both of suffering and of bliss, and finally give place to an open-eyed realization of the value of both orders of experience, when the soul momentarily returns to itself. What necessitates the further return of the soul into earth-life from this state of illumination is by no means clear; renewed life on earth can hardly be regarded as a continuation of the personal punishment-and-reward process, as is generally supposed, for that

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has already been experienced. The soul itself most probably consents to this return, knows that there is a positive purpose in the process, and longs for a renewed opportunity of taking part in that process. For the soul in itself, in its divine nature, is a free agent and not a creature of fate. Such, at any rate, is the persuasion of all Christians and of many another saving cult; and such was the teaching in the past, of many a school of religio-philosophy in the West, and notably among the Alexandrian believers in reincarnation. The latter held accordingly that purification in the after-death states was no real credit to the soul, for there it was purified by the compulsion of necessity and not from choice. True and lasting purification, they held, must be self-wrought, for the soul is a divine self-motive essence. It is only in earth-life that this self-initiated self-purification can be effected and the soul win to realization of its divine nature on the most strenuous battlefield of actuality. The soul, therefore, we may conclude, willingly submits to reincarnation on earth to carry out the divine purpose which is innate in its inmost essence, and of which it is accordingly fully aware only in its deepest self, free from all limitations of time and space, as a conscious member of the divine family. And indeed the famous Platonic 'reminiscence' of the soul is precisely this recalling to mind or bringing into consciousness on earth the memory of this divine state and purpose, and not the recollection of past states of existence on earth.

According to this line of thought, then, it is the life on earth that really counts, for here is the meeting-place of the above and the below, of the within and the without, the ground of really vital struggle, in which the world-process is most intensely engaged in realizing the world-purpose. It is therefore the state in which the individual soul can best win to ever greater realization of the divine purpose, for it is here in the very midst of the divine process. The soul in earth-life may thus be thought of, not as a criminal or a child of fortune, but as

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a warrior or divine adventurer, and the wounds which it suffers in one life may be regarded as the powers that it wields in the next; and so it grows in strength, and beauty, and virtue until it is finally perfected and passes from the man-stage into that which is greater than man. It is thus said in one of the great myths of the soul, that the stature of the angel in heaven,—the one who is elsewhere said perpetually to behold the Face of the Father, or who is in the immediacy of the eternal presence of the mystery of being,—grows with the struggles of its twin on earth, of the man who fights the good fight in the mystery of existence in time and space; until at last earth is raised to heaven and heaven is brought down to earth, and necessity and freedom embrace in the consummation of the divine purpose.

According to this high over-belief the main lessons that life has to teach seem to be the essential non-separability of the life of the individual soul from the life of the whole, and therewith the power of the individual life to enjoy communion with the divine life. The soul's greater destiny includes both necessity and freedom. Freedom resides in the power of the soul to change its individual attitude with regard to the circumstances of life, which are the necessary expressions of the greater life of the whole. If instead of looking on circumstances as vexatious and inimical limitations, we regarded them as ever-fresh opportunities, and indeed the most immediate means of bringing us to ourselves, we might embrace them gladly as the ever-changing moods of our destined complement and fulfillment. For with this change of attitude our personal separative love and will would unite with the all-embracing will and love, and we should be at one with our own greater destiny and with that of the rest, and so find ourselves in conscious coöperation with the divine purpose.

However this may be, the doctrine of reincarnation in its most highly developed form holds out the hope of our realizing some day in the midst of the conditions of

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greatest struggle the meaning of that struggle. To have the life-conflict explained theoretically in some shut-off and preserved heaven-state where the struggle itself is no longer present, would be a solution of an academic rather than of a practical nature. To leave this life forever with all or most of its problems unsolved has all the appearance of abandoning the struggle in irretrievable defeat, and this can hardly be a satisfactory outlook for a noble soul. On the contrary, the idea of the possibility of returning to do better another time, and yet again and again to learn the whole lesson, and above all to help others more easily to learn it, is a conception that should appeal very strongly to the practical instincts of the strenuous laborers for improving the present conditions of human existence on earth.

The doctrine of reincarnation thus provides many with considerations that give satisfaction to their sense of justice and their conception of orderly progress, and holds out the promise of eventual conscious coöperation with the world-process on the most practical plane of life. It cannot, however, be said that this theory has produced any higher types of humanity than the one-life theory. Both forms of belief have their long lists of saints and geniuses, of accomplished souls and heroes of all kinds, and also their endless records of ordinary and of quite undeveloped folk. It is also true that in the past, and even in the West, the reincarnation-doctrine has not been made to yield quite so practical an outlook as has recently been given it, and as has been insisted on in this paper; while in the East it has been the favorite doctrine of peoples for the most part naturally inclined to fatalism and *laisser faire*. On the contrary, the one-life theory has been the favorite doctrine with races who are naturally exuberant in activity, and who have thus found an additional incentive to moral effort in the belief that all is staked on a single throw. We boast ourselves to be more practical in the West; and after all, we say, that is what really counts in arriving at any judgment

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of value. But are we so sure of what is the most truly practical? Modern civilization increases our needs and diminishes our contentment; year by year we get further away from nature; culture does not keep pace with material progress, and moral and spiritual advance, if anything, lags still farther behind. This is hardly practical, at any rate if the true happiness of man is dependent upon harmonious development, and if the teaching of the greatest of mankind in East and West is held to be practical.

The doctrine of reincarnation, in its highest aspect, looks to a social end and not to the consummation of an isolated perfection. It is not to be thought that the individual soul has to acquire all arts and sciences, capacities and abilities, or pass through all experiences; the part cannot possibly perform the function of the whole. But what the wise soul can do is to develop that all-attractive power of harmlessness, and that positive power of fellow-feeling, of sympathy and compassion for all other souls and the whole creation, which are the passports to the adytum of every separated life and of life itself; till finally all separation is removed and the treasures of experience and capacity, knowledge and attainment, of all separated souls and of the soul of life itself are laid at the feet of the eternal victor who is also the perpetual self-sacrifice.

G. R. S. Mead.

London.

THE ESSENCE OF TRAGEDY.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

PLATO, at the end of the "Symposium," represents Socrates as forcing Aristophanes and Agathon to admit that the genius of comedy is the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy is an artist in comedy also. The suggestion is tantalizing. Plato

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discusses tragedy elsewhere,—its purpose to gratify audiences, the mixed character of the feelings it rouses, its place in the economy of the ideal state,—but nowhere again does he touch upon the hint in the Symposium, nowhere develop its implications or draw the necessary conclusions concerning the essence of the tragic. Intent on the coördination of excellences and the definition of the Highest Good, his interest in essence was subordinate to his interest in the essence of value, and he found the arts too immoral in function to pay much attention to their right nature. Thus it is to Aristotle that the doubtful distinction belongs of being the foremost 'esthetician,' the only one, indeed, of the ancient world, and the master of those critics who maintain the classic canons of art in the modern world. Being engaged less with morals than with nature, his empirical methods and his objective definitions made possible the formulation of the standards and descriptions of poetry without any reference to its significance for life. In consequence, where Plato was so much interested in the Highest Good that he lost all sense of the independent objectivity of good things, Aristotle was so much interested in each thing apart, including the Highest Good, that his sense of their interconnection is not obviously clear or strong. Hence, his definition of tragedy is a definition of the tragedy of Greek letters; he is concerned with the tragic institution, the playhouse and the drama, not with the world and human existence: tragedy is for him no more than an imitation, which he finds the best practice of the Hellenic stage to make, of an "action that is serious and complete, and of a certain magnitude, in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, . . . in the form of action not of narrative, through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of those emotions." This, obviously enough, is, if we except the function of katharsis, a close characterization of Athenian serious drama; and the further specifications which the "Poetics" offers are no less faithful to the norm of the Attic stage: the character of the hero,

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the unities of time, place, and story,—with respect to all these, description is legislation. Succinct, concrete, objective, possessed of the dry and firm flavor of reality, the very unpretentiousness of this summary of a local practice gripped the critical imagination, and became the authoritative norm for tragedy throughout Europe. It still remains fundamental. Although it was irrelevant to the practice of the ages, the religious and practical needs of the changing times giving rise to a new stage and a completely diverse dramatic tradition, although Marlowe and Shakespeare, Calderon and Lope created a new genus of tragedy, even English usage of Elizabeth's day sought the sanction of Aristotle and proclaimed his laws of tragedy eternally infallible, while his domination of the tragic stage of France was, in its classic prime, utter. Not until the gathering power of romantic feeling broke through the shell of eighteenth-century rationalism was it considered that the great tragic poets might not have been mere bunglers, too ignorant and unskilfull to make use of Aristotle's laws, but men of genius empowered to legislate and execute in their own right. Then a new definition of tragedy arose, envisaging the essential characters of modern European tradition, and in its turn giving the law, without relevancy to the changing practice of the times, to tragic art. There is a curious inversion in this fact that is itself not untragic: both classic and modern drama have their source in religious needs. Both begin as mysteries, the one of Dionysus, the other of Christ. But the mystery of self-asserting Dionysus grew into the tragedy of negation we call fate-tragedy, and the mystery of atoning Christ has grown into the tragedy of affirmation we call tragedy of character. The one is lawful and orderly and classic; the essence of the other is to assert rebellion and barbarous vitality, to be romantic. And in the theory, what Aristotle is to the classic tradition, that romanticism is to the Christian. Among theorists of tragedy there have been Aristotelians and Romanticists, no others.

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The spirit of romanticism is the spirit of adventure. It is self-centered, assured, irresponsible, eager, and spontaneous. Its pride of self is colossal, it thinks in worlds and universes, it acts as if it were God, it has no law but its own caprices, it breeds its freedom from its needs. It is nothing if not visionary and fanciful, madly so; but when its vision is coincident with reality, it reaches, by way of compensation, deeper into the heart of it and grasps more firmly the nature it sees. Such is the case with its account of tragedy. There, where classicism is formal, it is personal; where classicism is empirical, it is metaphysical. Based, no less than the Aristotelian account, on the tragedy of letters, it succeeds, nevertheless, in getting somewhat closer to the tragedy of life itself. Indeed, it aims to envisage nothing less, for romantic theories of tragedy assign to the elements of the drama a categorical nature and universal scope. This nature is disharmony, conflict at the core of being. But though the core, this conflict is not intrinsic, not permanent; rather is it incidental and transitive, a step in the self-realization of a metaphysical will. Transcendental peace broods always beyond: freedom *is* necessity, law *is* caprice. Thus, according to Schelling, tragedy portrays the conversion, in the course of their proper growth, of the stubbornness and lawlessness of raging and inimical passions, into a horrible necessity; the poet's spirit, all the while, resting in the midst of it like a silent, lovely, shining light, the unmoved subject in the weighty movement, the wise foresight which resolves the most oppugnant discords into satisfying harmonies.[1] Hegel sees in tragedy the reconstitution of the unity of the moral substance by an act of eternal justice which destroys the disturbing individuality;[2] Vischer, an image of the disappearance of every finite and human limitation before the infinite and absolute perfection, besides which finitude is sinful. The rôle of sin, indeed, is enormous in the

[1] Works, I, 118.

[2] "Aesthetics," III, 530.

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romantic view of tragedy, but it is not religious gracelessness, it is metaphysical evil. For some it is identical with wilfullness, caprice, at war with universal necessity, and defeated by being absorbed in the over-individual.[3] For others it is mere finitude, arrogating to itself the lordliness of the infinite and paying, by its tragedy, the price of arrogance,[4] while for others still it is the necessary restraint of the individual will by its peers, all at war with each other, and all reduced in tragedy to absurdity, by the outspanning cosmic purpose. Sin is difference, 'otherness,' variation from type. Tragedy is the conflict between the typical and the individual, the former being good, the latter evil. Tragedy consists, according to Hebbel, of the representation of this conflict. The individual's passions, which oppose him to the ideal, of their own force turn into instances of domination of the moral law, and the tragic pain has its seat in this conversion.[5]

The same romantic sense of the cosmic scope of tragedy marks the disillusion of Schopenhauer and the Darwinian optimism of Nietzsche. To the former tragedy is the exposure of the worthlessness of life, its content is the horrible, the sorrow of man, and the triumph of evil. "It is a conflict of the will with itself, which here, at the highest degree of objectivity, fully explicated, reveals its terrible nature, becoming visible in the sorrows of man."[6] The inward discrepancy makes the will seem both strong and weak, and it can have no pause until it ceases to love life. Its sin is its mere existence, its salvation is death, so that it is the tragic victim who conquers, not the overawing law. Nietzsche, trying to understand tragedy in terms of an interpretation of its origins, tells the same story with a different moral.[7] The *Ursein,* overfilled with its own vitality, becomes unrestful, and creates the individual for its assuagement. When, under the stress of

[3] *Cf.* Solger, "Vorlesungen über Asthetik," 309.

[4] *Cf.* Th. Ziegler, "Das Gefühl," 138, and L. Ziegler, "Zur Metaphysik der Tragödie," 55. [5] Hebbel, Works, 43, x.

[6] "World as Will and Idea," I, § 51. [7] "Geburt der Tragödie."

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Dionysan music, the tragic poet reproduces these creative birthpangs of God, he gives rise thereby to the Apollonic easing. In this way tragedy reveals our own nature to us: we are visions of the Lord, celestial dissonances that must necessarily be resolved in the tragic death which is no more than the individual's reunion with the *Ursein.* Later, when the evolutionary ideal of the superman had obsessed him, Nietzsche laid more emphasis on the glory of the tragic conflict in itself. Not resolution, but the eternity of dissonance became his concern, and he therefore began to see in tragedy a rendering of courage and the spontaneity of emotion before a powerful enemy, a horror, a sublime undoing. Now it is our victory, not our defeat, that the tragic poet selects and ennobles. "Before tragedy the warrior in us celebrates his Saturnalia."[8]

If we take such analyses at their face value, the difference between the classic and the romantic theories of tragedy lies in the classic sobriety of statement and its emphasis on form, the unities, and embellishments, in the ordering of the content rather than in the content as such. For both, the tragic essence is action or struggle, and the one finds its formal, the other its material nature to be of supreme importance. Both tend to insist on the lofty station and nobility of the tragic protagonist, but classicism finds his misfortune to be largely unmerited; romanticism sees it as the outcome of metaphysical sin. Both find an irrevocable finality in the tragic conclusion, for both it is as the "Sire, Zeus, willed it long ago," for both there is the peace that lies beyond. But to the classicist this peace is the fruit of katharsis, conceived, perhaps, physiologically[9] and naturally, while for the romanticist it is the peace that passeth all understanding. But from the romantic standpoint the struggle is cosmic, hence its essence appears in *any* struggle, and the peace may ensue upon any sad event. As Lipps says, the protagonist may be a morally poor and bad man. It is the imperative

[8] Works, VIII, 136.

[9] *Cf.* The discussion of music in the "Politics" of Aristotle.

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and categorical nature of his misfortune that constitutes his tragic nobility, not the nobility his misfortune. In the tragedy of the playhouse, of course, the nobility of the protagonist is that of the classic drama: he *is* a king, not in virtue of his unhappiness, and most of the romantic theories had in mind the Attic models of romantic dramas. Nevertheless, the vision of romanticism is truer to all of the facts, for it can readily envisage the tragedy of the daily life, where the conflict is essential and the station of protagonist unimportant.

Even so, however, can it be said to apprehend the right essence of all tragedy more truly than the classic theory? Do both together? What, in the light of them, shall we make of that pregnant hint of Socrates concerning the identity of the genius of tragedy with that of comedy? Or of the remark of Ibsen to the effect that contradiction, namely, "the contradiction between power and effort, will and possibility, constitute the tragedy and *also the comedy* of the race and the individual?"[10] In point of fact, in their emphasis on conflict, or on form, or on nobility of character, these theories have not grasped the distinctive essence of tragedy. What they say of it may be said of comedy also. For the comic, the ludicrous, is also not a rest, is also an action and developing process, having also a title to unities and embellishments. It, too, is a disharmony whose wholeness is the wholeness of a flicker. In it, too, something is lost or destroyed. But significantly, what is destroyed is not a thing of worth: the progression of the comic theme alters the relations of its elements, gradually eliminates the evil which fathers the unrest, leads to the peace beyond, and in so doing enhances the valuable and confirms the stability of what is precious. The comic conflict tends invariably to resolve into the adequate harmony of beauty; in it evil yields to the supremacy of excellence, and it is susceptible to the same metaphysical and romantic signifi-

[10] Foreword to "Catalina," 2d ed. Italics mine.

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cances usually invoked for tragedy, and yields no less than tragedy, a purgation.[11] If this be true, then there is no difference between comedy and tragedy with respect either to material or to scope of movement. The subject-matter of both is essentially one. What moves one man merrily will move another tearfully; it may be comic and tragic to the same mind at different times and to different minds at the same time. The daily life offers no occasion that cannot sustain these inverse relations; art holds innumerable examples of such objects. Once madness, intoxication, greed, personal deformity were comic; to-day they are tragic. The comic character is often lofty, his misfortunes are frequently unmerited. Alceste in "Le Misanthrope," Celia and Bonario in "Volpone," Orlando in "As You Like It," Hermione in "A Winter's Tale," and innumerable others are in and of themselves no less worthy the buskin than the sock. Nor is the tragic conflict of greater categorical import than the comic; for the opposition of society and the individual, law and caprice, nature and convention, the temporal and the eternal, are comic oppositions no less the tragic. And the great passions,—egoism, avarice, hypocrisy, jealousy, ambition, stupidity, conceit, love, treachery,—are they less effective engines of events in one than in the other? Nothing, perhaps, is so free as the interchange of the two sentiments, tragic and comic. It is the significance that alters, not the object. "Titus Andronicus," full of horrors, once a potent tragedy, is now ludicrous through just this replete intensity of horror. Kyd's "Spanish Tragedy," written to be a great purge of the soul by pity and terror, now tends to evoke only our laughter. "The Merchant of Venice," intended to split the ears of the groundlings with laughter, is now a tragedy moving our tears and consideration, while it is not unlikely that the whole heroic stage of the Restoration would awaken only derision. Moreover, there are

[11] For a detailed analysis of the comic *cf. American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1911: "The Aesthetic Principle in Comedy," by H. M. Kallen.

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border-plays, just as there are border events in the daily life, which leave us uncertain whether to laugh or weep, in which the tragic and the comic sentiments pass into each other as rendering mood, situation,—in a word, the mind's valuation of the event,—may determine. Such dramas are Molière's "Misanthrope," which Goethe called a tragedy, his "Tartuffe" and "George Dandin." Such are Shakespeare's "Measure for Measure," "All's Well that Ends Well," "A Winter's Tale," and "Much Ado." Such are Ibsen's "An Enemy of the People" and "Little Eyolf." And these are only notable and obvious instances: ultimately there is nothing in experience or in literature that cannot, as the occasion is served, move to laughter or to tears. Altogether, the mechanism and structure of the comic plot is the same as that of the tragic plot, even according to the Aristotelian analysis. Both involve specific conflicts, disharmonies brought to pass by recognition, exposures, inversions, repetitions, and so on. Whatever that is human and contains the dramatic essence of the comic by that fact contains the same essence of the tragic,—let it be deformity of person or of character, cancers of body or spirit, let them appear singly or combined into groups, systems and progressions, they with indifferent immediacy constitute the tragic optimum, or the comic. Not a detail of the one that cannot become the substance of the other without a change in nature. Where then does the constitutive alternation come?

Consider so commonplace a comic event as Mr. Pickwick in pursuit of his hat. Is his situation truly comic to him? Does he or can he stand outside it, the joyous spectator of the mutual defeat and destruction of elements in his environment which were menacing, potential of evil? Clearly not. Even his initial laughter (if he be moved to it) is unfree and therefore not truly the voice of the comic sentiment. For it has an instrumental intent; it is meant to ward off the pain of the greater derision from the watching crowd, which anger or bad

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temper would evoke. It does not endure, this initial laughter, inasmuch as its source cannot remain the serene beholder of his own undoing, nor can his mirth be honestly directed upon his present state. In his eyes the pursuit of his hat is an urgent and serious business, and as it prolongs, passes from seriousness to sadness and from sadness to tragedy. By it the even course of his life has been broken, its proper balance destroyed and the flow of his interests deployed from its right channel. The hat-hunt is a node and vortex of cross-purposes, arrested progress, and its prosecution involves at the same time neglect of the right and good and the pursuit of them; it is an attempt to restore these excellences to their pristine status. Further, for the permanence of this status, in a society where headgear is important, the right disposition of the hat is fundamental, propriety in dress being there a human interest and value which is in many respects the base and underpinning of innumerable more and important and higher interests. The very triviality and obvious ridiculousness of the instance must make clear how near together laughter and sorrow do lie. To violate this apparently insignificant interest of propriety is to throw the others out of gear, to upset a system or scheme of values. The chance wind, then, in carrying off a man's hat, makes him the victim of such an upheaval and loosens his grasp upon life and power. In his struggle to regain his hat he is in toils of evil, and he is thereby a tragic figure. Tragic because the doom which ordains him here to maladjustment, or defeat, or destruction, is his own nature. It is the inexorable and spontaneous necessity of living which compels him to pursue his lost good, to restore the upset equilibrium, to conserve the threatened value. If it be possible for the man to go freely on his way without his headgear, he can never figure as tragic, nor as comic either. As it is, his plans and arbitrariness of fate or chance being oppugnant, his expectations are disappointed, his aims missed, the worth and inward dignity

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of his life set at naught. And all this is to the beholder comic and yields him self-sufficiency and pleasure. But to the man himself, can it be anything but an increasingly terrible insufficiency and horror, rendering him tragic? And if this be the ready menace of so insignificant an incident as a hat-hunt, how much greater must be the tragedy in the more meaningful events of experience. For our hatless citizen there is a world out of joint whose cursed spite requires him to set it right.

"The world," says Horace Walpole, "is a comedy for those who think and a tragedy for those who feel." It is the same world, but it feeds the proper vitality of the one, and he laughs and grows fat, while it consumes that of the other, and he dies. Valuation is what makes tragedy. And it is for this reason that comedy is tragedy, tragedy comedy, seen the other way. If comedy involves detachment, tragedy requires attachment. Where comedy supplies superiority, tragedy demands loyalty, where comedy begins with menace, the beginning of tragedy is beauty. Comedy annihilates the rival, tragedy destroys the beloved. For every loyalty, every appreciation or attachment, all love, is, as we know, but the interweaving of value-relations by whose virtue objects get each its peculiar excellence. This excellence may be the direct and self-sufficient one of beauty; it may have the indirect character of instrumentality, mechanical or ethical, being good in respect to its uses rather than in its own right, or it may be possessed of the high and full dignity of the harmony of the two. But if there is to be tragedy, it must exist, and in some one of this triad of forms. Where there are no values, there can be no interests and no tragedy. That can arise only where a thing precious and cherished is involved in ruin: a thing dear to the soul, its care and joy. Whatever other characteristics tragedy may have, its prime essential is the destruction of value, and from that all the others derive.

That this should be so is implied in the nature of value itself. Being of the very essence of consciousness, the

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core of humanity, its disintegration must proceed through a human center, and tragedy of the unhuman is possible only as a secondary and symbolic fact, humanized by the infection of the human preference. This does not mean, as Lipps would have us think, that the tragic sentiment is *Mitleid*, sympathy or pity, or that it is value of the highest type, being the feeling of the worth of man. Nor does it mean that its excellence resides in the painfully sublime participation in the inmost life of another through the medium of his difficulties.[12] My meaning is rather the other way. Pain is exactly what does not lead to personality, it is personality that leads to pain. For an instance, consider again the relation of the onlooker to the hat-chasing victim of the wind. If the two are strangers utterly, if they do not obviously meet on any one excellence, each feels the other as somehow a menace to his own integrity of being. The stranger within the gate is ever in need of protection; "who is not for me is against me" seems to be the operative though unacknowledged rule of conduct of our gregarious world. The stranger's misfortune is sooner if not immediately felt as an excellence,—as the frustration of a potential menace, and this feeling's overt symbol is laughter. But if, on the other hand, two are not strangers; if, although for an instant only, an interest of each touches and strengthens the other's; then the hat-hunt becomes the spectator's tragedy also. He participates in the ruin: a value of his, however petty, is for the moment in jeopardy of its existence through the hat's mischance. That value may reside in the intrinsic character of the victim himself, in his appearance merely, in his affairs, in any one of the complexity of interests that make up our lives. Once given and endangered, tragedy arises, excellence becoming transmuted to turpitude, goodness falling into the toils of evil. Now there are non-human conflicts and disharmonies also, there are

[12] For Lipps's view *of*. tragedy, cf. Aesthetics, I, 565:

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discords of color, cacophonies of sound, natural cataclysms, misfortunes of animals, metaphysical evil, which are readily objects of laughter: but contents of the tragic sentiments they can become only by virtue of the 'pathetic fallacy.' Some form of value,—in a word, some attribute or *quale* of consciousness or personality must attach to them, be involved or shattered in their fall, and their ruin must in so far forth drag the spectator down with it. In some one respect it must be his ruin, his unhappy destiny.

Since the field of excellence is narrower than experience, the menace of existence being at least so pervasive as its joy, tragedy has a scope more limited than comedy. The tragic spirit lives by the misfortunes of man alone; the muse of comedy is nourished on all disharmonies. Tragedy, as an art, does not reach out to the residual world, but stays at home in the human heart. Whatever has figured as tragic, from God to stocks and stones, has been so only by its propitious bearing on some human interest, and has sucked its tragic import from that. Until very recently there have been no attempts at tragedies of beasts and things, and such experiments as had been made were foredoomed to failure. The material whereon we feed and live can be of itself comic, but it cannot of itslf be tragic. To achieve tragedy it needs to be raised to man's estate, made to care for the same things and to cherish the same values. Then, however, it is no longer tragic in its own right but vicariously, as Chanticleer may be, or the birds and beasts of Æsop, or the animal gods of the mythologists. Tragic in its own right only mankind can be, and all else is an image and a symbol merely, not a real life, the peer of man's.

But because the prime fact of valuation narrows the field of the tragic to humanity, it does not limit the sentiment to those classes of mankind defined by both the classic and romantic theories of tragedy. If in the tragic conflict the very core of life is thrust at, if it is value as

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such that is there gaged, it is value uninformed by any object, independent of any condition, caste, or station. Now bare value, so taken, is fundamental, is that direct excellence, intrinsic, immediate, self-sufficient, we have learned to know as beauty, so that beauty becomes the chief desideratum in tragedy. Here would seem to arise one of those parodoxes dear to romanticism,—the limited becoming unlimited, the relative absolute, and so on to the end. At least, there seems to be a contradiction: the tragic object must be beautiful, yet must belong to no special human group. What of ugly humanity? Does not that make a difference and could not comedy and tragedy be distinguished, after classicism, with reference to ugliness and beauty? Comedy, Aristotle tells us, is of the nature of the ugly, but tragedy must be adorned with every artistic ornament and its characters must be kingly. On the contrary, modern insight, of which the moral disillusions of Christianity and the spontaneous democracy of romanticism are a dominant spiritual background, has ceased to find tragedy only where ornament is pervasive and station significant. It is valuation that constitutes beauty, and that beauty need be unmixed still needs to be proved. Ugliness is endured, as we shall see, and even cherished for the sake of the value it lives with. Again as Lipp says,[18] and again, for another reason, morally poor and bad men may be tragic protagonists, men without station, dignity, or worth, but loving life and seeking to conserve it. Let alone the domestic tragedy of the English stage, there are also truly sordid tragedies, like those of Hauptmann, where the splendor of destruction is nil, the embellishment lacking, the nobility of the victim unrevealed. In them no magnificent recollections of bygone days wait upon death, no hells loom, no gods curse, no hosts of angels sing to rest; the evil event comes unbeautified and passes unembellished, the tragic figure has neither high station nor ex-

[18] *Ibid*, I, 566.

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ceeding virtue. It is the figure of the daily life, with all its dreariness, with all its imperfections, but with its essential value,—with its *life*. It is the figure of the daily life given, in an enhanced degree, the beauty which is life, the joy proper to being, to the maintenance of interests, the pursuit and participation in ideals. However commonplace and routinal it be, it becomes tragic when any of its positive values, wherever sustained and from whatever social reach declining, grips in its passing the onlooker's heart, and so, by becoming his own, carries him along to destruction. Neither fear nor pity nor heroic guilt nor embellishment nor station are, then, at the base of tragedy. At the base of tragedy is the goodness of mere life, expressed in the simplest of all values, beauty.

Hence, limited though it be, the tragic field has widened since Aristotle's day. From kings it has spread to all mankind, from a few values, given in religion or the more vivid taboos of a dearly gained morality, such as made Pentheus and Œdipus tragic figures, it has spread to all the values that men cherish and lose, whether through their own natures or the brute onsweep of the flux. The 'gravity and greatness' of the tragic career is no longer the gravity and greatness of the convention of implicated gods and suffering heroes. There may be tragedy in the fall of the sparrow, if there are men who love sparrows. Tragic significance now rests in intent purely as it lives in the moment of perception, and is identical with beauty as we have learned to know it, at its basest and simplest, the naked funamentum of value. This, the soul of all our interests and acolyte of every excellence, attaches us spontaneously to an object in the flux, and raises it to the region of the spirit and sustains it there. The object need only be selected or found. Beyond that it may be companioned by a horde of evils, born of evil, dependent on evil, and for its goodness's sake these will be not only endured but also sustained and cherished. The infection of its excellence

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will overcome the very horror that may surround and feed it, and turn all to good. Thus, however great the turpitude and sinfulness may be, however ineradicable save by annihilation, its destruction will, by virtue of the good it lives with, be also tragedy. Such destructions are those of Macbeth and his lady, of King John, of Richard III, of Werner. Camille, Iris, Paula Tanqueray, Rosa Bernd are considered no less tragic than Cordelia and Desdemona. Thérèse Raquin and Hannele are found as worthy of the buskin as Antigone or Iphigenia. For the intrinsic dignity of life, the slum is as worthy as the palace; millhands, spinners, thieves, are as excellent in their proper natures as captains and lords. Indeed, what, in the old tragedies the gods were to the heroes, that the upper classes are now recognized to be often to the lower. In plays like Tolstoi's "The Powers of Darkness," Sudermann's "Die Ehre," Hauptmann's "Die Weber," moreover, the groups as such are the protagonists, and individuals are merely background. Nor is the 'law' or the 'god' always vindicated now, or the individual invariably resolved into the universal. The tragic object may be the god or the law or the universal itself. This is so in "Ghosts," where a time-honored convention of human mating is destroyed; in "A Doll's House," where the obligation of family life and duty lies dismembered and bleeding. In a word, the tragic sentiment has been liberated, and will attach itself to any excellence of life whatever, involved in disharmony and going down to destruction.

The classic drama itself furnishes examples of how natural and inevitable this is. Indeed, it is only an accident of history that this extension of the tragic field did not occur a thousand years ago. It requires no more than the development of implicit attitudes of the chorus or of the protagonists of the Attic stage. A notable instance occurs in Euripides's "Bacchæ." Cadmus has been bemoaning his unhappy fate and the leader of the chorus replies:

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> Lo, I weep with thee. 'Twas but due reward
> God sent on Pentheus; but for thee. . . . 'Tis hard.[14]

The admission of Dionysian justice is pitying, grudging. The speaker is expressing two conflicting sentiments, loyalty to the god and pity for Cadmus. Suppose, however, that Euripides had been even more Platonic in his treatment of the divine immoralities. He might then have thrown the whole force of interest on Pentheus and Cadmus, even for the Dionysian choir, and instead of justice, the speaker of these verses might have seen immorality and horror in the god's revenge. On the other hand, the relation of the comic sentiment to the tragic is no less pregnantly implicit in this passage. For Euripides might easily have maintained the initial joy of revenge and triumph which the prophetic chorus expresses, instead of permitting it to lapse so humanly. Pentheus was outraging their beloved gods; his failure and his fate could easily have been laughed at rather than sighed over, and if he had succeeded in his blasphemous designs, not he but Dionysus would have been the tragic hero. Similarly, in the Sophoclean version of Prometheus, to those to whom Zeus was more important and of greater excellence than the Titan the tragedy must have been Zeus's. And in our time the death of Macbeth is to many more painful than the death of Duncan, and the fate of Beatrice Cenci's father than her own. To multiply examples would be superfluous. It is the destruction of value that primarily constitutes tragedy.

This cannot, however, be the whole story. The tragic sentiment is a complex one, and alone the destruction of value would give rise to horror, hardly anything more. True horror is not, however, a constituent of the sentiment. This is predominantly pleasant, luminous and calm rather than passionate and turgid, and with all the attachment and suffering, it leaves the soul somehow detached, free, even if subdued. That there are tragedies

[14] Translation by Gilbert Murray, p. 150.

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that do not involve this fulness of the tragic sentiment, that are valued only in terms of pity and terror, or even of terror alone, is not disputed. That whole group of dramas called 'tragedies of fate' may belong to this class. The horror of Œdipus, the inevitable but needless deaths of Romeo and Juliet, the suicide of Phædra and the killing of Hippolytus, the fates of Othello and Desdemona, may be held to be the fruits of evil purely, utter reversals of values, spanned by horror. In the course of the daily life they would be paralleled by the fearful accidents, —children under wheels, the ruin of shipwreck, the rack of earthquakes. The evil in them would be just the brute irrationality of being, the heedlessness and inadvertence of the flux. Whatever positive excellence is apprehended together with such misfortunes resides not in the fearful content as such, but in other and not altogether relevant excellences,—the proper embellishments of tragedy. The tragedies of fate are really not so simple, and most of them do exemplify the tragic sentiment. This, with its mixture of positive and negative values, pleasantness and unpleasantness, can rightly attach to nothing but the event itself, its development and culmination, not its extraneities. If tragedies of fate are truly objects of the tragic sentiment, they necessarily involve more in their content than their theory envisages. The sentiment is, as Lipps thinks,[15] a unique and single emotion, although its positive character is not intensified by its negative complement, nor does it appear to be derived from the apprehension of the inmost depths of humanity through suffering. A mood, it makes no judgments of kind or class; it requires only that the object it defines shall be involved in some cataclysm of value. But what else is necessary in the nature of the cataclysm to render it completely tragic?

The thing needful is that also the destroyer shall be an excellence.

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[15] Aesthetics, II, pp. 572-3.

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The right essence of tragedy lies not in the demolition of value merely, but in the destruction of value by value. Its movement is a conflict of values, its culmination is the victory of one of them. The hero and his enemy, whether in the tragedy of fate or of character, must be equally good if the tragic sentiment is to constitute them tragic figures. The verse already quoted from the Bacchæ is a consummate expression of this sentiment:

> Lo, I weep with thee. 'Twas but due reward
> God sent on Pentheus; but for thee. . . . 'Tis hard.

And in Macbeth's response to the announcement of his wife's death it sounds the depths:

> SEYTON—The queen, my lord, is dead.
> MACBETH—She should have died hereafter:
> There would have been a time for such a word;
> To-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow
> Creeps in the petty pace from day to day,
> To the last syllable of recorded time,
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more: it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing.

In both these instances, there is, it will be seen, a pause in the movement of events, a sort of peace, that comes with culmination. The battle and the breathlessness is done; the fever and the fret are at an end; only the fruit remains, a sorrow and a consolation in one. To the Bacchanal the supreme excellence has been the honor of Dionysus; that she lived by, that it was her interest to sustain and to glorify. She has found, however, in the aged Cadmus another excellence; his lamentations have moved her, his loss has become her loss, his tears her tears. Pentheus, the last of the Cadmean race, the old man's champion and his friend, has also become some-

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thing to sustain and cherish. But Pentheus is gone irretrievably. The world could not hold together him and Dionysus; one or the other must be the victim of the tragic conflict. All this the Bacchanal recognizes and envisages in her last speech,—an excellence has been destroyed, a star has fallen, but it had to be; and there remains the residual good,—God's justice which by destroying the man, preserved itself. So compounded also is the sentiment of Macbeth. Busied with his preparations for the approaching battle, requiring hopefulness and abundance of life, he receives instead a message of death. His instantaneous response thereto is one of rebellion and suffering: it is an untimely death. But over against this sense of disharmony and loss rises the other consideration of the emptiness and vanity of that which he so much lacks and regrets. Life, more life, indispensable for the purpose in hand, in itself not worth the living! Evil and good are inextricably commingled, and the one is born of the other. "Out, out, brief, candle!"

Tragedy exists wherever goodness is at war with goodness, nobility with nobility, truth with truth, in battle for a mere place in existence, a battle which both cannot survive. "Das Gute selbst kann Feind des Guten sein, die Rose kann die Lilie verdrängen wollen; beide sind existenzberechtigt, aber nur eines hat Existenz."[16] Such conflicts arise everywhere, and are the constituent matter of the whole drama of human life. They are the fabric of the mind of man, so that every moral nature has its roots in the tragic essence. For mind, as we have learned, is an arrangement or system of interests, each accommodated to the other, and in the accommodation, some are crippled, some are dwarfed, some are completely annihilated that the whole may be. Yet in the way of being, each value in itself is as validly entitled to a freehold in existence as any other, each is as possible and autonomous a happiness, if it come to fruition. In the freest and

[16] Hebbel, "Tagebuch," 7 Dez., 1839.

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most excellent life, where no environment would constrain, no pain contradict and demolish, each, in reaching its proper perfection, would enrich and deepen the harmony of its peers, while they in their turn would support the individual interest. But the mind is a conflict more than a harmony. In the flux and strain of living, the autonomy of existence and freedom for perfection that are spontaneously proper to each interest must give way to the domination of law. That many may be, one at least must pay. So only can the moral economy be maintained; but the moral economy so maintained, is implicit tragedy. Every choice is a destruction of value by value. The soul, it seems, must, in her housekeeping, waste to save, and what she wastes is initially as costly, as precious, as desirable as what she keeps. Indeed, the very freedom which is granted her in the existence of alternative excellences to choose between is the ground of her tragedy. Where there is none, where there are only uniformity, fate, 'overarching purpose,' and the difference and spontaneity are lacking or unreal, there can be no struggle and no tragedy. Growth in liberty, the enfranchisement of values as they rise in all men, means growth in tragic power. For this reason tragedy, in no less profound a sense than comedy, attends civilization, which is the liberation of the human spirit. For these reasons these converse values melt, in the development of the dramatic arts, one into the other, to merge into the neutrality of humor, the clearly diverse tragedy and comedy of Sophocles and Aristophanes culminating in the undeterminate and problematic dramas of Ibsen, which are tragic or comic as one chooses.

Tragedy enters the arts whenever any inimical and oppugnant goods are abstracted from their context in the experiential flux, and the progress of their duel to its culmination is set forth in unmixed purity. How deep-lying and inevitable such conflict is, how far-reaching, how finely woven into the texture of our own lives, the very honor and dignity which mankind apportions the tragic art,

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sufficiently attest. And not alone the high dignity of tragedy, but all those traits which criticism has regarded as its essentials, distinguishing it from comedy—reality, categorical force, embellishment. These are, nevertheless, not primary, and if they exist in tragedy, derive from something more fundamental. Upon the fact that the tragic object may at the same time be also comic follows that intrinsically it is not more real as the one than as the other. If, when comic, it seems abstract, unreal, mere 'personification' of moral traits,[17] this is because, emptied by virtue of the comic conflict of its own power for evil, it is *felt* as trivial, unimportant, negligible. Its value makes it unreal, the laughter that depreciates it, not its nature. Its value again makes it real, the love or loyalty that cherishes it and renders its endangerment tragic. The mind, by prizing and treasuring an object, whatever its status, endows it with genuineness and import such that it cannot and need not otherwise have, renders it solid, stable, significant. In a word, in comedy the value ensues upon the struggle, feeds upon that, but is not involved in it, while in tragedy it is value itself that is embattled and in danger of destruction.

From this fact springs the notion also of the 'universality' of the tragic protagonist, as well as of his reality. There is, in the tragic sentiment, something of finality, of the irrevocable, the fatal and necessary. This is the material of the cosmic resolutions of dissonance, of the absorption into the One, which the romantic interpreters of tragedy are so rich in. But it is born of nothing more than the fact that the tragic duel is between two excellences which cannot endure together. One or the other must be annihilated, and forever. And the poignancy of recognizing this unutterable incompatibility and inevitable bereavement seems no less than universal. It is like the past, which cannot be called back, yet without which we cannot live. If, then, tragedy is categorical and necessary,

[17] *Cf.* Bergson, "Le Rire."

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the universality and necessity are the fruits of its primary content and its essential 'terror' lies in that. For in that we see evil springing out of the very being of goodness, the love of excellence frustrate by its own nature. Tragedy reveals the subtlety, the pervasiveness, the invincibility of the enemy, "how evil evil is," as Mr. Santayana says, but it is also a tribute to the power of life and preserves intact the domination of goodness. For it is better that one value shall flourish and bear fruit than none at all. What survives the tragic ruin is still a thing to cherish and to love, the more precious for the price it costs.

In sum: the two historic theories of tragedy, the classic and the romantic, do not succeed in supplying a definite criterion of its nature. Although both enumerate many of its properties, they fail to distinguish such as will differentiate it from the comic on the one hand, and the horrible, on the other. With respect to singleness and unity of action, to purgative effect (even through such emotions as pity and terror), to subject-matter, to the passions and motives of protagonists, to the mechanism and structure of plots, comedy is essentially identical with tragedy. The history of literature records tragedies that have become comedies and comedies that have become tragedies, and the daily life teems with events that are tragic to one and comic to another, while dramatic art offers plays that are tragic or comic as the interpretations of the actors and the moods of the audience please. Again, the horrible, which is essentialy blinding and turgid, can play no important rôle (to say nothing of being identical with it) in tragedy, inasmuch as the tragic sentiment, subdued and massive though it be, is also speculative and not unquiet.

The reëxamination of the tragic essence to which these considerations lead reveals the fact that the one trait which makes the destruction or pain of an object tragic, not comic, is its *value,* and that its enemy must be equally a value. But value is meaningless except in terms of

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mind, whose essence value is. So that only human beings can be tragic and all other things are tragic vicariously. In life and in art, tragedy can exist only where human values are incompatible and cannot live together, one having to go if the other is to stay. From the fact that the tragic object must be valuable, spring the so-called universality of tragedy and the 'reality' of its protagonists. Its high place among the arts, again, is due to the fact that it is more directly representative of the essential movement of mind, which is compelled from moment to moment to choose between incompatible goods. Nevertheless, tragedy represents the victory of life, since it is better to conserve one or a partial excellence than none at all. It is, however, rooted in destruction, and where comedy is the *enrichment,* tragedy is only the *salvage* of life.

The foregoing theory of tragedy may be called pragmatic.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

LIBERALISM AND ORTHODOXY.

GEORGE ALEXANDER BARROW.

AS the number of liberals in the orthodox denominations daily increases, the issue which once seemed so clear is in danger of becoming confused. In the early days of the liberal movement, the controversy between the old and the new in theology was clear cut. The champions of higher criticism or evolution were known to all to be definitely opposed to the ordinarily received views in theology. But to-day, when many are drifting rather than working toward the new views, there are many intermediate positions. The center, too, of the conflict has changed. Whether from a feeling that debatable matters do not belong to the sphere of practical church adminis-

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tration, or from a wish to keep the peace, we have reached an era of good-feeling. The epithet of heretic is becoming obsolete, and heresy-trials relics to be put away on a shelf. To many, undoubtedly, this means that the church is putting the emphasis where it belongs,—on the moral problems. Such persons are saying that the great controversy is with sin, and that minor differences of belief as to the best means of warfare should be forgotten in the presence of the enemy. At the same time, fundamental disagreements are none the less important, because they are concerned with methods only. If the controversy were concerning the final goal, discussion might be fruitless, because neither party would be interested in the other's purpose; but where each party is striving for the same end and desires the other's help, the disagreement becomes quite important. The best interests, therefore, of the movement to raise our moral standards demand that we examine carefully our ideas as to the means of realizing the end. To be indifferent to differences of theological belief is not in the interest of real moral reform.

A further and a personal reason for keeping the issue clear is apparent to those, who, like the writer, are in touch with the orthodox denomination to which they belong, as well as with the radical thinkers outside the orthodox churches. It has often seemed to me that on one thing at least ultra-conservatives and ultra-radicals are agreed, and that is that the moderate, especially the moderate liberal, has no standing at all. In some form or other, the imputation of hypocrisy is sure to be cast on the liberal, especially the liberal clergyman, who remains in an orthodox organization. The conservative cannot see how the liberal can be sincere in his allegiance to the creeds of his church, and the radical shares in this inability. To be sure, our opponents of both wings are usually too polite to claim that we are knowingly insincere, yet the most that they will allow us is that we are self-deceived. Now, are the creeds of the churches such that the liberal can hold his new views and yet be

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sincere in his allegiance to the theology of a past age? The intelligent man is asking whether he cannot remain in his old associations and yet be progressive. This new attitude of the educated layman, who wishes to hold his liberal ideas and remain within the church, forces us to ask and face squarely the question, Can a liberal be truly orthodox?

If orthodoxy is to be defined in the terms of the conservatives, and liberalism in the terms of the radicals, the two cannot be brought into harmony. But it cannot be taken for granted that the ordinary idea of orthodoxy or of liberalism is the correct one. There have been many attempts to alter the ordinary definition of liberalism, in order to allow of its being orthodox, but there is also the other possibility, of so defining orthodoxy that it may be liberal. This is not so impossible as it seems at first. If we take orthodoxy, not as a closed system, but as that tendency of thought which the Christian church has taught as the true path to knowledge, we soon find that our whole conception is altered. This does not mean that all recent liberalism is orthodox, but that a liberal is not necessarily a heretic. We do not ordinarily realize that the closed system of truth was not the original idea of the leaders of the church. It arose not in the first flush of the pursuit of truth, either in the early Christian ages or in the first impulse of the Reformation; it was rather the work of the militant controversies which followed. In the heat of conflict men could not stop to weigh fine points, nor afford to leave loose edges. Now this hard and fast setting of bounds may be militant orthodoxy; it is hardly orthodoxy true to itself. The looser systems of Luther or Zwingli, and the speculations of Athanasius and Origen have a better claim to the title of truly orthodox than the more dogmatic pronouncements of Calvin or the Roman See. Our remarks apply not only to the less important matters of the faith; the central doctrines of the Atonement, the Incarnation, and the Trinity, were by no means held in the vise-like grip of modern orthodox scholars.

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A distinction between heresy and truth there has always been, but the distinction between heresy and orthodoxy is characteristic not of the creative age, but of the embalming age. When a great truth is being formulated, the test of truth is applied, and falsity is called heresy. It is only when orthodox development has stopped that the test of authority is substituted for that of truth. Liberalism, therefore, which insists on applying the test of truth, is at least not to be put out of court without a hearing when it seeks to prove itself orthodox.

The question which merits discussion is whether the trend of modern liberalism is in harmony with the early trend of Christian orthodoxy. We are not here concerned with applying the test of truth of which we have just spoken, but only with asking whether, if applied, the answer must be a decided yes or no. The fact of applying the test of truth to the doctrines of the church does not prove us unorthodox. The general question becomes at once an historical one. If the modern closed system does not represent orthodoxy, we must be able to explain how it came to be substituted for the earlier truth. We need to see how the original constructive thought of the East came to be tied down to the limits of our modern western orthodoxy.

In the days of classical Latin learning there was little in philosophic or religious thought that could be called distinctively Roman. The great names of Latin philosophy are either those of Greeks living in Italy, or those of followers of the different Greek schools of thought. Rome undoubtedly added something to the Greek development, but it was rather in the direction of a firmer moral standard, a more vigorous outlook on life, than in the way of speculation. Every educated Roman of the period looked to Athens and Greece for his education, as every Englishman of a century ago did to Oxford or Cambridge. Athens and Alexandria, the latter coming into prominence later than the former, spanned the region of new thought. Rome came to take, not only her formal learning, but

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even her new religions, from that eastern country which she had so lately conquered. Aside from the great influence of the Greek religion on the old Latin cult, all the faiths that had vigorous life in the first Christian centuries, within the western part of the Empire, came from the East. The cults of the Syrian goddess, of Isis, and especially of Mithra, held western Europe in a religious tutelage as firmly as Greek thought held Latin speculation. This eastern influence the first Christian propaganda increased. All the names of the early bishops, even of the Church of Rome itself, are Greek, and for years Greek was its official language, as it was of all the churches. Coming from the East, Christianity appealed first to the Greek elements in the population, and this still further increased the eastern influence within the church. It was to be expected, under these circumstances, that Rome should for a long time follow eastern leadership in the development of Christian speculative thought. Christian Rome turned, as readily as had classic Rome, to the East for guidance and instruction.

The whole history of the first four centuries shows the same thing. If we substitute Antioch for Athens, the statements concerning education in the East hold true down to the reign of Constantine, so far as education existed at all during these troubled times. Athens was too closely identified with the pagan learning to become a Christian center, but Syrian Antioch and Egyptian Alexandria, both become Greek, took its place. Not one of the leaders of the great heresies of these first four centuries is Latin. This is not because the Greek mind was more perverse than the Roman, but because the only thinking that could lead to heresy, the only constructive thinking, was being done in the East. The great rivals were Antioch and Alexandria; while Rome, influential as her church undoubtedly was, had very small part in these early controversies. What part she did have was rather that of a balance wheel than that of a qualified judge. She was subjected to harder trials than some of

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the other centers, especially as the seat of government, so her judgment was often more practical than that of her eastern sister churches. The formative period in any movement is the time that stamps upon it most strongly those tendencies which are to influence and guide it in later periods. The formative period in Christian theology stood under Greek influence. It is to the Greek theology of these first four centuries, therefore, that we must go to obtain our definition of orthodoxy.

In outlining the development of Greek theology it is well to consider somewhat the essence of the Hellenic mode of thought. As well known as the fact of the dependence of Rome on Greece, is the impulse to system-building which dominated the history of Greek philosophy. From the beginning to the end of the Hellenic intellectual dominance, systems of metaphysics continued to rise and fall. This was due partly to a desire to explain existence in as simple terms as possible, but especially to the desire to find a principle to explain the whole of existence. If each thinker had been intent on but one problem of reality, he would have evolved an explanation for that, but not a system to explain the whole. From the beginning, with the possible exception of Socrates, the object of the Greek was to give an account of the basis of all reality, and Socrates's work differed only because he was evolving a method. This bent of the Hellenic mind is seen in the ever-recurring cosmologies. They represented so many attempts to describe the universe in terms of the principle which each philosopher believed he had discovered as the basis of existence. When these Greek tendencies began to work upon the subject-matter of the Christian religion, history simply repeated itself. It is no surprise that the early Greek heresies centered around their cosmologies. Later, when these first crude attempts were shown to be false to the Christian truths, the same metaphysical spirit expressed itself in the more subtle constructions of Arius and the post-Nicean heresies. Each of these systems was concerned with the whole universe,

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and took man, and sought to explain him, as a subordinate part in creation. Quite foreign to them is the humanism of those whom the orthodox now call 'Arians.' The fact is, neither heretical thought nor early orthodox thought centered the attention upon man. The orthodox line, instead of building cosmologies, sought a central principle, simpler in operation than the emanation theory of the various heresies. This principle it found in the doctrine of the Logos. But orthodoxy had as little thought of personality as had the Gnostics: indeed, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Logos doctrine, taking its origin from Alexandria, scarcely resembled the later teaching, which insisted on the personality and individuality of the Christ. Arising in the midst of a great city, under the influence of a complex civilization that did not place the high value upon the individual which we have come to place upon him, this teaching of the orthodox in the time of Athanasius that the Logos is equal with God, and incarnate in Jesus, could not fail to fix its emphasis more on the ideal Logos than on the actual Jesus.

To this intellectual tendency is to be added the sense of empire. Under both the Macedonian and the Roman Empires, the impressive thing to the ancients was the whole, not the part. Principles rather than individuals grew more important as the units grew larger. Great forces, not the men who embodied them, claimed men's attention. So the Logos doctrine, not the personality of the Christ, held men's thoughts. Two factors, therefore, the tendency of the Hellenic mind to face world problems and the pressure of a great civilization away from the individual influenced early orthodoxy to formulate its creeds in impersonal terms.

What we mean by impersonal is plain when we read the decisions of the first four General Councils. Discussions of the equality of the Logos with God before the birth of Christ, of the equality of the human and the divine in Christ,—such problems scarcely emphasize the human side of Jesus, and his relation to human needs.

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Yet it is not due to the exaltation of the man Jesus, for these early thinkers avoid the imputation, sometimes cast on later theologians, of tritheism. Their whole concern is not with the humanity of Jesus, but with his relation to the universe and to God. The human figure necessarily became abstract, and they worshiped, not the Nazarene, but the Logos. Because of this, because their thought was not of history but of metaphysics and speculation, they never closed their system. The stagnation of eastern religious thought came only when all thought stagnated. As long as there were any to carry on the development, orthodoxy in the East moved forward. This is not our mode of thought to-day, nor was it the way of the Middle Ages. Eastern orthodox thought laid emphasis on the world problem, and did not take itself as a closed system. The discussions of the councils were against existing and past heresies; they did not attempt to forecast the future. Also, the authority they sought to exert was that of truth and correct thinking. Partisan and violent though they often were, authority was never invoked as an ideal. The emphasis on human personality and on church organization had its primary growth elsewhere than in the primitive regions of Christianity.

When the development of doctrine came in the west of Europe, it came, as it had come in the East, largely in response to heresy. To combat false doctrines, true doctrines had to be developed. Of course, Rome did not stand apart from the earlier evolution, but the earlier native theologians either merely reflected the eastern tendencies, or worked in harmony with them. When, however, the intercourse between East and West became less, and with political separation each section came to have its own peculiar problems, the churches of Africa and of Rome began to develop their own theology. This happened in the life-time of Augustine. The three great heresies, the Manichæan, the Donatist, and the Pelagian, forced the orthodox of the West to formulate their own views; for while Manichæism came from the East, it

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seems to have been especially strong in northern Africa, while the Donatist movement was confined to that region, and Pelagianism started in the West. Another reason that forced independence on the West was the lukewarmness of the East with regard to these questions. While Alexandria and Antioch never exactly lapsed into these heresies, they never so definitely condemned them as did the West. Rome and Carthage, therefore, began their independent doctrinal development at this point.

This Latin development differing in its origin from the Greek, dealt with heresies of a different nature from those which had convulsed the early church. They were all, in some form or other, concerned with action, with morality, and with man, not with the universe. The Manichæan theory, while it gave evil a large place in the universe, had its strength and its vogue because it presented a theory of conduct. It arose from the desire to explain sin, and was the forerunner of those theories of evil which have continued till to-day. While there had been explanations of evil in the Gnostic and Arian systems, that was not their chief interest; but with Manichæism, the conflict raged around this problem. Augustine joined this sect before he became an orthodox believer, and his first controversy, after his conversion, was against his old belief. The next controversy of his life was more concrete still. The Donatist schism arose over the matter of church discipline, and came to involve the theory of the church and her relation to the moral code. This limited Augustine's interest even more to the problem of sin, and to matters of conduct. Church organization being involved, the theory of the visible church was made a center of interest. The last of the three controversies, and the one which has colored the entire subsequent history of western Christianity, was with the Pelagians. In response to the attacks on orginal sin and human freedom, Augustine put forth the theories of predestination and the impossibility of salvation without baptism. The eastern churches never accepted these

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views; and from this time dates the definite drawing apart of the two halves of Christendom. With these doctrines came the development of the theories of the Incarnation and the Atonement to describe the method of salvation. The whole interest of theology was changed. Not the universe, but man; not God's need of revealing himself, but man's need of salvation; not the problem of the universe, but the problem of sin and evil, were men's concern.

Dealing thus with men, and men's government, theology became more concrete. While there has been development since then, even the Reformation has not changed the essential problems and doctrines of orthodoxy. Luther and Calvin were better followers of Augustine in doctrinal theology than their opponents, and it has been well said, that the Church of Rome built its doctrine around one half of Augustine's teaching, and the Protestants around the other half. Practically all the controversies since Augustine have dealt with man, or with church organization. The radicals, mainly humanists, have only emphasized this the more. The theory of God has so far stood still that it is only in the sphere of modern philosophy, the work mainly of laymen, that there has been any advance in the study of the fundamental problems of being. The whole strength of theologians seems to have been centered, so far as they have approached the problem at all, upon bolstering up the received views. The arguments for God's existence, and not that existence itself, have been the objects of study. This is very far removed from the condition of early orthodoxy with its whole interest in God rather than in man.

With this concreteness and preoccupation with man has gone a growing emphasis on the personality of Christ and of God. The term 'personality,' which in our sense the Greeks never used, has come to be the test of orthodoxy. God is conceived in more anthropomorphic terms to-day than by the pagan thinkers of two thousand years

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ago. Man has seemed to demand that God be like himself, or at least like his ideals. This was perhaps natural in the days of stress in which Augustine lived, and in those days of equal storm which brought in the Reformation. The sense of imperial destiny was gone. The area of men's thoughts and actions was circumscribed. The battle of life in many cases, especially during the Middle Ages, was a struggle for a bare living, and the task of the church the inculcation of the most primitive morality. Under such conditions, the individual came to the front, and the history of all that time, down to the rise of modern nationalism, is largely a history of the leaders. The forces acting through these leaders were not recognized, and even God could be thought of only in human terms. Where men's thoughts were tied down to earth, it is natural that their concern should be most with their own salvation, and with human organization in church as well as in state, and that they should tie their belief to definite historic facts. This insistence on the historic basis of Christianity, the concreteness of orthodoxy, and the emphasis of personality and individuality,—all are the products of the same causes. The Middle Ages may have been the time of great ideals, but they were concrete even when most fanciful. The ideal of religion for the Crusader was to reconquer the Holy Sepulcher by the sword, and he is the type of this age. The militant churchman of to-day is his true successor. To him and to the Crusader we have only to point to illustrate the distance we have traveled from primitive orthodoxy. I mean not merely nor principally his use of earthly weapons in a spiritual warfare, but his preoccupation with the problems of earth. The traditional question of some modern evangelists, "How is it with your soul?" is far different from the question of the orthodox of the age of the great councils, "What is your belief of the Logos?" Protestant orthodoxy has made even the doctrine of the Trinity primarily, as is sometimes said, 'economic,' and the chief use of the doctrine has at times seemed to be as a mere corollary of

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some theory of the Atonement. To carry these ideas into the creeds is plainly an anachronism. The creeds could not pronounce on questions that had never been raised. Augustinianism cannot preëmpt the whole field of orthodoxy.

When we turn to study the tendencies of recent thought, we understand easily the revolt from the orthodoxy which we have just characterized. At first sight it may seem that we are equally far from primitive orthodoxy. Yet, when we look more closely beneath the surface, we realize that some of the opposition to the creeds is due to our interpretation of them in mediæval terms, not to the meaning their own time gave to them. The chief characteristic that links us to the age of creedal formation is our search for the fundamental principles of action. In civil matters this nation of ours, given far more than many others to acting on mere expediency, is demanding more and more the underlying theory of the various reforms. The rise of socialism and its growing favor among moderates is due largely to their demand for some central principle; and socialism is the nearest at hand. It is gaining strength to-day because it presents to all the various eddies of political life certain rather fixed theories. The ethical culture movement, also,—seemingly the work of those who exalt humanity far above all religious impulses, not believing even in prayer,—yet seeks some central principle as a basis for conduct. Even pragmatic ethics deals with questions of the nature of man and of the universe, rather than with what man does, or what will be the result of his actions. In all the philosophic study of ethics we are seeking general ideas and general methods. The search for general terms is shown also by the growing scientific study of morals. The more we study the history and nature of morality, the less inclined is the philosopher to separate man as widely from the rest of the universe as does current orthodoxy. Even the interest in morality turns out to be not an interest in man, but in those forces which are working in man. History is taking more inter-

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est in the motives that govern great bodies of people than in the history of the leaders. We are turning from the concrete,—the price of food or the biography of a Napoleon,—to the principles of economics or of the expansion of a great nation. The emphasis is being laid on the nature of things rather than on their action.

The same movement from the concrete to the general is apparent among the liberal theologians. They are not now content with opposing or recasting separate articles of belief. Nor are they content to have the controversy center around the facts of history. The victory of the higher criticism and of evolution as regards matters of fact is won. Recent liberalism is demanding that theology be recast throughout. It is not content with attacking the concrete dogma; it is challenging the fundamental principles of belief. Likewise the insistence on a study of the nature of phenomena as they really are, which marks pragmatism, joins hands with the general theories of idealism in forcing upon us the new science of the psychology of religion, which is also requiring that theology be reconstructed. The preoccupation with the concrete dogma, Calvinistic or Anglican or Protestant, is being lost in the pursuit of a larger subject. There is even a question whether there is such a thing as Christian theology as distinct from a general theory of religion. The problem is once more where it was for the Greeks. We are asking questions about the fundamental nature of existence, not simply about man's fate and man's part.

With this renewed study of general problems has come a lessened insistence on the individual. As our civilization has grown more complex, the individual realizes that he counts for but one. The pendulum is swinging fast from the extreme of individualism. The modern rapid strides toward coöperation and union, which are influencing the separated denominations, are putting the wishes and beliefs of the individual far into the background. Our concern comes to be more with the organization and widespread forces than with the individual's concern for himself. The

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turn of the liberal from interest in individual salvation to corporate service is the parallel to the growing power of the nation and of the realization of duty to the nation. If salvation enters at all into our interest in the Cross, it is because the Cross represents a general principle, the power of self-sacrificing love. We connect it, as the Greeks did, with the rest of the universe, not separating and applying it only to man. Putting it simply, we are more concerned with the salvation of the world than with the salvation of our own soul. Our explanations are not the same as those of the Greeks; we have neither their theory of emanation nor of the Logos; but the effort is the same. We seek a reason in all reality, a reason or reasons that will give man his place; we do not seek to make the saving of the individual soul our only interest in the incarnation. In this we are far nearer to primitive orthodoxy than is the individualistic evangelism of the recent past.

These two movements, the renewed interest in general principles, and the lessened emphasis on the individual, have brought to the front as the main problems of theology the necessity, first, of world explanation, and second, of world government. The scientist has always striven after the former. It is not surprising, therefore, that the period when this explanation was not sought was the period of the decline of science. The Greeks brought scientific method to a fair development, but mediævalism took more interest in the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life, and it was not until the day of modern liberalism that science again really came to its own. In this, also, the liberal of to-day is nearer to the Greek than is the traditional theology. Even the interest in morality, which seems, from its preoccupation with man, to join more closely to the mediæval interest, is not to-day the interest in changing the world to unworldliness, nor in seeking to be saved out of it, but the concern with the problems of sociology. We ask not how to be saved from the world, but how to live in it. It is true that in the East the ascetic life was more developed than in the West, but for this very reason

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it had less influence on the non-ascetic world. The hermit of the East, withdrawn into the desert, affected the ordinary life of the church less than did the monk of the West, living in close touch with the life of his time. For this reason Greek thought reflects the desire to escape from the world much less than does western thought. Protestants have not had the desire to go into seclusion, but the estimate of life that led to this they have had. The modern appreciation of all that life holds which marks the revolt from Puritanism is far more Greek than western. Here again, as with the desire for explanation, the modern spirit is nearer the East than is western orthodoxy.

There is more to say, however, than simply that we are nearer to primitive thought. Being more in sympathy with it, those problems which it attacked we are attacking, and we have taken up its work, after the neglect of centuries, where the primitive church left off. The liberal of to-day, therefore, can claim not only to be primitive in his spirit; he can assume the larger rôle, and declare that through him runs the line of ancient orthodoxy; not that all modern orthodoxy is heretical and untrue, but that the main line of orthodox development leads not to orthodoxy, but to liberalism. The liberal of to-day is paying homage once more to the subtle and able work of the Greeks on the conception of God. This doctrine has at last a chance of becoming a living truth, worked over and recast, and not simply a relic of the past stored away. Our answer to the question we put in the beginning is answered, and emphatically. True orthodoxy not only may be liberal, as we mean liberal; to be true to its primitive history it must be liberal. The liberal is the true orthodox.

GEORGE ALEXANDER BARROW.

CHELSEA, MASS.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy. By William James. London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1911. Pp. xii, 237.

"Say it is fragmentary and unrevised. Call it 'a beginning of an introduction to philosophy.' Say that I hoped by it to round out my system, which now is too much like an arch built only on one side" (pp. vii *f.*) These are the words with which the author described his own work when, after a prolonged struggle against ill health and various distractions, he directed the publication of the unfinished manuscript. To complete it, the editor tells us, had become toward the end of his life his dearest ambition, but precisely one month before his death he was forced to abandon the task. Two copies of the work were left, and these had already been revised separately, but the changes differed, the editor states, only in matters of detail. At the request of the author, the two copies were compared, and the manuscript prepared for the press, largely by his friend and pupil, Dr. H. M. Kallen. Henry James, Jr., is the editor.

It is a matter of profound regret that the author's purpose to bring his scattered utterances upon metaphysics into a more systematic form should thus have been frustrated, for the result could not have been otherwise than enlightening. A thinker of great germinative force such as James, who touched contemporary life at a vast number of points and who stimulated men of so many stripes of opinion and character, could not have brought his philosophical ideas into systematic juxtaposition without illuminating the tangled skein of our contemporary intellectual life. Even though no radically new ideas had appeared,—and this perhaps was scarcely to be expected,—the order in which his matured views might have unrolled themselves, the emphasis of this point and the subordination of that, would certainly have proved helpful to us and perhaps doubly significant to the future biographer of James or to the historian of the thought of the twentieth century.

Even as the work stands, its significance in this respect can be discerned. The point is not merely that some of its chapters are as good philosophical discussion as James ever wrote, though

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this is undoubtedly true; the chapters on the Infinite (X and XI) are probably not surpassed by anything in his philosophical works. Nor is it that the mellowness and urbanity of this latest and most mature product of his pen reflect more clearly than his other works the beautiful personal character of the man, though this also is true. It is rather that the problem which James here puts in the foreground is admirably adapted to bring to light what may well be regarded as the most imperative task of contemporary philosophy. This problem is discussed under the caption of Percept and Concept, and in his theory of conception is to be found the root of James's logical and metaphysical views. If this be found true, the corollaries,—his pluralism and alogism,—must be accepted. The importance of putting this problem foremost and the value of James's discussion of it are unquestionable whether his results are accepted or not. It is the prerogative of a great man to teach even by his errors, and this must be our excuse for dwelling upon what seem to us the difficulties of James's method.

The striking feature of his theory of perception and conception is his radical separation of the two: throughout the book the emphasis is laid constantly upon the 'clash' of the empirical and the rational. Conception and perception are defined as opposites; each is what the other is not. They are intermingled, indeed, in our ordinary experience, but they are different because they vary independently; brutes have a life of feeling as copious as ours, but only a minimum of thought (p. 47). Percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete (p. 48). Perception is an ever changing flux; a concept never varies (p. 53). The perceptual flux as such means nothing; it is merely what it immediately is. Conception, on the other hand, is nothing except meaning; its nature is to symbolize and what it is in itself is a matter of little moment so far as its representative function is concerned (*cf.* p. 59). Perception is concrete and 'full'; conception is abstract and 'thin' (p. 78). Perception is full of dynamic relations; conception has no relations except those of static comparison (p. 81). The essence of the perceptual flux is the constant introduction of novelty (*cf.* pp. 154*f.*); "conception knows no way of explaining save by deducing the identical from the identical" (p. 152). Intellection is the "substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which . . . experience originally comes" (p. 51), and hence the intel-

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lect can never do justice to the changing and the novel. It translates it into static terms and leaves it dead and cold. Conception is thus secondary to perception and not only omits but falsifies it (p. 79). Perception and conception, then, are virtually distinct and contrasting faculties. It is indeed true that James more than once points out that in fact the two are not separable except by a violent effort of abstraction; in ordinary experience only the most rigid retrospection can determine what elements belong to each (pp. 107*ff.*). Nevertheless, this concrete experience, filled as it is with representative and symbolic elements, is always counted to the credit of perception, while conception, in spite of its practical usefulness, is charged with all the contradictions and disharmonies. In fact, James does not hesitate to call conception "a faculty superadded to our barely perceptual consciousness for its use in practically adapting us to a larger environment than that of which brutes take account" (pp. 64*f.*). James's theory turns upon the disparateness of the two faculties; conception is hopelessly self-contradictory and must therefore be regarded as the handmaid of perception, which always speaks the last word regarding concrete reality (pp. 96*f.*). The two are said, indeed, to supplement one another and both are said to be essential to 'knowledge' (p. 81, note), but the supplementation of perception by conception results only in making experience practically useful at the expense of making it incomprehensible (p. 78).

Forced as the comparison may sound, James's way of attacking his problem is strikingly like Kant's, and it is difficult to see why the objections raised against the latter do not apply also to the former. Both define perception and conception by contrast, and both, while admitting the invariable presence of both factors in experience, regard experience as an aggregation of the two. Both regard conception as fatally self-contradictory and both declare an alogical solution of the problem to be necessary. In both cases, moreover, the same postulate appears to underlie the method, though neither thinker avows it in set terms, —*viz.*, the assumption that there is such a thing as perception or conception *as such*, a sort of essential perception or conception which is always and everywhere the same. An assumption of this sort appears to be inseparable from the method of regarding experience as a mixture of the two, the one being superadded to the other. James so often criticized Kant for this sort

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of artificiality that it is very remarkable to note the degree in which his own theory is permeated with it, and this is the more remarkable in a pragmatist and a thinker filled with the spirit of evolution. Surely, it is radically non-evolutionary to assume that thinking is necessarily of one type only; the presumption would be far more natural that the 'substitution of the conceptual for the perceptual order' might be differently accomplished, and lead to different results, according to the varying characteristics of the subject-matter and the varying purposes which dictate such a substitution. With all its faults,—and they were legion,—the Hegelian dialectic had a truer insight into the actual complexities of the conceptual processes than this, for it at least was founded upon the belief that thinking has manifold forms rather than one single self-identical type.

The truth appears to be that James never entirely escaped from the crassly utilitarian form of statement in which pragmatism first expressed itself, though throughout this volume he has been careful to bracket thinking itself with the practical ends which thought may subserve (*cf.*, *e. g.*, p. 59). The one end which he seriously regards concepts as achieving is adaptation to the physical environment, and the test of conceptual thinking is regarded as the capacity to predict a result before it occurs. Hence the cases on which his description of conceptual thought is based are drawn mostly from the mathematical and mechanical sciences, and in these sciences it would be generally agreed that thought 'deduces the identical from the identical.' It is not obvious, however, that all thinking is and must be of this type. There are sciences, *e. g.*, history, in which prediction plays no *rôle* and in which there is no tendency to reduce the subject-matter to qualitatively identical elements. Yet history is a conceptual system, or at all events it is certainly not perception. It is the result of selection, of the emphasis of some events and the suppression of others, with a view to the production of a comprehensible whole. Nor does the fact that it deals with past time prove that its categories are necessarily static and discrete (*cf.* p. 167). And what is true of history is true in varying degrees of other departments of knowledge. It is by no means obvious that static discreteness is the only realm in which conceptual thought can move and that it inevitably falsifies every subject-matter in which development and continuity are essential to comprehension.

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James's solution of philosophical contradictions is determined by the assumed 'clash' between the perceptual and the conceptual, the empirical and the rational, which is 'emphasized throughout the volume' (p. 37). "Use concepts when they help, and drop them when they hinder understanding; and take reality bodily and integrally up into philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape in which it comes" (p. 95),—this is the 'simple' remedy proposed. But does it, as a matter of fact, present any clear conception whatever of a philosophical method? If it means that conception cannot be made a substitute for perception, as James often puts it, no one will disagree. But if it means literally that philosophy is in part a scientific, conceptual system and in part 'reality taken bodily,' the statement is surely incomprehensible. Such a program is no better, if no worse, than the conception of Hegel's dialectic as a process of creating reality from logical categories. As James himself says, philosophy is essentially 'talkative'; that is to say, essentially discursive and communicable. Moreover, it is first and foremost a technical, scientific discipline, as truly as any physical science. What constitutes its serious task, James as much as any man of this generation has shown. It is not to eke out thought with feeling, but to discover by careful scientific analysis the processes by which thinking goes on. This task is radically empirical, as James says, for the nature of conceptions can be discovered only by thorough genetic and analytic study of the situations in which they are used. In this way only is it possible to 'delimit the scope of perception and conception, showing how, as our experience works, they supplement each other' (p. 93). Anything less than this is false to the spirit of pragmatism, false to the best that James himself has sought to teach this generation of philosophical scholars, false, for example, to such painstaking work as the discussion of the Infinite in the present volume. James and pragmatism have brought not peace, but a sword,—not easy reconciliations by feeling of difficulties made by our own bad postulates, but scientific analysis to the bitter end, not of conception in general, but of particular working conceptions as they work. When this is done, the quarrel between empiricist and intellectualist, absolutist and pluralist, will either have vanished or have taken a new and more fruitful form.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Leland Stanford, Jr., University.

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PRAGMATISM AND ITS CRITICS. By Addison W. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910. Pp. xi, 283.

Professor Moore's study of pragmatism is characterized by a moderate temper and a clear style. Its distinctive features, as the preface suggests, are the sketch of the historical antecedents of pragmatism, the emphasis on the central "*rôle* of the conception of evolution in the development of pragmatism," and the insistence on the social character of experience. The book is made up of five chapters embodying a relatively untechnical exposition of pragmatism (originally given as 'semi-popular lectures'), followed by a collection of papers, already published in different journals, each in response to some critic of pragmatism. One hopes that Professor Moore will sometime give us a constructive treatise subordinating criticism to a discussion of pragmatism as complete system.

The comment on the book which follows is written from the standpoint of personalistic absolutism, and therefore concerns itself chiefly with the issue between pragmatism and this form of absolutism. Moore's consideration of the opposition of pragmatism to mere intellectualism and to thorough-going realism must, however, be noticed. (I.) In its effort to bring about the 'logical regeneration of voluntarism' pragmatism achieves its most important success. Its emphasis on the 'doctrine of the real efficiency of thought' (p. 103) is its central teaching. Dr. Moore admirably states the pragmatist's contention, that pure thinking is no end in itself, though he does not prove that pragmatism is the only system reconcilable with this view. (II.) So far as pure realism is concerned, Moore certainly shows that it denies the essential efficiency of thought. Realism of this type is a defence of the thesis that "*thinking makes no 'essential' difference to the things thought of or about,*" and that ideas make only "the difference of the *addition* of thought" (pp. 89-90). Pragmatism, on the other hand, holds that the addition of thought makes an 'essential alteration in the situation,' that thought is, indeed, 'a part of the total process of an efficient desire and effort to effect a change in experienced values' (p. 93; *cf.* p. 108). It should be added that Moore, in spite of his reiterated statement of this grave difference between realism and pragmatism, none the less recognizes a basal likeness of the one to the other. "The pragmatist," he says, "agrees with the realist that

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. . . at any given time some of the world (or experience) may be 'independent' of knowledge in the sense that it is not then 'being known' . . ." (p. 108). This makes of pragmatism a dualistic doctrine. Moore, to be sure (in reply to Creighton), argues that pragmatism is not dualistic in that it teaches the temporal continuity of non-thinking with thinking reality (p. 160); but the qualitative duality remains in spite of the temporal continuity.

(III.) With the pragmatist's opposition to absolutism, this review, as has already been suggested, will deal in greater detail. Moore's criticisms reduce to five which will be discussed in an order different from his own. (1) The first to be considered is introduced by Moore in reply to the critics who object to pragmatism as subjective. Professor Moore has no trouble in showing that contemporary pragmatists (notably Dr. Dewey and those of his school) regard experience from a social, not from an individualist standpoint, that they take for granted 'the perfectly objective and social character of consciousness' (p. 223) and assume that "consciousness is somehow born of a thoroughly social and objective world" (p. 229). In this assertion of the social character of consciousness (so Moore argues), the pragmatist makes absolutism unnecessary; and if, on the other hand (he continues), consciousness were not social, only a single self, and no Absolute, could be proved to exist (pp. 222-223). Students of Fichte and Royce do not need to be reminded of the answer which the absolutist will make to this criticism. He will claim that the pragmatist too naïvely and "confidingly took this conception of the perfectly objective and social character of consciousness at its full face value" (p. 223). For such an interrelated society of finite selves is only possible, he will contend, on the supposition that the finite selves are all parts of the one, absolute self.

(2) A criticism more frequently repeated saddles upon absolutism the difficulties inherent in any 'copy-theory' of knowledge,—the doctrine that "ideas can only algebraically represent or 'mean' or 'point at' a world of reality 'beyond'" (p. 109). This criticism, it should be noted, identifies absolutism with the Platonic theory of 'universal and immutable Ideas' existing distinct from the individual consciousness. The absolutist is well within his rights when he objects to this identification. Conceived after Lutoslawski's fashion, the Platonic theory so far from being absolutist is a pluralistic spiritualism which sub-

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ordinates ideas to souls; and according to the traditional interpretation, which sets the ideas as ultimate realities over against the souls, Platonism is at best one form of absolutism among others. But Moore uses 'Platonic Ideas' almost as a synonym for 'the Absolute,' and even attributes to Professor Royce the conception of the Absolute as 'system of ideas.' He nowhere takes account of the personalistic view of the Absolute as concrete thinking and willing self, of the finite selves as genuine parts of the absolute self, and of knowing as direct not mediate —a sharing, not an imitation or copy.

(3) In the third place, the pragmatist finds fault with the absolutist for conceiving reality as purely cognitive. Royce, to be sure,—as Moore notes,—attempts to introduce purpose into the Absolute (p. 63), but the effort is foredoomed to failure, since "to preserve the changeless perfection of reality, purpose can have for its content only an algebraic correspondence with the absolute system of ideas which makes it even more vacuous than Plato's 'contemplation'" (p. 69). This criticism recurs again and again. Absolutism is, in truth, equivalent for Moore with intellectualism (*cf.* pp. 23, 44, *et al.*). Evidently this objection is based in part on the assumptions already challenged, that the Absolute is a system of Platonic ideas and that absolutism involves a copy-theory of knowledge, but it is still more deeply rooted in the pragmatist's opposition to the absolutist doctrine of the permanence of reality.

(4) To this, the strongest reaction of pragmatism against absolutism, we must now turn our attention. All the foregoing criticisms are indeed outgrowths from this. The absolutist (whether his Absolute be impersonal or personal, system of ideas or absolute self) holds that there exists eternal and immutable reality; the pragmatist teaches that reality is purely in the making. Absolutist doctrine, so the pragmatist believes, tells against the reality of change; "pragmatism . . .is a crusade to release change from the limbo of 'appearances' and reality from the stocks of a 'changeless unity'" (p. 176).

We have reached at length the crucial point of divergence between the two systems. Unquestionably the absolutist believes that there exists reality other than that of the purely human experience—even other than that of the aggregate of human experiences. But he may appeal, if he will, from the Bradleian Absolute for whom change is mere appearance, and from the

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Platonic Absolute, 'a whole of the static, geometrical type,' to the Hegelian or Roycian Absolute for whom change is real, although subordinately real. The absolute self, as thus conceived, though *more than* temporal, is *also* temporal. And the development of human individuals constitutes a reality which (to the human consciousness, shared though transcended by the absolute self) is constantly changing. In a word, this personalistic form of absolutism challenges the pragmatist's claim to exclusive rights in the conceptions of change and of progress.

(5) The last of these criticisms, the pragmatist's objection to the absolutist conception of truth, is a corollary to the criticism just outlined. For the absolutist, truth is the agreement of individual experience with reality; for the personalistic absolutist, from whose standpoint this review is written, this means that truth is the correspondence of the individual with the absolute experience,—of the part, with the whole. The pragmatist objects "that there is no connection between the absolutist's general definition of truth and error and the standard actually employed in testing any particular judgment" (p. 131), or, that "there appears no necessary connection between the absolute system and the determination of truth and error in any given case." To this statement, modified a little, I think that the absolutist must agree. In other words, I believe that the absolutist is logically certain of truth only when he asserts his own existence and that of the absolute self. Of course he admits with Baldwin (quoted on p. 189) that the most convenient 'test' of the truth of an idea is its agreement with a purpose of which it is a constituent part. The pragmatist calls this agreement 'truth,' the absolutist regards it as an indication of the truth which he cannot define otherwise than as 'the fulfillment of an absolute purpose.' And he claims that this conception, empty as it is in its bearing on the special case, has a unique value as an essential factor of the general view of the universe as more-than-human reality.

A word may be added concerning the supposed advantage of the pragmatist conception of truth. Moore admits that the older pragmatist definition of true ideas as ideas which work "was an easy mark for the critic, who lost no time in reminding us that false ideas seem to be as industrious as true ones." Accordingly, he modifies the original definition so that it reads: ideas "which work in the way they set out to work . . . are true" (p. 87).

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To the form of this statement it must be objected that only persons, not 'ideas,' can 'set out to work' or 'purpose' anything. But, waiving this point, one cannot fail to see that this pragmatist conception of the true idea, as that which fulfills a purpose, is definite only in so far as it is individualistic. For it is practically no more difficult to describe the purpose of the Absolute in a given case than to estimate the relation of a given idea to the 'total objective situation.' Either the pragmatist's conception, like the absolutist's, must have no 'necessary connection' with a given case, or the pragmatist must consent to be called a subjectivist.

Wellesley College. MARY WHITON CALKINS.

EPICURUS. By A. E. Taylor. London: Constable & Co., 1911. Pp. viii, 122.

This little book is one of a series (Philosophies Ancient and Modern) to which Professor Taylor has already contributed books on Plato and Hobbes. It is delightful reading. The main characteristics of Epicurus and his school are admirably sketched,—their 'moral invalidism' due to the indigestion to which the Epicurean circle seem to have been martyrs (he might have made more of this point when speaking of Lucretius), their likeness to the early Christians, their secularism as opposed to the religious spirit of both the Academy and the Porch, their sad want of public spirit. In short, it is a study full of interesting information, salted with ingenious conjecture, and refreshingly free from pedantry.

To have escaped being dull when writing about an ancient philosopher is much; but it would have been still better if Professor Taylor could have combined impartiality with liveliness. Though he is not unfair when discussing the general spirit of the school, his attitude as regards its systematic philosophy is too much that of counsel for the prosecution. No one would now claim for Epicurus great merit as an original thinker. But can it be true that the founder of a sect, which for about five centuries influenced large numbers of highly civilized people, including Lucretius and Lucian, was a man quite destitute of real intellectual ability? That is what Professor Taylor would have us believe. He speaks of him as a 'charlatan,' and of his philosophy as 'a clumsy amalgam of

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inconsistent beliefs.' His thesis is that Epicurus borrowed his main doctrines from others, incidentally abusing his creditors; and that he was so stupid as not to see that these doctrines were mutually contradictory. Many of Professor Taylor's arguments for this view seem to me inconclusive, partly because the connections he points out between Epicureanism and other systems are often slight and conjectural, but chiefly because his explanations of Epicurus's inconsistencies are usually as ambiguous as the very positions he attacks. For instance, his main criticism is that Epicurus, while deriving his atomic theory from Democritus, combined it, in order to adapt it to current Aristotelian views, with a fundamentally incompatible theory of knowledge, namely, sensationalism. The Aristotelian connection here is the merest guess. And Professor Taylor does not succeed in clearly explaining why he thinks that the atomic theory,—the theory that nothing exists except atoms moving in space,—is inconsistent with the doctrine that 'all knowledge is derived from sensations.' This last phrase is of course highly ambiguous. But it appears from the passages quoted that Epicurus understood by it at least these propositions: 'everything immediately given to the senses exists'; 'we can know, by means of inference from sense-data, that many things exist which are never given to the senses.' These propositions are not mutually contradictory, and neither of them contradicts or is contradicted by the theory that nothing exists except atoms moving in space. They may indeed imply other propositions inconsistent with that theory, but meanwhile the philosopher who held all three at once ought not to be despised for trying to reconcile obvious incompatibles. If Aristotle, Plato or Democritus, all objects of reverence to Professor Taylor, were treated in this way, without any desire to mend their arguments and give them the benefit of the doubt wherever possible, it is doubtful whether they would come off any better than Epicurus.

Rye, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

ECCE DEUS: DIE URCHRISTLICHE LEHRE DES REINGÖTTLICHEN JESUS. By William Benjamin Smith. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1911. Pp. xvi, 315.

It is a widely received view that the rise of Christianity was made possible by the confluence of the two great streams of re-

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ligious thought, the Jewish and the Greek, these also having adopted certain Persian and Egyptian ideas. Professor Smith goes farther and holds that Christianity was simply the doctrine that emerged from this confluence,—that it was the creation not of one mind, but of many minds, the spirit of the age. There was, he says, in the centuries just before and just after the beginning of our era, a great religious movement in the Roman Empire, essentially a protest against the current polytheism; the source of the movement was believed to be divine power, and this power was naturally personified under the name Jesus, the Jewish name held to signify 'Savior'; thus arose a Jesus-cult, the cult of an imaginatively conceived divine Figure, the enemy and the destroyer of false gods, and thus the redeemer from a false religion; in process of time certain conceptions relating to the struggle against polytheism were ascribed to the ideal divine Jesus and were dramatized in the form of sayings and acts, and these constitute the biography of Jesus given in our Gospels and elsewhere in the New Testament; there is there no human Jesus, only the divine Figure, and all the words and deeds attributed to him are to be interpreted as symbolical descriptions of the anti-polytheistic crusade, being, if taken literally, unintelligible. This theory, set forth by Professor Smith in his former work, "Der vorchristliche Jesus" (1906), is in the present volume further illustrated, with a wide survey of the literature involved, with keen argumentation, and with apostolic fervor. His polemic is directed not against the orthodox position (which he ignores as impossible), but against the views of the 'liberal' critics, who recognize in the Gospels an account of a true human personality. Whether or not one accepts the author's conclusions, one cannot but admire the solidity of learning and the patience of research that the Tulane Professor of Mathematics brings to the discussion of a large and difficult problem.

A discussion of all of Professor Smith's material would require far more space than is here available; some remarks may be made on his main contentions. The points especially emphasized in the present volume are the reality of the Jesus-cult, the necessity of a symbolical interpretation of the New Testament statements concerning Jesus, and the absence of testimony to his humanity. The first of these points seems to me not to be established. There was, it is true, about the beginning of our era, a general withdrawal, among the educated classes, from the

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traditional theistic system: the Jews had a monolatry that nearly approached monotheism; Greek philosophy dispensed with the popular gods; the religions of Isis and Mithra emphasized each one transcendent deity; gnosticism filled the space between the supreme deity and the material world with a bizarre succession of emanations. The need of supernatural redemption from evil here and hereafter was felt also. There was, in a word, a general unrest that furnished a field for a well-defined religion of redemption that should satisfy the desires of the time. But of an organized cult of an expected redeemer there is no trace. The Messiah hoped for by the Jews was to be a political leader, and outside of Judaism there was no looking to an individual redeemer. No ideal figure appears who is the object of religious reverence. Opposition to polytheism plays a subordinate part,—it is an accompaniment of other aims. A satirist like Lucian might ridicule the stories of the gods, but such ridicule led to no organization. The Jews were chiefly concerned to secure the independence of the nation; philosophy sought a unitary conception of the world, and gnosticism attempted to free the deity from the taint of the world's evil. All these were important elements in the life of the time, but the literature of the period gives no hint of a Jesus-cult. If it be said that the New Testament material requires the supposition of such a cult, this is to assume the point at issue.

Symbolical interpretation of literary material is justifiable when it is involved in the literary form or is indicated in the context or when an author expressly states that it is to be employed. The parables in the Gospels are, of course, invented stories intended to embody ideas. Paul (Gal., iv, 21*ff.*) says of the story of Sarai and Hagar in rabbinical fashion that it contains an allegory; there is no basis for this interpretation in the narrative in Genesis (Gen., xvi), and Paul does not imply that the incident in question is not historically real. In the narrative portions of the synoptic Gospels there seems to be no suggestion of any other than a literal interpretation. Professor Smith's treatment of them as symbolical is based mainly on the view that, taken literally, they are insignificant or unintelligible, or that the symbolical interpretation invests them with larger meaning. Yet, on the supposition that the disciples treasured every tradition of the acts of the dead Master, there seems to be no difficulty in regarding the stories of the expulsion of demons,

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of Martha and Mary, of Zachæus, and other such, as intended to be understood literally. The details may not be always clear, but the stories are such as we may imagine the tradition would preserve or invent. Men in those days did undertake to cast out demons and heal the sick, and teachers did travel about and meet all sorts of people. Why is it, asks Professor Smith, that the expulsion of demons occurs always in Galilee, never in Judea? and he answers that the demons are Greek gods, and that polytheism, assailed by the personified divine power, existed in Galilee, but not in Judea. Another answer might be that in the story of the visit to Judea the Evangelists are interested in other things than miracles of healing.

The view that the Jesus of the New Testament is a god and in no sense a man seems to Professor Smith to be the only rational one both on the ground of general religious history and from the testimony of the New Testament itself. For the explanation of the diverse conceptions of the person of Jesus we have, he says, the choice between two suppositions,—a dedivinized god and a divinized man, and he holds to the former of these; the reduction of divine beings to human proportions he regards as the usual procedure. But in the West this dedivinization occurs only in the mythmaking period, as in such figures as Achilles, for example, never in a late highly developed community; the Indian system of successive incarnations belongs to a different order of ideas. On the other hand, the ascription of divinity to deceased men was a familiar procedure in the New Testament times,—witness the Greek kings of Egypt and Syria and the Roman emperors. The elevation of a human Jesus to a divine position would be quite in accordance with the ideas of the time. But is the Gospel picture of Jesus, considered as a man, of a sort to make his divinization probable? Professor Smith thinks that it is not of such sort. Jesus, he says, did not greatly impress his disciples,—they did not mourn for him after his death, —he said and did nothing remarkable (all the important utterances ascribed to him may be traced to other sources), and in the New Testament epistles the stress is laid not on his life, but on his death and resurrection,—it is inconceivable that a man like Paul should have been fascinated by so colorless a human figure. It is true that we are here confronted with a situation for the explanation of which full data are lacking. When our Gospels were edited belief in the divinity of Jesus was already

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well established, and it was natural that they should lay stress on this aspect of his person; the details of Paul's religious experience are not given, but it seems certain that he identified Jesus (of whose life he had heard little) with a great supernatural Jewish figure (such as that described in the Parables of Enoch), just as the writer of the Fourth Gospel identified him with the Philonian Logos. There was a gradual development of the conception of the person of Jesus, but the details of the process have not been recorded; however, given a belief in his resurrection, the rest might follow naturally. From such a process it may be inferred that there was something impressive in his personality.

The silence of Josephus respecting Jesus is discussed at length by Professor Smith, who attaches great importance to it as making against the reality of a human Jesus. It is indeed a noteworthy fact. We can easily understand how Philo, occupied with his philosophy and with the affairs of the Jewish population of Alexandria, may have been ignorant of or indifferent to a popular movement in Palestine. But Josephus was the historian of his nation, supposedly interested in all its experiences; he speaks of John the Baptist,—why does he not mention Jesus? (The references to Jesus in the older editions are now generally admitted to be Christian interpolations.) Paucity of data makes it difficult, if not impossible, to answer this question satisfactorily. It may be said that the initial Christian movement in Palestine was quiet and obscure, and that the centers of the later propaganda were in Asia Minor and Greece, regions in which Josephus was not greatly interested when he wrote the "Antiquities" and the "War," and the term 'Christian' may not have been connected in his mind with an historical 'Jesus.' However this may be, his silence cannot be regarded as decisive against the positive testimony of the New Testament,—a testimony which, for reasons stated above, Professor Smith does not seem to have shaken. It is also to be observed that this silence, whatever its force against the current view, tells equally against the theory of a widely diffused and vigorous Jesus-cult such as is assumed in the present volume.

This brief account of Professor Smith's discussion necessarily passes over many interesting details included therein. He makes a serious attempt to solve a complicated historical problem; and though, as it seems to the present reviewer, he lays too much

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stress on one set of facts and too little on another set, he puts sharply and discusses ably various points that call for investigation, and his work will thus help to clear the ground. The chief difficulties in the way of his theory, as it is presented in this volume, are the assumptions of a widespread more or less organized anti-polytheistic propaganda and of a thoroughgoing symbolical meaning in the narratives of the Gospels. These, however, he regards as essential elements of his exposition.

CRAWFORD H. TOY.

Harvard University.

THE CHRIST MYTH. By Arthur Drews, Ph.D. Translated from the third edition by C. Delisle Burns, M.A. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. N. D. Pp. 304.

The author of this book is a professor of philosophy in the Technische Hochschule at Karlsruhe. It grew out of a series of public addresses which attracted wide attention in Germany last year. Professor Drews maintains that the doctrines and practices of Christianity did not originate in the life and teachings of Jesus, whom he does not regard as an historic personality. He has brought together from various sources a vast amount of material to prove his thesis. It is sufficient to show that many of the leading tenets, principles, and ceremonies of the new religion were derived from ideas and customs already current in the Hellenistic world when Christianity appeared, and that the dogma and ritual of the church, as a whole, cannot be derived from the Galilean prophet, as has long been recognized by liberal theologians. But it is not, in the judgment of the reviewer, enough to render it probable, either that a god Jesus was worshiped in Jewish circles before our era, or that Jesus of Nazareth never lived. The reasons on which this judgment is based have been presented in an article entitled "The New Jesus Myth and Its Ethical Value" which appeared in this JOURNAL, October, 1911. For the general reader who wishes to familiarize himself with the latest theological tilt in Germany there is no better medium than Dr. Drews's book. A second part of "Die Christusmythe" has just appeared, and it deserves to be translated into English quite as well as the first.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

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THE ETHICS OF JESUS. Being the William Belden Noble Lectures for 1909. By Henry Churchill King, D.D., LL.D., President of Oberlin College. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910. Pp. xii, 293.

While the object of the William Belden Noble lectureship in Harvard University is stated by the founder in such terms as to give it a scope "as wide as the highest interests of humanity," it is evident that the lectures given by President King in a peculiarly fitting manner met the purposes of this foundation. The volume presenting them to the general public also forms an admirable addition to the useful series of New Testament Handbooks edited by Professor Shailer Matthews.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the book is its method of approach to the subject. It is, of course, impossible to discuss, or even to describe, the ethics of Jesus intelligently without first determining what documents shall be admitted as sources, and what material within these documents shall be relied on as revealing his moral attitude. President King did not deem it necessary to set forth in detail his conclusions on these preliminary questions, but on most points his position is indicated, or may at least be surmised with reasonable assurance. His treatment of the fourth gospel is characteristic. He nowhere says that he regards it as spurious and unreliable, and therefore unavailable for use. He simply leaves it out, with the casual remark (p. 16) that he does so because he must limit himself to the ethical teaching of Jesus and also because it is "a less primary source." One single passage from this gospel, xiii, 1-16, is quoted (p. 160). The reader is somewhat puzzled by the exception. Does it mean that out of the entire gospel the incident of the foot-washing alone is regarded as throwing light upon the ethics of Jesus? Wellhausen assigns verses 4, 5, 12-15 to a supposed ground-work resembling Mark and possibly containing valuable data; but the lesson, with its curious mixture of self-glorification and ostentatious humility, is characteristically 'Johannine' and suggests a moral attitude very different from that of the synoptic Jesus. There is plenty of material in this gospel for the construction of an ethics of Jesus, but if it is accepted as historically trustworthy, what seems most certain in the synoptic representation must be thrown overboard. The real reason why in these lectures the fourth gospel

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is brushed aside and attention confined to the synoptics cannot be doubtful.

Similarly, President King does not say in so many words that much of the synoptic material is also untrustworthy. He leaves it out, or lays no such stress on it as a man convinced of its genuineness would do. Without suggesting the grave difficulties which led to the search for such criteria of historicity as Professor Schmiedel's "foundation-pillars" and Professor Burkitt's "doubly attested passages," or anywhere stating why, in his judgment, certain synoptic traditions are more reliable than others, he proceeds with his exposition in a manner that clearly shows his appreciation of the importance of these far-reaching inquiries and his sympathy with what seem to him the main results of gospel criticism. He explains: "The restriction to the ethical teaching of Jesus means that any large consideration of the religious teaching is necessarily shut out, as well as any treatment of the doctrine of the person of Christ, and also all consideration of the eschatological teaching." But it surely is not possible to determine the ethical attitude of Jesus without considering what he thought concerning the source and sanction of morality, the authority of the ancient scriptures, the value of belief, profession of faith, and sacraments, his own relation to men, the motives for righteous conduct, and the agencies for the moral uplift of the human race. It makes a difference in our estimate of his moral nature, if he looked upon himself as Lord and Master and all mankind as his servants, accepted the royal title, but inwardly connected with it only absolute spiritual authority, thus playing with words, or repudiated every vestige of the Messianic idea; if he associated salvation with belief in himself, baptism and eucharist, and the atoning value of his own blood, or never thought of these things; if he urged men to strive for righteousness because their reward would be great in heaven, to avoid an evil life lest they be cast into the fire that is never quenched, and to arrange their lives in view of the approaching end of the world, or never appealed to motives of this nature. In matters of such importance the reader is left to infer from the things eliminated and the things emphasized rather than allowed to learn through unmistakable utterances in what direction the author's thought is moving.

After an excellent survey of the ethical contents of Luke, selected as the gospel presenting the largest amount of moral

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teaching, President King begins his closer study of the text with the famous 'foundation-pillars.' The choice of these nine pillars and three props does not seem to have been dictated so much by a feeling that they possess extraordinary evidential value, since Professor Sanday's criticism is quoted with approval, as rather by a desire to find a common ground from which all would be willing to start. But it was a wise choice, even if it can scarcely be said that there is a consensus of opinion in regard to the authenticity of all these sayings. It has always seemed to the present writer unfortunate that Professor Schmiedel should have included among these passages Mark, xiii, 32 (Matt., xxiv, 36), which is obviously a late addition, not found in Luke, to the synoptic apocalypse falsely ascribed to Jesus, and that on the ground that it contains the phrase "not even the Son," which is lacking in the oldest witnesses to the text in Matthew, did not find its way into all manuscripts in Mark, and is easily understood as a Monarchianist gloss. But most of them are of great value as evidence of an earlier strand of tradition which was preserved, but could not have been deliberately produced, by the evangelists. They are also important for the light they throw on the character of Jesus. President King comments upon them with rare insight and a firm grasp upon their ethical significance. Only in the case of Mark, x, 18, he seems curiously to avoid the obvious meaning of the words of Jesus. "Why callest thou me good; no one is good save the Father in heaven" (so the oldest witnesses to the text), he interprets as conveying the lesson that "there was to be no bandying of compliments," no 'idle' ascription of goodness to anyone (p. 37). But he would not have referred to the Father in heaven, if he had not had in mind the contrast between human and divine goodness. That Jesus had the sense of distance from the ideal, of moral imperfection, which always accompanies a high degree of moral excellence, and yet apparently was free from the morbid exaggeration of this feeling which is characteristic of some temperaments, is well worth noticing. It may be added that a consciousness of having a valuable message for men or of being able and willing to help them in various ways is by no means tantamount to a "sense of unique relation to God and men."

Proceeding to examine the thirty-one 'doubly attested' passages given by Professor Burkitt, he leaves out five as non-

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ethical, six as included among the 'foundation-pillars,' and three which in reality are found only in one source. The seventeen remaining passages he takes to be doubly attested in the sense that they are found both in Mark and in the supposed source (Q) used by Matthew and Luke, or some other source. If one is firmly convinced that Mark is the oldest gospel, that such a collection of sayings (Q) as may be read, with numerous variants, in the works of Harnack, Wellhausen, and other modern scholars already existed in Christian antiquity, and that it was later, and not earlier, than Mark so that it cannot have been used by him, these passages will, without a doubt, seem doubly attested. This conviction may be cherished with comfort and respectability, as it is held by the vast majority of critics, many of whom have investigated the question for themselves, and has been reached by distinguished conservatives, some of whom have spent much time before they were ready to see what other eyes had seen before. If, on the other hand, Matthew is regarded, in harmony with ecclesiastical tradition, as the oldest of our gospels, revealing the closest relation to the lost Aramaic original, though more disfigured than the other gospels by late additions and interpolations, the Greek 'Words of Jesus' or Q, as a modern fiction, the material ascribed to it as earlier than Mark, and Mark as based on the original Greek Matthew, though written in a vivid style of its own and for a definite didactic purpose accounting for omissions, additions and peculiar emphasis, and influenced by the local Roman tradition which in the time of Papias was traced back to Peter, then we have, not indeed independent attestations of these sayings, but a very valuable early attestation of the presence of these sayings in the text of our oldest gospel.

In view of the distance between even our oldest Greek text and the lost Aramaic original, the force of this attestation must not be overestimated. It would be especially hazardous to assume the integrity of the text in these passages, and consequently to suppose that Jesus said, "Let him take up his cross and follow me," referred to "these little ones that believe on me," or spoke of himself as "the Son of man" who "came to . . . give his life as a ransom for many." The exposition of all these sayings by President King again reveals his fine perception of what is essential and what is morally significant. Occasionally, however, there seems to be a studied avoidance of summing up

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the whole case, of stating outright that the principle of Jesus cannot be accepted, or only with modifications. It is rightly seen that Jesus was absolutely opposed to divorce and looked upon the marriage of a divorced woman as adultery. Dr. King also discerns the chief reason that led Jesus, as it did other dissenters in Israel, to take such an extreme position. "The positive principle," he says, "underlying his declaration against divorce is the spirit of reverent love that forbids that the wife should be treated as a thing or a slave," and he observes that much of the marital unrest and divorce in America "goes back to an increasing sense of what is due to a person, to the demand that may legitimately be made for reverent love on the part of both husband and wife." But he does not take note of the manifest tendency to asceticism, the preference for celibacy, the commendation of self-mutilation, as a secondary reason. Nor does he face squarely the question whether Jesus was right, whether his decision embodied in law has been beneficial to mankind, whether church or synagogue has produced a higher type of sexual morality, developed a better family life, and prevented more cruel, unprofitable, and immoral relations, and whether modifications of his principle are not necessary in order to secure the best interests of humanity.

From Professor Harnack's reconstruction of the document called Q ten passages other than those already considered are next selected for discussion. Two of them are marked as doubtful. The narrative of the temptation is quoted as "probably the surest bit of autobiography that comes to us from Jesus." It is difficult to see how this story told in the third person can be designated as an autobiography at all. That Jesus related to his disciples his experiences with the devil is at best a theory, and a very improbable one. The Bible texts may have been quoted by him, and were significant, as the first narrator must have felt, because of the implied contrast to the Messianic ideal. In discussing eight groups of sayings from Mark, Dr. King rightly emphasizes the revolutionary character of the teaching of Jesus as to dietary laws and the Sabbath and the principle of self-sacrifice. The teaching peculiar to Luke is well treated. It is admitted that "the eschatological coloring of certain passages may have been unconsciously deepened by the inherited presuppositions of the writers, and of those from whom their traditions were obtained." This is certainly no overstatement

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of the peculiarities and the share of tradition in producing them.

In the brief chapter dealing with the Sermon on the Mount as a whole, Dr. King gives an outline of "the spiritual discoveries" of Jesus. It is a delicate task to trace the authorship of ideas, particularly great ideas. Too often the search for ideas that can be designated as original leads away from what is most gloriously distinctive in the manner of approach to the objects of thought and the form of expression. It would be difficult to convince a Buddhist, or even a thoughtful reader of the *Slavonic Enoch*, that Jesus "added a whole new realm of morality,—that of the so-called passive virtues of the Beatitudes" (p. 199); and "the absence from the biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of human knowledge,—whether in natural science, ethics, political economy, or elsewhere,—has had to discount" (*ibid.*) would have to be demonstrated before it could be accepted as an evidence of originality. In fact, it is just his silence concerning, apparent ignorance of, and supposed disregard for, such absorbing interests of modern life as science, art, education, industry, commerce, state-craft, and political organization, that have led so many men to turn away from him as a guide who can no longer lead. Confidence in the intrinsic worth of the contributions of Jesus is not restored by sweeping claims and loud affirmations. Never have we been so much in need of discrimination, sharp and clear-cut, between the permanent principles for which Jesus stood and the perishable forms they assumed even in his own thinking, between what he can give, out of the fullness of his spirit, of direction and helpful suggestion even in realms he did not touch, or only superficially, and what he cannot give, between the soul and the body, as it were, of his religious and ethical convictions. It is to be regretted that President King did not find time to deal with the relation of the ethics of Jesus to the great ethical questions of our own day, in so far as they came within his view, or to accentuate more fully his peculiar positions on such important ethical questions as the killing of enemies, the legal principle of punitive justice, divorce, oath-taking, compulsory support of religion, autocracy, and the accumulation of private wealth.

The two chapters on "The Basic Qualities of Life" and "The Great Motives to Living" incorporate what to President King and undoubtedly to many of his readers must appear as the

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essence of the ethical teaching of Jesus. Throughout the book there is a spirit of fairness, inner freedom, and love of the truth, as well as of reverence, loyalty, and affection for the great teacher of the art of living.

Cornell University. NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

THE INFLUENCE OF WEALTH IN IMPERIAL ROME. By William Stearns Davis, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Minnesota. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910. Pp. xi, 340.

The purpose of this book is described as being "to consider the influence of money and the commercial spirit throughout the period of Roman greatness." But the author admits that he has given a liberal interpretation to the term Money Power, and the book contains accordingly chapters on the Life of the Lower Classes in Italy, and on Marriage and Divorce in the Roman State, and concludes with a chapter on "Some Reasons Why the Roman Empire Fell." Since Professor Davis has cast his net so wide, it may not be ungracious to complain that he has excluded subjects like the Economic Development of the Early Church as being "distinctly alien to the genius of Ancient Society" (whatever he may mean by this entity). Such discussions, indeed, one might have supposed especially suitable for treatment in the present work. For the same reason he might have been expected to attempt some bolder induction as to the influence of wealth on imperial prosperity. But though, in an earlier context, he has described with real insight the heavy drain on the precious metals of the Empire, it appears clearly from his concluding chapter that he regards it as merely a minor and subsidiary cause of Roman decline. A fellow-countryman of Mr. Brooks Adams might, in handling such a subject, have thought it worth his while to refute, modify, or adopt that writer's theory that the Roman Empire failed through the inadequate supply of bullion, which broke down the money economy and led directly to the loss of economic freedom.

Now, whether Mr. Adams's theory can or cannot be defended in all its breadth, it is as old as Alison, it has been adopted by so sober a writer as Archdeacon Cunningham, and is being assimilated in a modified form into the most cautious modern

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histories of the Empire. It has, at least, the merit of coming nearer than any other theory to assigning a *vera causa* for that creeping blight which paralyzed all the activities of the Empire, and which led Mommsen to speak of it as "an old world."

We may dismiss at once the intellectual faintheart who languidly declines upon retrograde theories of 'Decadence,' assuming that the facts as we have them cannot be explained by the verifiable causes which historians assign to them, and who has to invoke "some obscure cause analogous to senescence in physical organisms" (Mr. A. J. Balfour). As for other theories, most of the causes which they suggest can only have been limited and transient in their operation, some of them can be shown to have neutralized each other, while others again stand in a directly causal relation with the alleged economic decline. Some such theory as that of Mr. Adams, or a modification of it, would, I think, have been the proper basis of such a treatise as this. But to relegate the economic cause to an undistinguished place in a group of contributory causes is to throw the picture quite out of focus.

The book, however, is descriptive rather than analytical; and as such it possesses considerable merit. The author is too modest when he says that "the book does not claim to be a critical compendium for the advanced scholar." His generalizations exhibit sound and comprehensive judgment; and he especially excels in striking a balance between the lurid pictures of the satirists, on the one hand, and the noble temper of the moral philosopher and the 'spiritual director,' on the other. In a word, he succeeds in conveying a good general view of the actual moral practice of the period in relation to money. He is especially successful in dealing with the Roman idea of 'beneficence' and in contrasting it with some modern phases of that virtue. Indeed, the work abounds in illuminating criticisms of the activities of contemporary wealthy society. The style is easy and vigorous; and as the author has on the whole followed Friedländer in extenuating the alleged extravagance of imperial Rome, he has escaped the temptation of the garish or grandiose tone of other works on this theme. If on occasion he offends, that is perhaps due to the difficulty of presenting such a subject to 'the general reader.'

I must, however, protest against the dichotomy between 'general readers' and 'advanced scholars,' which the author en-

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dorses in his preface, but which is so overworked in these days in books of this kind. Everybody is a general reader; and on the other hand, the general reader who derives most profit from such works is the reader who is stimulated by them to examine and, if necessary, to correct their conclusions in the light of the original authorities. If Professor Davis feared that the references which he has omitted might offend the eye of general readers, he might have collected them in an appendix. This addition would have enormously enhanced the value of the work for the student of this period.

G. A. T. Davies.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

Lords of Industry. By H. D. Lloyd. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910. Pp. 239. Mazzini and Other Essays. Same author and publishers. Pp. 355.

These two volumes are collections of magazine articles, papers, and addresses by the late Henry D. Lloyd, the most recent being dated 1903 and the earliest going back to 1881. A wide range of topics is covered, but the fundamental note, an impassioned appeal for democracy, more democracy, and yet again democracy, is maintained throughout.

In the "Lords of Industry," Mr. Lloyd flays the monopolists of coal, oil, sugar, wheat, and railroads in the same trenchant fashion that gave vogue to his famous "Wealth Against Commonwealth." Many of the papers republished in this volume antedate by several years the period and even the name of muckraking. It would not be fair to place them wholly in that category, however. They possess a brilliance of style, a sustained cogency of argument, and a background of honest conviction that very few of the hasty modern school of exposure and vilification even remotely approach. Lloyd's pages sparkle with epigram and are full of quotable passages. Orators especially will find rich plunder in his "Lords of Industry." Characteristic if not always convincing are the following, although any choice from so great an abundance must seem invidious: "The buccaneer looked for gold, and is poor; the Puritan sought freedom and is rich." . . . According to "the New York code of legal ethics . . . if a lawyer is not a judge he need not be a gentleman, and if he is a judge he need not be investigated." . . .

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"Private property is sacred, but plunder must not be private. A philosopher of the commune said, 'Property is theft.' American self-government must have a philosophy to say, Theft shall not be property." . . . "Exchanges are the creameries of the world of labor." . . . Of one of these "price factories" he says, "It deals in brokers' eggs as well as hens' eggs, and has all the approved facilities to enable it to count and sell the chickens that are not yet hatched out of eggs that are not yet laid." . . . "It is the code of honor among wolves that no high-minded lamb will squeal." . . . "The cornerer is a middle-man who leaves nothing for the end-men." . . . "Free competition could be let run only in a community where every one had learned to say and act, 'I am the state.'" . . . "Morals and values rise and fall together." . . . "If one people are fit for liberty, all people are fit for it, because no people are fit for anything else." . . . "The coöperation of all for the benefit of the few we are going to put into the rag-bag where Reform keeps the other old clothes of history." . . . "In the days of honest competition there was a certain rough justice in the maxim, 'The devil take the hindmost.' The kind of competition the monopolies give us demands a change in the wording. 'Nowadays the devil ought to take the foremost.'" . . . "The rotten-ripe prosperity of America has bred a swarm of millionaire microbes, pestilence germs of plutocracy, the worst kind of grip, which are eating out the heart of our liberties." . . . "A country in which the people have at the elections only the right to be crucified between two thieves,—who are not crucified,—is not the Republic of Washington." . . . "The mother-wit of the people knows that prices are not cheap which produce ten-ply millionaires." . . . "The one thing the tyrant, in economics and politics, can always be sure of accomplishing is the education of his own destroyer." . . . "Though it is the human nature of the individual to seek monopoly, it is the human nature of the many to defeat it." . . . "The essence of Democracy is that the Democrat submits to no power of which he is not a constituent part and partner." . . . "Democracy found that the only way to regulate kings was to make every citizen a king." . . . Luncheons of the coal monopolists at which they entered upon gentlemen's agreements are polished off by Mr. Lloyd as cases of "collation and collusion."

Vituperation is not argument, although at times it is mighty

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good campaign material. It would be grossly unfair to characterize Mr. Lloyd's work as entirely of this sort. Much of it is, however. The plodding processes of the economists, whom, following Ruskin, he cordially despises, would have given a much keener temper to the blade with which he thrusts and slashes. At any rate one can say that Mr. Lloyd's arguments are for the most part distinctly negative in character. They are critical and destructive, seldom constructive except in vague proposals for greater democracy, a new religion, public ownership and operation. In his paper on *The National Ownership of Coal Mines,* dating from 1903, Mr. Lloyd presents a tremendous indictment against the mismanagement of the coal monopolists to which one cannot help giving a large measure of assent. But there is not the slightest consideration of the difficulties which national ownership and operation might entail beyond the single question-begging sentence: "Once these mines are in the hands of the public and we are certain they will be operated without interruption and without extortion, there will be plenty of time to discuss at our leisure all the other questions involved." The proposal to "First seize the mines, then pay for them" is also demagogic and unworthy the high ethical sense manifested in the rest of Mr. Lloyd's work.

Regarding the future of America there is a noticeable vaccillation between pessimism and optimism which becomes the more apparent as one turns from essay to essay. Possibly this would scarcely be marked by one who had read them separately as published, but brought together within the covers of a single volume the effect is curious, almost startling. Mr. Lloyd was fundamentally right in his contention that the menace of privilege must be met in this country. Also in his constantly reiterated statement that the tremendous importance of the issue is not yet fully perceived. Decidedly we need alarmists to awaken men and to drive this conviction home. Yet from the calmer scientific point of view one cannot help wondering whether Mr. Lloyd ever stopped to weigh the significance of the coolness with which the great mass of Americans take the cry of "chains and slavery" with which he and others constantly assail them. Why is it "that in no other country do the faces of the people show so much intelligence and cheerfulness as in America," and this in spite of the fact that nowadays there is "a King George in every important industry taxing the people

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without representation or consent." Certainly there was room for another essay on this subject, and possibly for the determination of a consistent outlook, whether pessimistic or optimistic, upon the future.

The papers presented in the volume entitled "Mazzini and Other Essays" are too various for discussion as a whole. Yet here also Mr. Lloyd's democratic conviction is never forgotten for a moment. He is a hero worshiper of the most extreme type provided that the hero is a champion of the masses. Mazzini, of course, is dealt with most sympathetically. Mr. Lloyd's fervor even carried him to the absurd one-sidedness manifest in the following statement: "The trickery, the treachery, the butcheries, with which the Italians were robbed of their Republic by the conspiracies of the House of Savoy, with the traitors within and tyrants without, is a chapter of cruelty and duplicity to be matched only by the conspiracy by the kings of Europe and the renegade aristocracy of France to crush the French Revolution." On the other hand, Mr. Lloyd's essay on *Emerson's Wit and Humor* is by far the most felicitous and the least exaggerated of all the papers in this volume. The writer seems to have been influenced as much by the sanity as by the humor of his great subject. The eighth paper, which discusses the question, *Is Personal Development the Best Social Policy?* involves an attempt to reconcile individualism with collectivism which should prove of some interest to students of ethics. In a final paper, entitled *No Mean City*, Mr. Lloyd sketches his Utopia in gracious but rather fantastic outline. Among other things there were "statistics"—[oh, blessed word]—"to show that every idle man if put at work, besides supporting himself, could procure enough in less than three years to replace all the capital advanced in the shape of machines, buildings, material, to employ him." Also it was found that "all the cotton cloth needed in *No Mean City* was easily made in a few hours each week by the senior class of the high school, as a part of its study of fibres and machinery; and so with many other things."

Mr. Lloyd's literary executors deserve great credit for the discrimination shown in selection and the form of presentation of these two volumes. While they will add but few new points to the gospel from which Mr. Lloyd never wavered, they deserve to survive for literary if for no other reasons.

University of Cincinnati. ROBERT C. BROOKS.

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THE DUTY OF ALTRUISM. By Ray Madding McConnell. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910. Pp. v, 255.

The old ethics of obligation took the objectivity of moral categories for granted, and merely set out to provide this objectivity with a suitable philosophical ground. The present-day ethics of the type represented by Dr. McConnell's book swings to the other pole and asserts that all conduct is a purely subjective matter, that there is no objective standard of ethical evaluation. How is one, then, to prove the duty of altruism? This is the writer's problem, and Chapters II-VIII of the book (pp. 19-172) are devoted to "an investigation of the various doctrines that have been proposed as solutions to this problem of converting egoism into altruism" (p. 15). Theological ethics, in seeking to base altruism upon the commandment of God, is involved in an unavoidable circle: "The rightness of the revelation is attested by its divine origin, and its divine origin is attested by its rightness" (p. 21). In metaphysical ethics the ground of obligation is placed in a noumenal world, and its absolute authority is deduced from its transcendent character. But belief in the metaphysical postulates is just as indispensable here as belief in God is in the case of theological ethics,—and the metaphysical solution is, therefore, just as artificial. The effort to ground altruism upon the external authority of law is obviously futile: the law can punish the aggressive egoist; it cannot make him altruistic. The theories offered by some ethical logicians start by gratuitously assuming their major premises. The 'good' cannot be grounded rationally; "no one knows what is right or wrong except by reference to will and experience" (p. 96). As for the various 'scientific' solutions of the problem of egoism and altruism, they are valuable as explanations of moral phenomena; but they cannot show why altruism *ought* to be preferred. The scientist cannot evaluate; he is limited to description. "Psychology has done a great deal towards *explaining* the rise and development of altruistic feelings, ideas, and volitions, but it is wholly incapable of convincing an individual who happens not to be altruistic that he *ought* to be altruistic" (pp. 114-115). Similarly, physiology endeavors to study the rise of instincts in human nature. But to convince an egoist that the fraction of altruism he happens to possess is a mere matter of instinct would not strengthen that instinct, but would

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rather tend to disorganize it. Evolution, likewise, has traced the development of altruistic sentiments, and identifies the moral ideal with the trend of nature. And Dr. McConnell insists that the descriptive and historical branch of evolutionistic ethics "has probably made a larger contribution to ethical *science* than all other schools together" (p. 172). But "to describe the way men have acted in the past is a very different matter from saying how they *ought* to have acted, or how they ought to act in the future" (p. 170).

All these efforts to provide the duty of altruism with a theoretical basis, Dr. McConnell concludes, are unavailing: it is impossible to reason men into being egoistic or altruistic. Nor can we ground ethical obligation upon the philosophical hybrid of reason-and-will. It is a confusion to speak of the intellect as a dynamic agency, a motor principle, or a force in any sense of the word as Fouillée does in his doctrine of *idées-forces*. Schopenhauer-wise, Dr. McConnell asserts: "The will is the primary force; the intellect is a secondary force" (p. 183). "Intelligence is accessory to will, and is without moral significance except as it enables the will better to accomplish itself" (p. 185).

Dr. McConnell accepts Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will-to-live. But, in Chapter X of his book, he emphasizes the variety of the forms in which the will-to-live, as he conceives it, expresses itself. Altruism is the expression of "the will to live the largest life." Egoism is the mark of abnormal men. Scientific ethics can recognize egoism as abnormality, but it cannot convert the egoist to altruism. "A man's 'moral nature' is not the result of his 'free choice' any more than is the original size of his liver" (p. 245). The moralist must abandon the futile effort to make bad men good, and spend his energy on showing good men how best to carry out their good will.

The reader will find the book very interesting in providing readable summaries of some recent ethical theories. In his own constructive work, too, Dr. McConnell is straightforward and to the point; he accepts the consequences of his position without any hesitation. Nevertheless, while it is true that ethics must constantly keep in contact with actual experience, this does not mean that it should abandon all objective standards. Dr. McConnell says: "The particular nature of the particular individual at a particular time and under particular circumstances is the fact from which moral science must start" (p. 192). But this four-

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fold particularity by itself can in no sense be called material for science of any sort. If ethics is to cease being 'normative' and become purely 'scientific,' 'descriptive,' then it must follow the method of all 'descriptive' science. And this means that it must discover in its particular 'facts' the universal meaning by virtue of which alone the empirical datum becomes a fact significant for science. Dr. McConnell follows Schopenhauer and seeks to improve upon his master by amplifying the notion of the will-to-live. But Schopenhauer himself recognizes that, once we leave reason behind, science becomes impossible. Descriptive science aims at objective truth, at universally valid conclusions. Dr. McConnell's descriptive ethical science is doubtless descriptive of the way in which Dr. McConnell's own will to live the largest life functioned at the particular time and under the particular circumstances of writing his book. But it is not ethical science. The science of ethics demands, not the *Gegenüberstellung* of 'subjective' and 'objective,' 'descriptive' and 'normative,' 'will' and 'reason,' but the study of their interrelation and mutual significance in the one world of concrete reality.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

New York City.

RELIGION AND IMMORTALITY. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911. Pp. vii, 87.

This is a little book, but full of great things. It has all the sincerity, charm, and depth of Mr. Dickinson's writings, and it deals with the most important concerns of life. In the main it might be described as a plea for 'the open door,' a plea the more weighty because the writer never allows himself to overstate his case. He feels intensely the connection between belief and action, a connection often thrust out of sight, but always present: he realizes, and makes us realize, that the old question, Is life worth living? is one that cannot be laughed aside, and that the answer, for rational creatures, depends on our hopes about the universe itself. But he is very careful not to say, "Therefore, since hope is so important, let us insist on taking a hopeful view of things, whether that view commends itself to our reason or not." He asks himself, it is true, what vision of hope it is that could make men feel it possible to accept life and all its fardels with con-

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tent or joy, and his own answer is as definite as Browning's or Goethe's: "Western optimism, in my judgment, is doomed, unless we can believe that there is more significance in individual lives than appears upon the surface; that there is a destiny reserved for them more august than any to which they can attain in their life of threescore years and ten. On this point I can, of course, only speak my own conviction,—the conviction that, at the bottom of every human soul, even of those that deny it, there lurks the insatiate hunger for eternity; that we desire, in Browning's phrase, something that will

> Make time break
> And let us pent-up creatures through
> Into eternity, our due;

and that nothing short of this will ever appear, in the long run, once men have begun to think and feel, to be a sufficient justification and apology for the life into which we are born" (p. 42).

But if this desire were shown to be baseless, if it were plain that there was indeed no such "justification and apology," our reason would have to face it and take the consequences. Mr. Dickinson is clear on this vital point, only he is clear also that we ought to think out what the consequences would be and not live, as many of us do now, by a faith which we deny with our lips or half ignore, to the detriment of practice and theory alike. To their detriment, because to turn aside from the Unknown, to refuse to speculate, however noble the motive, (and Mr. Dickinson recognizes the noble loyalty to truth which prompts the highest 'agnosticism,') is after all to cripple one's growth. "As I read man, he is a creature not finished, even approximately. . . . He is a being in process of creating himself. What he is not is more important than what he is; his divinations and guesses than his certainties; his imaginations than his facts. For him to tie himelf down to what he knows and to ignore what he does not know, would be to commit a kind of suicide" (p. 5). It is quite possible, and here is perhaps the essence of the contention, that we have in us something which is "a first apprehension of some Reality," something which cannot yet fully grasp its own utterances, still less justify them to the understanding, and yet which is on the way to do this, is the pioneer to full knowledge; if only we can at once hold it fast and wrestle with it. Incessantly we should ask ourselves, What is at bottom the faith

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we live by, and how far have we reason to think it also true? If personal immortality is desirable, we should never deny that desire, and we should search, deliberately and systematically, for all evidence on the matter, scientific as well as philosophic. If we believe in the value of human effort on the one hand and the inherent goodness of the universe on the other, we should take up again and criticise more closely than before the conception of the Absolute and the eternally Perfect. To Mr. Dickinson a Perfection that is compatible with the continued existence of evil as we have it now is a contradiction in terms, and would render our effort itself absurd. But one is tempted to ask: If the universe has a core of goodness that will more and more, *sub specie temporis,* triumph over and transform every evil, might not such a universe, in virtue of the end to which it is moving, be conceived, *sub specie æternitatis,* as itself absolutely perfect? The spring of all action Mr. Dickinson finds in the thirst for an absolute good which is to us not yet fully defined: certainly he will not identify it *sans phrase* with pleasure or pain: "If pleasure hampers it, I do not desire pleasure, if pain furthers it, I do desire pain." To the objection that this is to leave the ultimate good so undefined as to be meaningless, he would reply that the business of life is just to define it, and some of that business has been done already: we have discovered already some good things, and we believe there are "other and better beyond." And of these better he suggests that one at least might be the absorption of individual personality in a larger self yet not so as to lose its identity and consciousness, "included in a larger self without losing one's own self, so that one could say, 'I am somehow that self.'" This, as so much mysticism, strikes a distinctly Christian note, though Mr. Dickinson is strongly opposed to orthodox Christianity, and in connection with this there is an idea that may be worth throwing out. The figure of Christ has doubtless, as he says, lost its place for the thinking modern world, but is there not inexhaustible value in the Christian conception of a divine succoring power incarnated in one personality and overflowing into another? Is there an ultimate antithesis, after all, between Christ as "a power working mysteriously" in human beings, and Christ as "an inspiration and example, as other men also may be"? The bond is mysterious enough that unites us to other men, whoever they be, when in virtue of our relation to them we realize, even if

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only now and again, that at bottom "we live by admiration, hope, and love."

London. F. MELIAN STAWELL.

THE DOMAIN OF BELIEF. By Henry John Coke. London: Macmillan & Co., 1910. Pp. 311.

The epistemological position of this book is that of Kant's "Critique of the Pure Reason," taken quite uncritically: We can only know phenomena. Scientific laws are not applicable beyond the range of 'possible experience.' Reason cannot transcend the phenomenal, but faith may do so. The objects of faith are freedom, immortality, and God, which conceptions and others connected with them are discussed in this book.

Mr. Coke does not follow Kant's methods of establishing these conceptions. Nor does he substitute for them any definite and consistent method of his own. He seems to do little more than to "consult the opinions of men entitled to be heard as recognized authorities." Many philosophers, poets, and scientific writers are consulted, but our author does not bring what he learned from them into a systematic unity. Had he even criticised their statements in a systematic way, he might have succeeded in defining more clearly the issues involved and thereby contributed to their future solution.

Most of the objections to the conceptions mentioned are considered and their force recognized. The force of some of them is found to be partly due to the unreasonable form in which the conceptions are held. God, *e. g.*, is believed to be the omnipotent Creator of the world. Now in view of the reckless cruelty displayed by Nature, it is impossible for a reasonable moral being to accept this doctrine. But if omnipotence be denied to God, and if creating or fashioning the world be "exclusively limited to the conversion of evil into good by the process of evolution," the belief in God is not unreasonable (pp. 159-162). His existence cannot, however, be proved by reason. "In order to justify belief we must, so to speak, take leave of our senses; these can only lead to a realism which is the mainstay of atheism. All reasoning is founded on an empirical basis; it must therefore be inadequate to the demonstration of that which surpasses this limit" (p. 153). And yet Mr. Coke's views regarding the attributes of God and His relation to the good and

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evil in the world is a transgression of the Kantian epistemology. To speak of converting evil into good is to make a transcendental use of the principle of causality and of the ideas of good and evil. Is it possible, indeed, for him to talk of God without doing this? And after allowing himself the liberty of refining his conceptions of God's relation to the world, what limits can he set to the employment of reason in speculative construction or in destructive criticism? An idealist would say, rightly, that his contention itself leads to atheism, and its truth is disputed by most of the leading thinkers. Dr. Ward (*c. f.* Naturalism and Agnosticism) after a detailed examination of the fundamental conceptions of science comes to the conclusion of Lotze, that nature is essentially spiritual. Mr. Coke does not consider the views of Professor Ward, although they also are based on the Kantian theory of knowledge, qualified and corrected, however, by a more accurate psychology. The absolute idealism of Hegel which "so fascinates those who have no passion for clear thinking," he rejects as "little else than a travesty of the pantheism from which it really emanates" (p. 301). The modern philosophical authorities most used are Mill, Clifford, and Spencer, and by means of their help chiefly is it sought "to promote and strengthen religious faith,"—the object for which the book was written.

Bala, North Wales. DAVID PHILLIPS.

A MODERN HUMANIST. Miscellaneous Papers of B. Kirkman Gray. Edited with a Biographical Introduction by Henry Bryan Binns. London: A. C. Fifield, 1910. Pp. 271.

This volume consists of two introductions, together comprising one quarter of the book, and various papers, the more important of which have already appeared in periodicals. It will appeal chiefly to those who wish to have presented to them the more personal side of the earnest author of "The History of English Philanthropy." In the presentation of this intimate view of the man a good deal has been included which otherwise no doubt would have been omitted: there is always the danger in books of this character of including episodes which are of interest only to the person who has himself experienced them and to a few sympathizing friends. Moreover, a man of Mr. Gray's type of mind and training is sometimes in danger of re-

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discovering the commonplace, a fault which is illustrated by a good deal of the musing in "A Bank Holiday Crowd." Nevertheless the book succeeds on the whole in conveying the impression of the author's "sensitive intensity" and his profound and wide sympathy. This sympathy receives perhaps its best illustration in "The Mind of a Londoner," "Two Tramps," and "The Social Value of Hooligans."

Bristol, England. R. S. VARLEY.

CHRIST'S SOCIAL REMEDIES. By Harry Earl Montgomery. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Son, 1911. Pp. 409.

The purpose of this book is stated in the following advertisement: "In 'Christ's Social Remedies' the author seeks for the solution of present-day social and industrial problems, not in the teachings of the economic and philosophical schools, but in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. The practical value of Christ's social teachings in solving the vital social and industrial problems vexing the American people, and the duty of Christian men and women of applying to the solution of these problems the touchstone of His teachings, are set forth by the author, who is a lawyer and man of affairs, in a clean, sane, and dispassionate manner. The scope of the book is indicated by the titles of the chapters: (I) Responsibility of Citizenship, (II) Was Christ an Anarchist?, (III) Was Christ a Socialist?, (IV) Kingdom of God, (V) Non-resistance, (VI) Marriage and Divorce, (VII) Crime and the Criminal, (VIII) Wealth, (IX) Labor, (X) Sunday Observance, (XI) International Controversies, (XII) Social Reconstruction."

Such a publication as this has slight excuse for being. It is an attempt to treat a great theme while ignoring the results of scholarship touching that theme. Such an attitude on the part of one who assumes to teach, though all too common, is profoundly immoral. The result is that the book has no value for educated men. It can have significance only for those who, like the author, are either ignorant of the conclusions of the scholars known as 'higher critics' or have deliberately ignored them. A writer on biology who took no account of the discoveries of the last hundred years, would not be more absurd than this author, who assumes that Jesus said everything that is attributed to him in the New Testament.

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Some of the 'remedies' seem very good, as good as anything we know, but their derivation from the teaching of Jesus is very uncertain. The very sensible recommendations which the author frequently makes would have at least as much force if they were frankly advanced as his own. From the passage, Matthew 18:15-17 he thinks he derives "Christ's solution" for disputes between capital and labor:

"Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear *thee, then* take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell *it* unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican."

Referring to the phrase in v. 17, "unto the church," the author naïvely adds the words, "which was the legal tribunal of the Hebrew people." If he had been willing to listen, any scholar could have told this writer that these verses do not date from Jesus, but reflect the usages of succeeding times. The very word 'church' sufficiently indicates this.

The author's attempt to find ancient support for his moral judgments confuses those judgments, and cannot possibly contribute to the clarification of thought. One cannot repress a smile on reading of "the Jehovian view of marriage," and one wonders that the author, being a lawyer, is so unconscious of his sophistries in the interpretation of this ancient literature.

In the chapter entitled, "Was Christ a Socialist?" the author has, for the sake of contrast, placed in parallel columns extracts from socialistic writers and quotations from the New Testament. But it would be easy enough to take other quotations from both sources and arrange them so as to make a very different impression.

It must be said that there can be no helpful discussion of the bearing of the teaching of Jesus on modern life by those who ignore the conclusions of scholars on the question as to what Jesus actually did teach. Such books as this only add to the confusion and waste the time of the author, the reader, and the reviewer.

GEORGE R. DODSON.

St. Louis.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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APRIL, 1912.

A PLEA FOR AN HONEST CASUISTRY.

THE BISHOP OF TASMANIA.

I.

CONSCIOUSLY or unconsciously, with system or without system, we are all, in our several fashions and degrees, casuists. We are so even in our own despite. And yet there is a marked disinclination to make casuistry a definitely recognized part of ethics. In many leading treatises, the subject is not so much as mentioned; and in those which venture upon it, the discussion is almost invariably of a subsidiary and superficial character. Whence this disinclination?

It is hard to conceive that timidity is to any appreciable extent a deterring cause. Never before has ethical inquiry swung so clear of tradition and preconception,—never before been so greatly daring. There are not a small number of moralists who laud 'the will to power,' and urge advance into a region of conduct that lies altogether on the other side of good and evil. It cannot, then, be timidity that deters the modern moralist from offering himself,—as Jeremy Taylor offered himself in his day and generation,—to be a *ductor dubitantium,* on a generous scale, and on a definite system.

Perchance the blame must be laid upon surviving prejudices,—the aftermath of the reaction against the artificialties and abuses of the mediæval systems of casuistry. Undoubtedly we have here a *vera causa,* so far

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as popular sentiment is concerned, in certain communities; as also in the case of a few moralists of the older school who either shrink from questioning the sole sufficiency of the greater moral principles, or who cannot rid themselves of the feeling that there is something inherently uncanny and unwholesome in casuistry, just because it is casuistry. Still, this explanation does not carry us far; for the moralists whom we have chiefly in mind would scout it.

Are there deeper influences at work? Are there principles at stake? Not so, save in the case of the stricter intuitionalists. Martineau, for example, takes the line that "we have an intuitive consciousness of the relative claims of rival incentives," and categorically affirms that "the healthy and honest mind has short cuts to the truth." Plainly, if we start from such premises, casuistry is, to say the least, *de trop.* And he who attempts to argue against the sufficiency of the premises, ostracises himself, *ipso facto,* from the ranks of "healthy and honest minds." It is therefore comforting to find that the stalwart Martineau was compelled to modify the stringency of such pronouncements. "I admit (he writes) that in these complex cases, our first estimate is subject to reflective correction, in a way which is not observable with the simple impulses." He also speaks of "the implicit estimate" which is "wrapped up in the feeling," and which "needs to be made explicit." Now passing over without criticism his views as to the simple impulses (though they are by no means beyond question), we note the concession that, in certain complex cases, reflection has to supervise and supplement the work of intuition. This is surely to grant the existence of 'cases of conscience,'—and, if so, the need of some form of casuistry. If the facts of the moral life have won from Martineau a concession so significant, the defender of an honest casuistry may pass on his way undaunted.

Or it may be urged that casuistry lacks the pragmatic sanction,—that it will not work,—that it is calculated to

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demoralize individual consciences, and to endanger the public weal. The thorough-going inquirer into the bases of ethics is not likely to be deterred by scruples of this kind. His quest is for truth, and he is content to let consequences take care of themselves. Nevertheless it may be well to glance at the substance of this indictment, and meet it pragmatically. For, as James remarks, the casuistic question is at times "most tragically practical."

To put the matter in the broadest way, seeing that we are all, in our own despite, compelled to be casuists, can it be ultimately beneficial to shut our eyes to facts, and disown casuistry? Let the conventions and laws of politeness supply a test case. The strict Quaker condemns them because they tend to obscure the naked truth. But can he really be himself transparent in this difficult world?—or if he could be, would he relentlessly exercise his power? Surely his feelings of humanity would assert themselves periodically, even though his sense of propriety were sternly repressed. How much more will the average man who is not a Quaker find absolute transparency to be occasionally inconvenient?

But manners are capable of abuse. They may serve as a mask for a mean or a selfish soul. They may serve as a weapon in the armory of the libertine. Granted. But does the possibility of abuse make "a healthy and honest mind" openly display his real feelings, or indiscriminately assert his views and intentions? No. So long as human beings have such varying merits, excesses, and defects; so long as they view life from standpoints so diverse; so long in short, as they are human, will there be place for social amenities, for reciprocity in self-restraint, for reticence and cultured complaisance, for discreet evasion and modified statement.

These things being so, it is manifest that, to this extent at any rate, casuistry works; for manners are casuistry in action. They involve definite adaptations to circumstances, definite accommodations to individual idiosyncrasies. Why should we 'make-believe' in this regard?

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Let us be honest. Either manners are morally defensible, or they are not. If they are not, let us abandon them. If they are, let us make explicit the principles which are their justification. The same line of pragmatic reasoning will apply to all cases in which there is accommodation to individuals or circumstances.

The possible pragmatic objection thus falls to the ground. But its discussion has incidentally led to the recognition of genuine conflicts between competing duties. The corollary is that we shall have the courage to face them. Whatever pragmatism may ultimately come to mean, it will assuredly never ask us to bury our heads in the sand. On the contrary, it is pledged to found its ethics not on abstract principles, but on objective relations, and to protest against all that leads to self-deception and hypocrisy. It is best, says the pragmatist, to take ethical principles as general rules, indicating tendencies, and admitting of continuous exceptions and modifications. Nothing could be more in harmony with the postulates of an honest and living casuistry.

For those who regard 'duty' as predominantly a product of social evolution, the case for casuistry is indefinitely stronger. To affirm that any particular moral code is the expression of a particular social order, is only another way of saying that it is specially adapted to that order. If it is urged that certain moral principles are practically universal, the point may be conceded without damage to the view that each code has its own peculiar social mold and character. The three highest members in Martineau's table of the springs of action are as follows: primary affections, parental and social; primary affection of compassion; primary sentiment of reverence. Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the classification is founded on facts. So long as these springs of action are regarded in their abstract, generalized aspects, their presence may be traced in all the recognized moral codes. But when they are examined in their detailed applications, the differences bulk so

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largely that the original principles almost disappear. Each social order has its own distinctive set of moral problems, and solves them in its own way. In the interpretation and application of the primary parental affections, how wide the gap between the Chinese and the Americans. In respect of the primary affection of compassion, how utterly different the conceptions and actions of a head-hunter of Borneo and of a Burmese Buddhist. As for the primary sentiment of reverence, which Martineau ranks highest of all, the unevenness of its developments, and the capriciousness of its manifestations, render its systematic treatment a truly formidable task.

It is not necessary, however, to contrast the moral codes of various civilizations in order to realize how relative are particular moral judgments, in spite of the assumed universality of fundamental moral principles. It amply suffices to study various stages in the development of one and the same social order. Feudal England had its own peculiar code: that of the age of the Stuarts differed from it profoundly; this, again, differs profoundly from that now prevailing under the industrial system. To attempt to merge these differences in an abstract similarity, or identity, of moral principles is to lose touch with the actual facts of moral development. Changes in the social environment call for corresponding modifications and adaptations in the recognized moral code. Thus arise real moral stresses and strains,—real conflicts of duties. No table of springs of action could define the relation of the Barons to King John; nor settle the quarrels of Cavalier and Roundhead; nor determine for a British citizen of the present Empire what amount and what kind of social service he shall contribute for the general weal. As regards this last difficulty, Taylor, in his "Problem of Conduct," well remarks: "We are constantly talking about the duty or happiness of working for the common good of mankind in a loose, rhetorical way that ignores altogether the very real difficulties with which our problem is beset."

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The lion may be caught in a net from which no mere roaring will deliver him. The stoutest intuitionist may struggle with a moral problem which no declamation against casuistry will solve. It would be wise for him to reflect that there is no inconsistency in repudiating the over-subtlety and deadly artificiality of mediæval systems while emphasizing the old, but oft-neglected aphorism, *abusus non tollit usum*. The richness and varying complexity of experience render nugatory the elaborate artificiality of rigid moral rules; but also insistently demand a careful and scientific analysis of typical cases of conscience, and an unprejudiced criticism of the principles they involve. The healthy and honest mind can go a long way,—but unless it is also crass and unimaginative, it will welcome guidance through the thickets and quagmires that so frequently block the path of those who would fain climb the heights.

II.

Let us briefly review the salient characteristics of a sound and honest casuistry.

In the first place, it will refuse to allow 'cases of conscience' to be grouped in a quite peculiar and isolated class, as though they were suspicious vagrants in the ethical domain. Moral conduct is thus defined in a recent authoritative treatise: "Activity called forth and directed by ideas of value and worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon." If we accept this general definition of the moral situation, it will be seen that every moral judgment, or choice, partakes, in some degree, of the nature of casuistry, because, in the nature of the case, there is some amount of real incompatibility between competing ideas of value. If the *differentia* for casuistry proper is to be found, it will be by laying stress upon the factor of relative complexity—following the lines of the usual distinction between reflex action and instinct.

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It is a serious mistake, then, to suppose that, while ethics, as generally conceived, travels on the high road of duty, casuistry is condemned to wander on paths of tortuous, if not immoral, expediency. It would be just as reasonable to taboo the science of politics because Machiavelli wrote his "Prince." Given a complex incompatibility among competing ideas of value, the limitations of human knowledge may render a clear-cut decision impossible. But the effort to struggle through to such a decision is not a tortuous or immoral proceeding. Expediency is a necessity of the situation. The goodness or badness of the will can discover itself in the most complex, as in the simplest cases; it does not change its qualities when it operates on the plane of expediency. Rather is it the case that the value selected by the good will under complex conditions is elevated to the plane of duty. For duty is done wherever obedience is rendered to a moral decision of the good will. The dangerous maxim that the end justifies the means has not essentially any closer affinity to casuistry than to any other branch of ethical inquiry; the contrary view results from confusing complexity and motive.

Almost any case of conscience, ancient or modern, would serve to illustrate the views thus succinctly stated; but to select a well-worn one will be no disadvantage. It is generally allowed that a doctor is sometimes justified in misleading a patient, when to tell the full truth would cause unnecessary depression, or jeopardize recovery. The situation obviously manifests incompatibilities in the ideas of value which compete in the doctor's mind. Considerations of expediency come into play, and public opinion approves of harmless equivocation under the peculiar conditions. Now is the doctor really blameworthy, and is the moral standard amiably lowered in his favor? or is his conduct genuinely defensible? The casuist is prepared to defend the case. In such a typical conflict of duties he decides that obedience to an abstract law must yield to a concrete benefit. The doctor's conduct, then,

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is not something to be winked at, or slurred over; it presents itself as an honest fulfillment of a plain duty. It does not square with a bloodless law of absolute truth; but its divergence is due, not to disregard for the claims of truth, or for its vast importance as a condition of social welfare, but to a regard for a social duty which overrules the 'abstract' under the stress of the complexities of human life. Expediency carries the day, not as immoral, but in obedience to a higher prompting which is, in such a case, the fulfilling of the law. When once this viewpoint is gained,—that the truly expedient is also the morally right,—we emerge from the slimy caverns of false casuistry into the health-giving light of the blessed sun.

The dangers of such a doctrine are too obvious to need restatement,—the tendency for the individual to relax the greater moral laws in his own favor,—the temptation for various sections of the community, professional, commercial, or other, to allow themselves an esoteric morality to a harmful degree,—a general lowering of the moral standard. Most certainly caution is essential. But, as already remarked, the complexity of moral problems is no excuse for weakly yielding to moral paralysis. It cannot be the last word, in cases of conscience, that we are left to plunge blindly in obedience to unrationalized impulse. Plunging is, alas, only too often inevitable,—but we need not exalt it into a virtue! The moral agent is one who, to the utmost of his power, exercises conscious choice among competing ideas of value. Hence, when casuistry is called for to attain his end, he will not hesitate to use it,—in an honest and good heart, and a sincere determination to do his best 'according to his lights.' The moral law, for him, is no longer a fixed and rigid set of fiats, to be arranged in tabular form, and to be executed with literal and external obedience. He regards them as means for healthy self-development, and for advancing the general welfare and progress. In short, man is not made for the moral law, but the moral law

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is made for man,—or perhaps, rather, is man-in-the-making.

A word as to the harmony of this view with the ethics of the New Testament. Jesus Christ bade his disciples be "wise as serpents and harmless as doves," and himself illustrated his meaning in his skillful parrying of entangling questions, and in his adaptations of his teaching to character, place, and circumstance. St. Paul, the mightiest of his followers, with a devotion to truth so consuming that he was prepared to die for it, boldly declares that he became "all things to all men." How suggestive this of time-serving, of flattery, of sycophancy! How easily wrested to his confusion! But so sure is he of the existence of an honest casuistry, that he unhesitatingly risks all chances of misconception and proclaims his constant use of its underlying principles. The Christian moralist is therefore pledged beforehand to find a place in his ethics for expediency and accommodation.

III.

How is this plea for an honest casuistry affected by the far-reaching influence of the evolution hypothesis? The subject thus broached is a large one, and would seem to be almost untouched as yet by the prominent authorities. Perhaps the champions of distinctively evolutionary ethics may claim that their whole outlook is essentially that of the casuists; and they might substantiate their claim by referring to the casuist's view of 'accommodation.'

This term has a long and varied history. It was employed by Christian theologians and moralists to describe the principle of God's revelation of himself "by divers portions and in divers manners." The Early Church used it in connection with the concealment or modification of such of their doctrines and practices as called for wariness or reticence in communication. The later Doctors gave it a more technical sense, making it almost synonymous with casuistry. Its vitality in the sphere of

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Christian ethics is proved by its prominence in the controversy between Kingsley and Newman.

So much for its narrower uses. Its scientific connotation came on the scene with Darwin under the thin disguise of 'adaptation.' So close is the connection, that Baldwin proposes the use of the actual word 'accommodation' for a special type of adaptations,—namely, those by which an organism is itself an agent in adapting itself to some change in its environment. It is easy to see how such accommodations, starting down in the sphere of the relatively unconscious, have gained in complexity and significance, stage after stage, until they have found expression in conscious choice between incompatible ideas of value. It is also obvious that this conception of adaptation to new conditions fits in admirably with the fundamental principle of casuistry. The moral agent is challenged, from time to time, to respond to the ever varying combinations of springs of action which influence his power of conscious choice. His moral progress is in proportion to the quality and delicacy of the resulting accommodations.

The conception of evolution has now so firmly established itself in almost every department of human thought and action, that even the intuitionalist moralists have had to reconsider their most characteristic tenets. It is almost impossible for a modern thinker not to realize that the various moral codes of succeeding stages of civilization cannot be treated as isolated or static phenomena. They are seen to be continuous sections of an upward-sweeping arc. Or, more organically, they take their place, not as so much ready-made intuitional material, but as living and growing fibers in the tissue of social relations.

Casuistry thus comes to its own. It may be called the 'growing point' of morals—building up new material into the expanding limbs of the social structure. It may be going too far to say, with Rodrigues, that the pretended foundations of action flow from action itself, and are far from commanding it; and that our ethical systems are

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constructed afterwards to justify our action. Still, there is a wonderful amount of truth in such an assertion—as witness Aristotle's master treatise. And it is at least safe to maintain that moral development proceeds, like organic development, by the method of 'trial and failure,' and by a series of approximations to more perfect adaptations amid changing environments. Life is a process,—it defies fixed concepts,—it repudiates absolutism of every brand. And, for the moralist, this fact of 'process' implies that casuistry is not a continuous breaking away from duties, but a continuous wrestling with new problems which no mere appeal to established principles can hope to solve. The fixed rule has its function,—but only a provisional one. The moral law is like the scientific hypothesis,—an anticipation of experience, and eminently serviceable as such, but liable to correction by the same experience as gave it form and authority.

IV.

In the increasingly complex life of to-day, how multitudinous are the incompatibilities between ideas of value! Childhood, manhood, age, each brings its sheaf of casuistical problems. The rights of men; the rights of women; the rights of the state; the rights of the individual,—all these, and a thousand like matters, call for clearer definition and adjustment, and all imply the application of casuistical principles and methods. In fact, our social intercourse in all its forms, from that of the closest friendship to the slightest acquaintanceship, bristles with new problems from day to day,—based on differences of temperament and character, of education and position, of intellect and imagination, and tangled in a mesh of varying social relations which affect our most private as well as our public affairs and behavior. Nor does the crop of specialized codes give any signs of failing,—the lawyers, the doctors, the clergy, the sceptics, the soldiers and sailors, the police, tradesmen and merchants, politicians and philosophers,—each and all have

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their peculiar outlook on life, and their own particular bundles of moral problems to solve. There is not a new scientific discovery, a new economic development, a new mode of philosophic or historical criticism which does not bring sore moral perplexities into numberless lives.

Be just, we cry. All will applaud. But how to be just,—there is the rub! We are face to face with changes in the industrial world,—we are threatened with conflict between capital and labor,—we are torn by competing ideals of individualism and socialism. How shall we interpret this admirable sentiment, or rule, or categorical imperative,—Be just? The share-holder in the large company feels that the moral responsibility for the conduct of the business rests upon the directors; the directors aver that they are but servants of the share-holders at large, and that they are not handling their own money or affairs. Hence, 'a company has no conscience,' we are told. But a casuist maintains that a company can, and ought to, have a conscience. He urges that the confused issues should be teased out, and that practical help should be extended to those who are anxious to fulfill their social obligations. Under analogous conditions, help has been given to purchasers by well-matured schemes of preferential dealing; and the idea is capable of important developments.

Who can say how much the world's progress may depend on the moralization of politics? And who shall venture to exclude casuistry from a large share in the work of moralizing them? Lord Morley has indeed written a famous essay on "Compromise," and has dealt out severe blows against such forms of accommodation and adaptation as involve any infringement of cardinal principles. But he himself is a man of affairs, as well as an author. He has undertaken public duties in administering the affairs of a vast empire. And among other decisions of great moment, there occurs that which answers China's appeal anent the opium traffic. It cannot be doubted that Lord Morley's personal sympathies are with

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the appeal. For he well knows that England forced this traffic on China by an iniquitous war, and that the consumption of opium is one of the worst scourges from which a country can suffer. But the exigencies of political life are too strong, and Lord Morley 'compromises' by proposing a scheme for gradual diminution of the traffic. On the merits of this scheme there is no intention of pronouncing any opinion here, nor would the subject have been mentioned at all save as a practical commentary on the essay. The moralist, in the free field of literary composition, deals hardly with certain sections of the community (especially clergy) for indulging in compromise. The politician, hemmed in on every side by competing interests, and in the actual stress and strain of imperial administration, finds compromise to be a necessity. The moral is plain. Compromise means casuistry. And if compromise can be honest and beneficial, so can casuistry.

It is painfully apparent that, in this age of transitions, changes in religious environment are prolific sources of cases of conscience. As just observed, these cases seem especially to exercise Lord Morley's mind. Newman's case is rich in interest and suggestion. While remodeling his beliefs, he employed that species of accommodation known as reticence. He withheld the full truth, and delayed to correct erroneous impressions. His "Apologia" explains his views. How far they are defensible has not yet been thoroughly debated, chiefly because of the religious controversies which confuse and dwarf the moral problems, simply *quâ* moral. But there is one principle he lays down,—"the principle of economy,"—which will serve as a striking example of what a really scientific casuistry might contain. "In religious conduct or statement, out of various courses, all and each allowable antecedently and in themselves, that ought to be taken which is most expedient and most suitable at the time and for the matter in hand." True, this principle implies preliminary decisions to determine what courses may fall within the category of those "allowable antecedently and

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in themselves." Nevertheless, the formula is valuable as giving a lead in the construction of a scientific set of general principles which would be of enormous practical value in analyzing and solving cases of conscience.

For example's sake, apply Newman's principle of economy to this problem. The fisherfolk of Normandy and Brittany reveal their religious beliefs in the furnishing and decoration of the chapels which crown so many of their white cliffs. They are wont to fill them with votive emblems of their hopes and fears, of their prayers and thanksgivings. Suppose a religious reformer, or a zealous agnostic, to be bent upon freeing them from what he regards as harmful superstitions. How should he set to work. Newman's principle of economy would save the 'reformer' from rash and iconoclastic action. For it would lead him to reflect, and would afford opportunity for his wider sympathies to declare themselves in due proportion. The case is manifestly one of high complexity. It is a serious matter to disturb the faith of those whose religion brings many a gleam of comfort, many a flash of beauty, many a touch of poetry, many a spiritual vision into lives that are all too hard and stern. The ark must be touched with reverence. Infinite care would have to be taken to select, out of many possible courses, that one "which is most expedient and most suitable at the time and for the matter in hand."

In spite, then, of Lord Morley's strong stand against compromise, the facts of the moral life, the complexities of the social environment, are too strong for him. In politics and religion alike, the ethics of subscription to party programs and religious formularies, is complex, distracting, not seldom harrowing. But the thorough and open discussion of difficult moral situations, careful analysis, expert criticism, are bound to be helpful to all concerned. Views and decisions will clash—that is inevitable; but out of the confusion will emerge clearer understanding of the real issues, and firmer hold on those principles which will stand the test of experience. One

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thing is certain: formularies and programs, when drawn up too rigidly and too rigidly enforced are attempts to dam the stream of thought into pools and placid reaches. All goes well so long as there is passage for free water. But if the dam is too perfect, there will ensue the bursting of the artificial barrier, the flood, the desolation.

We must therefore conclude that the disinclination to grapple systematically with the problems of casuistry is not easy to be explained, and is assuredly a sign of weakness and a source of further mischief. The dangers are admittedly many and serious; and they are sufficiently recognized. But the advantages are preponderant. Reason cannot cover the whole ground in morals, or in any other sphere of human thought and action. But we can never get very far wrong in honestly attempting to be rational. Can it be shown that to evolve a rational casuistry will bring disaster? Then it must be also shown that, in this instance, the use of reason is in itself an evil.

Added to the steadying influences of rational analysis and scientific method, are the continuous pull of the received moral code and the tireless pressure of public opinion. And whatever may be the shortcomings of our age, the encouragement of hypocrisy and time-serving is not one. On this score, at any rate, the moral sense of the civilized peoples is being rapidly quickened and socialized. Never was there a better chance for rationalizing our casuistry without jeopardizing our morals. Nay, it may be argued, and hoped, that an honest casuistry would result, not only in the clearing of complex ethical problems, but in the deepening of our sympathy and social consciousness. The better we understand one another, the more brotherly we shall become. As Gautama puts it,—"the more we know, the more we shall forgive."

J. S. Tasmania.

Bishop's Court, Hobart, Tasmania.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOLDEN RULE.

A. T. CADOUX.

"ALL things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets." The aim of this essay is to inquire what is the good that is sought by the Golden Rule. Every rule or command implies that there is some good to be preserved or attained. "Thou shalt do no murder," carries an implication as to the value of human life. "Thou shalt not steal," implies that, under certain conditions as to acquisition and distribution, property is a good. And if particular injunctions bear this implication of good to be acquired or maintained, we may look to find it no less certainly, if not so apparently, in the wider principles of conduct. Many of these principles, however, although very inclusive, are so abstract that we have to modify them past recognition in order to bring them into touch with the actual choices of life, where alone their practical aim becomes visible and the good sought by them may be divined. For instance, Kant's principle, "Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law," gives us no inkling as to what the result of obedience to it would be in an individual or a world of individuals, because there are few, if any, concrete situations to which it can be applied, without modification, in any but a negative sense: we do not know at which point of the compass our Celestial City lies. But the Golden Rule starts from the present contents of the individual's mind, and has a direct application to every moral choice.

The last statement has, however, been challenged; it is said that there are spheres of conduct to which the Rule cannot be applied at all and that there are cases in which its application would produce bad results. And since the interest of our investigation is proportionate

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to our confidence in the universality of the Rule, it will be as well to consider these objections.

Kant says: "It cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on." The first point is the only one that needs serious consideration. Its apparent cogency lies in an abstraction that may be made in thought but not in reality. It is impossible to effect a more than mental separation between our duties to ourselves and our duties to others. The habits of body and unspoken thoughts with which our fellows have no apparent concern are potent in forming the character which at other moments will shape those actions that do concern them and in giving quality to the influence that is always going from us. There is thus no choice made by a human being that does not directly or indirectly affect his fellows, and the indirect effects are often the more important. The artificiality of the distinction is apparent in the instance that Kant produces as an occasion for the consideration of duty to oneself, *i. e.*, that of a man contemplating suicide. Is it possible to imagine a case of this nature in which duty to others is not implicated? Let us, for argument's sake, endeavor to do so. We will suppose the case of a man so absolutely bare of ties and responsibilities that his death will make a difference to no one. This aloofness compels us to look into the man himself for the cause of that continued and hopeless misery to which he seeks an end, and to imagine him in the contemplation of suicide postulating that he neither is nor intends nor hopes to be of any good to any one. And now we find that we have a being to whom, or an aspect of a being to which, all moral considerations are inept. What application

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would such a being find for Kant's own maxim, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only"? The very phrase "humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other," implies a link that makes the distinction between duty to oneself and duty to another merely formal. Every duty that a man owes to himself is owed to himself as a social being; to abstract from his social nature is to abstract from his moral nature, and the attempt to apply moral considerations to such an abstraction must end in absurdity. Duty to oneself and duty to others are the subjective and objective aspects of the same thing, and although the Golden Rule is couched in the terms of the latter, this does not make it less universally applicable.

Kant's second objection is misdirected. If the Rule really allowed a man to "consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them," it would certainly deserve the imputation he makes. But this is putting the cart before the horse. The Rule does not bid us consider first what we like or dislike doing to others and then make that the standard of what we expect from them; on the contrary, it bids us first consider what we would have men do to us and then to act so towards them, which is a very different matter.

With regard to Kant's third point, one wishes he had been more explicit in showing how the Rule lacks the principle of strict obligation to others, for to the ordinary man it would seem that just here its application is most obvious. A more apt instance for its working could not be found than Kant's example of a case for the duty of strict obligation to others, *i. e.*, that of a man "who is thinking of making a lying promise." It is the same with other duties of this nature, as "Thou shalt do no murder; thou shalt not steal," etc. We are, therefore, tempted to think that here, as above, Kant reads into the Rule something that it does not contain, and the in-

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stance he adduces in support of his objection goes to confirm this supposition. "On this principle," he says, "a criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him." Now it is obvious that a correct application of the principle, instead of inducing the judge to refrain from punishing, would rather serve to emphasize the dignity and severity of the law. If the criminal pleaded, "Do not sentence me because in my case you would wish to escape," the judge would reply, "I should be unworthy of my position as administrator of the law unless I were willing to undergo its penalties should I incur them."

Having now dealt with the instances of alleged deficiency of scope in the Golden Rule, we will turn to the statement that certain applications of it produce bad results. A common objection is that expressed by Dr. E. Caird. He allows the precept a certain practical value, but "not because in its literal sense it clearly marks out the path of duty,—for our wishes for another might be as unreasonable as our wishes for ourselves." But the precept says nothing whatever about our wishes for another: it bases itself upon our wishes for ourselves and bids us make them the guides of our acts for others. And as for the possible unreasonableness of the wish from which the action is to start, it is hard to see how this affects the matter except as an unnecessary advertisement of the undisputed fallibility of the agent. The unreasonableness that might make the application of the Golden Rule disastrous would pervert any principle and upset the working of any rule. But the Rule in question has this advantage that it always reacts, as will appear hereafter, upon the wish from which it starts in a sense that makes for reasonableness.

In this connection we may deal with Dr. Sidgwick's stricture to the effect that it is not true "to say that we ought to do to others only what we think it right for them to do to us; for no one will deny that there may be differences in the circumstances of two individuals, A. and B., which would make it wrong for A. to treat B.

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in the way in which it is right for B. to treat A." One might go further and say that in no case are the circumstances of two individuals so entirely similar that the right actions of each towards the other are also entirely similar. But the attempt to apply the Rule on this lowest basis of literalism would not only be frequently unhappy in result,—if that were all, the charge against it would be valid,—but it would break the Rule on the plane of more general thinking which is its natural level. Browne may like his name spelled with an "e," but he must generalize this desire into the wish for a correct spelling of his name before he can apply the Rule. Thus it must be recognized that any anomaly arising in the sense suggested by Dr. Sidgwick is due not to any defect in the Rule, but to lack of completeness in its application; for surely I always wish that others should treat me with a due regard to the difference between my circumstances and theirs, and therefore according to the Rule I should always exercise a like discrimination in its application.

A more serious objection is urged by the writer last quoted. "This formula," he says, "is obviously unprecise in statement; for one might wish for another's coöperation in sin and be willing to reciprocate it." And apart from actual conspiracy a very common form of this evil is seen in the wrong-doer's connivance at others' wrong-doing. This is found amongst all sorts of minor social groups from schoolboys, with their abhorrence of 'sneaking,' to the public official who pockets his perquisite in silence as to the profits of others, assured that although he may not find virtue its own reward, at least a certain selected modicum of the long-suffering grace of charity is not without gain. In this way the application of the Rule seems to make for the concealment and multiplication of wrong-doing. But we must bear in mind that the observance of the precept in these cases is intended to cover and so promote its infringement in more important aspects. The schoolboys observe it as between boy and boy that they may the more successfully break

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it as between themselves and the master: the public officials observe it among themselves to cover and promote its infringement as between themselves and the public. It becomes obvious therefore that the objection made to the Rule in these cases has really no better foundation than would be beneath an objection to honor because honor amongst thieves promotes theft. It is only an instance of the manner in which wrong always adopts the ways of right in the lesser that it may compass its own ends in the greater. Of course, it is possible that in some of these cases, as in the schoolboys' code of morals, the Rule, despite its perversion to wrong ends, may come to have a certain moral value in itself.

Possibly there are other and stronger objections to the universality of the Rule, but, until they appear, its ability to vindicate itself in the cases already considered gives us warrant to proceed with our examination on the assumption that we have here a principle which is all-inclusive and which may therefore be taken to have implicit in it, not some subsidiary good, but the good itself. And since the principle is easily applied to concrete experience, its implications should be capable of extraction without much difficulty. It starts from desire actually existing in me, "whatsoever ye would," but it does not contemplate the satisfaction of that desire. My action is to be aimed at the concerns of another, but not at the satisfaction of his desire: it is not a doctrine of complaisance, it does not say, "Do unto others as ye imagine they would have you do." The guide of my action is not to be my supposition of what my fellow's desire may be, but my own desire transferred in imagination to him, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them." The result is that the desire at the satisfaction of which my action aims is neither my desire nor his, as it existed prior to the application of the Rule, but my desire as seen through, and modified by, something that unites us, directing my action towards him and projecting my desires into him.

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Without the modification so effected the Rule would be meaningless, for if the satisfaction of any given desire is good, why not as good in me as in another? Unless, therefore, the Golden Rule, when we are willing to act on it, modifies our own desires and therefore the standard by which we act, it affords no guidance. And since its guidance lies in this modification, it is here that the good sought by the Rule will be manifest. Let us, therefore, consider the application of the Rule to a few cases and note the resulting modification of that desire with which it starts.

1. I am fond of the praise of others, therefore I must set myself to praise them. But in so doing I become conscious that praise of the lip is not worth giving. Thus, when I actually apply the Rule, I find that what I now desire from others is not mere praise, however emphatic or superlative, but genuine appreciation, no matter with what pruning of terms. My duty to others, therefore, becomes not indiscriminate adulation but appreciation of what is praiseworthy, and my praise becomes the expression of the pleasure I find in contemplating their excellence. It does not follow that this line of conduct will inevitably satisfy the desire of the other; compared with the flattery to which an oriental prince is accustomed, the genuine appreciation of his excellencies might seem insulting, but princes are exceptions amongst mankind and to the very great majority a real appreciation would bring much pleasure. And in me the application of the Rule has created the search for the praiseworthy in others, a new desire the satisfaction of which is not only compatible with but provocative of pleasure in others. In this case, then, the Golden Rule lays hold of a common desire, which in its original form often results in bickerings and heartburnings, and so modifies it as to make the agent's satisfaction more easily accomplished and at the same time linked to an equal if not greater satisfaction in his fellow.

2. A case in which we see the Rule at work, and prob-

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ably the case in which it has hitherto been more clearly exemplified than in any other, is that of art and the artist. "I love to behold or to hear or to read what is beautiful, and therefore I must create the beautiful for others to enjoy." It is obvious at once that when a man turns from the contemplation of the beautiful to the creation of it, his desires and their possible satisfaction are multiplied immensely. At once the active side of his nature receives its recognition and plays upon and interplays with the passive capacity for enjoyment, producing a variety, complexity, and wholeheartedness impossible before. It is obvious also that under such influence he will produce beauty of richer and more complex kind than that which he first enjoyed. What he produces therefore will not be aimed at the simple and direct satisfaction of others' desire for beauty, but will educate it to appreciation of higher and choicer kinds. Here again it is clear that the application of the rule so modifies the agent's desire as to multiply both the desire and the possibility of satisfaction, and at the same time to amplify and fulfill the desire of the recipient.

And even in cases where the lover of the beautiful lacks the artist's skill, a like result follows. Every true booklover is a proselytizer. An essential part of every beautiful thought that has ever been penned is the desire that others should share it, otherwise it would not have been written down; and he who reads it without being infected with this desire has missed just so much of its beauty. Here, too, we find that the man who shows another what has pleased himself multiplies his own enjoyment and creates enjoyment in the other.

3. I desire health and healthy conditions of life, therefore I must do all in my power to make them possible for others. The scope of my desires and consequently my possible satisfaction are thus increased by now including the improvement of life's conditions for others. But as healthy fellow-beings are a very important condition of health, my own good health must be sought for

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the sake of others, and thus the original desire is included in the subsequent modification. Also the satisfaction of the original desire is made more probable by its extension, for where the conditions of my fellows are made more healthy, my own health is better secured. In this case the original desire remains but is enriched by altruistic sentiment and its satisfaction is made easier; it is extended to aim at the improvement of life's conditions for others, and some at least of this extension of desire is likely to be satisfied.

4. We may also apply the Rule in very general terms. I wish to be happy, therefore I must endeavor to make others happy. Now by desiring to make others happy I add to my own desires a very large province, and one that is peculiarly fruitful, for it is very much easier to make another happy than to make oneself so. Then again, desiring to make others happy and finding myself happy when I succeed, I am also in duty bound to appreciate to the greatest extent possible any kindness done to me by another, so that he may be made happy by his success in making me so. Thus with the duty of making others happy comes the duty of being so myself. Here again we see that by the application of the rule the desire of the agent is both increased and so modified as to be made easier of satisfaction, while a very large amount of pleasure is created for his fellows.

In examining the above instances it has become clear that the one result, common to every application of the Golden Rule, is that the desires which form its raw material are so modified as to increase, both in the agent and in his fellows, the amount of satisfaction of desire or of unthwarted activity. It would seem therefore that this increase is the good sought. But we cannot be satisfied with proving the aim at a mere increase, for if the chief aim of any principle is at increase, it must also be at the greatest possible increase. If a principle aims at increase, but not at the maximum, the inference is that at some point a superior consideration appears and

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thus proves that increase was not the chief end, but merely incidental or subsidiary to some other aim of more importance.

It is true, of course, that, besides this increase in the quantity of satisfied desire, there is also found, as a result of obedience to the rule, a certain quality of nobleness in the desires that find satisfaction in it. But this quality can hardly be regarded as the good implicit in the Rule, for it is rather the spirit explicitly enjoined, and our inquiry is, "What is the good sought by enjoining such a spirit?" And since the only other prevailing characteristic is the increase in quantity, it remains for us to ask whether this rule does provide the maximum of satisfied desire or whether there may not be some other more effectual in this respect. And perhaps the best method of pursuing this part of our inquiry will be to imagine a world consisting of two individuals and to consider the result of various lines of conduct. Now, apart from the Golden Rule in which a man makes his own desire the guide of his act with regard to his fellow, there appear to be two main possibilities of conduct: the first, in which he seeks the satisfaction of his own desires without regard to those of his fellows; and the second, in which he makes it his desire to fulfill that of his fellow. In considering the case of two individuals, of course one may follow the former method and the other the latter, or both may agree to follow the former except where it would infringe certain agreed rights. We have thus, in all, five possibilities, and it seems that every other line of conduct that may be named is either one of these or a combination of them; as, for instance, if it is said that the one ought to seek the good or interest of the other, this must mean that he seeks either to do the other's desire, *i. e.*, what the other thinks good for himself, or to do for the other what the doer himself considers good, *i. e.*, what he would that men should do unto him; so that this is seen to be either the Golden Rule or the second of the above-mentioned alternatives, or a mixture of both.

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Let us then proceed to consider the result of these five lines of conduct in the case of two persons, A. and B., so far as the amount of satisfied desire is concerned. (1) If both obeyed the Golden Rule, A.'s desires would be so modified as generally to be enlarged (apart from any increase in loftiness), certainly to be more easily satisfied as far as his own effort is concerned, and moreover they would be very likely to receive great satisfaction from the action of B.; and the same of course would be the result in the case of the latter. (2) If each endeavors to satisfy his own desires without regard to the other, then, as compared with (1), there is of course no increase in desires, the original desires are harder to satisfy than those which in (1) take their place, and there is nothing to be expected by each from the other save competition and opposition. (3) If they agree to suppress those desires the satisfaction of which would infringe the rights of the other, then the original scope of desire is lessened and the prospect of fulfilling this limited number is the same as in (2), except that no active opposition from the other need be feared. (4) If A. seeks to fulfill B.'s desires while the latter seeks the fulfillment of his own, then A.'s desires are limited by B.'s, and it is not likely that he will be more successful in fulfilling another's desire than his own, so that as far as he is concerned there will be no increase over (2). B. will have a certain proportion of his desires fulfilled by A., while the rest will run the usual chance, so that in his case there will be some increase as compared with (2) and (3), but it is not likely to be so great as (1). (5) If A. and B. seek to fulfill each other's desire, then A. seeks to fulfill B.'s desire, but B.'s desire is that A.'s desire should be fulfilled. Thus the calculation goes in a circle and there is no guidance for action at all.

From this examination it is patent that cases (2), (3), (4), and (5), must each result in a considerably less amount of satisfied desire than in the application of the Golden Rule.

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It thus appears that, were this Rule consistently applied by any aggregate of people, the result would be the maximum of satisfied desire, or, since the principle is more active than passive, the maximum of unthwarted activity. The good, therefore, at which the Golden Rule aims may be said to be this maximum amount of satisfaction of desire or unthwarted activity, at least as far as the corporate life of man is concerned. Implicit in it lies this assurance, that when human nature attains its maximum of activity or of satisfaction, it will be found also to have reached what we have been accustomed to recognize as the highest quality of life, for in Him who gave the Rule we see to what height of character it leads. The total amount of fulfilled longing, of successful activity, of active, happy life in the world, is thus seen to be in proportion to its obedience to His Rule. "I am come," said He, "that they may have life, and may have it abundantly."

It will be further remarked that this result is attained by the combination of two factors, one individualistic and one altruistic. The foundation of all is human desire, which is intensely individual. But desire is made to pass through an impartial medium of thought under an impulse that makes another and not myself the object of action, and this compound is hard to effect at our low temperatures, however strong when effected. Here lies all the tragedy of human disappointment. But this aspect does not concern our present inquiry. Another point demands attention. We must now ask whether the Golden Rule, besides resulting in the maximum of satisfaction for an aggregate of persons, can be said also to have the same result for the individual, since, unless the two coincide, the authority of the rule is shaken; if it is the good for mankind that, taken as a whole, it should have the maximum satisfaction of its desires, then it must be the good for me also.

Now the mind having three functions, thought, will, and feeling, it seems that the greatest amount of activity

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and the completest satisfaction will not be attained except where all three are as active as possible and certainly not where any one is active in a way detrimental to the others. We must make this proviso because we have no reason for supposing that any one of these is more valuable than the others, and because the exercise of one to the almost complete exclusion of the others is always found to be distasteful. Feeling which is otherwise pleasurable but which enfeebles the will or dulls the intellect; thought that is only critical without being appreciative or creative; will that is unreasoning or implacable, are all generally undesirable.

From this consideration it follows that, even if it were possible to satisfy one after another the desires that happen for the moment to be uppermost in the mind, the result would not be the completest satisfaction of which the individual is capable, for such conditions would reduce the exercise of will and intellect to a minimum; and it becomes apparent that the maximum satisfaction of the individual can be attained only in some process by which the desires are brought into a coherent system. The intellect demands this, for it cannot find any satisfaction in a series of disconnected gratifications, however intense. It is necessary also for the consciously successful activity of the will, for we become conscious of exercising will when the course to which it is bent involves some self-control or the overcoming of obstacles. If we always yielded to the most importunate prompting of the moment, we should hardly be conscious of any exercise of will at all: there must at least be the suppression of present longings in the interest of future gratification, and this involves a systematization of desire more or less thorough.

But, from the side of mere feeling, it is obvious that systematization is necessary if the best results are to be obtained. Otherwise the contention of desires, when the satisfaction of one of them is incompatible with that of the others, becomes a prolific source of dissatisfaction.

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Then again, the satisfaction of any given desire is, when brought into a system, accompanied by the satisfaction of other desires, so that the total satisfaction attained is far greater. Consider, for example, the enjoyment of taking food. If indulged in without respect to other desires, it is found to be antagonistic to the desire for health, for intellectual activity, for self-respect, etc. But when brought into a system, as where it is desired as a sign of health, not only is the sensuous enjoyment itself probably greater,—hunger being the best sauce and the pampered taste soon becoming cloyed,—but with it comes an appurtenance of promise from higher intellectual, volitional, and emotional realms.

In order, then, that the desires of the individual should have the maximum satisfaction, it is necessary that they should be brought under a system. And in order to produce the best results, this system must be able to comprise and to unify the whole extent of human life, and it must be capable of attaching itself with a strong hold to every human desire. Its application to the items of life must not be too difficult or remote or hair-splitting, and, at the same time, the unification at which it aims must be comprehensible enough to satisfy the judgment and engage the imagination, and of sufficient value to appeal to the heart.

Now it is obvious at once that the Golden Rule supplies a principle which meets some of these conditions. It attaches itself strongly and directly to the desires: indeed, they form its basis. It is all-inclusive: there is no desire or choice to which it cannot be applied, for, as we have seen, there is none that does not affect our fellows. But, in another respect, it seems at first sight to be lacking. It appears to be rather a method of modifying each desire than a system in which each finds its relation to all. It will be seen, however, by reference to the cases dealt with above, that its immediate effect is to establish a wealth of relationships for each desire that it touches, *e. g.*, in the case of the lover of the beautiful,

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relationships are established between the passive and active sides of his nature. And just as in reading, the man who, as he reads, finds a wealth of association in each new fact, is in a better way to systematize his knowledge than one who endeavors to find a place for every fact in some preconceived scheme of things, so with the desires. The principle that at once brings all its raw material into an abundance of relationships is very valuable as a unifying process, even although the ultimate unity at which it aims is not clearly apparent. No doubt it may be objected that, although some sort of end is aimed at by the Rule yet this is either very indefinite if we express it as the maximum satisfaction for all; or if we describe it in the parallel terms as the approximation of all to the Christ-character, it recedes to such remote futurity that it comes to the same thing as indefiniteness in the present; so that it resolves itself into a vague purpose of general good to all. But it is evident that any all-inclusive and practical purpose must be to some extent indefinite, for perception grows with action, and a purpose clearly comprehensible and fully satisfactory at the beginning would prove insufficient with the growth of character and moral perception. We must have a purpose whose horizon widens as we climb, and part of it must therefore always be out of sight. Then, again, it will be found that every other, more clearly defined and immediately satisfactory purpose, must itself be included in some larger and therefore vaguer one; otherwise either success or failure would be disastrous to it as a unifying principle. Suppose, for instance, that a scientist makes it the aim of his life to discover the cure of some particular disease. It is obvious that if he succeeds, then, unless this particular aim be part of a larger one, as of fame or of general good for all, success will leave him purposeless, *i. e.*, without a unifying principle. If he fails, then, unless the purpose be part of a larger one, he has not the consolation of having done his best any more than a dog that misses his bone, for

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he has made the thing an end in itself, and missing that, misses all. In the same way it may be shown that all purposes capable of achievement in the individual's lifetime or dependent upon his individuality are insufficient. It follows that nothing within the individual's life can supply the systematizing principle necessary to his largest satisfaction; and, as soon as we see this, it becomes evident that nothing will serve but that which attaches itself to what he finds good, to his desire, and yet expands itself to his fellows; and this is the Golden Rule. None other starts from the individual's own desires, which are the only motives of action that man knows, and yet tends towards a consummation which involves all men and all time. The harmonious beauty and energy of the life of him who gave the Rule provide evidence as to its unifying and heightening power in the individual, and give our imagination some means of forecasting the quality of life to which it tends.

The Golden Rule thus is founded on the faith that both in the community and in the individual, the more life there is the better it will be; that the maximum of human energy and satisfaction will be accompanied by the maximum of human beauty and holiness; and that man by every application of the Rule advances towards this end with increasing momentum.

BELVEDERE, KENT, ENGLAND. ARTHUR T. CADOUX.

ETHICAL SCIENCE AMONG THE HINDUS.

SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN.

I.

SUPERFICIAL readers of the higher Hindu scriptures fail to discover any ethical system in them. Religion, metaphysics, and ethics are so intermingled here that it is really difficult to separate them, especially for those who have never thought or felt themselves into the forms of thought represented by these writings. But,

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nevertheless, they contain the elements of an ethical science. And the main questions, the main subjects of dispute, are the same as those which occupy and divide the moral philosophers of modern times. Hedonism, legalism, critical idealism, or rationalism, in all their varieties and combinations, struggle for supremacy in the minds of these ancient searchers after the true good. Thus the *Kathopanishad* at first draws a sharp distinction between the good and the pleasant. "The good is one thing," it says, "and the pleasant is another. These two bind man in different ways. He who accepts the good, obtains true well-being; and he who chooses the pleasant, loses his highest good" (I, 2, 1). So far, then, the good is conceived to be something different from the pleasant, and the error of hedonism,—the identification of the good with the pleasant,—is avoided. What the real good is, is also clearly indicated in the same Upanishad when it says: "The objects are superior to the senses, the sensorium is superior to the objects, the understanding superior to the sensorium, and the great soul (the cosmic soul,—Brahman) superior to the understanding. The undeveloped (the power implied in creation) is superior to the great soul, and the Supreme Person superior to the undeveloped. There is nothing superior to the Person; he is the end, the highest goal" (I, 3, 10, 11). In other words, no object presented to the senses, nothing, however great, which the mere understanding reaches, is or can be our ultimate end, though it has its use and value in its own way. The soul can find final satisfaction only in the Supreme Self, which transcends and explains all things. That this Supreme reality, which we are to realize as our highest end, is not an abstract universal unrelated to finite nature, but a concrete, all-comprehending Infinite which shines in everything, is in everything, though also out of everything, is also clear to every one who reads the Scriptures with an open, unbiased mind. Both the immanence and the transcendence of God are distinctly taught in them, and none of these aspects of the Divine

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nature should be ignored by the genuine seeker after truth. But if God is identical with everything, if he is "the sun in heaven, the air in the sky, the soma juice in the jar," as the same Upanishad says (II, 2, 2), if he is the husband, the wife, the son, the daughter, as the *Svetasvatara* teaches (IV, 3), what harm is there in seeking satisfaction in these objects? The answer is that if you look upon these objects as manifestations or embodiments of the Infinite, and seek satisfaction in them as such,—seek to satisfy yourself by studying the nature of these objects and admiring their beauty, and loving and serving your kind, then surely they will not fail to feed your soul. But if you regard them as objects real in themselves, or,—what is practically the same thing,—knowing their true nature, forget it while dealing with them, and seek satisfaction in them as such, the Scriptures will warn you by saying '*neti, neti,*' it is not that, it is not that, *i. e.,* these objects, conceived as real in themselves, are not Brahman,—are not our goal. The Scriptures do not exhort us to be indifferent to the concrete affairs of domestic and social life and concentrate our minds in an abstraction. But they do tell us not to be content with the finite as such, but to see the Infinite in the finite, the universal in the particular, and thus keep our highest goal always before us in all that we think, feel, and do.

So far, then, we have got a system of pure idealism with its necessary ethical bearings. The Supreme Person being conceived as perfectly wise, loving, and holy,—union with him, a realized identification with him,—in whatever way we may express the highest end,—means the attainment of perfect wisdom, love, and holiness. But the Supreme Person is not only perfect goodness, but also perfect bliss. Ever and anon is this aspect of the divine nature dwelt upon in our sacred books. Sanatkumara says to Narada in the *Chhandogya Upanishad:* "The Infinite alone is bliss, there is no happiness in things limited" (VII, 23, 1). There may be a transient happiness in mere objects, all objects being parts of the Infinite.

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But permanent peace and happiness is possible only to those who are consciously united to the Infinite. As the *Katha* says: "The one Ruler, the Inner Self of all creatures, who makes his one form manifold,—those wise men who perceive him in themselves, obtain everlasting happiness, and not others" (II, 2, 12). The *Bhagavadgita* is never tired of speaking of the transiency and hollowness of worldly pleasures and the reality, fullness, and permanence of the joy of union with God. As Krishna says in the sixth chapter: "The highest happiness comes to the *yogi* whose mind has become calm, who is freed from attachment to earthly things, and who has become holy and one with Brahman." Here, then, we come to hedonism again,—not hedonism in its first form, in which it does not differentiate good from pleasure and the lowest pleasure from the highest,—for in pleasure as such there is really no high and low,—but in a form in which it is not only not inconsistent with, but really one with, idealism. The antithesis of the good and the pleasant, of perfection and happiness,—an antithesis that is absent in pure hedonism,—was necessary for reaching this highest synthesis in which happiness,—in kind and degree undreamed of by the hedonist,—is found to be a necessary consequence, an essential characteristic, of perfection. Even the pleasures of the senses, in regard to which we are taught to take up an antithetical position at the beginning of spiritual culture, are found to have a place in the grand synthesis of the finite and the infinite, of the good and the pleasant, which a true view of life effects. As the *Gita* beautifully says, they are like rivers which the ocean does not seek, but which nevertheless enter into and lose themselves in it.

II.

We thus see how the hedonism of early Hindu thought was transformed into the exalted idealism of the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavadgita* without losing what is true in hedonism. A transition stage between hedonism

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and idealism is legalism,—the doctrine that ethical laws are absolute, that they are right without any reference to ends. Duty, it says, is to be done for its own sake, and not for any ulterior end either in the form of happiness or moral perfection. Hedonism loses sight of the absoluteness of morals by identifying the right with the pleasant. It destroys the sanctity which the mind intuitively attaches to the moral law. It ignores the authority which moral principles carry with them. Thus the devout mind spurns it and seeks a higher ground on which morals stand. It comes to look upon mere pleasures with contempt and ceases to make them the end of life. But when pleasures cease to attract it, and it gives up their pursuit, it sees that it must either give up those duties of life also which it has hitherto associated with some pleasurable end or other, or do those duties from other and higher motives than the desire for pleasure. The more ardent and rasher spirits take the former path and become *Sannyasis* or anchorites. To them the world means nothing higher than an elaborate system of pleasure-seeking, and they see that to be true to the light which has begun to shine in them, to attain something higher than pleasure, however it may be conceived, they must live beyond its sphere of attraction. The more thoughtful and conservative spirits pause before coming to such a bold decision. They see that to give up work is to ignore the sanctity of the moral law. It is also to be irreverent to the authority which dictates the law. So it is not mere selfishness and worldly prudence,—as it seems to the ardent spirits we have spoken of,—that leads some to stick to the world and continue to observe its laws, though unmindful of the rewards and enjoyments which those laws promise here and hereafter. They cannot so easily violate the sanctity and authority of the law that has guided society so long,—guided and trained them as its members and brought them where they are. But what *is* the authority on which law stands? What is the basis and the sanction of the duties it prescribes? In the history of our national philosophy

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we find the sage Jaimini, the author of the *Purva Mimánsá,* asking such questions, and coming to perhaps the first reasoned solution of them. According to him, the Vedas, the embodiment of all sacrificial, domestic, and social duties, are that authority. They indeed attach definite rewards to the performance of each duty prescribed by them, but even when such rewards cease to attract, as they must in the case of advanced souls, the duties prescribed must nevertheless be performed. Duty must be done for duty's sake, and not from any ulterior motive. Law, as embodied in the Vedas, stands upon its own authority and not upon that of any personal lawgiver, human or divine. Law works out its own effects infallibly and inexorably without the supervision of any personal judge; and to its ubiquitous rule, all rational beings, including even the gods, are subject. The Vedas, which, according to Jaimini, are nothing but a body of laws, of *Vidhi* and *nishedha,* prescriptions and prohibitions,—the science and philosophy contained in them being only illustrative matter, and of no essential importance,—are eternal, unwritten, *apaurusheya,* not the work of a personal author or any number of such authors.

That Jaimini hit upon a most important truth, must be admitted by all who believe in the supreme authority of the moral law and regard moral distinctions as ultimately absolute. His conception of an eternal law of right,—a law which stands upon its own authority and not upon the authority of any person,—not even any divine person, for our idea of divinity is also derived from the law, being nothing but the idea of a complete fulfillment of the law in life and conduct,—this conception of the moral law, we say, remains unshaken by the progress that ethical science has made since his days. That the moral law necessarily embodies itself and must be found in its concrete form in the manners and customs, the rites and ceremonies, the social and religious institutions of nations, is also a thought approved by the most advanced ethical systems of our time. Jaimini's mistake lay only

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in ignoring the fact that the embodiment of the moral law in any national code, however excellent in itself, cannot but be partial and therefore tentative. He was indeed right in regarding the Vedas as containing a revelation of eternal truth. If eternal truth is revealed anywhere, it is revealed in the laws that guide the rise and progress of communities and nations. His error consisted in not distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential elements in law, the passing form which it assumes according to the peculiar genius and necessities of a nation or community, and its permanent, eternal substance, which is the same in all ages and conditions of life. Hence his defence of the Vedic rites and sacrifices and his insistence on their due performance even when the fruits promised by them cease to be attractive. To him the moral law, in its absolute nature, was fully identified with the national law as he found it in its accredited records.

We find this legalism in European ethics, too, in the transcendental philosophy of Kant. His doctrine of the moral law as a categorical imperative, of duty for duty's sake, represents substantially the same stage of ethical thought that we find in Jaimini. Something of Jaimini's social conservatism too finds its counterpart in Kant's follower, Hegel, whose defence of the existing institutions of his country without regard to their imperfections earned for him the unenviable nick-name of the 'State-philosopher.' But in the hands of Hegel and his followers, the ethical legalism of Kant soon passed into the higher stage of ethical idealism. We find a similar movement of thought in the *Bhagavadgita* and the literature that rose out of its teachings. In the *Gita* one sees the very struggle which legalism went through,—its dissatisfaction with itself, the difficulty it felt in breaking its fetters, and the final triumph it achieved. We see how it reconciled the authority of law on the one hand, and the Absolute Good,—that which is essentially above all law,—on the other.

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III.

The *Gita* doctrine of desireless action (*nishkama karma*) seems most unreasonable to the ordinary moralist. It seems to be the result of an ascetic view of life more or less ignorant of its needs and final object. Students of Kant, those who see how, according to that great philosopher, a truly moral action must be absolutely untinged by selfish desires, those who appreciate the clear line of distinction that Kant draws between actions more or less directed to pleasurable ends and those which are done from a pure idea of law, recognize that the doctrine of desireless action is something very different from the senseless freak of a narrow and ignorant asceticism. It seems to us, however, that the Kantian reconciliation of desire and law is not a satisfactory one,—that in Kantian ethics the ordinary life of desire and impulse lies outside the truly ethical life. Happiness and moral perfection are reconciled only by a *deus ex machina*. In Hindu ethics, on the other hand, the ethical importance of desire is fully recognized and a rational reconciliation effected between the lower life of desires and the higher life of union with God. For instance, in the *Bhagavadgita* we find Krishna appealing at first to Arjuna's lower motives in trying to induce him to fight. He appeals successively to his pupil's (1) desire for heaven, (2) desire for power, and (3) desire for fame. These desires, then, and other desires like them, are not absolutely evil in the eyes of the author of the *Gita*. If they were so, he would not have represented the divine being as appealing to them. If such desires had no place in the divine scheme of life, they would not have been implanted in us. Evidently they serve purposes which the author of nature has in view,—serve them blindly, unconsciously, as desires, as instinctive impulses. They are cognizant,—if at all so,—only of the objects that excite them. They know nothing of any higher and ulterior object to which they lead. The conqueror is absorbed in his schemes of conquest, his self-aggrandizement; he does not see the

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moral and social effects which follow as the necessary consequence of his ambitious policy. The interested seeker after heaven fancies a region of exquisite sensual pleasures as the reward of his virtuous acts: he does not see that these acts indirectly pave the way to a heaven of which he can yet form no conception. The battle of Kurukshetra, even if it had been fought from purely personal motives, such as princely warriors would naturally have cherished, would still have led, as it is stated to have done, to the dethronement of a proud, malicious, and oppressive king, detested by his subjects, and the restoration of rulers whose piety and benevolence had endeared them to their people. The lower motives, therefore, are only relatively evil,—evil when compared with higher ones. Until one has come up to that level of moral life in which these higher motives come into play, he should be induced to do the duties of life from the lower ones, and every care should be taken that he may not be indifferent or apathetic to those duties. This is really the purport of Krishna's remarkable advice to Arjuna, in verse twenty-six of chapter three of the *Gita,* not to disturb the understanding of those who are ignorantly attached to work, but to lead them to all duties by setting an example to them. The Teacher's object is not to keep the ignorant permanently in ignorance, but to take care not to speak to them of things which they are incapable of understanding,—which it is impossible for one to understand before one has gone through a course of blind obedience to law. One should not, for instance, speak to them of work as of no real value in itself,—a proposition quite unintelligible to them.

When, however, one has come up to that higher level and become capable of appreciating motives superior to those that proceed from selfish desires, he should keep those motives constantly before him and keep down his lower inclinations. When that to which these inclinations lead is in view, when the end is practically or wholly visible, and may be pursued without subjection to these

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inclinations, they may be regarded as having done their appointed work, and should no more be allowed to darken the eyes of the spirit. So we find Krishna, when he saw that his pupil was insensible to all appeals to his lower propensities and capable of appreciating and following higher impulses,—we find him beginning to speak to him of *nishkama karma*,—disinterested work. He tells him to be indifferent to pleasure and pain, loss and gain, victory and defeat, and fight only for the sake of fighting (II, 38). He goes on crying down all desires for earthly things and for heavenly enjoyments, and teaching Arjuna to purge his heart of such desires, and it almost seems as if all holiness and all wisdom consisted in the complete eradication of desire from the mind. It is not, however, a merely destructive work that is demanded of us. The place of selfish desires is to be taken by a lofty aim,—that of doing all duty for duty's sake. All duties, whether domestic, social, or religious, all that we are called upon to do as appertaining to the station and condition of life occupied by us, and as following from the natural aptitudes with which we are endowed,—we are to do for their own sakes and not for the sake of the objects which prompt the merely natural man to do them. Desireless action, therefore, is not motiveless action, for there is a motive in it,—the sense of duty,—one which is indeed very different from ordinary motives, but is still a motive. Neither is it an action quite free from desire, for there is in it the desire of doing one's duty,—one very different from ordinary desires, but still a desire. What distinguishes the motive and desire that inspires *nishkama karma* from other desires and motives is that while the latter are personal, the former is impersonal,—that while the latter are related exclusively to the individual, to the gratification of the individual's inclinations,—the former is purely universal, proceeding from a law to which all rational beings as such are subject. The freedom from desires, therefore, which is sought in *nishkama karma*, consists not in the utter annihilation of desire, but in

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the merging of all other desires in the one all-absorbing desire of doing duty for duty's sake.

But is there not a singular incongruity in the injunction to do actions of which the ends have lost all value for us? We are, it seems, to fight, though we desire none of the things for which fighting becomes necessary. We are to perform the rites and ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, though we have no need of the rewards promised for their due performance. Aimless actions, it seems, are better than such as are directed to definite ends. Does the doctrine of *nishkama karma* mean this then? From many a verse in the *Bhagavadgita,* this indeed seems to be the meaning of the author, and the seeming absurdity of this doctrine has led many to reject it. But a close and careful study of the work leads to a truer interpretation. It discloses a deeper meaning in the injunction to do duty for duty's sake. As we have shown above, every action has an immediate and an ulterior end. It is only the former that appears to us at the first stages of moral progress. Fighting is for dominion, eating for the gratification of the palate or for sustaining the body, marriage and other social duties for the satisfaction of particular appetites and the removal of definite wants, sacrifices and other acts of devotion for the propitiation of the gods or for pleasing God, conceived as taking pleasure in acts of praise and prayer, and so on. But when the real self is seen, and the relation of duties to this self, duty wears a very different aspect. All duties then, whatever may be their immediate objects, are seen to contribute to one grand object, the final end of life,—the perfection of the self, or in other words, union with the Absolute Self. As the *Gita* says in the eighteenth chapter: "Men obtain perfection by devoting themselves to their respective duties. Hear how they obtain perfection by devotion to their duties. From whom the activities of creatures proceed, by whom all this is pervaded,—by adoring him by their respective duties men obtain perfection" (XVIII, 45, 46). In the same chapter,

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elsewhere, the Teacher says: "Sacrifice or worship (*yajna*), alms-giving, and disciplinary austerities (*tapas*) are not to be given up, but performed, for they are sanctifying to the wise" (XVIII, 5). In the fifth chapter he had already said: "By the body, the mind, the intellect, the senses, and the organs purified, the *yogins* do their work, giving up attachment, for the purification of the self" (V. 11). Thus the final end of duty was seen, and work, even when related to the smallest ends, ceased to be either unholy or useless. When all duties were seen to be ultimately related to the final end of life, each of them, however trifling in itself, was found to have a place allotted to it in the grand scheme of life and to have lost its insignificance. Even the so-called lower desires, which we are first enjoined to eschew, have their respective claims recognized when they are seen to be subsidiary to the fulfillment of the highest desire of life,—desire for perfection. Thus we find Krishna ever and anon speaking of earthly objects not as things to be abjured altogether, but as objects to be enjoyed with a purified heart unattached to such objects. It is thus that the *Gita* transforms the abstract legalism of earlier thinkers into an idealistic scheme of life in which both the absoluteness of the moral law and the relative importance of the concrete affairs of life find due recognition and reconciliation.

CALCUTTA. SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN.

MORALITY AS INTER-PERSONAL.

E. W. HIRST.

THE following essay is intended to be, first of all, a criticism of the usual view of ethics as being too 'individualistic' in a sense of the term which it is hoped will become clear as the discussion proceeds; secondly, it is a plea that morality is no form of merely unipersonal activity, but is rather an inter-personal relationship.

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At the outset we may perhaps be allowed to take for granted that 'good' has a relation to consciousness more or less direct, that ultimately it is some form of desirable conscious life. It is true that Moore ("Principia Ethica," ch. III, p. 50) thinks it would be a duty to seek to bring about a beautiful rather than an ugly world, even though no human being could by any possibility ever contemplate such beauty. But, surely, the very suggestion that a world can be 'beautiful' in itself stands in need of some justification. Such a world cannot even be referred to, save by language which embodies the ideas of a human consciousness. And it seems to us that, when we try to think of a world beautiful in itself, we can do so only as we imagine it contemplated by a consciousness either human or divine; and that we can call such a world 'good' only as we consider it in relation to a consciousness that either produces or appreciates it.

Of course, all that we call 'good' has not the same relation to human consciousness. Mr. Moore himself points out that 'good' may mean either that which is good in itself or that which is merely good as means to the production of what is good in itself. When we call a book or a house 'good,' we certainly do not mean that either of these things is an end in itself. There are many things we call 'good' in the sense either that they are means to what is good or that they are capable of relation to a whole which is valuable in itself. But it does not appear that there can be more than one thing good in itself. Our very nature as reasonable agents constrains us to unify our activity by connecting whatever proximate ends we pursue with some ultimate end or 'end in itself.' Two things declared 'good in themselves' would require to be brought into relation, and, in order to do this, either the one would need to be made subservient to the other, or both to some 'good' really final or absolute. Even 'personal affection' and 'æsthetic enjoyment,' which Mr. Moore considers to be the things intrinsically valuable, will continually call for a mutual adjustment of their

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claims. Or if, in other words, 'good' is regarded as that which satisfies desire, desires are never atomic and unrelated. They are always the desires of an intelligent consciousness and therefore they are given some sort of order or system. The expression 'master-passion' corresponds to reality.

Professor Royce, in his "Philosophy of Loyalty," identifies 'good' with loyalty to a 'cause.' But there does not appear to be anything ultimate in the 'cause' which is served, for example, by a light-house keeper, a watchmaker, or a domestic servant. A light-house keeper's 'cause' is good in so far as it safeguards sailors and merchandise. But this only raises the question as to the ultimate purpose of merchandise and indeed of human life.

We hope, however, at a later stage of the discussion, to make more clear the precise relation between the good which is good in itself and good which is good only as means or by incorporation.

Taking it for granted, then, that 'goodness' is some form of desirable conscious life, we find that most moralists have regarded that conscious life as belonging to the mere individual, considered in abstraction and insulated from his fellows. The treatment of the ethical problem has been further artificial and unreal in that this insulated consciousness of the individual has been, as it were mechanically, taken to pieces. Abstraction has been made of some one element of consciousness, such as that of feeling, knowing, or willing, and goodness has been identified with the perfection of such element.

There is no need to refer at length to those moralists who, making abstraction of the affective aspect of consciousness, have identified ultimate good with pleasure. The defects of this view have so often been pointed out that nothing in the way of criticism will be attempted here. Other moralists, making abstraction of the cognitive aspect of consciousness, have identified morality with a way of knowing. In English ethics we have inter-

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esting examples of this type in Wollaston and Clarke. But our consciousness of ethical value is certainly not a mere matter of cognition. It may be expressed in a judgment, but the judgment is not therefore creative of the value. No number of judgments could ever convey the idea of goodness to an intelligence devoid of moral consciousness. "It is one thing for an object to have a meaning for thought, *i. e.*, significance, but another thing to have a meaning for experience, *i. e.*, value." "Value is never a character or quality of an object, but always a relation between an object and a subject."[1] "Predicates are *what* we feel about the object, not *how* we feel. We feel beauty, goodness, nobility, sublimity, obligation, but when we describe how we feel, in such cases a transition has been made to the appreciative description of the feeling itself."[2]

Very influential has been a third school of thinkers who, abstracting from consciousness the element of will, look upon conduct too much as a matter of separate and unrelated volitions. Morality is accordingly supposed to reside in actions, whether these be regarded in their overt aspect as deeds, or on their inner side as intentions. From such a point of view, man becomes simply a doer of deeds. Butler, for instance, teaches that human nature is made up of 'principles of action,' an expression to be interpreted as implying that there are within us 'settled ways of acting.' These 'principles of action' are further distinguished as being some of them good and some bad. In fact, human nature is represented as containing a hierarchy of impulses, and the language used is of 'superior and inferior' principles of action, or of 'higher and lower' parts of the nature. Martineau also has a similar doctrine. "We are sensible," he says, "of a contrast between impulses other than that of mere intensity or of qualitative variety . . . that one is higher, worthier,

[1] J. L. McIntyre, Proceedings of Aristotelian Soc., N. S., Vol. 5.
[2] W. M. Urban, "Valuation, Its Nature and Laws," p. 56.

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than the other, and, in comparison with it, has the clear right to us." Again, "we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles."[8] It should be borne in mind that these so-called 'springs of action' are indeed 'actions'; they are unreflecting instincts which impel to their appropriate objects, or impulses supervening on experience and whose preconceived end is the object of a primary impulse.

To say only one brief word of criticism, the supreme difficulty of all such views is of course that, if impulses differ in rank, if some are good and some are bad or even less good, nothing can ever make such bad impulse good, or quite acquit of moral compromise anyone who acts from an impulse of inferior value. The truth is that appetites, passions, and affections, when considered merely as 'parts' of human nature, are in themselves neither right nor wrong. They are, of course, ethically indifferent: they are unmoral. Butler never succeeds in clearly showing what it is that makes the exercise of any impulse right or wrong. All he says is practically this: If you act in one way, you are right; if in another way, you are wrong. Conduct is regarded too much as an affair of deeds or isolated intentions, and for its regulation is supposed to require just 'principles of action.' Accordingly, the honest, the pure, the benevolent are such because they manifest a traditional form of behavior. Doubtless there is an important sense in which we may speak of honest, pure or benevolent 'acts,' but, for our part, we cannot regard goodness as expressible in terms of mere deeds and impulses, or of rules and principles of action. Certainly, such rules or principles have their place, embodying as they do the results of individual and racial experience. But when once reflection is brought to bear on all such 'principles of conduct,' their inadequacy as real principles is easily seen. Henry Sidgwick has clearly shown that these so-called moral axioms lack

[8] "Types of Ethical Theory," Part 2, Bk. 1, ch. 1, Par. 2.

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self-evidence and self-sufficiency: they are not all equally fundamental or independent. One illustration only need be given. Let it be that of veracity, which Butler in his "Dissertation" declared to be (along with justice and the common good) 'virtue.' That we should speak truth might well be regarded as axiomatic. Yet many hold it right to deceive,—in such cases as those where the deception will be for the benefit of the person 'deceived.' People do not hesitate to speak 'falsely' to invalids and children. All acknowledge the wisdom of limiting, according to circumstances, the amount of knowledge to be imparted. We speak the truth, therefore, not so much because it is right to do so, for there need be no inherent virtue merely in the accurate stating of an occurrence. There is, to be sure, accuracy and accuracy. There may be a correctness of statement which is falser than inaccuracy. All depends on the use which one wishes to make of what one is telling, and it is instructive to note that, according to variation of motive, a statement is given with added comments, or allowed to pass with the minimum of detail, or uttered with reservations so important as to render the report in its bareness misleading. A lie is not so much an inaccurate statement as it is a statement of which the object is to use another person as a means to purposes purely selfish. No one can tell the truth to another save as he reverences the other's personality. We regard quite differently the inaccuracy which results from bad memory or defective observation. What we condemn is an egoistic use of the medium by which thought is communicated. In this sense truth is made for man, and not man for truth. And what is especially significant for our purpose is that two or more persons are necessary ere truth can be told.

Not only do we see therefore that morality cannot be identified with the exercise (if that were possible) of any particular aspect of consciousness, but we are securing evidence that consciousness itself, when it is regarded as that of the individual considered in abstraction, cannot

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possess ethical quality. The single self cannot be moral. We have just seen that veracity implies inter-activity between persons. That benevolence does so needs no proof. Self-love, too, would have no meaning except as it implies a social situation in the background. As for 'the several passions and affections,' Butler admits that even those which tend most immediately to respect self tend, however, to the public good as well. But a thorough discussion of the relations of self-love and benevolence and of the passions as capable of organization by a supreme principle is wanting in Butler. He wavers as to the relative position of self-love and benevolence. But it is significant that in Sermon XII he considers benevolence regarded as a reasonable principle (rather than a natural affection) as superior to 'conscience.' He speaks of it as 'the temper of virtue,' and points out that "the common virtues and the common vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it." And though in the "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue," published ten years later than the Sermons, he apparently contradicts this statement, yet it is to be remembered that in the "Dissertation," benevolence means simply a 'disposition to make happy,' whereas in Sermon XII it is rather 'goodwill' of which the object is 'the greatest public good.'

If Martineau be taken, it requires little penetration to see how unescapable is the social reference of his 'springs of action.' With regard to 'antipathy, fear, and anger,' he himself confesses that "in a world without persons, they would fail of their proper idea and identity." Again, love of pleasure, of money, of power, not to speak of further items in the list, clearly have a very vital relation to our positions as social beings.

The indication of all this is that a good individual, in vacuo so to speak, is an impossibility. The individual cannot be moral in the same sense in which he can be clever or happy. He is of course an agent, and in that sense morality is something which the individual must practise. But to practise his morality, he must at once

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go out of himself. As soon as he deliberates what he ought to do, he finds that all his actions have both social references and social consequences. If he is to be anything, he is to be something in relation to others. He is a self in a world of selves. The supreme ethical question, therefore, is the attitude he shall assume to the selves by whom he is surrounded.

Now it seems to us true in the abstract that there can be no expression of the self as a whole save to other selves. I can come into relationship with a thing only in virtue of my being in space. As I am much more than a 'thing,' I cannot possibly express myself other than partially to a 'thing.' A man needs beings like to himself if he would manifest himself in all his fullness: a person can express personality only to persons.

Further, there is growing evidence derived from social psychology as to the inter-relationship of mind with mind. The phenomena of the single mind simply cannot be understood unless we take account of the social factor. At the very dawn of intelligent life there seems in the infant an instinctive tendency to react upon a social environment represented by the mother or nurse. As it has been said, the 'ego' and the 'alter' are born together in child experience. "Bashfulness, shame, jealousy, are some of the more fundamental tendencies rooted in the organic structure of the human babe, which seem to reveal ancestral conditions of collective life and habit."[4] The growth of the sense of self acts and reacts upon the growth of the sense of other selves. "The social relation is in all cases intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual." A few examples will show how true this is. The development of intelligence is throughout dependent upon the social factor. Our 'world' is to a large extent made over to us by others through the medium of language. We continue to believe in an objective realm because such belief receives con-

[4] Mark Baldwin, "The Individual and Society," p. 19.

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stant social verification. Unless we were sure that other people would pronounce the same verdict, we should not usually call anything a 'fact.' Likewise emotional experiences cannot be fully explained except as we consider minds in relation. The physical organs of reproduction, implying as they do more than the individual's body, are accompanied by a characteristic mental equipment which finds its explanation in the appropriate impulses and feelings of another of different sex. The phenomena of vanity and guilty fear are unintelligible if account be taken of the private consciousness alone. Objects of ambition would have their value much modified, if not destroyed, were the social environment conceived as being absent. The actions we conventionally regard as right or wrong are so considered largely owing to the influence of the opinions or traditions of the community. If, as McDougall contends, the instincts are directly or indirectly the prime movers of all human activity, and if they are the survivals of those ways of acting which animals adopted for the preservation of their kind, then it is easy to see in this case also how the instincts of flight, curiosity, pugnacity, self-display, self-abasement, and the parental instinct lend support to the thesis that the activity of men, as of animals, is really 'inter-activity.'

There follows immediately an important consequence for ethics. Since a self is not active except as among other selves, morality, being some attitude of the self as a whole, must be inter-personal. There can therefore be no duties that are strictly speaking 'self-regarding.' Not that prudence and self-culture cease to be obligatory. Rather are one's powers to be developed and exercised on account of their social value.

It is now time to try to determine that form of inter-activity between selves which is 'ethical.' What precisely must be the attitude of an 'I' to a 'thou.' Many forms of inter-relationship call for a brief preliminary examination. By a study of the actual instances of coherence which life shows to us we shall best find out the coherence

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that is moral. Whatever form of activity we decide to be morally valid must have its psychical antecedents. The ethical mode of action must be psychically possible, and as such must have a relationship to those other modes by which men inter-act.

There is disagreement among psychologists as to the beginnings of sociality. Professor Baldwin holds that "actual life together of creatures having the tendency to imitative reaction, results inevitably in sympathy and sociality. . . . Self-thoughts imitatively organized are, I contend, the essence of what is social."[5] Others think the greater factor is not so much imitation as sympathy.[6] There is, however, an ambiguous use of the term 'sympathy' which must be guarded against. There is a sense in which it refers merely to the tendency of animals or persons to feel 'like' their neighbors, *e. g.*, to take on the same moods. Such 'sympathy' is of the nature of imitation, though the latter term is usually restricted to the assimilation of bodily movements rather than to the sympathetic induction of feeling. There are many illustrations of this hard, ethically neutral sympathy which is by some called 'organic,' by others, 'primitive.' It is an instinctive reflex. It is shown by the infant in responding to the smiles or frowns of others; it is shown by dogs when they howl at the distresses of their master or their fellow-dogs. One of the commonest examples is the spread of fear and its flight-impulse among the members of a flock or herd. "Sympathy of this crude kind is the cement that binds animal societies together, renders the actions of all members of a group harmonious, and allows them to reap some of the prime advantages of social life in spite of lack of intelligence."

But it is one thing to feel 'like' others; it is quite another thing to feel 'for' others. It does not seem possible that the latter should be evolved from the former. To feel 'for' others is to put a bridge across the gulf which

[5] "Social and Ethical Interpretations," pp. 574, 575.

[6] McDougall, "Social Psych.," p. 91 *sq.*

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yawns between two lives. No reproduction or reflection of another's experiences seems in itself capable of bringing about any approximation. Accordingly, many psychologists turn to the maternal feelings as the ultimate source of tender emotion or of sympathy in the popular sense of that term as a 'feeling for.' In the devotion of the mother to her offspring is found the beginning of every kind of altruistic conduct. Höffding suggests ("Outlines of Psychology," ch. VI) that as the child before birth forms with the mother a vital whole, sympathy appears as growing out of self-preservation. It will be sufficient, however, to note how mother and child are interlocked as separate lives. The mother's primary impulse is to afford physical protection to the child by throwing her arms about it. The strength of this instinct in animals and man is probably owing to the activity of natural selection which weeds out the feeble offspring of a badly mothered race and brings about the survival of the well-mothered. It is suggested that in human beings there takes place a vast extension of the field of application of the maternal instinct. Anything weak or defenceless tends by the operation of the law of association to rouse the instinct to cherish. Intelligence and imagination cannot fail to have some effect in widening and extending the scope of the operation of this impulse to cherish. Accordingly, it is to this instinct, existing first in the female, but shared later in different degrees by all, that many ascribe all agitation on behalf of the sick, the poor, the enslaved, and all labor for social reform.

Granting, then, that maternal affection is a stage through which other types of love must pass, we must carefully note the points of difference between it and the love that is ethical. We do not imply that there is any rigid dualism as between the 'instinctive' and the 'ethical,' for a human instinct extended and worked over by the intelligence is incorporated into the activity of that whole we call consciousness, however widely we may afterwards have to conceive that whole. But ethical activity cannot

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depend upon an excitant of that specific, predetermined kind, which we associate with an instinct. And, clearly, maternal affection is automatic and largely independent of the will. In some mothers it is found to be nearly wanting, in which case they are denounced as 'unnatural.' Where it is very strong, it is often accompanied by modes of behavior which the moral consciousness of the community would condemn. Such lapses are contrasted with devotion to offspring as being the one redeeming feature saving from utter disorganization of life. Maternal love further gives evidence of its instinctive character by its narrowness of range. It exhausts itself in a specific object,—the mother loves her own child. She may do this at the same time that she maintains an attitude of indifference or even of hostility to the children of others. Sometimes domestic love can become quite insular and love for one's own family even anti-social. The literature of 'wills' and bequests often supplies evidence of an interpretation of the interests of family which is out of all relation to the interests of city or country. Perhaps one of the most needed of reforms is the complete ethicizing of domestic life in its relation to society and the race.

Group life also need not imply more than the operation of instinct. The tendency of animals and men to herd together in flocks and tribes has been a useful instrument of evolution. But the instinctive nature of these human attachments is clearly shown by the fact that they do not prevent the members of one class, tribe or nation from indulging in the most violent hatred towards, or waging the most terrible conflicts with, members of other classes, tribes, or nations. Nor is the coöperation which obtains in modern industrial, civic, and national life really moral. Men live and work with, rather than for, one another. Much of this combination, being little more than intelligent egoism, is ever liable to be interfered with by strikes, lock-outs, class prejudice and legislation. As Rudolph Eucken says: "All combination and coöperation in work

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cannot prevent a wide divergence, a rampant selfishness, an inward isolation of the individual.''[7]

Regarding philanthropy as a form of the maternal instinct, we do not even here get rid of that automatism and narrowness of range aforementioned. There seems little principle in the way in which people select the causes they will agitate and suffer for. To some needs the philanthropist heartily responds; to other kinds of need he is strangely cold. And these vagaries are quite consistent with the activity of an instinct as dependent upon a specific excitant. Some men are provoked to relieve merely hunger; others are stirred by slavery; yet others by political injustice. The causes of charity are legion and the selection of any one of these seems often quite arbitrary. What is still more striking is that ardor in one cause can and often does co-exist with a strange coolness for other equally or more deserving causes. Moreover the reformer's aim is often quite immediate and concrete; many labor to make a nation sober with little or no reflection on the ulterior purposes of sobriety. Social work is sometimes divorced from a 'working faith.'

And as to philanthropy in general, the bestowment of physical 'good' on another may be prompted by the desire merely to provide others with the means of greater happiness. That this is good as far as it goes we do not wish to deny. But if this beneficence be regarded as exhaustive of the ethical responsibility of one man to another, we demur. We have already rejected the view that the ultimate good is happiness. Therefore to regard my neighbor as merely the subject of happiness is to offer an affront to his nature. He is more than a creature of feeling,—he is a self,—a person. As a matter of fact, there is much philanthropy which actually tends to encourage an unhealthy and unethical social condition. For if one section of society are 'givers' and another 'receiv-

[7] ''Life of the Spirit,'' Eng. Trans., by Pogson, p. 92.

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ers,' a sense of superiority is easily begotten in the former, of weakness and inferiority in the latter.

But a true 'philanthropy,'—that love of man which is ethical,—will seek for others a 'good' which one judges to be highest for oneself. It will be accepted as a formal criterion of ethical good that it must be capable of being universalized. The good for one is the good for others. Therefore if 'love' be the good, all men are called to be 'lovers,' and in so far as 'love' and 'gifts' are associated, all men ought to be 'givers,' each having something to give. In other words, man must be drawn to man as man. Instinct, however developed, seems of itself inadequate to do this. It may do much to attach man to his fellow when helpless, poor, hungry, enslaved, or diseased. But the impulses of pity and compassion act too mechanically, too arbitrarily, and too externally. For it is to treat the self-hood of another in far too external a fashion if we are concerned merely to safeguard his health of body, his liberty as a subject, his freedom as a citizen. Man is more than body, than feeling, than intelligence,—he is a self, a person. So that the ethical question is the quite general one of the relationship of man to man as such. The ultimate inquiry is as to their attitude as persons. Is it one of repulsion or attraction? If it is one of attraction, we may call this union of selves love. Such love is essentially voluntary and truly universal in scope. Those instincts and impulses which bind man to his fellow lead up to this love. But as the roots of the former are in man's physical nature, and the latter is by contrast spiritual, transcendent of merely natural impulses in being thus voluntary and universal, we have here no case of evolution as ordinarily conceived. Love may evolve through instincts without being evolved by them. To trace it back to maternal affection is to find only its psychological antecedents. And we part company from all those writers who regard the origin and history of an experience as tantamount to an explanation of it. Love is of such a nature as not only to require a history, but

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also to present a challenge and set a problem. It actually calls for an explanation. And to solve the phenomena of ethical love we need, to use a Euckenian term, a no-ology rather than a psychology. We cannot here go further into the matter, but the newer views of evolution offer some help. At every stage of development Bergson finds the presence of a creative impulse which is perpetually adding something to life which was not already there. It may be, however, that the contrast between matter and spirit should be, as with Eucken, somewhat sharper, and that love is the product of an 'independent spiritual life.'

Now this coherence of selves is life's consummate achievement. It is an experience unique in its nature; it cannot be ranged under a higher genus; for its true appreciation it must be felt. We can, however, identify the experience by means of more or less adequate description. When we say that the moral relationship of A. to B. is one of 'love,' we mean that each retains his separateness as an individual agent, but parts with any separateness of 'interest.' To lose separateness of interest is to cease to have any aim for self from which we exclude another. Individuals may and will differ as to their proximate aims. But such differences will only make the ultimate oneness of aim illustrative of a richer and fuller harmony. It is in respect of qualities of mind or body, and with regard to circumstances, that differences between A. and B. obtrude themselves. But it is not these differences in themselves that tend most to bring about disunity. That which really keeps individuals apart is self-centeredness of aim. If A. and B. respectively revolve in an ego-centric orbit, they will move in different planes and a point of coördination can never be ensured.

We maintain that love effects the unification of A. and B., for love knows no separateness of 'interest' as between the two. But we must be clear that love is its own object. Butler said "every good affection implies

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the love of itself." Therefore when A. loves B., he does not seek only, or even primarily, to bestow on B. any form of external good which B. and B. alone can use. Such a proceeding would tend to create in A. a sense of superior power working by pity and, in B.'s case, to magnify the importance of possessions in such wise as would obtrude the point of view of the happiness of the mere individual and interpret the 'interest' of B. in a purely proprietary and private sense. So long as the object of love is regarded as being only the happiness of another, we have not transcended the sphere of instinct or sentiment. When A. loves B. in the ideal, ethical way, he strives to establish as between the two one 'will' or 'heart.' And though A. alone may 'love' in point of fact, yet the relationship is complete when B. also aims to create and develop love in A. The relationship would, from the moral point of view, not be changed one iota by the substitution of Q. and X. for A. and B.

How love of love is possible may be made clear by a consideration of the various processes of *Einfühlung.* According to Professor W. M. Urban ("Valuation: Its Nature and Laws"), *Einfühlung,* which is at first intuitive, later becomes conceptual. In 'common feeling,' as it occurs in organic sympathy we 'think experiences in' intuitively. No distinction is made between feeling as felt and feeling as projected. But later "when the subject explicitly assumes the existence of the feeling in the *alter* and its necessary presuppositions, it can only be 'ejected' as a conceptual construction. The 'feeling-in' of an attitude into another, with the assumption of presuppositions different from those of one's own feeling, gives to the feeling a quasi-general meaning, a schematic character, which raises it out of the sphere of simple subjective appreciation, and starts it upon a new path of objective meaning" (p. 246). This 'schematic' character of the feeling abstracted from individual presuppositions permits of its being read to and fro from the *ego* to the *alter* in terms of idea.

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In favor of 'love of love' as an ethical ideal we find an interesting statement in chapter XIV of the "Data of Ethics," where Spencer remarks that the highest altruism is that which ministers not to the egoistic satisfactions of others only, but also to their altruistic satisfactions. We may add to this a significant statement by Moore: "It is true that the most valuable appreciation of persons appears to be that which consists in the appreciation of their appreciation of other persons" ("Prin. Ethica," p. 204). A similar view is expressed in the "Philosophy of Loyalty" by Professor Royce, who, regarding loyalty to a cause as the supreme business of men, finally enunciates his principle thus: "In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less. And, in fact, so choose and serve your individual cause as to secure thereby the greatest possible increase of loyalty amongst men. More briefly: in choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty" (p. 121). Again "Loyalty is a good for all men. And it is in any man just as much a true good as my loyalty could be in me."

We must now address ourselves to the question of the relation between morality and its content so-called. It will be asked how our view affects that relation. Our reply is in the nature of a paradox,—that goodness has no content. We mean that there are no deeds, thoughts, or volitions which are inherently right. It is not without significance that when the different schools of moralists turn from the exposition of their antagonistic principles to a discussion of rules for practice, antagonism seems almost to cease. The utilitarian will take over the moral code of the intuitionist. The Hegelian moralist, so far from actually extracting the content of conduct from any abstract consideration of an ideal like self-realization, obtains that content by reference to the concrete conditions under which life is found to be lived. And these con-

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ditions are not inferred; they are simply observed. It looks as though, whatever our moral theories may be, men do and have to do in the world very much the same kind of things. Good and bad alike are engaged in doing much the same kind of things. The differences in their overt deeds are differences as to time, place, manner, and circumstances. But the mere deeds in themselves are inadequate criteria by which to discriminate the moral and immoral, the virtuous and vicious.

When we say, then, that 'love' has no content, do we mean that love alone is good? Far from it. There could be no such thing in this world as 'love alone' or love in vacuo. To begin with, there is no love apart from a lover. And when once we have said this, we have implied much besides. We have, in effect, in assuming lovers, postulated the existence of a number of human beings capable of inter-relation, and therefore living together in the same world, the world that we know. And in a world like ours man is not called upon to deliberate about the things he has to do. This is settled for him. He must eat and drink, be clad, and reproduce his kind, otherwise he cannot even be, let alone be a 'lover.' Indeed even before intelligence begins the reflective consideration of what modes of action this world requires, the main types of reaction on environment are determined for us by instincts. Hunger, thirst, nakedness, and sex bring into being in due course all the complexities of industry and the institutions of family, city and state. "It is impossible to draw any fixed line between the content of the moral good and of natural satisfaction." (Dewey and Tuft's "Ethics," p. 300.)

If, then, there can be no meaning in the statement that love alone is good, what is the precise relation of 'love' to those various forms of activity by which the 'lover' relates himself to his environment. We contend that love has intrinsic value; we have now to determine its relation to things which have not intrinsic value. We are not able to regard that relationship as one of end and means for

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the reason that the 'means' is not a part of the good thing for the existence of which its existence is a necessary condition. As Moore puts it ("Prin. Ethica," p. 29), the necessity by which, if the good in question is to exist, the means to it must exist, is merely a natural or causal necessity. But in such a case it is clear that if the means can 'cause' the end, means and end must have a common nature to the extent of existing in the same sphere of reality. It is impossible for a physical means to 'cause' a spiritual good. Love, being, as we believe, the intrinsic good, nothing can be a means to love in the sense of being its 'cause.' Accordingly, we reject the relationship of 'end and means' and adopt that of 'whole and part.' We have already seen that love cannot exist except in a lover and his world. In other words, love which is the intrinsic good cannot exist save as it forms part of a wider whole. That which goes along with love to form this whole has not of itself intrinsic value, but since it forms part of a valuable whole it has a certain share in the value of that whole if only to the extent of making that value possible. That any form of activity in a world of time and space can become the vehicle of love gives it dignity on this account. But that which provides love with the possibility of its expression may exist by itself. Men may, and do, do the same things without love as they do with love. But these loveless activities cease to be quite the 'same,' inasmuch as they will lack the special spirit which otherwise informs them. That is to say, the 'whole' which is constituted by love's intermixing with life's ordinary activities differs from that whole made up of those activities alone, by being (1) wider, (2) of ethical quality.

In allowing that there is a part of our ethical whole which has no intrinsic value, we do not mean that the value of the whole must reside entirely in the other part, for, as we have seen, 'love alone' is an impossibility; love cannot be isolated or considered apart from the lover and his world. How exactly love can form with concrete

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thoughts and deeds a 'whole' is not a problem specially ethical. It is but a particular example of the general problem of the relation between subject and object. As a matter of fact, life is always 'organized.' And whether the synthesis of spirit and nature is capable of a 'logical' explanation, or comes under the general category of 'action,' as with Eucken, is a matter somewhat outside the scope of this essay.

But it will be inquired whether there is any sort of guidance for practice furnished by the view of ethics here adopted. Granted that there are no deeds right in themselves, we may well expect that love will modify our deeds in respect to such matters as time, place, and circumstances of performance, frequency or infrequency of action together with abstention on occasion. We are not of course concerned now with the 'conscience' of any particular person or age. 'Conscience' in any particular man is a growth: it is largely the product of the community in which he lives and the deposit of racial experience. In the same way, men call many different things 'goods.' Any object satisfying a desire that is uniform and insistent gets singled out and called 'good.' But just as 'conscience' passes through stages of development, so there is a value-movement in reference to the things from time to time called 'good.' Though the 'values' of life continually vary in respect of emphasis and even often suffer inversion, yet generally speaking worth becomes transferred from some object of desire and feeling to the disposition which the worth attitude presupposes (Urban, "Valuation," p. 196). Objects of condition-worth are felt to be of less value than personal worths. They have more capacity for substitution and have less capacity for continuous valuation than personal worths (*ib.* p. 377). But as we have already seen, worthless objects may acquire 'complementary' value through relation to a valuable whole. Similarly 'conscience' has its history both in the individual and the race. It is an interesting inquiry how far moral laws, traditions, and practices as a

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matter of history owe their origin to intelligence, and how far to emotion in the form of superstition.[8]

Leaving, however, these historical questions, we must recognize that there is a function which intelligence has to perform in relation to a moral value or end which itself it may be able neither to provide nor to validate. Intelligence may not be able to tell us what love is or that it is ethically supreme, but it may be expected to supply guidance as to how love should express itself in an intelligible world. Let us recall what we have considered to be the ideal ethical situation. Love is such a blending of persons as precludes any merely individual will. This experience, which is not purely cognitive or intellectual, is capable of reduction to intellectual terms. As thus reduced it becomes the Golden Rule and, expressed in the fuller and more precise rendering of Sidgwick, says: "It cannot be right for A. to treat B. in a manner in which it would be wrong for B. to treat A., merely on the ground that they are two different individuals and without there being any difference between the natures and circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment." Anyone who believes with us that the evil of the world proceeds rather from want of 'heart' than from want of 'thought' will attach much importance for practice to what may be criticized as a mere principle of impartiality. Such a principle forbids arbitrary inequality in the framing and administration of laws, and dictates that in the matter of the distribution of objects of desire men should be furnished as their needs or capacities require. Each man's aim should be to secure for love its most perfect expression in all possible kinds of mental and material excellence. Men as lovers should be given and should give whatever is needful for the richest and most complete development of their lives in the service of love. What kind of social and political action is necessary ere such

[8] *Cf.* Farnell: "The Moral Service of the Intellect," *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1911.

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an ideal could be realizable is a problem demanding the unbiassed exercise of intelligence. And when the hearts of men become really 'impartial' and the paramount interest is 'love,' such an 'interest' will not fail of its effect upon 'thought.' Imagination thus stimulated will be ever at work in criticism of custom and tradition; the natural sluggishness of intelligence will be quickened and the immobility of opinion disturbed. Freed from an egoistic bias, the mind will become open to the consideration of changes and will seek the way to such reconstruction of the various institutions of society as will provide love with its most suitable embodiment.

But it cannot be too strongly urged that social and economic changes of themselves would be without moral utility, save as they were used in the service of love. The 'goods' of life are but the tools of love. Equality of opportunity is of real value only as 'opportunity' is ethically interpreted and improved. Such equality may be called 'justice' and it is a state of things which government can help to bring about. But as it is 'a state of things,' it gives no guarantee of any permanent solution of the great human problem, because it cannot create among men that inner and spiritual union which is the real basis of interactivity. Justice without love loses its rationale. We are aware that to give to all men equal consideration and to attribute to them an equal importance has been described as a 'Rational Benevolence' on the ground that all men may be considered as forming parts of a Mathematical Whole. And such a mode of reasoning exerts upon the mind the quasi-æsthetic effect of any neat presentation of a case in figures or symbols. But there is here an error due to the love of abstraction. We are not dealing with anything quite like the relative position of units in forming a numerical whole. The 'whole' which men are called upon to form is of a different sort, and the mode of formation is different. This 'whole' is formable by any two individuals. That other individuals may and do form the same sort of 'whole' is not at all com-

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parable to the differences made in the size of a number according as it is made up of five or five thousand units. Of course, if five thousand people 'love' instead of five, there is a difference, but it is like the difference made when a family grows in size. As the number of those who are united together increases, the oneness of spirit and aim grows in strength of richness, and love becomes more complex in its organization.

Now it is sometimes said that true good does not admit of being competed for. So long as 'good' is identified with anything of an external nature, so that it is shareable in unequal amounts, it does seem to us that in this case competition can never be precluded. Moreover, when the 'good' is regarded as being something at the end of a series of actions, it is impossible to know that there will be no discrepancy as between the individual and the general interest. As soon as goodness is made a calculable matter, we can never be sure of it, either for ourselves or others. For example, it is impossible to say beforehand exactly how much 'pleasure' a certain course of action will bring either for oneself or for others. A reconciliation of interests can never be assured when you are at the mercy of issues and results. But the theory we advocate does not seek to prove coincidence of interests empirically. It begins with the coincidence rather than arrives at it, for it defines the individual's 'interest' as the act of love which transcends self and other in a union of wills. Such love is the guarantee of a 'justice' which becomes ever more perfect.

Into the metaphysical questions that suggest themselves we cannot enter. The ultimate rationale of 'love' appears to be connected with the view that finite selves are dependent upon a common ground alike for their existence and apparent independence as for the possibility of their interaction. We have passed in review many of the ways by which, as it were mechanically, men are drawn together. But their proper ethical union seems to require, not only a metaphysic for its justification, but also a re-

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ligion for its effecting. Man draws his neighbor to a moral embrace of the purest and most lasting kind on his realization that they both form parts of the same great Whole; and aided, as we believe, by the energy wherewith the Whole sustains itself together with the parts. Love to man is at once ensured and transcended by reverence for God.

RANMOOR COLLEGE, SHEFFIELD. E. W. HIRST.

THE WOMAN-SOUL.

E. M. WHITE.

THE motive forces animating those interested in Feminism are as various as the reasons which caused their interest to arise. But in general these supporters may be separated, with regard to their hopes or expectations concerning the womanhood of the future, into three main classes, two large and one small. In one class are those who believe that eventually men and women will possess the same capabilities, and exhibit identical mental and moral qualities. Many Americans are of this type, and the idea is the main thesis of "Sex Equality," by Emmot Densmore, M.D. The author says: "There is every reason to anticipate that in the full fruition of the race, each individual, male and female, will exhibit indifferently both masculine and feminine traits." This class claim that it is environment and sex-heredity that have caused the differences in the sexes; and as, in the future, woman's upbringing, education, and occupations approximate to man's, and man's moral qualities approximate to woman's, then the two sexes will differ only in physique, and even in regard to physical strength there will be less difference, owing to changes in the circumstances of each. Man, with the introduction of machinery, will need to use less and less muscular power, and with the elimination of war, will exercise less often the fierce elements of his nature; while woman,

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with more sensible styles of dressing, will increase in health, and with increased outdoor exercises, will grow in strength.

In the second class are those who say that woman has been, and ever will be, different from man, not only physically, but also mentally and morally. They affirm that the spheres of the two sexes not only should not, but cannot, overlap unless in very exceptional instances. They desire more freedom for woman, but they regard her as the normal and moral half of humanity, and man as the initiatory and intellectual half; and they consider that these qualities will always remain thus apportioned. The average and unthinking are of this opinion (except that they wish to keep woman subservient still); as also are some who have worked out their theories from a psychological and historical view, *e. g.*, the Positivists, who, while desiring no legal bar to any occupation for women, yet consider her rightful sphere to be that of moral inspirer, home-maker, child-educator.

The third class includes a much smaller number of persons who take a *via media* between the other two classes. They suspend judgment with regard to the future position and capabilities of woman and ask these two questions, first: Are men and women differentiating or approximating in their characteristics? In the average, men and women have been and still are very different; are they becoming nearer to one another in their qualities or is the difference becoming greater?

The answer cannot be a mere affirmation of one alternative and direct negation of the other. On first considering the matter it would seem that the sexes are approximating, as is witnessed by woman's increased physical and mental vigor. Her intellectual qualities in general are now acknowledged to be equal to man's by those who have opportunities of judging, such as teachers in mixed schools, professors at universities, and others. (We leave out of consideration the supernormal types, the genuises of both sexes, as we are now considering the general

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average.) The moral qualities, too, are now less easily classified as masculine or feminine. Woman is gaining courage, strength of purpose, and, very slowly, self-confidence, a result due to her greater independence; while man is acquiring more altruistic qualities, shown in the desire for social reform, and losing admiration for brute force, as is witnessed by the peace movement.

It remains to be seen whether in the ultimate proportionate *value* placed on the activities and ideals of life and its various aspects, the highest types of man and woman are approaching one another. This point of view or evaluation pervades the whole of character, directs the course of our human instincts and desires, formulates our ideals and aspirations; it thus determines life itself and the destiny of the human race. This evaluation of the things of life has been different in the sexes throughout the ages, but woman's point of view has been held, as it were, shamefacedly; it has been considered worthless as coming from 'only a woman.' Men and women together have made history, but man alone has recorded it; as Elizabeth Robins says, "All that is not silence is the voice of man." It is in connection with this angle of vision on the things that matter that we shall find the answer to the question regarding the approximation or differentiation of the sexes. When the Man-Ideal and the Woman-Ideal are each clearly and unrestrainedly expressed and understood, which cannot be until woman has been as free as man in all things, then will be seen for the first time what the real differences and likenesses are.

Meanwhile the third class ask this second question: *Is* there a Woman-Soul, distinct from a Man-Soul, which shall continue distinct, and form a different side of the great Soul of Humanity? The question is a difficult one to answer. By soul here is meant mind, feelings, will, *i. e.*, character as a whole, as distinct from physical body or spirit. For our argument the existence of the spiritual *apart* from the physical makes but little difference.

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Whatever the origin or nature of the spiritual in human beings may be, it must, in this plane of existence, manifest itself through matter, and can only be known to ordinary people in that way. Controversies as to whether the physical produces the spiritual or whether the spiritual moulds the physical, are foreign to this point, for in either case the physical must have some effect on the spiritual, for it conditions the spiritual and is its vehicle. Foreign to this discussion also are controversies as to the existence of the spiritual; if it exists, the body affects it, since it dwells therein and manifests through the body; if it does not exist, the body remains at least as important as if it did. It seems, then, that since physique has this influence, there must be a distinction between the soul of the sexes.

It is frequently said that sex is a dominating factor in morality and intellect, but until all other factors in the environment of the sexes are practically alike, this statement is merely an unproved opinion. So far the *dominating* factors have been other than sex, and until they are removed it is impossible to see the real part which sex, as a factor in itself, plays. Woman's whole environment, and man's wishes regarding her character, intellect, opinions, occupations have been dominating factors from which womanhood is only now beginning to free itself, and not until her complete freedom is gained can her soul be seen. It may then be found that sex is rather the director of the way in which the moral and intellectual faculties are used than their shaper, rather the giver of the attitude than of the personality. This distinction is shown more clearly by saying that if the capacities of a man and of a woman were identical, they would be directed by partially different motives, and used to slightly different purposes. However, in the past, the average man has been widely different from the average woman. Havelock Ellis shows in "Man and Woman" what the differences have been and are in the present, but he does not prophesy with certainty of the future.

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If the circumstances causing the differences be examined, however, it will be seen that they are not all due to sex only. The unlikeness between men and women has arisen chiefly on account of: (a) Child-bearing, which, with its occasional prostration and lengthened nursing and caring for the child, has prevented woman from being a free agent in developing her strength and independence, and has given man a physical advantage over her. Hence (b) the greater muscular strength of man (due largely to his habits of life) has subdued woman, and literally forced her to follow his wishes and ideas for her life. A knock-down blow is a conclusive argument. (c) Home-making and home-keeping has prevented travel and discovery, and kept the initiative faculty of woman undeveloped. It has also subdued the savage fighting instincts and made physical strength less necessary than in man.[1] This civilizing factor of home-making and home-keeping has also resulted in (d) the economic dependence of woman on man with all its attendant misery to woman. The home being considered woman's unpaid sphere has forced her to sell her liberty in marriage in order to obtain a home, or failing that, to sell her body in prostitution. (Cicely Hamilton's "Marriage as a Trade" is an instance of the intense reaction against this economic dependence.) (a) and (c) have also prevented woman from achievement in the various fields of labor, and she has thus remained in general at a normal dead level.

The result to women themselves and to their characters of this subjection has been twofold. There are poor, mean results, grossly exaggerated by Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and lesser men of their type, results such as want of coöperation, and lack of courage, neither of which has woman had an opportunity of expressing; or uncultivated intellect, petty interests and vanities, both of which her environment has directly caused; or conven-

[1] Another question, too lengthy to be discussed here, arises: What part has woman played in initiating and forwarding civilization through her home-making and her working at industries?

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tionality, insincerity, dependence, in which, as in all the others, man has, in a sense, actually coöperated in setting the standard for woman's morality and characteristics. These results have commenced to disappear in the changed circumstances and comparatively greater freedom of to-day.

The other results are good and have been mainly the three following: 1. Woman has acquired a greater delicacy and refinement, and a desire for beauty in her surroundings, as well as in general behavior. (As Buckle says, woman's influence "has softened the violence of men; it has improved their manners; it has lessened their cruelty.") This is due partly to her weaker and more delicately made body requiring different clothing, habits, etc., partly to the desire of making the home comfortable and attractive, partly to the necessity of rendering herself pleasing.

2. Woman possesses in a greater degree the qualities of sympathy, patience, endurance, and all that is of love; the altruistic qualities, proportionally to the egoistic ones, have in her reached a higher stage than in man. Sympathy has been developed in her through her closer contact with children, both before and after birth, and the sacrifices she has made for them. Patience and endurance have come through her enforced subjection to man, and as a result of the many injustices meted out to her. The unselfishness of woman would not have become as great and firm had she possessed the freedom which, comparatively, man has enjoyed. One cannot learn patience without having something to be patient about; nor is endurance cultivated without enduring. Such qualities grow only in the midst of hardship, pain, and repression; faculties arise to fit the circumstances, and character strengthens only by resistance.

3. The growth of intuition in woman has been more unhampered than in man; her intellect having been neglected or suppressed, this faculty, allied to instinct and intellect, yet distinct from each, has developed more

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freely. It would be well to examine this statement more closely, and first to form some conception of what intuition means. Chamber's definition states that it is "the power of the mind by which it immediately perceives the truth of things without reasoning or analysis"; with which may be compared Browning's

> The rest may reason and welcome
> 'Tis we musicians *know*.

Mr. F. J. Gould has said: "Instinct, intuition, intellect, are at bottom one: they are complicated with each other. But broadly speaking they can be analyzed into separate aspects. Instinct is feeling in animals and men which directs to beneficent ends. Intuition is instinct combined with consciousness but distinct from ratiocination." Professor Bergson, the high priest of intuitionism, speaks of it as that spiritual sensibility through which we apprehend reality as instinctively tense, mobile, free, and creative. He calls it that form of mental fellow-feeling by virtue of which we are able to pass inwardly into an object so as to come into touch with the unique, ineffable quality that distinguishes it from everything else. Bergson, in his "Creative Evolution" (p. 186), says:

> Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us a key to vital operations—just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. For—we cannot too often repeat it—intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former toward inert matter, the latter towards life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and moreover only claims to bring us a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us,—by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely.

Knowledge about the exact nature and workings of the intuitive faculty is scanty, but few will deny that

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women in general possess that faculty in greater degree than men in general. Popular opinion credits woman with more quickness of perception than man, and the accusation that she "jumps to conclusions" may be due to the exercise of her intuition. The epithet 'illogical' as applied to women may also have arisen because they can 'see' things quickly and be unable to trace the steps along the path of reason that led them to the particular conclusion; in this case the adjective should rather be *superlogical.*

Not only does popular opinion consider women as superior to men in intuition, but also writers, such as J. S. Mill and H. T. Buckle, whose experience, work, and knowledge give them the right to judge, declare that woman's intuitive faculty is more developed than man's. J. S. Mill, in his "Subjection of Woman" (pp. 85, 86), says:

> Men who have been much taught are apt to be deficient in the sense of present fact; they do not see, in the facts they are called upon to deal with, what is really there, but what they have been taught to expect. This is seldom the case with women of any ability. Their capacity of 'intuition' preserves them from it. With equality of experience and of general faculties a woman usually sees much more than a man of what is immediately before her. . . . The predominant place which quickness of observation holds among a woman's faculties makes her particularly apt to build overhasty generalizations upon her own observations; though at the same time no less ready to rectifying those generalizations, as her observation takes a wider range.

A little later he speaks of that "admitted superiority of clever women, greater quickness of apprehension."

Buckle's essay on "The Influence of Women in the Progress of Knowledge," is based on the fact that woman's deductive ability is far greater than man's. The following extracts show that by deductive ability he often means intuition, or the help of intuition, and that women possess it more than men:

> Another circumstance which makes women more deductive is that they possess more of what is called intuition . . . what they do see they see quicker. Hence they are constantly tempted to grasp at once an idea, to

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seek to solve a problem suddenly in contradistinction to the slower and more laborious ascent of the inductive investigator. . . . I submit there is a spiritual, a poetic, and for aught we know a spontaneous and uncaused element in the human mind, which, ever and anon, suddenly and without warning, gives us a glimpse and a forecast of the future, and urges us to seize truth as it were by anticipation. . . . To theorize is the highest function of genius, and the greatest philosophers must always be the greatest theorists. . . . Induction is indeed a mighty weapon laid up in the armory of the human mind, and by its aid great deeds have been accomplished and noble conquests have been won. But in that armory there is another weapon, I will not say of a stronger make, but certainly of a keener edge; and if that weapon had been oftener used during the present and preceding century, our knowledge would be far more advanced than it actually is. If the imagination had been cultivated, if there had been a closer union between the spirit of poetry and the spirit of science, natural philosophy would have made greater progress, because natural philosophers would have taken a higher and more successful aim, and would have enlisted on their side a wider range of human sympathies. From this point of view you will see the incalculable service women have rendered to the progress of knowledge.

He goes on to show that woman's intuition has to some extent counterbalanced the more "sluggish and apathetic understanding" of man.

Thus it may be taken as proved that women's intuition is greater than man's, *i. e.*, the average woman has more quickness of perception, more superlogic (if I may coin a word) than man. But even in the most intuitive of women the faculty is presumably only in its rudimentary and practically uncontrolled stage. What its powers may be, if and when the human race develops it in the future, cannot be estimated. But that the subject is worthy of consideration can be seen by the importance attached to it by the foremost philosopher of the day, Professor Henri Bergson.

The question now arises, Could this result have been obtained in any other way than by suppression of the intellect? Just as sympathy, patience, endurance, came by want of freedom, and enforced hardship and injustice, has intuition come by want of intellectual training? It would seem so. It appears that the intuitive faculty cannot develop co-extensively with ratiocinative power; if the latter is cultivated, then the former

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lies in abeyance. Bergson, in "L'évolution créatrice," says:[2]

> In the humanity of which we form a part intuition has been almost entirely sacrificed to intelligence. It would seem as if, in order to conquer matter and to gain the mastery over itself, consciousness has had to spend the best portion of its strength. This conquest, under the particular conditions, required that consciousness should adapt itself to the habits of matter, and concentrate its attention upon them, so as to specialize into intelligence. Intuition, however, is still there, though vague and very intermittent. It is like an almost extinguished lamp, which, for a few moments, and at long intervals, flickers up. But the point of this flickering up is just where and when a vital interest is in question. On the subjects of our personality, our freedom, of our place in the schemes of nature, of our origin and perchance also our destiny, it throws a trembling and feeble ray, but a ray which succeeds in piercing the obscurity of the night in which intelligence has left us.[3]

Bergson's remarks concerning the lapse of intuition through the growth of intellect of course apply to the human race in general, but they may be taken to show that woman, through the comparative non-development in the past of her intellect, has been able to develop, in a slightly greater degree than man, this faculty of intuition. Therefore just as, had woman possessed equal power and freedom with man in the past, her altruistic qualities would not be above his, so, had she been able to

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[2] Quoted from a review on the book by Mr. F. J. Gould in the *Literary Guide*, Nov., 1910.

[3] Again, compared with the above, is the following: "The *intellect* finds its true sphere of usefulness when construing movement in terms of immovability. That is its practical *raison d'être*. The trouble begins only when philosophers drag into the sphere of speculation methods of thought which the exigencies of practical life hammered into shape. The intellect, then, is no proper philosophical instrument. It cannot grapple with reality, it cannot shed any light on the inner nature of things. The reality, argues Bergson, is essentially movement, life, spirit, or perpetual becoming. . . . Hence to interpret reality is to understand the meaning and drift of movement, life, creation, and these are the very facts which the intellect cannot understand." Quoted from Boyce-Gibson, "The Intuitionism of H. Bergson," in *The Quest*, Jan., 1911. Bergson himself says in "Creative Evolution" (p. 159): "There are things that the intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them."

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train and exercise her intellect to an equal extent with him, she would not have the greater intuition.

Since, then, the results to women are so ennobling and beneficial, should not those among them who understand rejoice in the long subjection of their sex, and be glad that opportunity was given to the *woman* to attain the highest? The thought of the means whereby such things have come to pass, and whereby the future holds so much, almost brings reverence with it, for it seems as though the vast scheme were teleological; and then indeed would "the scales of eternal justice hang even," and the purpose and end be worth the uphill way.

The special traits already mentioned will remain with the woman-soul; no success or freedom, no joy or praise, can drive such deeply ingrained characteristics from her now. Their exercise will always come even with freedom; nature, in her gift of children, will provide for that.

Though ignorance is disappearing quickly,—a fog blown away by the healthy wind of inquiry,—yet the remedies come very slowly, because women have first to struggle to positions whence they may wield the rod of power instead of depending upon the hand of mere influence, which under present conditions is not sufficient. And woman is hindered in this climb to reach man's level in point of political and material advantage by many obstacles which can be fundamentally classified as follows: 1. The desire of men to remain lords of creation; which is the natural and inevitable wish of a dominant class to retain its power. This desire is disguised in many ways and is sometimes held unconsciously to the possessor, but behind the majority of objections to the Woman Movement there remains this dislike of women in any position which means power, merely because it means the authority of some women over some men. 2. The fact that men and women are not regarded as human beings to an equal extent. Man is considered as a human being *first;* his sex or potential fatherhood comes second. Woman is looked upon as an actual or potential mother first, and a

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human being with human attributes second. That is the basic reason for the rejection of Mme. Curie by the French Academy, and for the various bars to the entrance of women to many learned societies and to some professions in England. 3. There are two distinct normals among women and only one among men. There is an average normal man whom marriage does not essentially change; the married state has influence, socially and morally, on him, but it does not bring such upheaval and change of occupation as comes to the woman at marriage. Thus there are two normal women, a majority and a minority, the former consisting of married women usually with young children, and the latter of unattached women, usually unmarried or without young children. It is this minority class of women which is never considered in any scheme of society nor allowed for in any proposed Utopia. All women marry or should do so, is the thought behind most minds, or, if this minority class is considered at all, it is regarded as consisting of the failures among womenkind in that its members have not joined the great majority.

But the signs of the times show that this class is an increasingly large one, and it demands recognition, expression, and opportunities. From this section of women does the new womanhood emanate, from them comes the force that will indirectly mould the next generation, since it directly permeates the life-springs of this one. Though it is chiefly in her outward activities that the minority woman differs from her sister of the majority, yet her inner qualities, similar to those of the other, are emphasized in a different proportion. She has usually more independence, more individual responsibilities, less care taken of her and less conventionality. She can also view life from a wider window, and take interest in much outside a home. But it is not until both these normals are recognized and appreciated that there will come a settlement of the woman question.

Some of the next steps in our civilization for the forth-

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coming few centuries will be the displacement of male domination by human domination, and its necessary consequences. Positions of authority will gradually be shared by men and women; even, it may be, there will be duplication of offices in church and state, *i. e.*, a man and woman as co-home secretaries, co-judges, co-priests. The medical profession in England and the legal in France are slight forecasts of this. Thus the experiments in government (the growth of government is but a series of experiments) will have more chance of real success, since both sexes will express their views and wishes; and our common humanity will evolve less slowly since its two points of view will decide action. To adopt Mazzini's metaphor, humanity will rise on its two wings, and not struggle painfully upwards with the use of one only.

When this stage has been reached the results will be many and far-reaching, but impossible to forecast. Prophets' eyes can see only a few centuries ahead and they can but dimly descry the average man and woman of that distant future—a man and woman different in character and outlook. But in the higher type of each sex will the characteristics differ? Is there but one human ideal, one truth and one good? If then opinions on life, religion, society are the same, if the qualities of mind and feeling are equally developed, if capacities are as high in each sex, in *what* will lie the difference between them? It will probably be chiefly in manner, in the different shades of value placed on vital things, such as the relative importance of material inventions and moral victories or the sanctity of life in itself, and in the small angle of outlook. The charm of the sexes for each other will still remain, and the friendships between men and women will increase and be of a higher nature.

But again a question arises: If woman develops her ratiocinative powers (as she is increasingly doing) and retains her intuitive faculty; if she gains in courage, self-reliance, and strength of will (as she is undoubtedly doing), and retains her sympathy and refinement, what

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will be the relative position of man? Physically woman is more evolved than man, as the following extract from Havelock Ellis's "Man and Woman" (p. 390) shows:

> That the adult man diverges to a greater extent from the child-type than the adult woman is certainly true. . . . In order to appraise rightly the significance of the fact that women remain somewhat nearer to children than do men, we must have a clear idea of the position occupied by the child in human and allied species. Among the anthropoids the infant ape is higher in the line of evolution than the adult, and the female ape by approximating to the infant type is somewhat higher than the male. . . . The human infant bears precisely the same relation to his species that the simian infant bears to his, and we are bound to conclude that his relation to the future evolution of the race is similar. The human infant presents in an exaggerated form the chief distinctive characters of humanity, —the large head and brain, the small face, the hairlessness, the delicate bony system. . . . If we turn to what we are accustomed to regard as the highest human types, as represented in men of genius, we shall find a striking approximation to the child-type. . . . When we have realized the position of the child in relation to evolution we can take a clearer view as to the natural position of woman. She bears the special characteristics of humanity in a higher degree than man (as Burdock pointed out). Her conservatism is thus compensated and justified by the fact that she represents more nearly than man the human type towards which man is approximating. This is true of physical characters: the large-headed delicate-faced small-boned man of urban civilization is much nearer to the typical woman than is the savage.

Physically then woman is more evolved; and also she has qualities which man has not, and is gaining some which he has. Will man develop intuition, sympathy, patience, and the other so-called 'womanly' qualities? *Can* he do so (except through heredity as he does now) without an age-long tribulation such as woman has suffered? Is it then woman's fate to realize in herself the highest and best of which humanity is capable; to become in the dim distance of time a being higher in type than man and farther removed from the animal, physically, mentally, and morally?

The heart of the future holds the answer within itself, and no human mind can see into that heart until the time comes.

E. M. White.

Brighton.

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SOME MISCONCEPTIONS OF MORAL EDUCATION.

HENRY NEUMANN.

A GREAT deal of the present-day controversy on the subject of moral education springs from certain misconceptions as to the nature of the schooling proposed in this much-debated suggestion. That our boys and girls are sadly in need of an education which does more than develop the non-moral intelligence and skills nurtured in the ordinary class-room, is only too evident to those who know our schools, our children, and our country's problems. In view, therefore, of this pressing need, it seems fitting to suggest that much of our current discussion might center with far greater profit not on the question whether moral education is advisable or not, but rather on the question what lines it might best follow. In the hope that ground may be cleared in this direction, the following pages attempt to correct a few common misconceptions.

It is said for one thing that since morality is not a product of intelligence, moral education, whatever else it may do, must dispense with ethical instruction, for this instruction is useless and too often positively harmful. Thus Professor Palmer of Harvard objects: "What is asked of us teachers, is that we invite our pupils to direct study of the principles of conduct, that we awaken their consciousness about their modes of life, and so by degrees impart a science of righteousness. This is theory, ethics; not morals, practice; and in my judgment, it is dangerous business with the slenderest chance of success. . . . Many matters do not take their rise in knowledge at all. Morality does not."[1]

[1] G. H. Palmer, "The Teacher," pp. 36, 37. Reprinted in "Ethical and Moral Instruction in Schools."

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This position is easy to understand. It is indeed a fact that life is not shaped by reason alone. Instincts and habits, envy, prejudice, laziness, all undoubtedly play just as important a part. Often, moreover, as Aristotle pointed out, our intellect cannot even be convinced that a bad act is really bad, because our habits have loaded the scales of judgment in favor of our own special practices. A boy who has been used to lord it over his uncomplaining sisters grows up for that reason into mistaken but firm views of masculine superiority, just as the libertine, fixed in his habits of indulgence, cannot understand why his 'perfectly reasonable' pleasures should be condemned. Such also is the case in the doing of the right: here, too, the part played by a bare thinking is frequently very small. Many of our best acts are as immediate and unreasoned as a mother's rushing to her baby at the cry of pain. In view of these facts, it would indeed seem true that informing the intelligence may be counted a negligible element in the building of character.

Nevertheless, because a mere process of cognition alone fails to bring right conduct, it does not follow that attempts to enlighten the judgment by instruction must be frowned upon. Surely to trust behavior only to instinct is to rely upon an unsafe guide. Instinct itself needs direction; for it is just as likely to lead us wrong as it is to point us aright. It is the experience of all human society that children must somehow, at some time or other, be taught which innate tendencies to suppress and which to encourage. The commonest method is to inflict pain when they let a wrong instinct rule; but as they grow older and continue to act out their instincts for mischief, this surely is not the only way nor the wisest, to teach them how to choose rightly. Would any one maintain that children can never be helped even before maturity, by appeals to an intelligent understanding of what right and wrong conduct mean?

It is equally mistaken to hold that moral development can be entrusted solely to the forming of habits. To build

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habits calls also for the help of intelligence. Every growing life must advance by breaking many of its habits, even its good ones; and how is this to be done? There comes a time, for instance, when the child's beautiful practice of indiscriminate alms-giving must be superseded by wiser charity. In every such readjustment, the significance of the new custom must be made clear. If it is to commend itself, the new line of conduct must at least appear reasonable; and here, it would seem, there is a decided call for adult counsel. What, moreover, shall we do with the many boys and girls who come to school without those habits which the right training at home ought to have inculcated? Some word of helpful teaching is certainly demanded as an aid in the necessary start.

A like assistance is needed to make so-called experiences yield their best fruit. To get the most out of an 'experience,' there must be more or less understanding of its meaning. A boy who is disgruntled because he thinks he is a good pitcher, but is obliged to play centerfield, may be forced by his comrades to do his allotted share in the work of his team, and thus, according to some teachers, be educated into obedience to a group will. The simple fact remains, however, that this experience is of no value unless its ethical significance is understood and grasped. Left to himself, the lad may get no more out of the situation than a mood of ugliness. Far from being 'socialized,' he may feel nothing but anti-social emotions. A word or two of interpretation may do much, however, to send the boy back to his undesired post with a clearer notion of responsibility and a helpful resolve to live up to it. A member of one of the writer's classes told of a pupil who had received such help in a situation of this very sort. Disliking his position on the school team, he resigned, against the protests of his fellow-athletes. A month later, he was allowed to play a leading rôle in a performance of *Julius Cæsar,* where he acquitted himself with all credit. His teacher thereupon reminded him of the part contributed to his success by the obscure

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but none the less important efforts of the other actors. The boy was ashamed and saw his selfishness in its true light. Whatever the experience, it counts for most when its fuller implications are comprehended; and here the clearer and wider insight of the teacher may render valuable aid. It is no argument against direct and regular instruction to say that this instance was simply the interpretation of a very real experience. Man, unlike the animal, is able to profit by anticipating experience. To be sure, there is always danger that the anticipation may be too remote to be effective when the occasion arises; but the unwisdom of such an extreme is no proof that a sound middle course has no place.

Thinking, therefore, is by no means to be ignored as a moral agency in childhood, even though it is neither the chief source of conduct nor the only one. To dispense with it will no more do than for a teacher of religion to trust children's unaided instincts to bring desired notions of God. That right attitudes and practices result from a complex interplay of forces surely does not allow us to say any more about a single one of these forces than that it is not the only one.

A second misconception (responsible in part for the preceding) is due to thinking that children have no capacity for reflection upon ethical problems before their late adolescence. Professor Palmer says: "The college, not the school, is the place for this study. . . . Many of the evils that I have thus far traced are brought about by projecting upon a young mind problems which it has not yet encountered in itself. Such problems abound in the latter teens and twenties, and then is the time to set about their discussion." Evidently it is assumed that ethics-teaching in the schools is to be an attempt to reconcile conflicting sanctions. "Has he grown up unquestioning? Has he accepted the moral code inherited from honored parents? Then let him be thankful and go his way untaught. But has he, on the other hand, felt that the moral mechanism by which he was early guided does not fit all

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cases? Has he found one class of duties in conflict with another? Has he discovered that the moral standards obtaining in different sections of society, in different parts of the world, are irreconcilable? In short, is he puzzled and desirous of working his way through his puzzles, of facing them and tracking them to their beginnings? Then is he ripe for the study of ethics." This study is further declared to be analogous to "philology, grammar, rhetoric, systematic study of the laws of language," "abstract grammar," "theoretical talk"; "it should be pursued as a science, critically, and the student should be informed at the outset that the aim of the course is knowledge, not the endeavor to make better men."[2]

If it were proposed to defend such a study of ethical science in the schools, the objection here cited would be unanswerable. But *moral instruction* is not at all synonymous with the teaching of *ethics as a science*. To see what the difference is, let us look at other fields of study in the elementary schools where the same misconception obtains. Teachers of 'nature-study,' for example, have to be warned that they are not to teach the science of biology or the science of physics. A science is an attempt to explain the whole ground of known phenomena by relating these to certain great generalizations, such as the atomic theory, or the evolutionary hypothesis, or the law of conservation of energy. An organization of this sort represents the needs of the adult scientist. It does not correspond to the needs of children. For them there need be no more than "a study of the facts of botany, zoölogy, physics, chemistry, geology, that affect our daily life." They are interested, that is, in what makes the electric bell ring, without discussing the nature of the electric current; they want to know about the formation of a river-basin, without caring for the details which a Lyell would demand to prove the precise period when the watershed was elevated. "Nature-study, then, stands for *edu-*

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 46, 47, 41.

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cational organization based on direct human interest in nature. Science stands for *scientific organization* based on direct interest in organized knowledge for its own sake. . . . Thus . . . it does not seem possible that anyone with experience in schools will dispute the statement *that nature-study minus the scientific organization adapted to mature minds, is the proper work for elementary schools.*"[3] The same point of view is held by experienced teachers in regard to other subjects. They teach hygiene effectively without going into histology or comparative morphology, music without treating the mathematical basis of harmony, grammar and composition without giving a college course in philology or rhetoric. They teach laws and rules, to be sure,—not, however, because their pupils are interested in generalizations as such, but because, and in so far as, these principles help to explain the concrete things of greatest interest.

This selection and organization with reference to the needs of the immature pupil rather than the demands of a perfected science is the guiding principle in moral instruction. Children do not have to organize their ideas of right and wrong around their understanding of the categorical imperative or the theory of utilitarianism. The main business of the school is to get them to perform concrete acts of right conduct. They must be taught to respect property, for example, without entering into the question whether the ultimate sanction for this duty is the 'absolute ought' or 'their own best interest.' When, however, they are old enough to grasp the significance of a great principle like Kant's injunction to act in the way which one would will to be the law for all human kind, the generalization may be offered as a guiding clue in specific cases but not as a means of relating the whole world of ethical experience to a single scientific conception. The aim of moral instruction below the college

[3] M. Bigelow, "The Relation of Nature-Study and Science Teaching," *Nature-Study Review*, Vol. 4, p. 38.

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years is not, as Professor Palmer thinks, a 'study of puzzles,' but an attempt to teach the truths behind familiar experiences in terms that our pupils can comprehend at their present stage of development.

This distinction ought also to answer the objection that young people have no interest in ethical discussion. Undoubtedly they will sit serenely indifferent if we try to expound a whole science of ethics; and we cannot blame them, because they are not interested in generalizations as such. Hear them, however, debating whether it is fair to let a newcomer in the ball-team displace a tried pitcher, or whether their committee has the right to spend more money than was voted in the appropriation, or whether they ought to expel a member who is said to have slandered their club. Their interest now is most intense, because here, to be sure, they have immediate problems to solve. From this point of departure, however, a good teacher can lead them to deeper and wider reflection, to a clearer understanding, for example, of the moral principles behind some of our social institutions. Or, when, to illustrate further, he makes them see why it is that their games of dice are forbidden, or why they themselves disapprove of lying, he prepares the ground for a much-needed insight into the meaning of the laws against gambling and the reason for the world's insistence upon truth-telling. Moral instruction takes it for granted that children normally do a certain amount of thinking; it seeks only to get them to give more thinking to the moral issues involved than they ordinarily give, to think more soundly, and as they grow wiser, to make their thoughts gradually include more remote considerations.

In certain circles, the two objections which we have here criticized are linked with the conviction that moral precept is valueless except as it finds a conscious sanction in religion. There are those who hold that ethical instruction rests upon nothing solid unless it can show its derivation from the fundamental religious assumptions. Is not this, however, closely akin to the pre-

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ceding misconception that we cannot offer wise counsel to young folks without teaching ethical philosophy? The answer is given by experience: our schools are not obliged to tread upon this debatable ground. When school principals, for example, give a series of talks on the right use of school-property, or on the value of coöperation, do they feel obliged to go into the philosophic or religious sanctions, and say that their words are true because they rest upon this or that article of a creed, or text in the Bible? They know that they cannot enter into religious discussion because the schools are supported by a population of widely divergent beliefs, so much at variance that it is impossible to enunciate a doctrine which will not give offence in some particular to some one body or other. The City Superintendent of Schools in New York tried to get a body of the clergy of different denominations to draw up a code of moral instruction for the public schools of his community. The conference came to naught. In his report on the matter, Dr. Maxwell voiced the conclusion which has presented itself to many other students of the problem elsewhere: "In view of this fact . . . that an agreement as to ethical instruction has not been, and probably will not be, reached among the clergy, . . . I here express my conviction that educators should take up the subject, even without the aid of the clergy, and formulate large rules of conduct which may be illustrated by innumerable particular instances, and *which are so well founded in the usages of civilized communities, and so well attested in the lives of noble men and women, that no one will be bold enough to gainsay their validity.*"[4] The words which we have italicized strike bottom as far as public education is concerned: there is an undeniable moral heritage into which all right-minded people alike, no matter what their religion, wish their children to enter; and into this common heritage our public schools can and ought to lead.

[4] Report of the City Superintendent of Schools, for the year 1908.

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The unwillingness of the schools to provoke the religious question does not therefore leave them helpless before their great task of moral guidance. Religious teaching they must perforce leave to other agencies; moral education they may and can give, and effectively, too. Deficient as our public system in too many cases has been, it is also true that its best teachers have done much to quicken their pupils' lives into good without raising the issue of the ultimate religious sanctions. Convinced by experiences like these, the advocates of moral instruction are simply pleading for more of this better practice. They are encouraged by the further fact that the question of ultimate sanctions is rarely brought up by the children themselves. It is only the mature mind which insists upon a metaphysical answer to its inquiries; young people are quite content with secondary explanations.

A fourth misconception is the notion that moral instruction consists chiefly of a preaching of bald generalities. A school principal, addressing an audience of teachers, declared that he saw no opportunity to point a moral, for instance, in a lesson on the Spanish conquest of Mexico. "Cortez was not punished for his inhuman treatment of the Indians," he said; "and we do not know whether he was punished in the hereafter." If the drawing of a moral from a punishment were all there is to ethical values in the teaching of history, one might well be glad to see all attempts at such an aim ruthlessly forbidden. A moral value, however, might be realized in the lesson on Cortez, if the pupils were simply made to hate the cruelty of which his conduct was a type. There would be a sound 'application of an idea to life,'—and, therefore, according to Matthew Arnold, a *moral* idea,— if the lesson made clear the wider truth that people often use their superior powers to do harm to those who are weaker. The best treatment, however, would leave the young people conscious of a nobler way of using such gifts and would inspire them with a love for such exemplars of this better way as the Puritan Apostle Eliot,

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for instance, who employed his talents to make life better for the Indians, not worse. This is something quite different from using (and often distorting) facts of history to prove that good is rewarded and evil punished. Moral education would be richly justified if it did no more than to realize Plato's lofty ideal of a "training in respect to virtue which makes one hate what he ought to hate and love what he ought to love."

It also follows from this conception that moral education is not meant simply for delinquents or for the children of the poor whom we are so prone to regard as needing more of such schooling than the boys and girls of 'respectable' homes. None of our young people, whatever their parentage, are so perfect that there is no need of suggesting higher standards than their present ones or better effort to reach those already accepted. To be sure, the ideals which we hold up will fail to possess vital meaning unless they go with a genuine desire to realize them; but this is no reason for never calling attention to them. Moral instruction might be compared to an attempt to increase our young people's circle of acquaintances in the hope that thus they will be more likely to find the friends whom they really want to cultivate. It is not by any means the poor or the criminal classes alone who need such an opportunity.

Here we may consider the objection that a constant offering of ideal characters to admire, and a constant calling for judgments on acts of conduct do harm by making children priggish. The best excellence, it is declared with truth, is that which grows unconsciously. Nevertheless, it is evidently forgotten that a perfectly unconscious growth is a goal which for the great majority of us, can never be reached. There would never be any need of a word of warning or of a reminder that there are better ways of behavior than our customary ones, if we really grew without knowing it into the best habits of those who are better than we, if we really imitated spontaneously the best examples around us,—but, unfortu-

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nately, we do not. Somewhere, at some time, conduct must receive a certain degree of very conscious attention. It is indeed true that this attention may bring with it a sense of moral self-satisfaction, if not of superiority; but this possibility need not always be actualized. Even if it were not a fact that comrades and relatives are only too ready to shake out whatever moral conceit happens to be generated, there is little danger of its being fostered to any alarming extent when the teacher goes about his task properly, with due tact and a saving sense of humor. For one thing, he can teach his pupils to respect different moral views from their own,—as every good teacher of history and geography tries to do. He can also remind them of how easy duty is for those who have not been tempted so hard as others. Where he is sure that priggishness has set in, he can readily find occasions to prove that there are still greater heights of moral endeavor to be climbed. The method, in short, is similar in many respects to that which is employed to prevent or overcome conceit about skill in drawing or composition or athletics. The possibility of spiritual pride is real and serious, but it ought not to frighten us into letting things alone, when conditions call as loudly for moral betterment as they do in our country to-day.

Another misconception is due to a popular but nevertheless fallacious theory of character. The conscious effort of the school to instill high principles of conduct is called an idle dream on the ground that a loftier morality cannot be inculcated there than is practised in the life outside. According to this view, the attempt to make school pupils honest is doomed to failure until there is more integrity, let us say, in the world of business. This idea is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, namely, that character is something which is inhaled like a physical atmosphere. Character, however, is not an affair of purely passive reaction to environing influences. It is a matter of strength that comes from victory over obstacles. These obstacles are certain

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tendencies in our own make-up which prompt to evil doing. Wrong exists in the environment, but only because human beings commit it. The same traits that incline people to do the bad in the outer world, such as the love of gain or the love of ease, or vanity, are found in the nature of young folks in the school. These germs must be destroyed, to be sure, in the life outside; the efforts of the school must indeed be backed up by the unceasing efforts of the rest of the community to drive out its worst and encourage its noblest; but since the germs of evil are lodged also in the individual within the fold, here, too, the bad must be made over into the good. The social-determination view of human improvement is as onesided as the old idea of the complete spontaneity of the moral nature.

Moreover, the environment outside is not composed exclusively of the morally inferior. There are indeed shopkeepers who cheat; but there are also those who give honest weight and make true statements about their wares. In every occupation there are high grades of moral development which are no whit less real than the low. Why, then, may not the imitation which plays so strong a part in character-building be directed to these better examples? Furthermore, if the social-determination argument is sound, why should the schools hold up any standards at all which are higher than those already extant in the environment? In courtesy, in neatness, in purity of speech, the tone of the school is better than that of life in many homes, and certainly higher than the tone of the street. Children are ashamed of ridicule from their comrades when they pronounce the "u" properly in "student" and the "h" in "when"; yet the school would call itself recreant to its trust if it did not at least make the attempt to supply correct standards of speech. If there is no desire for better things, what better place is there to try to create it than the school, and what better time than the years when the worthier influences are still possible? If this is true of a secondary value like good Eng-

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lish, how far more urgent is the need in the case of the primary commandments of the moral law!

The objections which we have here considered serve a very useful purpose. They warn us of no imaginary dangers. Perhaps the greatest mistake of all is our nation-wide tendency to put our trust in isolated devices and quick remedies. We forget too often that character is a matter of the slowest growth and of the most complex interplay of forces. With an all too easy optimism, we are inclined to fancy that just as the teaching of spelling in the school years will insure a permanent excellence in spelling, so moral training, or else the inspiration of good examples in history and literature, or set lessons upon the various duties,—in short, some single happy device, will make for a permanent bettering of the national character. How idle is this hope! No ethical instruction alone will see to it that every legislator of the future spurns a proffered bribe or that 'big business' scorns to offer it. The task of social regeneration is far too vast to be left entirely to the schoolhouse. In like manner, the share in this task which can properly be demanded of the school is too complex to be entrusted to any single one of the agencies there. Moral instruction which does not touch the deeper springs of conduct becomes a fruitless and often harmful intellectual exercise. Moral emotion which finds no opportunity to express itself in the concrete experiences of the daily life, loses itself in sentimental vapor. Moral training, indispensable as it is, has no vital meaning to the children unless it calls to its aid the enlightenment of the judgment and the stirring of the proper disposition. The problem of the school, in a word, is the question not of any one agency, but of three so closely interrelated that none of them can do its allotted work without the other two. Instruction, inspiration, training, are necessary, all three. It is in this triply inclusive sense that the term 'moral education' should be employed.

BROOKLYN, N. Y. HENRY NEUMANN.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

INDIVIDUALISM. Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations. By Warner Fite, Ph.D. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. Pp. xix, 301.

Professor Fite's book, as a recent French reviewer says, is "a curious attempt to resurrect doctrines quite abandoned today,"[1] namely, the doctrines of the essentially self-regarding nature of consciousness in psychology, of rational egoism in ethics, of the social contract in sociology, and of natural rights in political science. The book is, however, the most powerful plea for the reinstatement of individualism in the social and moral sciences which has recently appeared, and as such deserves careful attention.

According to Professor Fite, consciousness is entirely an individual matter; therefore the individual is the original and sole source of all values. Primitively the individual can be considered neither as self-regarding nor as altruistic, but as he becomes conscious he grows, never less self-regarding, but always more so. Consciousness can never, therefore, afford any sanction for an act which has no value to self. Consciousness, therefore, makes the individual not only an end in himself, but the supreme end which must be inclusive of all other ends. Thus there can be no rational sanction for an entirely disinterested act. Reason is essentially the calculation of consequences to oneself. From this it follows that rational egoism must be the good of life. The highest duty is accordingly the duty of self-assertion, not blind, but conscious and deliberate self-assertion. Moreover, with such rational egoism in a society of fully conscious individuals perfect harmony would be secured, because, with the full consciousness of a situation on the part of all, conflict between individuals is impossible. Perfect knowledge in and of itself will secure perfectly rational or right conduct. Virtue and knowledge are, therefore, practically identical. Society, therefore, presents itself as essentially an agreement between individuals. A relation is social in proportion as it is self-conscious; and society is perfected,—the social problem

[1] *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, April, 1911, p. 284.

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is solved,—in so far as relationships come into full consciousness. A few quotations may make the essential points in Professor's Fite's 'new individualism' clearer: "In becoming a conscious individual you become an end in and for yourself and a law unto yourself" (p. 88). "Society is constituted by mutual understanding" (p. 100). "A social action is an action by mutual agreement" (p. 117). "The logic of the social relation is thus precisely that of self and mechanical objects" (p. 174). "So far as I know my fellow I become in logic bound,—by the same logic that binds me to get out of the way of an approaching train,—to include his interests among those to be considered,—not to prefer them to my own or to give them an equal share with my own,—but to place them among the various interests involved in the moral problem" (p. 175). "Some opponent who has reserved his fire may now assail me with this: 'And so what you propose is a principle of social morality constructed out of deliberate selfishness.' Precisely this. Only please be careful not to omit or to ignore the qualifying term deliberate" (pp. 178-9).

In other words, Professor Fite proposes the eighteenth-century principle of 'enlightened self-interest' as a sufficient principle to explain the fully conscious life of the individual, the life of society, and also as a sufficient basis for moral or ethical conduct. Now, there can be no doubt that there is a sense in which individualism must be accepted as an outcome of modern science in both psychology and sociology, and therefore as a basis for the formation of rational ethical ideals. The biological and psychological individual, in other words, is fully accepted by modern science as the unit in both mental and social life, and therefore also in morality. But to acknowledge this is a very different thing from accepting individualism in the true philosophical sense in which Professor Fite explains it; and especially is it different from accepting rational egoism as a basis for morality. The argument of Professor Fite's book, that these doctrines are logically identical, must be, on the whole, pronounced unsound, not only from the standpoint of psychology and sociology, but also from the standpoint of ethics and metaphysics.

In the first place, there is no good evidence for Professor Fite's assumption of the exclusively individual nature of consciousness. There is much evidence, on the contrary, to show

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that consciousness has been evolved quite as much in connection with the life of groups and the adaptations of groups as in connection with the adaptations of individuals. The apparently social or impersonal nature of much of our consciousness Professor Fite does not stop to explain, but simply denies that it is possible for consciousness or reason to give value to, or sanction to, any act which is not essentially self-regarding. It would seem that in denying the social or impersonal nature of much of our consciousness our author is guilty of the same psychological fallacy which he accuses so many others of committing, namely, that he thinks mental processes must be in actuality what they appear to be through reflective introspective analysis. Surely Professor Fite has no warrant for his assumption that destructive conflict would entirely disappear in a society of fully conscious individuals. Consciousness, by the way, with Professor Fite becomes a sort of a 'god of the machine' which rules absolutely once that it has appeared, and is in itself the only possible end. A functional view of consciousness is, therefore, derided. As to our author's view that the individual is the original and sole source of all values, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that while the individual's consciousness may be the active evaluating agent in a group, that by no means makes it the sole source of value. Professor Fite's psychology is not the generally accepted psychology of the scientific world to-day.

As to Professor Fite's sociology, we have already seen that society according to him is "constituted by mutual understanding"; that the social relation is necessarily a self-conscious relation. This intellectualistic definition of society makes the essence of the social life to consist in mutual agreement; consequently, society is essentially an intellectual construction. This conclusion is, of course, the opposite of that which has been reached by most modern sociologists, and hence the sociologists are particularly attacked by Professor Fite, although comparatively few of them are guilty of the mechanical view of society which he attributes to them, and none of them, so far as the writer of this notice knows, believes in the preëstablished social harmony, for holding to which he criticises Professor Dewey so severely. It may be suggested in criticism of Professor Fite's sociological theories that if he had taken the view that there is such a thing as a collective or common life he

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would not have found so many difficulties in reconciling individual consciousness and social activity. The psychological view of society by no means necessitates an individualistic view.

Professor Fite pours unmeasured ridicule upon the social view of morality and especially upon the accepted Christian view, that the moral consists essentially in the service of others or rather of humanity as a whole. Very rightly our author points out that the modern world has inherited from the past two conflicting ethical ideals,—the Christian ideal of brotherly love, service, and self-sacrifice for the sake of service, and the Greek ideal of self-realization, self-culture, and rational self-assertion. Professor Fite sees nothing but Oriental mysticism in the Christian teaching. The whole purpose of his book, as he tells us, is to justify and develop the Greek point of view; and the fundamental thesis in Greek ethics is the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. Rational self-realization is possible through consciousness, but brotherly love or the brotherhood of man is simply a mystical ideal which is not only unrealized, but unrealizable. Justice, not love, must be the social ideal according to Professor Fite, and justice is simply the harmonious organization and adjustment of the self-seeking interests of individuals. In criticism it may be said that Professor Fite makes love, as he himself expressly says, simply a matter of feeling, whereas the Christian teaching is very manifestly that love is primarily an attitude of the will, an attitude of service and helpfulness toward others. Again Professor Fite makes absolute self-sacrifice and self-effacement the Christian ideal, whereas the implied teaching of the gospels is clearly that sacrifice should be for the sake of service. Neither in economics nor in ethics, our author tells us, is cost, or sacrifice, a criterion of value; but it may well be replied that both in economics and in ethics social service is the criterion of value in the long run. In drawing this clear antithesis between the Greek and the Christian ethical ideals, between the individualistic and the social view of morality, Professor Fite has performed a distinct service to ethical thought.

Much might be said, of course, from the standpoint of metaphysics in criticism of the whole position of the book. It might be argued, for example, that individualism is much more consistent with materialism than is the social view. At any rate,

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most of the extreme individualists of the eighteenth century were materialists. But space does not permit any criticism of Professor Fite's implied metaphysics. A mechanical view of the social life, however, by no means follows from the rejection of his individualistic premises, as he implies.

The book is profoundly symptomatic of our age. It expresses the strife between the ideals in our modern life better than any recent philosophical work which the writer of this review has read. Because it does so, and because it puts so strongly the case for individualism in psychology, sociology, and ethics, it certainly deserves to be read, and read carefully, by all who are interested in those disciplines.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

THE MORAL LIFE AND MORAL WORTH. By W. R. Sorley, Litt.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. 147.

The present little book is one of the few contributions in the sphere of moral science that have as yet been made to the admirable series of condensed accounts of special subjects which distinguished authorities are writing for the Cambridge University Press. It well maintains the reputation which that series has won of being intelligible to the cultured layman without being 'popular' in a bad sense.

For the purpose of the present work Professor Sorley treats ethics as an account of virtue. In a general treatise on ethics we might quarrel with this method for beginning with too complex matter; but for general intelligibility, and in view of the limitations of space imposed on the author, this is probably the best method.

The book begins by distinguishing the purely historical view of ethical subject-matter from its properly ethical treatment. And it suggests that the apparent divergence of ethical judgment between different nations and times is largely due to improper limitation of ethical principles to one's own tribe or family. Still this does not of course get rid of the fact that there is a real ethical difference between holding that one ought not to cheat anyone and holding that one is at liberty to cheat strangers. Professor Sorley classifies the virtues into those that are mainly concerned with the individual, those that are mainly

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concerned with society, and the theological virtues. He then discusses the special virtues in turn. Under the first heading he places courage, temperance, and wisdom. Both courage and temperance become very much widened in meaning under Professor Sorley's discussion of them. Courage seems to end by including the characteristic which is desiderated when we are told 'not to be *wearied* with well-doing'; and temperance is made to include any habit of right judgment about relative values where one side must be sacrificed, as where we have to choose between working in the slums or increasing our knowledge of the philosophy of mathematics. Professor Sorley's discussion gives me the impression that he would be unduly severe on the man who chose the latter alternative! Under the subject, wisdom,—as elsewhere in the book,—there is a discussion on the connection between volition and virtue, and it seems to contain a slight confusion. Sometimes it seems to be held that virtue must be a habit of choice and sometimes that any habit that can be modified by volition may be a virtue. I do not see that the latter view can be maintained. The power of intellectual concentration is a virtue because it is voluntary, not because it can be made more or less of a habit by appropriate volition. In the main, however, wisdom seems to reduce for Professor Sorley to the habit of intellectual honesty.

Under the second sub-division, justice and benevolence are discussed. As usual, the discussion on justice,—which Professor Sorley reduces to that of right,—mainly shows the inextricable confusion of our ideas on the subject. The assertion of natural rights is shown to be the statement of the more salient features in any distribution of good that we should call just; but it is also shown that, as stated, these rights are incompatible, and justice must be found, if at all, in some compromise between them. But no suggestion is offered as to a dependable principle of compromise. A difficulty is found in distinguishing justice from benevolence, and it is suggested that for the ideal man in the ideal state they would coincide. But ought we not rather to say that if justice be right distribution of goods (whatever that may mean) to everyone, benevolence is that part of it that deals with right distribution to others?

C. D. Broad.

St. Andrew's University, Scotland.

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WILLIAM JAMES AND OTHER ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. Pp. 301.

We have here a collection of five addresses delivered on occasions varying from a Phi Beta Kappa reunion to a ministers' meeting, and from the commencement of a young women's college to the Heidelberg International Congress of Philosophy. At first sight the subjects of these discourses seem almost as varied as the occasions which drew them forth, ranging from a decidedly stiff and critical discussion of the problems of truth to a sympathetic and semi-theological consideration of immortality. But the variety is more apparent here than real. These discussions are rich and suggestive applications, in these various fields of interest, of the philosophical system which we in America have come to associate with Royce's name, that of idealistic absolutism.

The first discussion is doubtless the one of greatest popular interest, that on William James and the Philosophy of Life. It may be doubted whether there has appeared any other estimate of James's thought at once so appreciative and so discriminating, so revealing and so just. These two long-time friends and near neighbors were at the antipodes philosophically. They were always dear protagonists, none the less frank because personally friendly. James is here given a high place indeed, named as one of the three American thinkers who have made "novel and notable and typical contributions to general philosophy," Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William James. And the last is evidently not estimated as the least of the three. James is declared to be our national philosopher, because "he understood, he shared, and he also transcended the American spirit" of activity and efficiency. His greatest contribution after all was perhaps not as "the great psychologist, the empiricist, the pragmatist, but as the interpreter of the ethical spirit of his time and his people." James's most significant philosophical work is said to be the volume entitled "The Will to Believe," and not "Pragmatism" or "A Pluralistic Universe."

The second address, on "Loyalty and Insight," is a most excellent summary of Royce's book, "Loyalty." If the young ladies at whose commencement this address was delivered fol-

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lowed it loyally even unto the end, with insight, then they deserved to have, in James's phrase, a "moral holiday" along with their diplomas. Loyalty is defined as "the thorough-going and practical devotion of a self to a cause." A cause which is fascinating to his sentiments and "is also one to which the loyal man is meanwhile practically and voluntarily devoted, so that his loyalty is no mere glow of enthusiasm, but is an affair of his deeds as well as of his emotions." Loyalty always rests on personal affections, yet one can never be genuinely loyal to an individual human being, for loyalty is essentially a social sentiment. Even the loyal life of friendship of two friends is not just the life of either or both of the two friends, but "is a new spiritual person on a higher level." This is especially true when the object of loyalty is a social class,—as your country, your church, your particular group. Here the object of your loyalty is a spiritual unity as real as you are, and is at once personal and super-personal; a person because only between persons can the loyal relation exist, and a super-person "because no mere individual human creature, and no mere pairs or groups or throngs of human beings can ever constitute unified causes. Only some sort of organized unity of social life can either do the work of an unit or hold the effective loyalty of the enlightened worker."

One of the most interesting parts of this study in ethics is Royce's appeal to the character of science in proof of the idealistic and personal nature of reality. In order that science may be at all, it is necessary to presuppose "that human experience has, or can by the loyal efforts of truth seekers be made to possess, a real unity, superior in its nature and significance to the nature and significance of any detached observer's experience, more genuinely real than is the mere collection of the experiences of any set of detached observers, however large." The coming to see the truth of this situation is that true and necessary insight, and loyalty—"is essentially adoration with service" to a "cause." This is essentially a religious attitude; and, apart from this loyal attitude, there can be no religion.

This ending leads, naturally, to the next subject, "What is Vital in Christianity?" "What is most vital to Christianity is contained in whatever is essential and permanent about the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement." The sound of this is doubtless more orthodox than the outcome of it. The

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essential and the permanent element in the doctrine of incarnation is the necessity which the Absolute has of finding its expressions under the limitations of the time and space order. In order to be at all, the Absolute needs these finite human expressions no less than they on their part need the Absolute that they may be. Each human expression is an attempt of the Absolute to win perfection through the limitation and imperfection of finiteness. This process of the Absolute winning self-expression in finite conditions raises the problem of the second great Christian doctrine, the atonement. The atonement is the manner in which the Absolute is able to take upon itself the form of human flesh and dwell amongst us. Only by being man, can God save men, for it is only by sharing man's experience, in weakness and limitation, and triumphing over these human sins, that God can redeem, make apparent, bring to fruition, his infinite purposes embodied in the sons of men. But the kind of human experiences that come immediately to mind in protest against such a view are the unsuccessful, the sorrowful, and the tragic experiences. Surely God is not in this storm and fire and earthquake of human sorrow! Yes, these, too, are forms of the Absolute's finite strivings toward perfection of human expression. It is just because God suffers with us that he is our God. So the problem of evil, so far from destroying religion, is the condition out of which it arises. On the whole it seems about the most profound and significant note struck in theology in our day. This treatment of these cardinal Christian doctrines goes much deeper than the shallow rationalizings which form the most part of what is called "New Theology."

The fourth address concerns itself with "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion," and was delivered before the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, 1908. In some sense this is the most serious of the five essays. It is certainly the heaviest; there is a circulatory repetitiousness about the style which contrasts sadly with the clear, fascinating style of "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" and "Studies of Good and Evil." The first of the three motives in the modern discussion of truth is seen in the recent philosophical movement called, in America, pragmatism, and in England, humanism. It is a part of the modern tendency to interpret all our interests in evolutionary terms. The second of these

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motives is the same as that which in ethics we call individualism, and is perhaps best called voluntarism, for it says that truth is won by willing, by creative activities. The third motive is especially evident in the creation of a new logic, which is perhaps best called "a new and general theory of the categories" and it is hoped that the outcome of it will be "a new synthesis of voluntarism and absolutism."

The fifth discussion is concerned with that oft recurrently disproved, but ever recurrently interesting human hope,—immortality. This chapter is a supplementary word by Royce to his Ingersol lecture on the same subject. In the introduction it is said: "The present way of dealing with the concept of immortality also gives me the opportunity to sketch anew some of my general idealistic theses, and incidentally to repudiate the frequent and groundless assertion that my own form of idealism regards time as 'unreal,' or the absolute as 'timeless,' or the universe as a 'block.'" "All questions about immortality relate to some form of the continuance of human life in time, beyond death." But what is time? "All questions about immortality relate to the survival of human personality. But what is our human personality?" Time is defined in voluntaristic terms: it is indeed indefinable and meaningless except as the form in which a conscious will process expresses its own coherent series of deeds and meanings." "We define the time relations practically, and in terms of deeds done and to be done." If we generalize our time experience, then the necessary conclusion is "that the entire world is the expression of a single will, which is in its totality continuous with our own, so that the past and future of our personal will is also the past and future of this world will, and conversely."

So much for time. And as to the other presupposition of immortality, personality, this, too, is described in terms of absolutistic idealism. The will here, also, is the significant element. "A man, as an ethical being, is what he purposes to be, so far as his purpose is as yet temporarily expressed. So far as his will is not yet expressed, his life belongs to the future." We demand, and rightly, future enough in which fully to express our wills. But as our present purpose is but the fragmentary and partially understood purpose of the world will, it turns out that we need as much time as the Absolute may require to fulfill that part of his purpose which we are.

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This doctrine of immortality assures to all those whose lives embody a strongly significant purpose a long continuance of personal existence beyond death. Perhaps the richest of human personalities will continue forever to be "needed by the Absolute" as persons, and in any case the continued existence of every one who has won personality is safe, for he will be embalmed in the memory of the Absolute.

The volume is fascinating in the controlled mental daring of its reach. Some of the problems most at the center of human interest are here marshaled before us, and treated with a freedom that never relaxes its unity of purpose. Royce's message is the same old profound message as that of all the great philosophers,—a message of interpretation to men of the real meaning of their own purposes. The more we hanker after pluralism in ideals and the new gods of immediate efficiency and success, the better it will be for us to read this book and others like unto it in spirit.

EZRA B. CROOKS.

Northwestern University.

WANDLUNGEN IN DER PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART. By Prof. Dr. Julius Goldstein. Leipzig: Verlag von Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, 1911. Pp. vii, 171.

Professor Goldstein celebrates the downfall of rationalism, and hails three men, William James, Henri Bergson, and Rudolf Eucken, as the pioneers of a new philosophy suited to modern needs. He uses the name rationalism, which he applies to all philosophy up to about 1850, when the new age dawned, to describe what he regards as the fundamental common characteristic of the most diverse schools of thought,—namely, that they all assume that philosophy must be based on the same principle as the sciences, of which the model is provided by mathematics; and he then argues that this assumption is no longer tenable, the ideal of science, which is to establish a closed system of changeless and timeless judgments, being now proved to have no philosophical validity. For science, he says, has lost its 'epistemological autonomy,' by which is meant that it is now recognized as being incapable of understanding life. This is shown under five heads. (1) Philosophies of history, like Hegel's, are exploded; no one thinks that we can discover gen-

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eral laws governing events. For modern technical inventions have made history irrational: *i. e.*, thanks to machine guns and wireless telegraphy the course of social, political, and economic changes can never be safely predicted. (2) Belief in the absolute truth of any religion has become impossible; it is not dogma, but religious experience, that is important now. (3) In ethics it is generally admitted that no ideals hold good universally. (4) In physics and chemistry everything has turned out to be much more complicated than our ancestors expected, and there are no laws of nature having *a priori* certainty. (5) In biology the search for universal laws is abandoned, the tendency being to regard life as irreducible to the inorganic. In short, there is no absolute truth anywhere. All is fluid hypothesis. Mathematics remains the only deductively certain science, because here "we are in the sphere of our own thought;" everywhere else "we see the brimming stream of life overflowing the barriers once raised against it by rationalism."

But if science is now content with modest approximations and has given up the old alleged *a priori* necessities of thought, why do philosophers still cling to their *a priori* truths? I have no space to expose the ambiguities enfolded in this question; it must be enough to state Professor Goldstein's answer, which is simply that most philosophers are the slaves of tradition and hate anything new; they are, as he amusingly puts it, intellectual *rentiers*, always calling out for the police when their darling absolute truths are attacked. But the forces of progress, as represented by James, Bergson, and Eucken, are against them. These men "see things again with their own eyes, and hear again the rush of the life-stream beneath the frozen crust of concepts." The author's summary of Eucken's views is short, and he fails to make plain the connection between his idealism and the views of James and Bergson. The account of James, on the other hand, is excellent, bringing out very clearly the connection between his psychology, his pragmatism, and his theory that in subliminal consciousness we have glimpses of a higher reality, a theory, by the way, which seems the less convincing the more is known about the pathology of subconsciousness. The section on Bergson is good, too, but Professor Goldstein seems to be wrong on one important point. He says (p. 146) that Bergson's rejection of 'intellectual' methods only applies to living organisms, and that he allows science to attain

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complete truth in the realm of the inorganic. Bergson no doubt often says something like this, but his main view surely is that the truths of science are mere convenient, provisional, schematic statements. The point is interesting, as it illustrates a confusion common in these writers. They often imply that it is only in the attempt to understand mental phenomena that the use of our reasoning power is illegitimate, for it does seem absurd to say openly that reasoning cannot lead to any true conclusions in, say, thermo-dynamics. But then philosophy deals not only with mental phenomena, but also, in so far as it discusses problems about matter, space, and time, with the same subject-matter as physics or dynamics, and what is wanted is some pretext for discrediting reason as a weapon of investigation in the whole of philosophy; hence they constantly argue that the special sciences do not give us genuine truths, and thence infer the futility of reasoning about any of the contents of the universe. Thus what it comes to is that intellect is well enough in useful but humdrum occupations like science, but the philosopher who wishes to embrace the whole of reality needs some higher principle. In science our beliefs have to be based on clear and consistent demonstration; this is not amusing enough for philosophers (Professor Goldstein holds, with Bergson, the extraordinary view that logical consistency would make it impossible for anything new or surprising to happen in the universe), who have accordingly discovered the grand principle that in philosophy the proper method is to believe anything that we like.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

Cambridge, England.

IDEALISM, POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE. By Alice Blundell. London: John Ouseley. Pp. 106.

This little work is evidently written by a young writer of ability, but her style is so queer, involved, and tortuous that it is hard to make out what she means.

It contains three essays, the last a clever, learned, but not very effective diatribe against modern democracy, put in the mouth of Pericles; the first a short metaphysical study, which, if I understand it rightly, aims at a comparison between (1) the relation of intellectual apprehension in general to its ob-

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jects, and (2) such a relation as that involved in a judgment of value being passed on things in virtue of the interest we take in them practically. For example, we apprehend that a hundred dollars are there, existing 'in space': here we have a relation of general apprehension; but we may also deem them to have an economic value, because, and only because, we connect them with possibilities of pleasure and pain. This connection that we make may fairly be called a mental contribution drawn from our practical nature. Does it, or does it not, 'falsify' the facts? If not, the conclusion is suggested that there might be no reason to shrink from saying that intellectual apprehension in general was a contribution to fact and yet did not falsify it. Miss Blundell refers (p. 16) to what she calls, rightly, I think, "the logically antecedent question whether some fact, into which it (the apprehension) is entering, exists to be interpreted," and she makes the very enigmatic remark that to this question "the relation of apprehension will be theorizable as an indisputable answer." What does this mean? That without apprehension there *is* no fact, of any kind, sort, or description? And if so, is there *any* residuum? And if so, *what?*

The greater part of the book is taken up with a discussion on optimism. At the outset Miss Blundell distinguishes between different forms of teleology and asserts that intellectual teleology contributes little to the question whether the world is worth while. But does not that just depend on what is involved in the ideal of perfectly understanding the world? One thing at least is surely involved: the grasp in some sense of reality. Even if that reality is held not to be outside the thinker's thought, there would still be the reality of the thinker, and until he had, as we might say, 'realized' his own reality, he would not have understood the whole. Now it might be maintained, rightly, in my opinion, that merely to grasp the whole of reality and know it, even if that reality were evil, would be in itself a great good. Miss Blundell says thought "cares nothing for reality," but it is difficult to see how she could defend that. Perhaps she only means "a reality which it could not in any sense conceive." There is the still more important question whether even the intellect could be satisfied without an answer to the question Why? and whether that answer could ever be given except from a point of view that saw all things working ultimately to the production of good. But it may be granted

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that no system has yet reached such a point of view, and, of course, in any case to have a sound judgment of value is not the same as to be sure that things embodying those values exist or will exist.

Miss Blundell's general survey leads to the conclusion that thoroughgoing optimism must be given up: a wide surplus of pain is here, among finite beings in this world, and even absolute pleasure in the Absolute could not cancel this. But the argument in point depends on the precise relation between the Absolute and the finite. Moreover, as in all questions between 'optimism' and 'pessimism,' the further question of immortality is of supreme importance, and apparently Miss Blundell holds (p. 43) that the unknown possibilities of life after death should make us suspend our final judgment.

The 'Experience of Beauty' she sweeps aside as of little use for optimism, somewhat too hastily, for the astonishing fact remains that a Shakspere can so write a drama in which an Iago appears as to bring comfort in some mysterious way to the soul. Nor will she admit that the production of moral goodness can justify the suffering in the world, although she grants that "no accumulation of lesser goodness could compare with the rarest good grown in the worst wrongnesses in the world." Miss Blundell attacks the old problems with life and courage and does not shrink from crossing swords with such a writer as Bradley, but her conclusions are almost always fired at the reader far too much in the 'pistol-shot' fashion.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

The Vitality of Platonism and Other Essays. By James Adam. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. viii, 242.

We have here a collection of papers put together after the death of their author, a distinguished Cambridge scholar. The first five are variations on a central and evidently a favorite theme,—the thought, namely, that there runs through the whole of Greek philosophy and poetry a chain of ideas which leads up to and is substantially identical with the leading principle of Christian theology. This principle is the doctrine of the divine immanence, and though the author's object is to do no more than expound and illustrate it by quotations from poets, philosophers,

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and prophets, ancient and modern, it is clear that his interest in it is not merely that of the historian or scholar; his motive in dwelling on this analogy between Greek and Christian thought is partly the attractiveness of the belief that we are all parts of the universal divine spirit. And evidently one reason why the belief attracts him is that he regards it as true. For instance, he often speaks as if the fact of its occurrence before the Christian era were some confirmation of its truth. Again, in one place he explicitly describes the doctrine of the logos as a 'fundamental truth'; in another he says that not only do poetry and religion make us feel the omnipresent divine unity, but science presupposes it. And Platonism is 'vital' because in Plato we find the noblest pre-Christian expression of this truth. The world-soul of the *Timaeus*, for instance, is identical with Nature, which is a direct emanation from God, and hence the divinity of the human soul easily follows,—a line of thought which culminates in the Hymn of Cleanthes (ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γενόμεσθα), where 'the distinction between Pagan and Christian seems to fade away.' In the second essay this doctrine with its various consequences is traced from Pindar upwards, through Aristotle and the Stoics, to the Pauline writings. There is little that is new in the parallelism, but the subject is handled with a mild and not ungraceful fervor.

The third essay is the most interesting in the book. Its thesis is that the word logos in the fragments of Heraclitus means, not 'my reasoning,' but the divine principle of Reason, which is identical with the world-forming Fire. A good deal of evidence is brought forward for this interpretation, which makes Heraclitus, with his theory of the ultimate harmony of opposites, the first founder of pantheism in Greek literature. We next have an analysis of the Hymn of Cleanthes directed toward displaying its points of contact with Christianity. Faced with the question why Stoicism, since it was almost Christian in doctrinal essentials, never became popular but remained a religion of the *élite*, the author finds the reason in the fact that it lacked the one necessary factor of driving power,—the personification of the logos in Christ. The fifth essay discusses various Greek attempts to solve the problem of evil.

Anyone who is familiar with Plato and the poets will get much pleasure from running over the familiar quotations with which this book is full, but he will probably have an uneasy feeling that all really interesting questions are being evaded. Thus

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how much more pointed this confrontation of Greek with Christian writers would be, if the end it serves were made to seem worth while by some discussion of the validity of the theories illustrated. An instance of this evasion occurs in connection with the Stoic indifference to immortality. 'We need not inquire,' we are told, whether Stoicism was right or wrong in insisting that virtue should be pursued for its own sake rather than for the sake of rewards after death. Why need we not inquire? The reflexion occurs that it is perhaps because the consequences of inquiry would be humiliating for Christianity. Take, again, the paper, the last in the book, on the value of a classical education. What one naturally expects is some estimate of its value in comparison with other methods of education; what we get is a description, rather vague and high-flown, of the beneficent effects of the classics on character, with no attempt to show that no other discipline would produce equally good effects. An extraordinary slip may be noted at the beginning of this essay. A friend of the author's, it seems, was constantly asking, as to classical education, *cui bono?* and it is plain from the context that this phrase is taken to mean, What good is it? and not, what of course it does mean, Whom does it benefit?

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

Cambridge, England.

ROMAN STOICISM: Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with special reference to its Development within the Roman Empire. By E. Vernon Arnold, Litt.D., etc. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. ix, 468.

In Dr. Bussell's work on "Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics," which I reviewed recently in this JOURNAL, one special aspect of the school was brought out, namely, its approximation to a 'Buddhistic' quietism. Professor Arnold's treatment might serve to correct this presentation if taken as exclusive. What he brings out especially is the interesting detail of the Stoic ethics, its humanity,—both in the general sense and as opposed to ascetic aversion from the world,—and its essential moderation in practice. His own exposition has something of the character impressed by the Stoics of the transition who passed on the philosophic doctrine from Zeno and his successors to the

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Romans of the Empire. Teachers like Panaetius and Posidonius, in their different ways, as he notes, made Stoicism accessible to a larger world by giving it a more literary and even a semi-popular character. Thus while in Professor Arnold's work we get a much more balanced view than in Dr. Bussell's, we are still left by both writers dependent on more technical expositors for exact knowledge of the system as a scientific structure. Perhaps we ought not to expect this exactitude in relation to the early period in works dealing with later or with Roman Stoicism; and certainly no fault can be found as regards full and accurate citation of the sources. The citations, it may be mentioned, are in the form of footnotes, and are not, as in Dr. Bussell's work, incorporated in the text without translation; so that the general reader will find the book easier.

Students of the transitional and eclectic period of Stoicism have recently found their attention much directed to Posidonius, who had a powerful influence in bringing the philosophy into sympathetic relations (absent at first) with popular religion. A tendency resembling this may be noticed in Professor Arnold. Regarding Stoicism (unlike Dr. Bussell) as a system with a permanent value, he tries to show, first that it arose as one portion of a religious propaganda from East to West; and, finally, that it contributed considerable elements to nascent Christianity. In this last aspect, he holds that its interest is not yet exhausted. To demonstrate the Stoic elements in the earliest Christianity, and through this demonstration to carry them forward into the Christianity of the future, is for him a living problem. In both his historical contentions, a portion of truth may be admitted. Philosophy, as he insists at the beginning, did not develop apart from relation to the propagandist religions of the East. On this, I think, something remains to be made out, but I will not discuss it here. It is quite true that "the era of philosophy is the era of the world-religions" (p. 4). And Christianity, growing up in the period of official Stoicism, naturally absorbed much of it till later the Platonizing movement became predominant and determined its theory of the soul, as Stoicism had largely furnished the basis of its ethics. Yet on neither side do Professor Arnold's positions seem wholly true. The history of a philosophic school cannot be summed up as essentially a transition between two phases of religious propaganda. Undoubtedly Stoicism had religious affinities. Its origins, with

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those of Greek philosophy in general, as I have allowed, cannot be wholly understood in isolation from the propaganda of the 'universalist' religions. Yet, in spite of this I hold that the impression which, as the author says, has arisen from Roman literature and is still widespread, "that Greece was the birthplace of philosophy, and that its triumphs must be placed to the credit of Hellenic culture" (p. 3), is substantially true. Philosophy, for all its contacts with religion, was a thing of a new kind, not simply one 'new religion' among others. If, in the end, it had merely furnished elements to that which became, at the close of the ancient world, the triumphant religion, and had not again recovered its independence, it would have been lost as philosophy. So on the other side, a Christianity interpreted as Professor Arnold in his concluding chapter suggests that it may be interpreted, namely, as a kind of philosophy with an emotional coloring, would not be the religion of the historic Christian Church.

Thus it seems to me that his tone in referring to the repression of the new religion under the Antonines results from a misunderstanding. 'Pious' as Marcus Aurelius no doubt was personally towards the ancient gods, he certainly did not persecute the Christians from a horror of their 'atheism.' And indeed I must observe that in a passage where this is suggested, the reference (p. 124, n. 137) to M. Aurelius, xii, 28, is misleading if supposed to bear out what is said in the text: namely, that the emperor held in reserve "the sword, the cross, and the stake for the atheists who refused to be convinced." This comes not from anything said by the emperor himself, but from the legend of the Lyons martyrs, regarded by competent critics who have gone further than Renan in discounting ecclesiastical presuppositions, not as an authentic document, but as a romance. And Renan himself, in spite of his acceptance (in one place though not in another) of the legendary details, points to the true ground of the procedure against the Church by the Roman government, when he says that a state tolerant in principle found itself compelled either to persecute or to become a theocracy. As to the number of martyrdoms, Origen, in the middle of the third century, recognizes that up to then they had been very few.

It is curious that while, in the passage just referred to, Professor Arnold explains the supposed severity of the philosophic

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emperor by the remark that he was, after all, a king, he makes a point elsewhere of protesting against the 'republican prejudices' displayed by the Stoics of the first century. He does not say whether he considers it one manifestation of those prejudices that, as he very reasonably puts it in speaking of the reign of Caligula (p. 393): "We may infer that, like the Jews, they resisted tacitly or openly the claim of the emperor to be regarded as a god"; but he is careful to note that, in the persecution of the philosophers under Nero, "the modern historian finds extenuating circumstances" (p. 399). Elsewhere (p. 20) he remarks that "in the first century of the principate Stoicism imparted a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which otherwise would evoke little sympathy." Apparently his own view is that the Cæsarean monarchy introduced into the administration a more liberal spirit than that of the Senate; and yet, when it comes to detail, he has to assign to the second century the genuinely liberal movement by which the law was systematically rendered more humane under the influence of Stoicism. Now the empire from Nerva onwards was definitely a new departure in which the senatorial (and especially the Stoical) opposition came into power. The monarchical form, as the author correctly notes, was not condemned by the philosophers as a class. What no ancient philosopher could approve of, as he might have pointed out more clearly, was absolutism.

I note finally a detail of terminology where a preference (not to say prejudice) decidedly not republican is displayed. For the name of the 'ruling principle' in the soul the author selects as translation the term 'principate'; adding as comment (p. 90, n. 81): "There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using this term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the soul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus. There is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by the Latin writers." Why it was not developed is obvious. Professor Arnold himself has noted how, in spite of the ease with which they could have brought it within their system of historical explanations applied to religions, the philosophers, whether on good terms with the government or not, tacitly disdained to find a place for the contemporary deification of the emperors. To Stoicism under the principate, nothing could have been more

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antipathetic than to lay stress on the use of the same name for the power of the emperor and for that which in the soul corresponds to deity in the world.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

THE PLEROMA: AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY. By Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909. Pp. vi, 163.

The object of this book is to show that "Christianity is not the result of accident, but of necessity," and to indicate how "its doctrines, its ceremonies, and its ethics are the product of given conditions." Dr. Carus explains that "the author's method is purely scientific," and that "he has investigated the origin of Christianity as a botanist would study the growth of a tree." The spirit in which he approaches what to him seem the facts of history is indeed what one looks for in a scientist. It is truth-seeking, hospitable to new ideas, and independent, yet conservative in the best sense, reverent, and appreciative of relative values. There is an effort at comprehensiveness of research, a manifest eagerness to cast at least a glance at every fact likely to have a bearing on the subject under discussion, a desire to examine each question from every viewpoint that promises new light. No scientific inquirer will be seriously disposed to take up the cudgels against the main contentions of the author. His fundamental positions are perfectly self-evident. All historians worthy of the name believe to-day in a law of cause and effect and in an evolution of man's social life, including his religious consciousness and its expressions. A botanist feels under no obligation to spend half his time explaining that the tree has grown up out of the ground, and has not fallen down from the sky. We might therefore easily get the impression that this author has used too much force in breaking through open doors. But Dr. Carus knows what deeply rooted prejudices there are in this particular field of study, and his emphasis on the natural origin of Christianity is not unnecessary. In an age of excessive specialization there is a need of scholars willing to acquaint themselves in a fashion with the advance of science all along the line and capable of popularizing the results, problems, and experiments in various departments

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of learning. Dr. Carus is particularly fitted for rendering this service. Such is his amazing versatility that no one can read his utterances on any subject without receiving some valuable suggestion, and some helpful stimulus to independent thinking.

It is, no doubt, due to some extent to the restlessness of all polymathy, the insecurity of all universal knowledge, that Dr. Carus sometimes disturbs the confidence of his readers in the 'purely scientific' character of his method. Science demands of its votaries, whether they study the growth of a religion or the growth of a tree, whether they investigate the entire universe or its smallest part, patience and accuracy. It is to be feared that Dr. Carus allows himself to be too much in a hurry to be as careful and correct in his statements as, with his generous equipment, it would be possible for him to be. The list of seventy-four articles by himself "on subjects relating to the origin of Christianity," given on pp. 146*ff*, is impressive, even if one wonders just what the relation to the origin of Christianity is of such subjects as "Naram-Sin's Stele," "The Rosetta Stone," "Mesha's Declaration of Independence," "The Siloam Inscription," "Stone-Worship," "Haeckel's Monism," and forty other topics mentioned. But a perusal of a considerable part of this 'collateral reading' gives the same impression that the author has been unable to find the necessary time for minute study, accurate quotation, and careful proof-reading.

On page 49 Dr. Carus explains that the subject of how much Christianity was prepared in Babylon "is discussed by Schrader in 'Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament,' pp. 377 *ff*." Of the passage then summarized at length Professor Schrader never wrote a line; it was written by Heinrich Zimmern. On pp. 87*f*. the statements appear that "Schrader points out," "Schrader thinks" and "Schrader says," and the quotations are made from a book written by Hugo Winckler, with which Schrader had absolutely nothing to do. In the Index, p. 161, Professor Otto Schrader, the famous linguist of Jena, is made responsible for the speculations of Zimmern and Winckler. It was Professor Eberhard Schrader, of Berlin, whose name these Assyriologists thought proper still to retain on the title-page of the so-called third edition of his work, after they had removed every word written by him and substituted their own joint product. Dr. Carus, knowing these little peculiarities of Ger-

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man ethics, should have looked more closely at the book he was going to quote as the chief authority for some of his most startling statements. Even the most pronounced Pan-Babylonianism sometimes admits the difficulty of finding proof-texts to support its dogmas; and Professor Zimmern does not pretend to have discovered any Babylonian texts referring to the death, burial, and resurrection on the third day of the god Marduk. This should have been noticed before the proof was read of the following statement: "In both ancient Babylon and Phœnicia a kind of Good Friday as well as an Easter Day were celebrated, and it is noteworthy that the resurrection of the god took place three days after his death." It would be noteworthy, if true. But where is the evidence? Professor Zimmern suggests that the moon is visible in the spring three days; but Marduk was a solar deity. It is tantalizing to have to wait for evidence, but patience has its compensations.

There is no evidence that Manichæans, or even Mandæans, existed "in the Augustan age, shortly before and after" (p. 4). Hermes Trismegistus was not a Hellenistic form of the Egyptian Ptah (p. 5), but of Thoth. Until evidence is produced, it is permissible to doubt that Samson's death and resurrection were commemorated in religious festivals in Israel (p. 16). The doctrine of the trinity is not "common to all Gentile religions" (p. 18); the grouping together of three gods does not make a trinity, and even such triads are not found everywhere. No proof whatever can be adduced for the statement that John the Baptist was the great prophet of the Zabians, or Mandæans, in Palestine, and that these Mandæans counted many adherents in Samaria as well as Asia Minor (p. 36). Since Paul is called "a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes," it is, of course, as the author says (p. 46), "absolutely excluded that Nazarenes can mean men born in Nazareth" (which nobody ever supposed), but it does not follow that "the word must be the name of a sect of which Jesus was a member," for the probability is that the word 'Nazoræan' or 'Nazarene' means 'Galilæan,' and applied to Jesus designates him as founder of the sect. One would like to know where, outside of works written in the last few years, "Christianity itself is stated to have developed from the local gnostic sects" (p. 47). Against the assertion that "the house of David had died out with Zerubbabel" (p. 112), the five generations of his descendants men-

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tioned in I Chron. 3:19*ff.*, may be urged and also the part taken by the house of David along with other families in the lament over Hadad-Rimmon (Zech. 12:12). Dr. Carus believes the story that Jesus refused to help a heathen woman, because it was not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs. He accepts as genuine the saying, "Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law," because it stands in strong contradiction to the spirit and principles of the Sermon on the Mount, and the criticism of the law is later than its acceptance. As if there were no Jewish-Christian readers of the first gospel who would be glad to have Paul assigned to the least place in the kingdom of heaven, and the effect of the radicalism of Jesus neutralized by a sweeping confession of faith in the law! No wonder that he thinks it "of very little consequence what view Jesus held." Dr. Carus does not agree with Professors Smith and Drews in their assertion that Jesus never lived. But he does not attach much importance to the life and teaching of Jesus. "Jesus is gone, but Christ remains," "the ideal of humanity, which is not an individual being, but a super-personal presence, not a man who lived and died at a certain time, but like the Platonic ideas, an eternal type," "to use the mystic and profound symbolism of dogmatic Christianity, God the Son begotten in all eternity by God the Father" (pp. 121*f.*).

In the preface to his book, Dr. Carus declares: "We may be assured that even on other planets where rational beings have developed, a religion of universal love will be preached and will hold up the ideal of a divine Saviour, be he called Christ, or Buddha, or the Prophet, or the manifestation of God, and he, representing the eternal in the transient, will be to many millions a source of comfort in the tribulations of life and in the face of death." The stuff of which worlds are made seems indeed to be essentially the same throughout the universe. But spectral analysis indicates that it is differently mixed in different parts; which makes us pause. May there not be some little planet in the temperate zone of some far off solar system where the people are more in sympathy with the principles of the Sermon on the Mount than with the philosophy of the Nicene Creed?

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

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THE APOCRYPHAL ACTS OF PAUL, PETER, JOHN, ANDREW AND THOMAS. By Bernhard Pick. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909. Pp. xiv, 376.

During the thirty years that have passed since Dr. Pick wrote his article on "Acts of Paul and Thecla" in McClintock and Strong's Cyclopædia, our knowledge of the apocryphal acts of the apostles has greatly increased. New material has been found, and a more thorough and critical study has been given to this branch of early Christian literature. Tischendorf's text on which Walker's translation in the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* was based has given place to the more complete and accurate edition of Lipsius-Bonnet. The researches of Richard Adalbert Lipsius, Max Bonnet, and Carl Schmidt, in the first place, but also those of Zahn, Harnack, Hilgenfeld, Hennecke, Pfleiderer, Batiffol, Ehrhard, Bardenhewer, and others, have thrown much light on the character and significance of these works. It was, therefore, a happy idea to supplement the collection of apocryphal gospels and sayings of Jesus published by the same company, under the title "Paralipomena," and reviewed in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July, 1910, with a new English translation of the apocryphal Acts. Only those of Paul, Peter, John, Andrew, and Thomas are given. Hennecke limited himself in the same way in his German translation, but the example should not have been followed. It is especially to be regretted that the important Acts of Philip, of which we possess a considerable part, should not have been included. The numerous other Acts of which we have more or less extended fragments might also profitably have been rendered into English. This would have been all the more welcome as the material is not easily accessible. It is sincerely to be hoped that this volume may be followed by another presenting the rest of this literature so far as it is known to us.

Dr. Pick has provided a general introduction, special introductions and bibliographies to each work, and a number of footnotes referring chiefly to textual variants. The introductions are altogether too brief. They give, on the whole, a good account of text and versions, but a less adequate treatment of the questions concerning authorship, date, integrity, composition, character, and relation to Gnostic and Catholic thought. As the selection was, in the main, limited to the works ascribed

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by Photius to Leucius Charinus, there should have been some discussion of this Gnostic writer, regarded by many as a fictitious personage, or at least a reference to Salmon's article on Leucius in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. When an article like that of Bonnet on the original language of the Passion of Andrew in the bibliography is referred to, the reader naturally looks for a hint in the text as to the conclusions of the distinguished scholar, or an allusion to the original language. Bonnet thought that it was Latin, and set forth some strong reasons for this belief in the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, but every reader may not have ready access to this journal. It is not accurate to say, "Zahn dates the Leucian Acts of John as early as 130." This he did, with some hesitancy in his "Acta Joannis," 1880, p. cxliv f; in his "Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons," 1892, II, p. 864, he abandoned this date for 160 A. D. One misses in the otherwise very complete list of books Pfleiderer's illuminating discussion in "Das Urchristentum," 1902, II, 120*ff.*; on the Acts of Thomas, Bousset, "Hauptprobleme der Gnosis," 1907; on the Hymn to the Soul, Buonaiuti, "Lo Gnosticismo," 1907; and on the apocryphal Acts in general, the excellent article by George J. Reid in the *Catholic Encyclopædia*, not to mention other works. The translation is everywhere good. A larger number of notes elucidating the meaning of the text would have been useful.

The value of these books from an ethical standpoint lies chiefly in the light they throw upon the development of moral ideas, aspirations, and practices in the early church. There was, in the middle of the second century, a strong tendency within the church to asceticism, to the suppression of all natural appetites and pleasures, to fasting, abstinence from wine, celibacy and abandonment of marital relations, finding its logical outcome in the eagerness for martyrdom. The many stories of how, through the preaching of the apostles, the family life was broken up, wives refusing to live with their husbands and betrothed young women determining to remain virgins, are quite characteristic of these Acts. Such a negative attitude toward life was not limited to the church, and had more than one cause. A period of vigorous exertion or of eager indulgence is apt to be followed by one of physical exhaustion, aversion to pleasure, and languorous mysticism. It is nature's way of gaining new strength and higher refinement. Stoicism had taught the virtue

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of self-control up to the point where self-suppression seemed more heroic and noble than self-realization. On the other hand, the doctrine of a personal immortality, proclaimed not only by Christianity but by numerous mysteries and other cult-communities, had created an otherworldliness that counted the conditions and experiences of this life as of little importance. It is well worth observing how wisely, in the historic circumstances, the growing Catholic Church, directed by the sturdy practical sense of Rome, steered the middle course between the extremes, saving the sanctity of the institution of marriage, while retaining in the case of its spiritual ministry the idea of a superior sanctity attaching to celibacy.

There is a tender mysticism in these works, nourished by the cult and by the memories of the holy apostles who not only embodied in their characters the Christian ideal, but transcended the bounds of what was attainable by others in their power of working miracles. The piety is so sincere, the devotion so genuine, the faith so simple and often sweetly expressed, and yet the tales are so manifestly fictitious, without the slightest foundation in fact, that they should be especially valuable to those who still find it difficult to understand how religious romances can be woven out of such material as faith works with by earnest men, willing to give up for the cause they have espoused, not only the ordinary joys of life, but life itself. These authors were Gnostics,—their docetic conception of the Christ and their encratism prove that; but when they wrote, the church in all its parts was so much under the influence of this Gnostic movement that their stories of the apostles continued to be popular reading. It is generally supposed that they have undergone certain mutilations at the hands of orthodox copyists. This is evident from the description given by Photius; but one cannot help asking why they did not remove all the traces of heresy.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION IN EUROPE. By H. A. L. Fisher, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1911. Pp. xi, 305.

Written by an accomplished historian, with historical and not with any apparent doctrinal purpose, this book (based on lectures to an American audience) has for me the interest of

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confirming a position I have been accustomed to maintain with some consciousness of antagonism to those who, in the last century, claimed especially to represent 'the historical sense.' Much used to be made of the supposed absurdity, in the mouths of French Revolutionaries, of the appeal to Brutus and Cassius, and other ancient republicans and tyrannicides, as precedents for their own cause. Brutus and Cassius, it was pointed out, were 'aristocrats'; that is to say, they were describable by the most vituperative term in the vocabulary of those who were founding the new democratic republic. Now Mr. Fisher makes perfectly clear the distinctive features of modern democratic republicanism. He shows how, though it grew up never wholly untouched by classical influences, it always had its direct origin in practical grievances; how, both in America and in France, there was something undesigned in the process that ended in the foundation of a great national Republic,—a state of a new order as compared with any ancient or mediæval city-republic. Yet he leaves no doubt from beginning to end that there was a sound basis for the conception of the republican cause as one. The differences of aristocratic and democratic, federal and unitary, and so forth, are differences within one type, broadly contrasted with the theocratic monarchy that descends in Europe from Cæsar and Constantine. The remote origin of this as of the classical republics he does not follow out; but, opening with a brief sketch of the ideal of European monarchy, as impressively stated by Bossuet, he begins his account of the republican tradition with the revivals of classical republicanism, at first very slight, in the Middle Ages, and arrives soon at the rise of the French Republic; from whence onwards the tradition of European monarchy, though still strong and perhaps even predominant, has been confronted with a definitely republican doctrine.

The European movement, it thus appears from the history, has a sort of cyclical character. From the fall of the Roman Republic to the revived knowledge of earlier antiquity at the dawn of the modern epoch, the tradition of Europe has been mainly monarchical. "The interest in the history of republican Rome dates from the Renaissance." Near the middle of the seventeenth century, it seemed as if absolute monarchy was to be finally triumphant; but then came the English Civil War, to be followed after a period of repose by the American War

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of Independence and the French Revolution; and now Western Europe and America are divided among republics and (more or less) constitutional monarchies. Political freedom, over a certain range, is held to be secure. And the logical community between the republican ideal within the state in ancient and in modern times is not denied. Yet to this logic the author, in a way that to some will seem characteristically English, refuses to yield. The movement that has gone so far is to go no further. We are now to substitute constitutional monarchy as the real terminus of progress. "The republican movement has done its work."

With this last position, especially in view of recent events in Portugal (before the appearance of W. Fisher's book) and in the Far East (since it appeared), I am unable to agree. Of the two forms, he seems to think, hereditary monarchy of the constitutional type is preferable on its merits to formal republicanism; and he does not definitely point out that a constitutional monarchy, according to the defense of it that was almost official in England, is really a kind of republic with a hereditary head. This shows the disadvantages of preserving, for the sake of continuity, an old form of which we repudiate the inner meaning. It may be said with truth that for more than two centuries no other course has been possible; but, merely as a matter of imaginative preference, Liberals at least might have continued to lay all the stress on the idea of Commonwealth, and not assumed, or perhaps sincerely tried to share, an admiration of monarchical institutions for themselves. These last remarks do not apply to the author, who, I cannot help thinking, has been unable, in a realistic statement of the present causes of the revival of monarchical feeling, to repress a touch of sarcasm in his way of putting it. He fully recognizes that the emotional appeal of modern republicanism, in spite of the baser elements that mix themselves with all human ideals when they reach the stage of action, has been to the nobler feelings. And this is what he says on the revival of monarchical feeling in England: "Physical science, which, by planing down social and intellectual inequalities, has given us a democratic civilization, supplies, by a subtle form of revenge, to persons of eminent station, a powerful engine of advertisement and a kind of automatic mechanism for the manufacture of popularity." Then follows an account of the rôle

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of photography, the cinematograph, steam, and electricity, in enabling "the most remote person of all, the head of the State, to take lodgment in the feeblest and humblest imagination." "Thus by a process of ceaseless and multitudinous attrition the image of the sovereign and his circle is stamped into the brain-stuff of the country" (pp. 272, 273). It would have been a pleasure to transcribe the whole passage; but I prefer to send the reader to the book itself. I merely set beside it, as not inapposite, a reference from another page (p. 146) to the Miltonic republicanism of Walter Savage Landor: "To Landor's mind a monarchy seemed inherently vulgar."

As to the prospects for the future, I think not quite enough stress is laid on a certain logical coherence of the two most strongly opposed types,—the formal Republic and theocratic Absolutism; though certainly the author is clear enough on the historic necessity with which republicanism in the Latin countries has become anti-clerical. And for the past a real practical efficacy in logic is recognized. Some of the causes of the triumph in France of the republican principle, it is remarked (p. 62), "belong to the intellectual tissue of the age." Thus while few either among thinkers or practical reformers had advocated a republic in advance, republican institutions came, when once the movement was set going, through a certain compulsive force that there is finally in logic. It may be important to bear this in mind. Whenever our country again has an impassioned mood, the theoretic positions in terms of which political thinking has gone on will not be negligible.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION. By J. Welton, M.A., Professor of Education in the University of Leeds. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. xxi, 507.

In the words of Professor Welton's preface: "This book is a systematic treatise neither on psychology nor on education. It endeavors to set forth the relation between them." This relation he says "must be found in the actual lives of individual children," and his object is to help people engaged in education to study those lives and, it may be, to inspire teachers "to publish precise records of careful observation on points

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which specially interest them." In the introductory chapter, Education and Psychology, he seeks to win the good will of the teacher by a sympathetic discussion of the plain teacher's skepticism of the value of formal psychology. He points out that all experienced teachers who seriously reflect on their work attain a very considerable amount of psychological knowledge and insight. "Teachers and parents in so far as they lack this ('practical psychology') are nothing better than external forces which define more or less narrowly the course of the child's life: they are not, and never can be, agents influencing that course of life from within so as to make it richer and fuller." But save to the heaven-born teacher, this practical psychology is not enough. It needs to be made explicit and in order to guard against error it must be constantly tested and guided by 'theoretical psychology' by a knowledge of genetic psychology in fact. On the other hand, the young teacher is warned that books and introspection alone will never make a psychologist; individuals must be studied in addition.

The book is a most enjoyable one to read. It is free from technicalities and very pleasantly written, but somehow it hardly comes up to the expectation raised by the introductory discussions. It is not sufficiently convincing. This is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that in trying to keep the treatment simple, the author leaves a good many difficulties unsolved. We feel this, for example, in the treatment of mental endowment, habit, suggestion, and imitation. Thus he says "it is apparent that in the copying of a product, as distinct from the imitation of a mode of action, there is a considerable element which is suggestion and not imitation at all. The picture to be copied suggested the actual process of painting." Again he speaks of "the powerful suggestive power Raphael exercises" over the later work of the art student who has tried to acquire the master's style or his skill in coloring. It is not easy to distinguish the difference between this use of the term suggestion and the popular one as when we speak of a 'suggestive idea,' whatever that may be. Moreover, it is doubtful whether where children are concerned "imitation of process is earlier than imitation of result" if we are to accept imitation as implying volition. Only passing reference is made to the problems that modern experimental psychology is trying to solve, and nothing is said of the methods that are adopted. Hence it is doubtful whether

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such a bald quotation as "a child of superior intelligence is a force which should not be wasted" (M. Binet) will convey much meaning to the uninitiated. Again the thread of a gradually developing genetic psychology is not kept clear throughout the book, with the result that the beginner will probably receive less help than it was the author's intention to give. This is unfortunate, as the book will prove very helpful to the teacher who already possesses some knowledge of 'theoretical psychology.' The many classroom problems scattered throughout the book are admirably discussed: the treatment of interest and attention is very stimulating. The part purpose plays in education and in life generally is repeatedly emphasized though the genesis of purpose is not very clearly developed. As Professor Welton says, we are still a long way from Pestalozzi's ideal of psychologizing education. In the meantime, this book can be confidently recommended to teachers as a real effort in this direction.

C. BIRCHENOUGH.

The University, Sheffield.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JULY, 1912.

THE MANY-SIDEDNESS OF MORAL EDUCATION.*

SOPHIE BRYANT.

MORAL education may be conceived in different ways according to the psychological process in relation to which we regard it; and, as a matter of fact, most types of psychological process are involved in it. It has to do with our thoughts and feelings, our impulses, our habits and our will, and with these in manifold composition. It has to do with our *tout ensemble,* with the way we regulate and express ourselves and react on our environment as a whole. It has to do with the making and training of our personality; and it has to recognize the fact that this personality has its own energies of growth which may withstand educational influence. Nevertheless, education claims control at all points,—demanding that every reaction, not merely in its effect, but as a whole, shall be what it calls *right* in the subjective sense. It claims, too, to bring us up so that we shall react *rightly* in the objective sense on all occasions. The former undertaking it calls the training of character.

Let us begin by considering moral education as the training of character in the general sense well understood by all whose experience of human beings is wide. We speak of a man as lacking in character when his motives are vague, wavering and indeterminate, when he is feeble in purpose and so incalculable as to action that

* The Annual Address to the Moral Education League in London.

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you can never be certain as to the line he will take. One of the special moral problems is the training of such an individual to be a person of *determinate character* on which one can count, with a steady *system of life purposes,* exhibiting organic unity and implying a *life-ideal,* to the realization of which particular impulses and desires are subordinate. Such a person is pointed out with satisfaction as 'a man of character.' A great deal of education in homes and in schools is directed to the attainment of this apparently formal end, the turning out of men and women,—but especially men,—of character—strong, self-united, determined and determinate individuals.

Such persons are determinate because they become intelligible to us in so far as we have discovered the life-ideal which is the key to their system of purpose. They may be exceedingly unintelligible when we try to interpret them by a life-ideal which is not theirs. If egoists and altruists,—classifying men crudely,—were perfectly frank, they would find it much easier to understand each other. But each is apt to clothe himself more or less in conventions expressing the spirit of the other, so that between wolf-clad sheep and sheep-clad wolves our social perceptions are much confused. Even the men of determinate character do not understand one another.

It is obvious that a man who is not a good man may be a man of character. Conquerors, whether in war or politics, in trade or finance may be ruthless, cruel, bad. Milton, according to his lights, made a study of the type. I prefer to point to that great literary creation the Miltonic Satan, rather than to historic examples to whom I might wrongly impute the same titanic egoism. The real men of character who were monuments of selfishness in history probably had weak spots in their armor through which kindly human nature found a vent. The very bad are the brutally selfish who fail in character at some point, whose strength, when they are strong, is marred by some wildness or weakness or twist of incon-

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sistency. The worst have minds like a tropical jungle, a tangle of impulse, imagination and desire, in the midst of the exuberant riotousness of which the human soul, with all its marvellous capacity for rational humane development, lies prostrate, darkened, hard to rouse. A child or a savage may be of this type, and under good conditions, if taken in time, may find his way to light and, in the end, grow up straight, pointing sunwards as all true human nature points. And all the while his plight may never have been discovered. Some are found by education and rescued,—perhaps unwittingly. Some require special personal efforts long sustained.

Experience of such cases makes one feel that there is nothing more essential in moral growth than development of character in the general sense. This, I think, is true; but the truth may be applied in such a way as to prove a serious practical fallacy. Everything depends on the way of life adopted, the life-ideal maintained as the mainspring of character. A parent, or schoolmaster, in love with the idea of character *per se* as the foundation on which to build, may think he is doing very well by stimulating 'prudential self love' for all it is worth and getting the self-regarding motives to combine into a permanent purpose of 'getting on in the world.' So we get the man of character indeed,—we get him as the egoist. It may be the perfect egoist,—Meredith's Sir Willoughby Patterne. With coarser material there emerges Bill Sykes. With commonplace human stuff,—the boy in the street,—there is a chance that his native human kindliness, bubbling up within him, may save him in part from his educational fate. He goes out into life indeed with the idea of duty to self as "a light unto his eyes and a lamp unto his feet." But for all that he has grown up a human boy among his fellows and is probably a great deal more unselfish, more public spirited, and more kindly than he at all intends to be. Especially if he be a poor boy. The rich, in their luxury, security,

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and withdrawal from the common life, are in much greater moral danger.

My point is that development of character in the abstract degenerates all too easily into its growth under the form of determined self-regard. The moral for us is two-fold: (1) We should from the first in our training of character make for the development of altruistic motives, social purposes, and a full composite ideal of life and personality. The training of character must be a training to righteous character all the time. (2) We have a new educational problem opened up before us. What education is required for persons growing up, or grown up in spite of us, on these very natural egoistic lines. This is the problem which the human race, at divers times and in divers ways, has had to solve. It is the subject of a fine old story which has been much misunderstood. How was Jacob the egoist, strong in character, trained by life within and without, to become the devoted, as well as successful, tribal chief?

We are surrounded by character developed to excess on egoistic lines. In most cases it tends to develop a good deal on those lines. We do not, in fact, call a person egoistic unless he is egoistic in excess. Indeed we are all egoists, slightly at any rate, in excess. Schemes for moral education,—both training and instruction,—should therefore on one of their sides make appeal to the individual's desire for his own good in some sense that he understands: it need not be the sense of ease and pleasure. If, indeed, we could catch all the children early and were ourselves omnipresent and infinitely wise, we might train them for the most part into such self-devoted membership of the human community as to realize the great social ideal which is common to modern scientific ethics and to the Pauline exposition of the Christian way of life. I am sure we have to go on doing this as much as we can. It is our main business to which we return again and again.

At the same time we must recognize the primordial

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existence, the obvious naturalness of the crude self-centered way of life. Man is social and sympathetic. He is also solitary, self-contained, needing, indeed, continued spells of isolated self-communing for the development of those reflective powers which make him what he is, capable of understanding and acting in the sense of that natural system of which he is a part.

Now man the individual, no less than,—though not to us so obviously as,—man the social member, needs the moral life. He calls it righteousness, cleanness of heart, purity, *i. e.,* singleness of purpose. This is the language of Hebraic thought leading on to the root-idea of practical religion, the identification of the individual will with the purpose that rules the universe. The next step is the identification of that purpose with the winning to righteousness of the human race; and these two constitute the characteristic idea on which Christian ethical thought turns. In other words, the method of ethical education in religion is from the individual athirst for personal righteousness to the idea of coöperation in the purposes of God, and thence to the realization of that idea in the practical self-devotion of the individual to the service of the human community.

We might describe all this in secularist terms as the quest for personal perfection,—for a sound rich nature entirely at unity with itself, all its chords of impulse, feeling, thought, in harmony, all its life-functions co-operative to noble ends. After all, this is much what Plato said and no doubt Socrates also in the youth of the world. Aristotle, in his own way, which has its peculiar effectiveness for certain minds, teaches a similar lesson. Every man pursues his own good, and the intelligent man pursues it wisely, with careful inquiry into its nature and the way of pursuit. He calls it happiness, but he finds it to consist in the excellent life of the soul according to that reason which is the characteristic of man as Man. Hence it follows that the excellent life consists in the subordination of every kind of activity to that right

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mean of sufficient, and not excessive, abundance which reason requires.

Thus Greek thought begins with the individual and makes reason the centre of his virtue. Wisdom stands forth as the ruling virtue, temperance and courage as its necessary allies in the governance of the whole. Within this scheme all the little virtues fall into their place. No man can be virtuous in the full sense, therefore, unless he be wise; and this is not given to all. The others, however, can be virtuous in a secondary sense through obedience to the wise.

So far, virtue (except for this dependence on the wise man) is individualistic. For that very reason this line of thought has a peculiar value at the individualistic stage of life: and to some natures at any stage it gives the most effective lead. It starts from the ideal of the individual seeking his own good; and goes on to interest him in the fascinating business of building up his own character, in learning to be brave and temperate and generous by doing brave and temperate and generous acts till by practice they become a joy and the product of natural impulse, by which sign we know that the character is formed. Just so, as Aristotle reminds us, a harper becomes a good or a bad harper by playing well or ill upon the harp. I remember having once taken great delight in this way of seeing the matter. I am sure it helps.

The ideal of character as the end of moral education may be worked to good effect on these lines of inquiry into the nature of the individual personal good, and hence of personal virtue. It is important in every case that this inquiry should be made, as otherwise ideas about the social good may be vague, confusing or even erroneous. It is well to be sure that for others as for self 'the goods of the soul' shall be valued at their worth.

This, however, is only the beginning of the subject. We seem, with the Greeks, to reach the edge of a plateau and look across a gulf for the completion of our quest in

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the land of social virtue on the other side. Greek thought threw a bridge across the gulf and explored the fourth great virtue under the name of justice. In effect, Greek practice assumed the State as the natural medium of the individual life, and expounded the idea of the just man, —presumably identical with the virtuous man,—as one whose life is at all points upright, and more particularly as one who yields to others all that is their due.

Thus in a sense the picture is completed, but it seems that organic unity between the first and second parts is somewhat lacking. The ideal of individual virtue needs a further development,—a development in which, as we shall find, the ideal is democratized,—in order to reveal to us the social virtue to which it tends. For this, it is best to look to modern times. The modern mind has this advantage: its sympathies are more lively and of wider extent, its ideal of universal human solidarity is more practical. An ideal of virtue which leads up to wisdom is not democratic enough to satisfy it permanently.

So we begin again making a fresh start. The life ruled by the pursuit of noble ends,—here is an idea that a child or a Bedouin can understand. Our egoist finds his unifying principle, and with it that balance and harmony for which he craves, when and if he finds the object in devotion to which he realizes all his moral powers. It must be of such a kind as to call out all the riches of his nature, his sympathies and affection, his spirituality and will, the resources of his intellect. He will love it and take pleasure in it and make plans about it and labor for it. As it has to be the object correlated to his virtue it must be such that in serving it he grows into mastery of himself. It has to be the right object for the righteous person, concrete, lovable, needing service. Where can he find it save in a person or persons. He is surrounded with persons,—he is one of a commonwealth of persons. His means of growth, it is obvious, lies in the development of his community with one or more or all of them. At this point he is able to see his fellow as really equal

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to himself: the gusty altruism of his egoistic days becomes a steady breeze, and, as it grows in strength, he perceives further that this community with his fellows which is his means of personal growth is their means of personal growth likewise. Thus a sense of mutual moral responsibility develops in the group. In so far as each has realized for himself a sound ideal of personal good, he will desire to forward its realization in the others. In so far as any*one* has definitely reflected on his personal need for serviceable social life, his thoughts will pass beyond the limits of his immediate surroundings, and the ideal of social service as the object of personal life will be borne in upon him. One in a group who reaches this stage becomes a leader to the others. The most effective moral education is thus achieved. I remember very well when I discovered some of these things. I cannot even state them half as effectively now as I could then.

My contention so far is that in any system of moral education, considered as a "net spread abroad with cords" to catch minds of all sorts and different previous education, room should be left for the treatment of ethics in transition from the standpoint of personal good, conceived as righteousness, virtue, or heroic dignity,—the terms are interchangeable—to that of social service for the realization of such good in all. This in any case is the ideal of the end to be reached. All will not equally need to begin at the egoistic beginning, but I suggest that the opportunity of doing so should be made available for all. Egoism is a mighty force. It cannot be wise to disregard it in our practical logic.

In the above analysis it has appeared that human thought,—the human spirit rather, to use a wider word,—has reached this point by two very different roads. I have called them Hebraic and Greek, respectively, thus commemorating their most familiar starting points, and suggesting the two delightful literatures corresponding. The contrast between them, however, goes deeper than any racial distinction. It divides human beings in every

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land, as no doubt it divides us in this room. Many of us there are moreover to whom the one way is as familiar, or as delightful, or as convincing as the other: the *way of religion,* from the single soul desiring righteousness to the idea of that righteousness as identification with the Universal Will and personal coöperation with it for the realization of the righteous human community: the *way of reason* (or scientific analysis), by natural development from simple egoism to the pursuit of good, seen at last to consist in the virtue of human personality finding its necessary complement in labor for the good, (in the same sense), of the social community. Scientific ethics leaves the matter there. Any sequel there may be is generally classified under philosophy. I could pursue the matter further so as to develop a certain latent parallelism between the ways: but this is not the place or time. I will content myself rather with a simple statement of the idea which lies, as I believe, at the back of the plain man's ethical faith and constitutes the pragmatic philosophy which supports him.[1]

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[1] S. Bryant, "Educational Ends," pp. 115, 116: He may see in it (*i. e.*, the world), a necessity alien to his will, to which he must conform; or he may see it in a partial realization of the purpose which he seeks to realize completely. Nature may seem to him as an enemy to be conquered, or as an ally who has done his work without his conscious guidance so far and is ready now to be guided by him, guiding him also, towards his end. In the latter case he sees himself as sovereign come into an inheritance of natural purpose, which he makes his own by understanding natural law, thus absorbing nature's guidance of him into his sovereignty over her. Society, too, may seem to him an evil thing which he must revolutionize, or a good partially accomplished which it is his purpose to carry out towards its end. . . . And by the same spirit of faith he may look upon his own character, not as a bad thing to be despised, but as a good thing to be made better—as an incomplete realization, but still a realization, of his personal end.

In this way, the impulse of freedom may assert its sovereignty over the past and the present, by asserting the partial realization of its essential purpose in both. This assertion, it is evident, carries us once more beyond the moral into the religious consciousness. We find ourselves asserting that the present has been fashioned as we would have it fashioned, if indeed we could quite clearly understand our own purpose.

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My business here is strictly practical. I suggest that of these two ways neither can be with wisdom neglected. I have trodden both and each has taught me to understand the other better. To each of us as teachers it is essential that we should teach only what we believe and understand,—and not all of that, inasmuch as we should not take our learners out of their depth until they can swim. But as regards the learners I am sure of this: some learners more easily find their way to human fellowship by the short cut of ethical practice and reflection. Some, on the other hand, take no early interest in this, but before we have had them under our influence at all are off on the upper road through the universal purpose, where, without guidance, they may easily lose their way. For myself as teacher I offer both roads and think both best. Especially I would urge that the way of religion which obtains in our schools should be supplemented by such direct social teaching as is necessary to make its application clear. Likewise if our schools were universally secularized, I would urge the necessity of supplementing the ethical teaching in them by effective teaching elsewhere of religion as practical,—a way of life.

In either of these ways, or in both, or in some other, it is, I think, necessary for stable continuity of moral being that a doctrine or idea of moral relationships and personal virtue should be developed in young minds. This, however, is far from being the whole of that many-

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We are driven to this assertion by the claim to sovereignty which we find implicit in our moral consciousness; and such an assertion implies the idea that the world is fashioned by a purpose relative to our moral purposes, and towards the further realization of which they are directed.

Of this religious idea, implied in moral ideas, there are many caricatures, arising from the tendency of the intellect to consider one part of an idea at a time. Thus there is the idea that the world has been so fashioned without any reference to man as further freely fashioning it; whence it is inferred that man is presumptuous when he doubts that it is in its present state a perfect realization of divine wisdom and goodness, and still more presumptuous when he dreams of improving it. In truth his faith in its goodness is relative to his conviction that it is his business to improve it.

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sided activity, moral education. It is not, as you know, even the whole of moral instruction.

Moral education is concerned with the whole of the complex process by which persons grow from worse to better and with the external conditions favorable to that growth. As we have seen, there are two main dangers: (1) There is the danger to which some are, from the outset, condemned, by a self-contradictory or an unstable heredity. These we call weak, or passionate, or easily led, or moody, unreliable, lacking character. These are the Esaus of all times and all races, lacking unity of nature, persistence of purpose. Their contrast—the Jacob of Biblical story—has been my text so far. This was quite without intention,—I did not discover the fact until I had finished the description.

(2) The second danger is universal: it is implied in that very intensity of self-consciousness which places man at the head of beings on this earth; it makes him capable of understanding as a whole both his own welfare and the welfare of mankind, between which two when they conflict he can choose at any point of his life career. The danger is that he will always, or generally, choose the course which, for the moment, appears to his limited vision as best for himself. We have considered that danger, and inferred from its omnipresence the moral necessity of counteracting its influence by the further development of that which is its source, the personal intelligence which, having found the egoistic good as practical object, must go on to find the social or some other cosmic end implied in it. "No man liveth for himself," though most men try. The saddest spectacle in the world is the culmination of that attempt in the unspeakable dreariness of a selfish old age. But youth lacks imagination to fear the solitude of age.

Moral education is above all things an undertaking to provide occasion for unselfish deeds, for the uprush of sympathy and its practical expression, and in general for the development of considerateness toward others as

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an abiding habit of mind. To be touched by the feeling of another, when we imagine it, is not enough: the affections of our own being become our feelings only when we attend to them, *i. e.*, when we bring our self-conscious minds to bear upon them. So also when we have a habit of attending on due occasion to others, of bringing our minds to bear upon them, then we are indeed in touch and disposed to deal with their good as with our own. The beautiful sympathetic characters, who seem to radiate wise kindness at every pore, are so either by rare natural grace or by the good fortune of an education rich in opportunities, — perhaps also in examples, — developing this simple habit of considerateness for others. The high talent of sympathetic intuition grows thus from the tiniest seed. Consideration for the baby who must not be waked by careless noise, for the busy literary father who should not be disturbed, for the invalid mother to be saved in every way,—little early lessons like these are wonderfully efficacious. Too seldom, alas! does the early mountaineer in the Swiss hotel come quietly down stairs at 2 A. M., nailed boots in hand, careful not to wake the sleepers. Too often, alas! are the children in well-to-do households considered beyond reason, and never expected to consider others in making their plans. Incidentally, even in childhood, the result is boredom to themselves.

The family is, I believe, the best of all schools, for the drawing out of this fundamental social instinct, and for its incorporation in the sense of duty, or obligation to others, which emerges *pari passu* with the family requirement for willing service. The claims made by the family on the child, to light the fire, to mind the baby, to fetch water from the well, to drive the cows to grass, —the poor child is better off than the rich in these moral opportunities,—all these little claims train him in the way of ordering his life within the limits they prescribe. Outside these he is his own man and does what he desires. Inside these he does what he must. But in a good home circle, where mutual respect and affection obtains, the

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'must' of slavish obligation easily becomes 'ought'; and, with the growing realization of the family welfare as a main object of personal pursuit, 'ought' is absorbed into the free will as one of the strongest elements in it.

The more vigorous natures progress more rapidly to this absorption of 'must' in 'ought' and 'ought' in 'will.' The child of strong personal initiative claims all his activity for his own free will. Here and there he finds himself fettered by compulsions. It is not, however, the doings to be done that he minds: it is the being made to do them. If he rebels, as he may, there is perhaps more compulsion and things are worse than before. Or, perhaps it is not compulsion, but some other treatment which makes him ashamed of himself. Or, perhaps it is only friction and the spoiling of fun and affection. In one way or another he is dissatisfied with rebellion as a remedy. Or, if he be a thoughtful boy, he will consider the position before he rebels; he will probably conclude that the claims are in part, at any rate, reasonable, also that he does not mind taking them as part of the day's work, also that it is perhaps a shame to worry his parents,— 'mean,' in fact. Anyhow he *will* do what is wanted, and do it quickly before he is told. After all, what he wants is *not to be ordered about;* that can be escaped by a little easy thought to find out what will be wanted in order to do it first. Hence emerges the remarkably good child who will not, however, stand 'telling.' If left alone,—not worried too much at least,—or better still, appreciated without spoiling,—the self-discipline involved in the maintenance of this thought-won freedom, does the rest: the social nature develops, and meekness with it; the breach between self-will and other-will is healed by the identification of desire with duty.

School has advantages over the family in dealing with strong-willed natures whether thoughtful or not,—with rebels incipient or otherwise. Government in the family is naturally patriarchal; it may easily seem to the child, —and it sometimes is,—arbitrary and uncertain. Deeds

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are allowed at one time and forbidden at another. The association of parent and child is, indeed, so intimate and continual that it is not easy for the ordinary parent to be quite consistent. He,—or she,—stops a thing when it is a worry, and allows it when it is too much trouble to interfere. This is what the high-spirited child,—too egoistic as yet to be patient with grown-up moods,—this is what he hates. He does not know,—he cannot find out,—the rules of the game of life; and he is estranged by the recurrent shock of unexpected interferences.

He goes to school and finds himself one of many, all expected to behave,—and for the most part behaving,—according to a law and tradition, written or unwritten, the details of which are promulgated clearly and the principles of which are even discussed with explanation from time to time. The great thing for the self-willed child is that he knows, or can know, what they are. He lives, therefore, under a constitution and knows that he is free,—*i. e.*, that he will not be stopped,—so long as he observes the rules of life laid down by that constitution. *If he accepts this status in his mind,* he is a free boy well content. Under a well-administered and reasonable constitution the rebel disappears. The arbitrary schoolmaster, on the other hand, who decides what shall be done out of his own head from day to day, rules with difficulty and moral loss over an unwilling, if not insurgent, community.

School masters of this kind are no doubt out of date. The characteristic fallacy to which school systems tend to-day is not excess of personal government, nor excess in rules of conduct, nor over-strictness. Quite the contrary. Our fallacy to-day is the over-development of the school life, in games and work and communal undertakings, so that all the individual's voluntary activity tends to be absorbed into it. No room is left, or not sufficient room, for personal initiative in the rank and file. The social habit waxes strong within the sphere of action as-

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signed to it, in school and home and social circle. There is public spirit in that limited sense and altruistic feeling. But where is the opportunity we all need for that *first essential of the moral life, the self-training of character to independent initiative and sturdy adhesion to purposes freely chosen?* The schoolboy's conformity to the prevalent type, his identification of his personal choice with the common will, his dedication of time, interest, and thought to the common pursuits, his development of the social, at the expense of the personal, initiative in himself,—the excess of all this tends in the long run to the impoverishment of social nature and personal nature alike. In the mind of the man who is not mere conformist, but holds fast to his freedom, the reach of social purpose is wider than it can be when the range of duty is conceived under the limited forms given it by the common-sense of any particular community. It is the *individual* who by his own initiative of thought and will,—not otherwise,—transcends the familiar limits of the particular public spirit in which he has been bred, to find his chief good in a wider sphere, the community of all intelligent beings. It is the maintenance of the free man's personality in its freedom that, under social motives working in him, makes possible this intimate apprehension of the universal good as his. Nor is this all.

In truth morality implies no tendency to the absorption of my personal ideas in the idea common to all. It implies the contrary. Those common ideas originated in persons and are propagated by persons in other persons. If any man lay down his personality as an originator of ideas he thereby ceases to contribute to the growth of the common stock: so far he ceases to serve others as well as to be his separate self. It is by the free growth of ideas in separate persons that humanity creates the great ideas in the service of which men gain freedom. The personal development of ideas is, therefore, no less the service due to all than it is the personal right of each. As man is the self-conscious organ of nature, so persons discharge that function of humanity by the free use of personal reason and personal will. *To each man his personality is a gift in the use of which he fulfils his mission to humanity.* Such mission is at once his right and his duty.[2]

[2] S. Bryant, "Educational Ends," p. 126.

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This was to have been an address on the many-sidedness of moral education. I have used nearly all my time in discussing three elements in that composite transformation which the human race, here and there, does imperfectly achieve, (1) the transformation of wayward impulse into a steady purpose; (2) the evolution of altruism side by side with egoism in wholesome social life; (3) the training to dutifulness, conscience, and voluntary submission, within limits, to the social will; and the maintenance, over against all this and yet blending with it, of the strong man's claim so to use circumstance and so adjust himself that he may in all that he does be conscious of himself as doing it freely.

I have spoken, too, on that ancient and inexhaustible topic, the conversion of the mind set on the realization of its own good from egoistic to universal purpose; and we marked the large part played in this conversion by the unifying impulse of Reason,—the human characteristic which insists that the purpose of an intelligent being must be at one with itself and with the purposes of all equally developed intelligences. We noted also the part played by religion and pragmatic philosophy, respectively, in holding up as it were the hands of human nature, by faith in the real fulfillment of the moral end. It is clear, too, that in relation to the whole of this topic, education must in the main be indebted to instruction for its progress.

One other side of the process has been mentioned, but not with sufficient clearness set out by itself. Character, conscience, reason, sympathy, personality, the need of educational opportunity for these we see. But deeper, simpler, and more potent than any other motive is the soul's direct impulse toward self-devotion by means of which life can put itself forth to reach new and enlarged self-consciousness. There is nothing more natural to human nature than this impulse, and few things so valuable. The most insignificant life is glorified and literally enlarged by it, the dullest life enlightened. Happily, too,

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it needs no direct positive education. It quickens as life quickens, it brings itself up, it pours itself out: the educator, attentive to guidance and encouragement in his business otherwise, does all that need be done for self-devotion by expecting it to show itself along the lines of his work, and for the rest by being careful to see that even unwise manifestations are not lightly discouraged.

SOPHIE BRYANT.

LONDON.

COMPETITION, NATURAL AND INDUSTRIAL.

IRA WOODS HOWERTH.

THE fundamental and essential principle of the modern industrial order, that is, of Capitalism, is competition. Remove competition and the whole system would be demolished, or at least transformed. The competitive system, however, has the sanction and the sanctity of 'the established fact,' and of a long-continued existence. Hence any reform which would endanger it by disturbing its foundation principle is at once, and almost instinctively, discredited and opposed. Do the trusts suppress competition? Then, they must be 'smashed.' Will Socialism destroy competition? Down, then, with Socialism. This represents the attitude of perhaps a majority of the people, with whom competition is almost a sacred principle which it is next to sacrilege to question or criticise.

The classical economists from Adam Smith to the present time have taught that competition is indispensable to progress. They have assumed perfect mobility of capital and labor, and, on the part of competitors, a complete knowledge of the market. With this wholly theoretical assumption they have been easily able to show that competition exerts a necessary regulative action in industry, and they have consequently claimed for it the sanction of a natural (or divine) law.

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It is unnecessary to quote from these economists, whose writings are familiar or easily accessible, but I must be permitted to introduce here, as representative, a passage from a recent book by a distinguished French economist. Speaking of industry, and after discussing the effects of competition on production and value, he says: "The socialistic cry for regulation, whether by the State or any other artificial authority, is therefore entirely absurd. Regulation is essential, but the two natural laws of Production and Value have long since joined to secure it. We need only refrain from throwing obstacles in the way of their regulative operation; or, if an artificial obstruction opposes that action, to guarantee their freedom in removing the obstruction, according to their own methods. Their action must be secured, but it is to be secured only *by refraining from all interference.*"[1] What society needs, then, according to this conception, is absolute industrial liberty. Give everybody a fair field and no favor, and competition will usher in the industrial millennium!

But in spite of the confident declarations of politicians and the teachings of the classical school of economists, there are two classes of persons with whom competition has lost some, or all, of its sanctity. These are the large capitalists on the one hand and the socialists on the other. Mr. Carnegie and Mr. Gary have declared, before a Congressional investigating committee, that in the steel industry competition is dead. Mr. James J. Hill, who, we may suppose, would not brook competition in the railroad business if he could help it, expressed the opinion, before the same committee, that "there will be competition just as long as the doctrine of the survival of the fittest lasts." It would perhaps be sufficiently accurate to say that the magnates of industry still believe in competition as applied to consumers, and to unorganized laborers. The

[1] Molinari, "The Society of To-morrow," New York, 1904, p. xlvii. Italics mine.

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latter especially, they think, need the spur of competition. But with respect to large units of capital, the waste and instability of prices occasioned by competition, have become so obvious to those who control such units, that, by legal combinations, pools, gentlemen's agreements, and the like, they seek to avoid it. So strong is the tendency among capitalists to combine that it has been said with truth that "where combination is possible, competition is impossible."

With the socialist, of course, competition has no sanctity whatever. He even fails sometimes to recognize its historic value. At all events he denies its rationality as a principle of industrial organization, and strives for a coöperative commonwealth.

With these two exceptions faith in the beneficence of competition seems to be general. We are told that it is the life of trade; that it stimulates production, and effects favorably both its quantity and its quality; that it is the test of efficiency; that it lowers prices and tends to regulate them; that it keeps open the avenues of opportunity and preserves individual initiative; and, finally, that it is a law of nature with which it is folly to try to interfere. A speaker at a recent meeting of the Western Economic Society declared that, "if there is one thing in the world that the government ought not to do it is to attempt arbitrarily to interfere with the natural laws of the economic and business world, which are of divine origin. If all the congresses from now till doomsday should attempt to interfere with the laws of competition on the one hand and monopoly on the other, they would fail just as disastrously as if they should attempt to interfere with or alter the law of gravitation. Trade laws are just as immutable as natural laws in the physical world."[2] Thus the basis of all hope of the conscious construction of an improved industrial order is removed. We can only stand by and await the operation

[2] W. T. Denison, assistant attorney-general of the United States, in a talk on "The Proper Purpose of Regulatory Legislation."

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of the natural laws of trade. Such at least is the practical and sensible policy if the all but general faith in competition is well founded, that is, if competition is a natural law from the operation of which flow all the beneficent results claimed for it.

But is competition a natural law "as immutable as natural laws in the physical world"? Those who contend that it is base their contention upon the universality of the struggle for existence among organic beings. By identifying competition with the struggle for existence its advocates derive for it a double sanction. This struggle, we are told, is a law of nature; competition is struggle; ergo, competition is a law of nature. And, again, the struggle for existence results in the survival of the fittest; competition is a struggle for existence; ergo, competition results in the survival of the fittest. Such reasoning is fallacious unless competition and the struggle for existence are the same. That they are not the same becomes obvious if we consider carefully the meaning of the phrase, struggle for existence.

I use this term, said Darwin, in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. Two canine animals, in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds, of which only one of an average comes to maturity, may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground. The mistletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched sense be said to struggle with these trees, for, if too many of these parasites grow on the same tree, it languishes and dies. But several seedling mistletoes, growing close together on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with each other. As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on them; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in tempting the birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience sake the general term of 'Struggle for Existence.'[1]

[1] "Origin of Species," sixth London edition, pp. 59, 60.

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From this explanation of its use it should be clear that the term struggle for existence involves what is correctly known as competition,—that is, the struggle of individuals (or groups) with individuals (or groups) of the same species, and with individuals (or groups) of a distinct species,—and also the struggle of individuals, alone or in combination, against the physical conditions of life. It is obvious that this second form of struggle has nothing whatever to do with competition. And it is not only conceivable but to be expected that among beings sufficiently intelligent there would be combination and perfect cooperation to achieve success economically in this form of struggle, that is, in the struggle against nature. At all events, competition, that is, the wasteful strife of living beings with each other, might be conceived as entirely eliminated, and the struggle for existence would still remain. There is no escape, indeed, from struggle. It is required by the very constitution of things. And it is beneficent, for it is practically synonymous with activity, which is the basis of all development. "Nature," says Goethe, "knows no pause in progress, and attaches her curse to all inaction." But with increasing intelligence the competitive form of struggle may and ought to be supplanted by voluntary coöperation, for only by coöperation may the struggle against nature, against unfavorable physical and social conditions, be most effectively carried on.

Struggle, then, or rather activity, is the law, and not competition. He who engages in the conquest of nature, of disease, of ignorance, of vice and of his own lower self will find all the opportunity for struggle necessary to his own development without entering into the competitive strife of man against man. Competition is not an immutable law of nature.

Eliminating from the struggle for existence the struggle against nature there remains competition, and it may be freely admitted that, as the struggle is carried on among the lower forms of life, competition is the most

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conspicuous if not the chief element. This kind of struggle follows necessarily from the fact that these forms of life are endowed with marvelous powers of propagation, and exercise no self-restraint. They consequently press upon the food supply and a competitive struggle results. All organic beings tend to increase in a geometrical ratio. If none was destroyed, the progeny of a single pair, even of the slowest breeding, would soon fill the earth. Darwin reckoned that from a single pair of elephants, which are supposed to be the slowest breeders of all known animals, there would be produced, at the minimum natural rate of increase, nineteen million descendants in seven hundred and fifty years.[4] It has been calculated that, beginning with two persons and supposing a doubling of the population every fifty years, "at the expiration of three thousand years the whole surface of the earth, land and sea, would be covered with people piled one on top of the other eight hundred deep."[5] Professor Huxley introduced in one of his lectures a calculation showing that a plant which produces annually fifty seeds could cover every square foot of the land surface of the earth in less than nine years. Certain low forms of aquatic life increase with such amazing rapidity that, if none was destroyed, they would fill the ocean in a week. Thus all forms of life, high and low, are endowed with great powers of propagation. Nature pours into the arena innumerable combatants, vastly more than can possibly survive, and, under such circumstances, a competitive struggle for food and reproduction of species inevitably results. Competition may therefore be said to be a biological law. It holds true among beings which have not sufficient intelligence to appreciate its wastefulness, to restrain their increase, and to practice a higher economy.

The competitive form of the struggle for existence is, then, inevitable so far as creatures below man are con-

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 60, 61.

[5] See Ely, "Introduction to Political Economy," p. 163.

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cerned. And in this struggle, it is true, the fittest survive. But what are the fittest? As has often been pointed out, they are not always the highest types, but merely those best adapted to the circumstances of the particular time and place. It may so happen, and does often happen, that the circumstances are such as to favor the survival of a lower rather than a higher type. The parasite may drive out the paragon. In Paraguay, for instance, as we are told by Darwin, "neither cattle nor horses nor dogs have ever run wild, though they swarm southward and northward in a feral state." This is due to the prevalence in that country of a certain kind of fly which lays its eggs in the navels of these animals when first born, which results in their destruction. Thus cattle, horses, and dogs are among the unfit in one region of South America, and the fittest in another. Again, in equatorial Africa the tsetse fly, whose bite occasions the sleeping sickness, has depopulated whole regions of fertile country. Beasts and reptiles, however, are found in great abundance. They are 'the fittest' to the conditions which there prevail. And so everywhere, those who survive in the competitive struggle for existence do not prove thereby that they are superior in any sense. "If our hemisphere were to cool again," says Huxley, "the survival of the fittest might bring about, in the vegetable kingdom, a population of more and more stunted and humbler and humbler organisms, until the 'fittest' that survived might be nothing but lichens, diatoms, and such microscopic organisms as those which give red snow its color; while, if it became hotter, the pleasant valley of the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any animated beings save those that flourish in a tropical jungle. They, as the fittest, the best adapted to the changed conditions, would survive."[6] In the course of social evolution, doubtless, many tribes of men have succumbed to ferocious animals and venomous serpents. Certainly

[6] "Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays," New York, 1899, pp. 80, 81.

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states possessing a 'superior' civilization have been conquered by 'inferior' peoples. In such cases a certain superiority might be claimed for the conquering race,—in numbers, in military prowess, in hardihood, or the like. But, in an environment fit only for a low type of beasts or of men, the lower will drive out the higher unless the higher has the intelligence to transform the circumstances into fitness for its own survival. Despite the currency of the proverb it is demonstrably untrue that always "the race is to the swift and the battle to the strong."

The doctrine of the survival of the fittest, then, has no bearing upon the permanence of competition in industrial society or the desirability of its maintenance as a method of human progress. To say that "we shall have competition as long as the doctrine of the survival of the fittest lasts" is to frame a remark which "sounds better than it senses." If the 'fittest' meant the 'best,' such a statement would be relevant, but, as has been shown here, and as has been pointed out many times by others, it does not mean the best; hence the doctrine of the survival of the fittest has no ethical significance. It is no obstacle to the belief in the gradual substitution of cooperation for competition. Paraphrasing the language of Huxley, we may say that social progress means a checking of competition at every step and the substitution for it of coöperation, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the natural conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically best. "In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence."

It is curious that men will justify competition, and assert its necessity, on the ground of the struggle for

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existence and the survival of the fittest, and preach non-interference with nature, when they are continually denying their theory in actual practice. Who believes in the doctrine of non-interference as applied to the plant world? To rely there upon the doctrine of the survival of the fittest would be to let weeds take the corn. It must have been an early advocate of the virtues of competition who expected to gather grapes from thorns and figs from thistles! What is cultivation, artificial selection, domestication, education, legislation, but a negation of the general doctrine that nature is a complex of fixed laws with which it is folly to try to interfere? A natural law is nothing but a descriptive formula expressing a tendency, and what tendency in the organic and social world may not be to some extent counteracted by intelligent action? Man does not rely upon the doctrine of the survival of the fittest and let the weeds take his corn, or expect to obtain from unrestrained competitive strife the highest type of horse or cow, hog or sheep. No more should he hope for the highest type of man, or of civilization, to be produced through competition.

From the foregoing it should be clear that, so far as industrial competition is concerned, we can get little comfort out of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest, unless industrial conditions are wholly satisfactory. The richest men, the economically successful, are not necessarily the best men. As things now are, success too often depends upon hard-heartedness, cruelty, ruthless aggression, animal cunning, unscrupulousness, and other intensely egoistic traits which are foreign to the nature of the highest type of man.

"But, at all events," it may be said, "industrial competition acts upon the producer by stimulating his powers and capacities of production. Hence the survivors of such competition are at least the most effective producers." Not even so much can be admitted without qualification. It is true that effectiveness, say in production, is an element in successful competition, and sometimes a man

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succeeds in business, that is, drives out his competitors, solely by producing superior goods, or the same goods at a lower cost. But that is by no means the rule. Quality of goods, or cheapness, is not the end the business man is aiming at. His primary object is profits, and profits depend upon price of goods and quantity of sale. The stimulus of competition operates, therefore, not merely upon quantity and quality of goods produced, but upon methods of sale. Of two producers of equal ability the cheapest seller will survive. Now the arts of sale consist largely in the misrepresentation of wares through expensive advertising, 'aggression,' detraction of rivals, and other 'tricks of trade' which have nothing to do with improved production. Profits are reaped through adulteration of goods, by sly substitution of shoddy material, by convincing customers that you 'have something just as good,' when you have not, even in larger proportion than by honest striving for improved quality or lower cost of production. Say what you will, modesty, sympathy with the unfortunate and the weak, altruism, strict honesty, are not the qualities at premium in successful industrial competition. And when competition is successful, that is, when a rival is 'put out of business,' society is likely to lose. For if the defeated rival owes his defeat merely to a more scrupulous conscience, the standard of business ethics is lowered; and, even if he be a less efficient producer, his services are lost until he readjusts himself, during which time his successful competitor reaps a monopoly advantage. In either case society would be better off through intelligent coöperation.

Neither the best men, then, nor the most efficient producers are the certain product of industrial competition. In piratical conditions competition produces pirates; and, under certain circumstances, parasites are the inevitable result. From no possible point of view may the advocates of industrial competition derive a sanction for it, or assurance of its perpetuity, from the doctrine of the survival of the fittest.

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Descending, then, from the theory of the general beneficence of industrial competition, may it not be claimed for it that it operates to the advantage of one class of society particularly, namely, the consumers? It is a popular conception encouraged by certain economists, and by a superficial consideration of the facts, that competition lowers prices. That is indeed sometimes, perhaps usually, the first result. But competition usually leads to combination, and when combination is effected the losses which the competitors sustained during their struggle for the market are recouped, and thenceforward prices may be maintained at a higher level to provide profits on a larger mass of capital. This is well illustrated in the effort of a municipality to secure a cheaper service from public utilities by encouraging competition. A city has, let us say, a gas plant. This plant is capable of supplying all the service required, but prices are too high. A franchise is granted to another company, another plant is built, competition results and prices are lowered. But it is not long until the plants are united under one management, or there is an agreement as to prices, and thenceforward prices must be sufficiently high to bring the usual return upon twice as much capital as is really needed to supply the service.

But there is another and more general reason why competition does not permanently lower prices. Industrial competition, like the competition which takes place among the lower orders of life, is extremely wasteful. Consider the vast amount of advertising, the armies of salesmen, the superfluous middlemen, the high rents paid for favorable locations, all of which, for the most part, merely determine who shall sell the goods, and from which buyers get no benefit whatever, and then reflect that all these expenses must be added to the cost of production and covered by the selling price. This forces prices upward, and if competition is 'aggressive,' and that is the kind that is popularly approved, they will be pushed to the point beyond which buyers will cease to purchase in large quantities,

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and that is all that monopoly can do. The tendency of prices under aggressive competition is to the same point as under monopoly.

The plain facts of industrial life disprove the prevailing belief that competition lowers prices. Take, for instance, our recent experience with the Standard Oil Trust. Relief from the tyranny of this oppressive monopoly was to be obtained, it was generally thought, only by its dissolution. Thus was competition to be restored. Well, the Trust was dissolved, and with what result? An increase in the capital stocks of the former constituent companies ("to adjust the capital so as to make it commensurate with the value of the assets," it is apologetically explained), and an increase in the prices of many oil products! "Since the dissolution of Standard Oil," says the *Chicago Record-Herald* of February 8, 1912, "the price of many of the products has been advanced. It is the theory that the old subsidiary companies dissociated and in theoretical competition are entitled to make larger profits than when they were all owned by the old holding concern." And so, it seems, in this case at least, even 'theoretical' competition has the effect of raising prices.

We have now seen that contrary to the popular impression industrial competition does not result in a permanent reduction of prices; that it does not secure the survival of the most efficient producer; that in no case does competition necessarily result in the survival of the highest type; that it is only one element in the struggle for existence; and, finally, that to ground sanction of industrial competition on the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest is to evince a gross misconception of the process of organic evolution.

But competition is a fact of nature and of industrial society. It is reasonable to suppose that it could not have persisted without an important use. What, then, is the real function of competition?

As already pointed out, the basis of all development is activity. Without it there could be neither life nor evolu-

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tion. Now, it is obvious that among brutes and among men, competition, if conscious, is a stimulus to action. If it should suddenly cease as a natural phenomenon the activity of many men, and most animals, would be greatly diminished, and progress, of course, retarded. Among the lowest animals the only barriers to increase are defeat and destruction. They know nothing of self-restraint. A want impels to immediate effort to gratify it. Interference on the part of another animal naturally results in conflict. Strife is the normal condition, and 'the lust of battle' an advantage. Here competition reigns supreme. It is inevitable; and, although wasteful in the highest degree, it supplies a powerful stimulus to action. The function of competition, then, is to secure action on the part of unintelligent creatures, creatures incapable of appreciating the waste of energy due to competitive strife and of combining and coöperating to prevent it. It is nature's method of stimulating action until mind is sufficiently developed to supplant it by higher motives.

Competition, then, is indeed an incentive to action. Does that not prove its necessity and permanence in industrial society? Not any more than the stimulating quality of anything else proves its necessity and permanence. Fear is an incentive, but we are trying to drive out fear. Goethe ascribes to Satan the exact virtue claimed for competition. In explaining the existence of this personage, the Lord, in the prologue to Faust, is made to say:

> All too prone is man activity to shirk,
> In unconditioned rest he fain would live;
> Hence this companion purposely I give,
> Who stirs, excites, and must as devil work.

But as modern theology has practically discarded the devil, so, let us hope, that in time we may eliminate competition as a necessary means of social progress. Competition is an incentive to action, but so is a bull-dog after a tramp. There are other incentives, and higher.

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The mere desire to beat somebody does not compare favorably, from an ethical standpoint, with interest in the welfare of wife and children, the joy of the artist, the scientist's love of truth, the delight of the mechanical inventor, publicity and honor, to say nothing of the desire to promote the public good, which has been shown again and again to be among the most powerful of incentives.

The necessity of competition, then, can be admitted only with respect to the brute creation in a state of nature, and to such men as do not respond to higher motives. As to its permanence, it is significant that those who argue for competition as a necessary incentive usually affirm it with respect to others, not to themselves. They at least have risen above it! If any man of action has 'risen above' competition, then, of course, the possibility may be asserted of all. To deny it is to disregard past evolution and the influence of education. Competition will gradually disappear, then, as higher types of men are developed. But society will not wait upon individual development for the removal of competition. As soon as it becomes entirely awake to its excessive wastefulness and brutality, it will put an end to it, even at the risk of weakening, in certain cases, individual interest and incentive. If society were as intelligent as the average individual, it would not tolerate the waste and anarchy of industrial competition for a single week.

To sum up this division of our discussion, we may say that competition, in the natural order, is a necessary incentive to action. Its necessity in industrial society diminishes, however, with advancing intelligence, and ends the moment individuals are sufficiently responsive to higher motives to secure the activity necessary to progress. For the appearance and strengthening of these higher motives we may safely rely upon association, assisted by education and other civilizing influences. It is useless to deny, as some do, the possibility of changing human nature. Man has emerged from the brutes. His

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present nature is as much a product of evolution as he is himself. Its past evolution is a promise of continuing change. Development, here as elsewhere, may be consciously effected by changing the environment. The argument, if it is to be so dignified, that human nature is not susceptible to change, tells against the 'regulation' of competition, as well as against its elimination. Such an argument, however, is really not worth discussing. In social polemics the dogma, 'You cannot change human nature,' is the last refuge of a defeated opponent.

It is usually admitted by those who assert the necessity and permanence of competition that it should be raised to higher levels. "Competition," says Professor Ely, "is a permanent feature of human society. It begins with the lowest orders of animals and continues its action among the highest orders of men. But it continually mounts to higher and higher elevations, and means rivalry for ever better and better things. We leave behind contests for bare subsistence to engage in contests for noble prizes of the mind and for opportunities for social service. We can, then, never allow competition to cease."[7] The context shows that Professor Ely means industrial competition should not be allowed to cease. His conclusion is a *non sequitur*. For, if competition "mounts to higher and higher elevations," it may rise above the industrial plane and industry become coöperative.

To me it seems that to admit that competition may and should be raised to higher and higher levels, is to give up the case for our competitive system of industry. For when competition is raised so high that it becomes rivalry in 'social service,' it is no longer competition. My contention is that strife of man against man is not essential to progress, and that because it always involves wasteful expenditure of energy, the elevation of competition by eliminating waste, and supplying worthier

[7] "Evolution of Industrial Society," New York, 1902, pp. 144, 145.

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objects, must inevitably result in emulation and coöperation.

Suppose, for instance, an individual raised to the moral level at which he responds to the scriptural injunction, "Let nothing be done through strife or vain glory; but in lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves." Such a man would naturally emulate, but not compete. Suppose, again, two competitors in industry. Their object is profits. To succeed each tries to defeat the other. The thwarting or crippling of one is an advantage to his opponent. Now suppose the object of their rivalry transformed from profits to the public good. Then, if, for any cause, one is rendered less effective, the other's aim is to that extent defeated. Each desires the maximum promotion of social well-being. Neither would interfere by any of the methods known to competition to diminish the efficiency of the other. For by so doing he would deny his interest in the public good, or defeat his own purpose. On the contrary, each would help the other. That is to say, they would cooperate, not compete.

As differences of opinion here seem to depend largely on definitions, it will be well to discriminate as carefully as possible between competition on the one hand and emulation and coöperation on the other. First let us endeavor to fix the meaning of competition. In the application of the word competition to the plant world, it is used in a figurative sense, just as the word 'struggle' is used in the same application. We may therefore leave out of account the so-called competition of plants, and confine our attention to competition in the animal and social world. In this realm competition is the rivalry of individuals or groups for a satisfaction which only one competitor may enjoy. The food which one animal secures is forever lost to another who was striving to obtain it. The primary definition of competition, according to the Century Dictionary, is "the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain

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at the same time; common contest, or the striving for the same object." Industrial competition, then, must be defined as the effort of men to obtain an economic advantage which all in pursuit of it may not enjoy. In the case of competition among laborers the object is wages; with employers it is profits. Inasmuch, however, as industry is controlled and directed by the employing class, the chief end of industry is profits, and the whole industrial process may be described with fairness as a struggle for profits.

If to this definition of industrial competition it is objected that it brings into undue prominence its selfish phase, the answer is, All competition is essentially selfish. That is its condemnation. Its motto is, "Thou shalt starve ere I want." No matter how much competition is 'regulated' by forbidding the practice of objectionable methods, the selfishness of it remains. Professor Ely asks: "If I knock you down with a sand bag and rob you, is that to be called competition? If I fit out an armed ship and prey upon the commerce of the world, is that competition?"[8] The answer is they are inevitable incidents of 'free' competition. Declare such practices criminal, and punish those who resort to them as robbers and pirates, and you have not changed the essential nature of competition. The eternal and insuperable objection to competition from the ethical standpoint is the state of mind involved, just as waste is the insuperable objection from the economic standpoint.

Of course, it is not to be denied that high motives and generous action are often operative in the industrial world. Business men are sometimes philanthropists. But it would be naïve to assume that business is philanthropy, and define industrial competition as friendly emulation. We must regard it as what it really is, namely, the strife of men, or groups of men, consciously or unconsciously carried on, with the purpose of economic

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

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gain; success being dependent upon the crippling or defeat of rivals. Emulation, benevolence, sympathy, love are all to be found in the industrial world, but they exist in spite of competition, not because of it. Their presence there should not blind us to the essential nature of industrial competition.

By emulation I mean the struggle to approach, equal, or surpass another in merit, or, in the field of industry, in productivity. It is a strong motive power in production, but it differs essentially from competition, since its object is the satisfaction of achievement, and not the selfish enjoyment of wealth. It involves no waste, and is therefore consistent with a maximum production at a minimum expenditure, or the law of economy. An emulative industrial order would be vastly superior to the present competitive system, but it would not be the highest, for the complete moralization of emulation, and of competition, would inevitably result in industrial coöperation.

To transform competition and emulation into industrial coöperation it is only necessary to raise the end of action from 'better and better things' to the best, namely, the public good. Coöperation means, literally, of course, working together. To work together, in the sense implied, men must have a common object. It may be noble or ignoble. But always to work together is more effective than to work against. The highest end of action is the social welfare. The highest type of men must be animated by the desire to promote it. Hence, if intelligent, and they must be or they would not be the highest type of men, they must coöperate. For the highest industrial efficiency is possible only when there is common effort for the common good. Coöperation is therefore the goal of industrial evolution.

Deep down in biological evolution originated the parental and the gregarious instincts, the 'struggle for the life of others,' and mutual aid, or coöperation. They softened and lessened competition within groups and

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proved to be an advantage in group competition and group survival. Coöperation in its origin, then, has exactly the same natural sanction as competition; it originated spontaneously as an aid to survival. But while out of competition sprang the self-regarding virtues, the other-regarding virtues owe their origin to cooperation. "Important as the struggle for existence has been and still is," said Darwin, "yet as far as the higher part of man's nature is concerned, there are other agencies more important."[9] Chief among these other agencies is coöperation. Coöperation, therefore, is the more significant fact in human evolution. It exerts by far the stronger socializing and moralizing influence. If progress continues, it seems inevitable that competition must grow less and less and coöperation more and more.

It might seem that in the upward march of living things those in which mind first appeared would at once see the unnecessary expenditure of energy involved in competition, and combine to prevent it. So they would if mind, at its appearance, had been fully formed. But intelligence began in the simpler feelings, and advanced only by slow degrees. What we should expect to find in history, therefore, is a gradual displacement of competition by coöperation. And that is exactly what we do find. Every step in civilization has meant a modification of the competitive struggle. Men talk of 'free' industrial competition, but there is no such thing to-day on any large scale. Combination in productive enterprise and trade will continue because of their economy, and complete economy cannot be attained without thorough voluntary coöperation.

It is sometimes said that even with socialized industry competition would be necessary to determine individual efficiency. The most that can be admitted is that socialized industry *with* a competitive test of efficiency would be a great advance over the present order. But to say

[9] "Descent of Man," 2d ed., p. 618.

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that such a test is ideally necessary is to misconceive the real meaning of competition. In a large firm, for instance, each employé is assigned his work by the conscious direction and control of the manager. If the manager be wise, he does not set his men to competing, to trying to defeat each other, or to get one another's jobs, in order to determine fitness. He encourages emulation, not competition. What is he there for but to determine efficiency by achievement? Conscious selection does not necessarily involve or imply competition. In the selection of men for the giant corps of Frederick the Great, stature was the primary test. Five-foot men could hardly be said to compete for a place with men of six feet four. Men were chosen merely because they were tall. Under industrial coöperation what a man could actually do would be the rational determinant of his place and duty.

So while competition might long remain in socialized industry, it is not a necessary factor. Its necessity will decline with the increase of intelligence and public spirit. Full and voluntary coöperation is the ideal.

To appreciate the truth that the ideal state must be industrially coöperative, it is only necessary to try to conceive what a state would be like in which competition was 'free,' and the business maxim, 'Every man for himself,' was perfectly applicable. The terrible disaster in the Iroquois Theater in Chicago a few years ago affords an interesting illustration of competition 'at its best'! Two thousand people were sitting quietly waiting for a performance to begin. Suddenly there was a cry of 'Fire!' They leaped to their feet and there began a competitive scramble for the exits. There was 'a fair field and no favor.' 'Every man for himself.' The weak,—men, women and children,—were knocked down and trampled under foot. To help another meant to lose one's chance of escape. The result was that six hundred people lost their lives. Coöperation would have saved them all. Ruskin spoke the truth when he said, "Govern-

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ment and Coöperation are in all things the Laws of life; Anarchy and Competition the Laws of Death."

IRA WOODS HOWERTH.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

A. K. ROGERS.

IN making *individualism* the premise of what I am about to say, I wish it understood that I am not attempting to settle in advance what concretely is the importance or the lack of importance of the social content of life. The assumption is only intended to voice the methodological demand that we should begin at the simplest end of the inquiry. And it presupposes that the first question we are bound to ask about any matter that ends in practice is the question as to what is really *desirable;* and that the final test of the desirable will always be in terms, not of something that is called society, but of the particular persons of whom society is made up. I should find myself at a loss to say a great deal in defense of this, since it seems to me so self-evident. Nothing surely can be set forth as desirable except as it is capable of satisfying desire; and desire is always located in this or that particular man, and never in society at large. Put in other words, it is to psychology we must look to get a point of departure, since a question of human ends needs first of all a knowledge of human nature. It may very well turn out that human nature fulfills itself only in the form of social life. But this does not alter the fact that motive power is still to be found in a *want* for social life, seated in the inner man. To start from the other side has the disadvantage, if nothing more, that it substitutes a hazy and immensely complex conception for a perfectly plain and simple one. And as social welfare is an end only as it is *my* end, so

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the conception of scientific laws of society, as a determiner of action, is secondary rather than primary. Such laws are at best indirect, abstract, held insecurely with many waverings of mind; and they cannot overbear the first-hand testimony of experience. And it is a clear fact of experience that men are not merely the creatures of social law, but active agents who decide which of competing tendencies they shall espouse. It may be demonstrated to me never so clearly that social forces govern me without redress; only I know that as a matter of fact they do nothing of the sort. So long as I was in ignorance of them I may have been under their sway. But the moment they are presented consciously to my mind, I am endowed with power either to accept or to reject them as ends; and if they gain my suffrage, it is because, again, they stand for something which I actively desire. I can do this simply because in the social world I and my ideas are real factors, which can help determine the law that the outcome is to reveal, instead of merely being an unresisting product of this law. Even what I judge as a matter of theory to be the most plausible account of the world's trend, will be very largely influenced by my prepossessions, until at least the results of sociology become much more indisputable than at present. A man will accept an apparent law of history when this chimes in with his own disposition; but it will have very little intellectual compulsion for him if it goes against the grain. So one may see Spencer certain of the triumphant progress of sympathy, and Nietzsche evolving a philosophy which makes this with equal definiteness a pure aberration.

The first question which underlies any discussion about rights or principles of action is, then, the concrete question, What do men want? Now this can be answered in a general way with a good deal of confidence. I know that there are a number of things which I desire to do, a kind of life which I should like to lead. Of course, I know also that not just the same sort of life would satisfy

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other people; but allowing for details, the same statement would in its abstract form hold of them as well. Every man wants to lead the life which appeals to him, be given the chance to satisfy his desire for the particular ends that seem to him worth working for. There would be no great objection to making this read that every man desires happiness, if it were not that happiness is a word about which philosophers have stirred up some confusion. But since in any case men do not want the result merely, but they want the fun of getting it for themselves in their own way, it will be preferable to use words less passive in their implication, and to say, again, that everybody wishes to lead freely the sort of life that will most truly call forth all his energies and possibilities of accomplishment. I do not need to stop upon this notion of man as a fountain of pent-up energy striving to make its escape into action and self-expression; it enters so largely into recent psychology, and is the note of so much in modern literature as well, with its insistence on life, living, as worth while for its own sake, and upon freedom and vigor of life as the first of the virtues, that it has become a commonplace.

But now while this may be clear enough so far as it goes, it evidently does not go very far. One very quickly finds himself compelled in dealing with social questions to make use of a new term, whose justification does not at once appear. This is the word 'right' or 'rights.' Hitherto the assumption has contained no reference to such a notion. Human beings want certain things. Supposedly they will get them if they can, and if they cannot they will go without; but why should they claim them as a *right?* It is obvious that the ordinary man supposes there is such a thing as a 'natural right.' At certain periods the 'Rights of Man' has been a phrase to conjure with. There has been much disagreement about the nature of these rights. But in any case they are looked upon as somehow or other constituting an ideal, which can be used to pass judgment upon facts as

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they are, by comparing them with what they ought to be.

In recent days it is universally admitted that such natural rights can at any rate no longer be taken wholly for granted. And furthermore, in opposition alike to *a priori* philosophies, and to what have seemed to be the sentimentalisms of democracy, the temptation has been to set them aside altogether as the legacy of an uncritical age. 'Rights' from the popular scientific standpoint, are either facts, or they do not exist at all; there is no room any longer left for 'ideals.' As applied to facts, the word, of course, still retains a meaning which has at least the merit of being plain and unambiguous. If one is committed to the historical method simply, a right can only mean a *de facto* legal right. As governments and laws are real things, so the acts which are forbidden or permitted by law are real; and it is entirely intelligible to say that men have under definite conditions certain definite legal rights. But beyond this the historical method cannot go. Nor is it easy to see how the method of deductive science could ever succeed any better in setting up an 'ought' with claims upon us, unless by slipping it in surreptitiously, as Spencer, for example, does continually in the form of his predilection for looking upon nature, and the laws of nature, as carrying like the discarded God of religion a sacredness and obligatoriness, such as condemns morally the man who refuses to submit to them as interpreted by the high priests of science.

Nevertheless it is much easier to dismiss the word in theory than in practice. No man who begins to reason about questions of politics can go very long before he finds himself, inadvertently perhaps, bringing his arguments to the touchstone of what he has to speak of as the real right or justice of the case. It has never been observed that the philosopher who repudiates the theory is any less concerned by his personal rights than less instructed men, as evidenced by his indignant protests when he thinks these disregarded. Regret, not indigna-

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tion, is the suitable temper of one who makes no claims beyond what his abilities can wrest from an indifferent world. Even the modern advocates of power,—the disciples of Nietzsche,—seem seldom able to rid themselves of the old habits of thought and to follow the logic of their theory; they are once again the prophets of an ideal, which they defend with all the heat of devotees against the wicked effort to cheat might of its rights. Indeed the very proposal to argue the matter is to put oneself in the wrong. The only people who are really true to their logic,—we call them criminals when they do not operate on too large a scale,—are those who go ahead and take what they want regardless, without supposing they must first prove their right to ignore the rights of others.

I am not prepared to affirm that there is no way of grounding a philosophy of absolute rights. But as I find myself without any clear notion of how to do this, I shall resort to a less ambitious method. If we do not look abroad to the universe or to *a priori* truth, but to the constitution of human nature as an empirical fact, there is a way to introduce again a working conception of rights without having to make gratuitous assumptions. The serious drawback, as I have said, to the attempt to show that there is no real validity to the 'rights of man,' is the fact that no one in his practical affairs takes the denial seriously. Every one is liable to assert at times that he has such rights, which are not at all identified with the legal status of the day, or with his present ability to maintain his claims; usually indeed he does not take the trouble to assert these except as he finds himself falling short of attainment. The notion of rights, in other words, is legitimate and necessary, not because you can prove them, but because you cannot make men give them up. Merely because man is a being whose life consists in trying to attain what at the start is present in him only as a demand, and because this sense of himself takes the form of a strong claim for satisfaction, the emotional accompaniment of this claim,—the feeling a man has for

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his *right* to satisfaction,—has to be recognized. At the outset the sense of rights is no more than this inarticulate feeling that the presence in us of any strong desire forms a guarantee that somehow it ought to be met,—a feeling which leaves us with a sense of personal aggrievement in case the fulfillment does not take place. The sense of rebellion which stirs in me when I contemplate an invasion of my rights, is just this upheaval of my instincts against a force threatening to put restraint upon their freedom. The knowledge that I am being disregarded in other men's plans, the feeling of impotence when interests vital to me are held back simply because my fellows refuse to take me into account in their reckonings, will inevitably arouse in me a fierce resentment, which is the starting point of all my sense of rights. There are indeed a considerable number of people who seem honestly able to persuade themselves that right is bounded wholly by their own desires, and who have no trouble in developing an apparently genuine sense of injury when for whatever reason things do not go their way. Indeed it is probable that everyone finds at times his emotional feeling following thus the line of personal interest, even when his reason may tell him that it has no valid foundation. And that as a matter of conscious theory also men tend naturally to accept validity for their desires, would be indicated by the wide popularity of such an argument as that which infers the truth of immortality from the presence in us of a longing for it,—an argument which seems to presuppose the inherent injustice of things if the demand is not met. Let me repeat that the existence of such a feeling is not put forth here as proof of an independently based right. The whole point is, indeed, on the contrary, that the search for any further answer to the question, What *right* have I to be satisfied? is unmeaning, since the very source of any recognition of rights lies in this self-evident character that human desire bears within itself.

However, it is evident that the idea of rights cannot be

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limited to its merely self-assertive quality. What we have to explain is not merely a feeling, but a concept, an intellectual notion as well. And this new element reveals its presence in the conflict that may arise between our naïve craving for self-expansion, and the perception that this is not always consistent with the rules of justice. It is the word *justice,* indeed, that sums up expressly this fuller content of the idea of rights, and which therefore stands in need of a further examination.

As the word 'rights' lays emphasis on the positive claims of the individual who urges them, so 'justice' brings to the front the idea of a limit to these claims. Its most conspicuous ingredient is an intellectual one,—the notion of a curb put upon the boundless desire for self-gratification, and bringing it under an ideal law of balance or proportion. And furthermore it is clear that this idea of proportion concerns itself mainly with a new and complicating sort of fact. The problem of justice is primarily the problem of reconciling the conflicting claims of different individuals; it involves the explicit introduction of the rights of other men along with those of each individual himself.

The transition from an egoistic demand for one's own satisfaction to a recognition that other people have the same rights with oneself, evidently stands in need of some mediation. That a man will feel himself abused when he is interfered with, no one requires to have proved to him. But this cannot be transferred forthwith to explain his acceptance of another man's similar claims. It is this other man's desire now that is in question; and I might certainly have a strong craving for my own gratification without being necessitated to feel the same about his. And in particular when his desires clash with mine, they are bound to go under unless something more is present in the situation.

The considerations which seem to be involved here it will be found convenient to treat in two divisions, since they appeal with such different degrees of force to differ-

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ent men that it is hard to weave them into a single persuasive argument. And first there is what may be called the *disinterested* basis of justice,—the appeal which justice makes directly to the feelings apart from and sometimes even contrary to the dictates of private self-interest.

The first sentiment which is connected with the idea of justice may be called the sentiment of fair play. It will perhaps not be universally conceded that such a sentiment as this exists; but the fact for which the word is intended to stand does not seem easily disposed of. As the conception of justice has its peculiar character in an intellectual perception of measure or equality, so there appears to be attached to the exercise of this intellectual function an emotional quality which is capable of motivating action. It is possible to underestimate the motive force that may reside in the perception of intellectual relationships. The disinterested recognition that I as a unit am on a par with any other similar unit, may have to a certain type of mind a real compelling force to make him hesitate to give to himself, still more to any other single unit, a preferential position. Of course it would be too much to claim that such a motive is by itself powerful enough in most cases to counteract our natural egoism. It is, however, apparently true that, on the whole, the more rational a man is, and the more jealous of his intellectual integrity, the more such considerations are likely to weigh with him. It would probably be found that as a rule scientists are within their lights more ready to be just in their dealings than are men busied less constantly with impartial affairs of reason; and science has, if anything, a tendency to deaden the sympathies. And probably the appeal is more general than one might suppose. Almost any reasonable man will feel impelled to find some excuse for himself if he is convicted of sacrificing a greater to a lesser number, or if he lays claim to a reward obviously disproportionate to his services; and the need for an excuse points to a sense in his own mind that things are not quite what they should be.

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Especially when one's private interests or prejudices are not directly involved, there is some evidence of a natural love of fair play in mankind, governed by a rough sense of the reasonableness of giving everyone his chance. And when a man has once recognized this in the case of others, he will, if he is at all clear-headed, have some tendency to apply it to himself, and to admit that there is no more reason why a special dispensation should be due to him than to the outsider to whom his impartial judgment has already denied it; and if he cares at all for justifying his acts, he is bound to be in some slight degree intellectually uneasy if he violates this perception. Or, he learns to regard with approval fair play in another when it works to his own interest; and then if he reverses this judgment of approbation in his own case, he gets a disagreeable sense of intellectual inconsistency. And in a more direct way the same perception may arise. The revolt against injustice comes about mainly when our desires are interfered with by our fellow men. If the force which puts constraint upon us is conceived as an impersonal one, it hardly furnishes occasion for an appeal to our rights. We may be disappointed, but hardly resentful, for resentment has reference naturally to persons. Suppose now I have been careless of the rights of others, and later have to resent a similar attack upon myself. Provided I act as an intellectual being at all, by what logic can I refuse to take my own medicine? The very emergence of the notion of justice is due to my denial of the right of another man to oppress me; and I have only to recognize this to see that it involves an equal validity to his claim to be free from my oppression. If I ask of him, What right have you to disregard my wishes? and he can answer, The same right which justified you in disregarding the wishes of others, I am left without any argumentative standing. I can refuse to pay attention to his logic, but only as I give up any desire to be called reasonable.

And this semi-æsthetic dislike of a failure in propor-

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tion becomes more pronounced when the situation is viewed in its larger aspects. The spectacle of a world ruled by injustice is naturally repugnant to a mind endued with any tincture of the scientific love of order. The confusion, the incalculability, the openness to all the viscissitudes of brute force or blind luck, the absence of any intrinsic fitness in the outcome such as the mind can rest in, the substitution of multitudinous conflicting ends governed by private caprice for an objective and comprehensive Reason in things, are considerations that get an ever-increasing weight with the displacement of the romantic by the scientific temper. This is almost the whole gospel of Mr. H. G. Wells, and how impressive it can be made is sufficiently shown by the wide influence which he commands. And along with this intellectual or scientific sentiment there is commonly mingled another element. The man who disdains to take an unfair advantage because it distorts the rational scheme of things, wherein he counts for only one, by an unfounded claim to exceptional privileges for himself, is apt also to be a man with a keen sense of personal dignity, who would feel it a reflection upon his powers that he should have to think of himself as needing special favors in order to hold his own.

The other disinterested emotional element to be mentioned as entering into the appeal of justice is much more common and more powerful. A purely emotional *sympathy* is indeed often inclined to be ineffective as a means to finished justice, even while it emphasizes the good of others. Logically its issue is charity or mercy. It may lead me to subordinate the rights of self. But too much self-sacrifice is as far from justice on the one side as selfishness is on the other; and the unreasoning exercise of sympathy is always liable to exalt unjustly the claims of some partial object of sympathy over equal or superior claims. Indeed, if justice is to be lacking in either of the two ingredients, it is perhaps more easily compounded of a strong intellectual perception of equality

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without sympathy, than of sympathy without the other. One may sometimes meet with men who are by no means sympathetic in temperament in the ordinary sense, and who yet are scrupulously fair-minded.

But while sympathy in the form of an emotional uneasiness arising from a contemplation of the sufferings of others thus does not take of necessity the form of justice, yet it does, when independently the characteristic intellectual judgment implied in justice is aroused, contribute powerfully to the tone of feeling with which the idea must be permeated to be effective in conduct. And from a different angle, in so far as the power of sympathy enables us, not to realize another man's suffering by its reflection back into our own emotional life, but to put ourselves and the feeling natural to us into his situation, sympathy becomes a very important part of justice. The primary emotional root of justice, I have argued, is not the pains that come to us in a secondary way from the aggression of others, but the immediate swelling of revolt on the part of an active impulse which finds itself prevented from expression. When a man protests emotionally against an act of injustice which does not touch himself, his state of mind is, I think, usually the same. He is not so apt to dwell upon the indirect painful consequences of the unjust act, as he is to feel rising within his own breast a reflex wave of the same indignation he would experience if he were in similar circumstances. And without this power of transferring himself to another's situation, he would probably never get much beyond a demand for the rights he claims for himself.

Now I do not mean to suggest that the disinterested content of justice is a thing which we can safely depend on in political affairs. To the few indeed who feel it strongly it constitutes in itself a sufficient justification for fair dealing; and the widespread and enduring appeal which the conception of an ideal justice has made in human history is in a considerable degree its creation.

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We may call it only a sentiment, but the fact remains that sentiments are still forces to be reckoned with. Indeed the despisers of sentiment in their attitude reveal the weakness of their position; their petulant antipathy to sentimental considerations is a sign not of the impotence of these, but of their strength. It is not because they are in reality futile and ineffective, but because they are so powerful, because they interfere so incalculably with well-laid plans, that the hard-headed man shows his uneasiness by an assumption of contempt. Certainly since the French Revolution no one is justified in despising the possibilities of sentiment as an engine for getting results. But while I decline to admit the unimportance of the disinterested sentiment of justice as a fact of human nature, and while the argument from interested calculation would, I am convinced, be far less easy to manage were there not already such a background prepared for it, still it is upon the other sort of consideration that the argument for political justice, as a state in which freedom shall be exercised only up to the point where it does not encroach upon the equal freedom of others, will always have chiefly to rely.

The abstract logic of the transition, on the grounds simply of enlightened self-interest, from a demand for my own right to satisfaction to the admission that a similar conception of rights applies to others as well, lies pretty much on the surface. No one who is at all reasonable can fail to see that what he lays claim to for himself, his neighbor is bound from his own standpoint to lay claim to for *himself*. And the passage to my own recognition of these foreign claims would evidently be brought about, if I were to find them implicated in my own satisfaction. If there are any claims of our fellows that must be allowed as a necessary means to the attainment of our own ends, we condemn ourselves as reasonable beings if we refuse to admit them.

Now although I may feel the force of my own rights as a passionate demand, and still decline to entertain

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those of others, I cannot make of these a *social concept,* cannot argue about them that is, and present them to others for their recognition, without generalizing them, and so granting to the other man the right to use the same words with reference to himself. The admission of rights, in other words, is a necessity if I am to get into the arena of public recognition the admission of my own rights. In its simplest and most unambiguous terms, the notion of human as opposed to merely personal rights—of justice in other words—is thus a corollary of the situation in which men find themselves as surrounded and limited by other men in society. Put abstractly, rights represent a necessary *modus vivendi* of beings whose efforts at self-expansion are met and crowded by the similar efforts of other men. It is a tool by which alone we can gain that tolerance which we require for ourselves, and it has therefore, in so far as it proves a necessary tool, all the first-hand legitimacy which anyone can feel as attaching to his personal cravings.

And in calling it a tool, there is indicated again the essential difference from the traditional theory of rights. The latter finds its justification in some existing fact of the world order, universal in its character; and the difficulty which it has there to meet is the difficulty of reconciling its theoretical validity with its actual lack of realization, and of showing how we are to prove the obligatoriness of what is apparently contradicted by the facts of the world as they stand. As a tool, the concept of rights does not pretend to rest upon our ability to demonstrate a universal rule, but upon the fact that it is a practicable instrument for securing what we desire. Thus the right to liberty differs materially, for example, from the right to immortality. We cannot justify our right to immortality, because we are entirely unable to wrest it from the hand of powers who might be conceived able to bestow it. We *can* justify the right to liberty, to the extent to which the assertion of its validity aids us to secure its realization. A man has no rights, in any in-

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telligible sense, when under no circumstances can he be conceived capable of getting his claims advanced. The existence of desires, and the power to attain in some degree these desires by asserting them, are the sufficient conditions for giving not only meaning but an unavoidable place in political theory to the concepts of rights.

Such a pragmatic transfer of emphasis will furnish an answer to most of the difficulties that arise when the basis of justification is put in terms of the past or the eternally existent. Why, for example, to take an instance from the obverse side of justice, should we lay on society, as is often done, the responsibility for the evils about us? As an attempt to locate past blame the assertion is not only hard to prove, but it would be of no special consequence if it were true. But as the setting of a future task, a demand that now the evil is pointed out, society accept the responsibility, and use collective intelligence and coöperative effort for the removal of the wrong, it rests on a wholly different basis. Society may not have been to blame before. But it is at fault *now* if, with the ability to remedy an evil which it clearly sees, it shirks the task. The difference in practical attitude may be illustrated in another way. It has frequently been noted—for example, in connection with modern labor propaganda—that when men grow most bitter in the spirit of revolt, their actual grievances may nevertheless be not so great as in times when these were accepted without much protest; and this is sometimes taken to be unreasonable, as though a recognition of material betterment should decrease rather than increase the zeal for change. But if rights are primarily instruments of realization, then the fact that evils have become more clearly recognized, and not quantity of suffering, is the determining factor in the assertion of rights. We shall expect to find that growing intelligence is more often the cause of revolution than sheer weight of wrongs, and shall be less ready to assign relative improvement of conditions as an argument against social discontent. It

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ought in reason to be a spur to make us work so much the harder, since it shows that the enterprise is not hopeless.

A complete justification, then, of the policy of granting other persons the same rights that I desire for myself, and of limiting therefore my own self-assertion to such acts as will not entrench upon their freedom, would necessitate proving that no one can hope to get the maximum of satisfaction except under conditions which guarantee the equal satisfaction of the rest. If this were capable of proof, a man would seem bound to concede to everyone alike all the opportunities he claims for himself, as a condition of his own good fortune. I am not proposing to do more than indicate here the general direction of such an argument, the character of which is indeed sufficiently plain. In a considerable degree its acceptance depends only upon the possession of good common-sense. It is hardly worth while to argue against the claims of unlimited self-aggression, when the world is so plainly constituted to make us dependent, both negatively and positively, upon our fellows. Doubtless we all should like abstractly to be able to do precisely as we pleased. But in the actual world only a fool makes unlimited demands. The man who is not willing to be satisfied with a reasonable degree of liberty, and who will not accept as a matter of course a certain recognition of the interests of others, is simply suffering from a lack of intelligence. Any disposition, therefore, to raise our first naïve and instinctive reaction against restraint into a final philosophy, is negatived by our constitution as presumably rational beings. Our right to freedom has no necessary application to any particular act in detail, especially when this is of a minor and unessential character; to rebut a supposed claim to any heaven-born right to spit on the sidewalk, or to numberless other things which we might indeed be inclined to do if we did not stop to think, needs no more philosophy than is involved in ordinary good judgment. When, therefore, a

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restraint is clearly in the interest of all, ourselves included when we look beyond the moment, nothing more needs to be said. Most men can be relied upon to accept without protest the general conditions of life in society such as is familiar to them. They know that social compulsion of some sort is bound to be applied, and they are concerned only to see it limited to what will appear to them advantageous to their own interests. And since law is in its nature not a thing that can be expected to take care of the exceptional circumstances in which an individual may find himself, but must be so framed as to admit of impartial application, they are ready, in order to get the proposed benefit for themselves, to see law take a form which secures this benefit generally, trusting if they are so inclined to their ability to evade the law on occasion if they are dissatisfied with its working in their own case.

Of course this concession will not voluntarily go any further than a man thinks will recompense him for the denials he is called on to undergo. Nor do I think there is any possible way of proving in detail that the interests of the individual and of society will exactly coincide. If a given man has an inner leaning toward justice, there are many considerations to strengthen his faith in a final harmony; but the argument can never be entirely conclusive to anyone, least of all to the ordinary self-seeking and relatively able devotee of his own private interests. But in such a case there is one final consideration to be adduced. It may be that the abler or more powerful portion of a community will think that by combining they can secure legally special privileges over their fellows; and this, of course, has been done almost universally in the past. But the average man—and he is in the great majority—is nowadays quick to see that such a discrimination will in all probability lessen his own particular chance. And therefore he refuses any longer to accept less than an impartial equality before the law; if he puts up with less, it is because he is fooled into believing

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it to be there, when in reality it is not. And the bearing of this rests upon a very simple consideration. The ultimate warrant for general as opposed to special rights is to be found in *force,* if this is interpreted to mean that whatever shows itself with the capacity in the end to enforce its claims will have to find a place in the practical understanding of his own rights on the part of any person with brains enough to see the facts. And for this reason the last word to be said for the democratic extension of rights to all, when this is questioned or denied, is the increasingly apparent power of *numbers* in human society. Unless the instruments of public enlightenment can be abolished, it is perfectly certain that the trend will be constantly to open the eyes and therefore increase the power of the masses, and render it continually more difficult to manage them in the interests of a few. And in so far, if it is agreed that rights represent effective demands and not demonstrable conclusions of logic, the power which the common man is beginning to find within himself to secure his own fuller life by coöperating on the basis of a mutual tolerance against aggression, enters as a decisive element into the rational justification of his claim. And in so far, also, as the man whose chances for exploitation are in danger of being contracted sees himself forced to accept the necessity, he will be compelled rationally to seek an adjustment. If he still thinks that he can carry his point against the majority, then there is nothing for it but that he should make the attempt. The issue lies in the lap of fate, and I see no logic that can be brought to bear upon him.

Of course this does not mean that force is the only, or that intellectually it is the most important test of justice. And if a despotic power is claimed by the majority, it is to be met by a criticism in no wise different from that which applies to an aristocracy, namely, that it will not be found to pay. The common man, like the exceptional man, is taking here the wrong path, and therefore actually failing to reach the good which the conception of rights is

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an instrument for attaining. Force is indeed a final argument as between rival despotisms, and as such there is every reason for supposing that it will ultimately leave the majority with the power to enforce its wishes. In the face of an irreconcilable conflict of aims the stronger side is bound to get its way; and since, if they know clearly what they want and work together, the many can always in the issue overpower the few, democracy holds the winning cards. And if the world were actually so constituted that the masses could get all their heart's desire through a system of oppression, then the despotism of a majority is what, however reluctantly, we should have to look forward to in the future. The reasons why presumably nothing of the sort will be found to be true, I shall not here attempt to discuss.

Meanwhile there is one further consideration which may be mentioned before closing. Among the motives which tend to moderate our self-seeking, a regard for the opinions of our fellow-beings ranks high. Unfortunately this for the most part does not come into effective play to bring about actual new extensions of justice and equality in the first place. And the reason is, that the people about whose opinions we care very much are limited in number, and belong chiefly to our own class and those with whom we are brought into immediate contact. In consequence those who are already in possession of special privileges almost always give one another moral support in maintaining these, and, since it does not come home to them directly, think but little about the opinion of the rest of mankind; indeed, they are actually hindered by the force of opinion from doing anything that may be interpreted as a betrayal of their own class. So that the initiative is pretty sure to come mainly from the self-interest of those who think themselves exploited, who are conscious of advantages which they are denied, and who therefore set themselves to fight actively to secure the enjoyment of these. But on the other hand, the more they succeed in their endeavor, the more help

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they progressively obtain from the action of less selfish and personal motives. The bulk of the powerful classes are less intentionally tyrannical than they are merely stupid and unimaginative. Popular opinion has only to force itself upon them to begin to enlarge their notions of the extent of the public with which they care to stand well. And meanwhile in the background there are present the disinterested motives in the stricter sense, ready to play some part as soon as conditions are ripe. These seldom produce great changes by themselves. But when for other reasons changes have begun to take effect, they may have an indefinitely large influence upon the state of mind which will finally decide the issue, by undermining confidence on the one side in the justice of the cause, and by strengthening it on the other.

A. K. ROGERS.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF CALVINISM.

WILLIAM A. ROSS.

ONE of the results of the wide-spread diffusion of literary education at the present day is a certain indifference with regard to those systems or forms of religion which have come down to us from the past. Either all are rejected because they comprehend dogmas which cannot be believed in the light of modern knowledge, or all are accepted because all contain some elements of good. In neither case is there such a degree of belief as will influence conduct. Thus it frequently happens that literary culture is accompanied by lack of individuality and weakness of will, because the person possessing it cannot attach himself to any definite creed.

It might be suggested as a remedy that each person should enter, or endeavor to enter, as far as possible, into conscious sympathy with the religion of his forefathers,

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especially if that religion has helped to stamp a notable character upon the people who have adopted it, and has exercised a powerful influence upon their history. Each person, it has been said, is an epitome of his ancestors. Their strength and their weakness are latent in him. If their strongest and best qualities have been developed by a certain religion, that religion is peculiarly adapted to develop the same qualities in the descendant. To renounce that religion is to cut off a source of vital energy. For this reason it may be contended that each person should make the religion of his ancestors the groundwork of his system of belief. If he cannot accept the dogmas in a literal sense, he should search for the kernel of truth in the dogmas and endeavor to apprehend the mental and moral attitude of which they may be interpreted as the symbolical expression. He will thus maintain a certain continuity with the past while proceeding to new phases of thought.

In applying this principle to Calvinism, and particularly to Calvinism in Scotland, I do not propose to attempt an elaborate exposition of the subject, but to approach it from a practical point of view, from the point of view of a layman and a Scotsman. How should a Scotsman of the present day regard the religion of his forefathers? In an age which calls for efficiency and does not allow much time for idle speculation, what has Calvinism to offer?

Calvinism was in its origin a transvaluation or a revaluation of accepted values. The authority of the Pope was rejected and the Bible, as the Word of God, was declared to be the supreme and final authority. Any religious doctrines or institutions or ceremonies, sometimes even civil institutions, and social customs, which appeared to be contrary to Scripture, or for which authority could not be found in Scripture, were liable to be questioned and to be swept away. The early reformers earnestly studied the Bible, and then proceeded to readjust existing institutions in the light of what they regarded as the

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supreme and heavenly pattern. Their methods were drastic, and they admitted no compromise. On the ruins of the old religious system a fresh system was established with a well-defined creed. It would be in accordance with the spirit of early Calvinism to revalue this system and to apply the same uncompromising logic to its revaluation, if it were found that some of the assumptions on which it rested could not be maintained.

In many parts of Scotland it is still possible to attend a religious service which does not differ substantially from the services of three hundred years ago. There is the same simplicity of worship, the same logical precision in the sermon, the same emphasis on certain leading ideas, God's sovereignty, man's guilt and corruption, the need for redemption and regeneration, the absolute inspiration of Holy Scripture. There are guarded references to predestination and election. Among the persons who attend these services there are many who adhere firmly to the literal acceptance of the dogmas of Calvin. There is, therefore, in Scotland a very favorable opportunity of studying the subject not only by reference to old documents, but by reference to the opinions of living men, or of men who are dead but whose memory is green. It will often be important for the purpose of this inquiry to consider not so much what Calvin and other theologians believed with reference to any specific doctrine, but what form it assumed in the minds of practical men, not profound theologians, who believed and acted upon it.

It would profit little to discuss election and predestination except from the above point of view. The former doctrine, as stated in its most uncompromising form in the Westminster Confession of 1647, is to the effect that some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death, and the number of the predestinated and foreordained is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or

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diminished. The modern mind recoils from such a proposition. The doctrine was stated in a much more guarded form in the early Scotch Confession of 1567, known as John Knox's Confession, the emphasis being on the duties and privileges of the elect, and it has generally assumed this form in Scotland. The orthodox Scotsman felt bound to accept the doctrine because he found authority for it in the Epistle to the Romans, and to question it was to question the inspiration of Scripture, but he looked upon it as a mystery into which he must not pry, and he generally acted upon the view that the Gospel was freely offered to all. The doctrine of predestination, the doctrine that every event has been foreordained, cannot in an absolute sense be reconciled with another doctrine of Calvinism which is in practice much more important, the doctrine of man's responsibility. We do not find that the belief in predestination has paralyzed the will, but rather that it has acted as a powerful stimulus. The idea of an over-ruling Providence and the idea of man's responsibility appear to be reconciled and harmonized in the mind of the individual. He regards himself as working under a 'great Taskmaster's eye.' For all sins of omission and commission he must lay the blame upon himself, since God cannot be the author of sin; but if he does that which is good the merit belongs to God, who has prompted the good deed through the working of the Holy Spirit. There emerges the general principle that for error and failure the individual must assume full responsibility, for success he must claim no credit whatever, a principle well adapted to produce or develop an energetic and heroic type of character.

It was formerly not uncommon in Scotland for a father to recommend his son to read the Epistle to the Romans as containing the general scheme of Christian doctrine. This scheme, as interpreted and expounded by Calvin and his followers, may perhaps be summarized briefly as follows: Man is a being who has fallen from a state of perfection, he is depraved and corrupt and stained

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through and through with sin. He lives in a glorious[1] universe, but, because his eyes are darkened, he is unable to see the glory of it and the glory of its creator. A standard is set before him, a law of conduct every jot and tittle of which he is commanded to obey, and he falls far short of the fulfillment thereof. For these defects man is inexcusable and incurs the wrath and condemnation of God. When he becomes convinced of his sin, and, by the grace of God and by the operation of the Holy Spirit accepts the plan of salvation offered in the Gospel, and becomes justified by faith in Christ, his nature is regenerated. His mind is enlightened, his will is renewed, and he recovers something of the pristine glory of man before the fall. There is still, however, in his nature a spring of evil, and he is not freed from the taint of sin so long as he remains in this life. God chastens him by putting misfortune in his way, by exposing him to temptation that he may be always on his guard, by allowing him at times to stumble that he may be reminded of his infirmity, but he can never totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace. Whatever befalls him, pain, disease, loss of property, loss of kindred, he must never show impatience and expostulate, but recognizing justice and lenity in the rod, must welcome whatever happens with a humble and grateful mind, knowing that it has been so ordained by God.[2] When assured of his calling and election, he should in evidence of the faith that is in him devote himself to doing God's work and extending the glory of God.

There is more emphasis on God's sovereignty than God's love, and more emphasis on man's sin and corruption than in any other religious system. Perhaps we may

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[1] Ergo frustra nobis in mundi opificio collucent tot accensæ lampades ad illustrandam auctoris gloriam; quæ sic nos undique irradiant ut tamen in rectam viam per se nequaquam possint perducere. Et scintillas certe quasdam excitant, sed quæ ante præfocantur quam pleniorem effundant fulgorem. (Calvin's Institutes, Book I, chap. 5 (14).)

[2] Calvin's Institutes, Book III, chap. 7.

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say that this stern creed, with its emphasis on sin, on divine wrath, on inexcusable defect, on the need for redemption and regeneration, was peculiarly adapted to the development of a certain type of character, a type very common among those people to whom Calvinism has made an especial appeal. There are some men upon whom Nature pours her gifts abundantly, and what they produce they produce with little effort. There are others to whom everything is hard. They can achieve nothing good unless they live in a state of constant training, unless there is set before them a high standard, a law of conduct every jot and tittle of which must be obeyed. If they relax their efforts for even a short time they quickly degenerate and the labor of years may be in vain. Men of this type, endowed with native vigor, and vaguely conscious of great latent possibilities, would be stimulated by Calvinism to put forth their best energies. The doctrine of man's guilt and corruption, of the need for redemption and regeneration, would be taken to express in effect the tremendous potentiality of man, a potentiality not yet realized; for the healthy mind, that wastes no time in looking back, views sin as the difference between the actual and the potential.

It is difficult at first for a modern to enter into sympathy with such doctrines as the fall of man, and the depravity of man in his present state. We now believe in evolution, in continuous development. We do not think of man as the ruin of a noble building, to use Calvin's phrase. We think of him as a building in process of completion. We put perfection not in the past, but in the future. This idea is symbolically conveyed in the modern doctrine of the superman, which can be regarded as the expression of a modern Puritanism. The psychological effect of the old idea and the new idea is the same. Both ideas move men to discontent with their present condition and spur them to action. Having wider knowledge we must vary the language in which the idea is clothed. In the same way we can give a new

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significance even to the doctrine of election in the light of recent discoveries with respect to the laws of heredity. By heredity and by environment some men appear to form an elect who have exceptional privileges and exceptional duties.

To return to the general outline of the subject,—God's sovereignty implies man's humility. Calvin constantly insists that no merit belongs to man, and he expresses entire agreement with a saying of Augustine that the first precept of the Christian religion is humility, and the second humility, and the third humility.[3] We find, however, on reading the life of John Knox, the life of Cromwell, and the lives of other Scotch and English Puritans whose religion was Calvinism, that this humility was a humility before God which in human relations became a boundless self-assertion. There was not much of that humility which at the present day so often accompanies the study of religion and ethics, which allows the Philistines and the Amalekites to triumph and dominate the world, and which sometimes differs little from a vicious indolence. The Puritan asserted himself in matters spiritual and temporal. The regenerate man, feeling assured of his election and convinced of his mission, set out to regenerate the earth, or at all events to do as effective work as possible within the sphere allotted to him by Providence. Knowing that his nature was corrupt and would always be corrupt in this life, distrusting every impulse which did not spring from his inmost self, or, as he would express it, which was not inspired by the Holy Spirit, he nevertheless felt a boundless confidence, inasmuch as he knew that he could never fall from the state of grace, that he could commit no irretrievable errors, and that all things would work for good in the end. Having his mind anchored on that which is eternal, acknowledging the Word of God as superior to all earthly authority, he had no fear of man, and no undue regard

[3] Institutes, Book II, chap. 2 (11).

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for rank and wealth. The problems presented by this evanescent world, problems of politics, of law, of finance, the problems connected with the mechanism of life, he approached with a proud sense of mastery, as one accustomed to greater problems. If the Philistines and the Amalekites crossed his path, he met force with force, gentle methods failing; for he was not limited by the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, but might derive his examples from the Old Testament which was to him equally inspired with the New Testament. To sum up, —we find that this religion developed a character presenting a remarkable combination of freedom and discipline, humility and confidence, reverence and absolute fearlessness, mysticism and practical energy, a character which could be hard and even cruel. It developed the will and the intelligence more than the emotions, and the will more than the intelligence. As a result the Puritan was very often irresistible on the battlefield and afterwards in the field of industrial enterprise, in any occupation which called for concentration of purpose and untiring effort, rather than expansive sympathies, artistic perceptions, and fineness of imagination.

The doctrine of man's corruption and the consequent distrust of natural inclinations, the constant feeling of responsibility, of duty undischarged, carried with them a condemnation of artificial amusements, of the theatre, the novel, of any occupation which did not appear to have a direct bearing on the main purpose of life. It is true that Calvin in his chapter in the Institutes on Christian Liberty, warns the Christian against excessive scruples about small matters which lead him into a labyrinth from which he cannot escape; and we find that the deeply religious Scotsman was tolerant about matters which he regarded as not essential, for instance, he insisted on temperance, but not on total abstinence. Still, the morality of Calvinism was necessarily very austere. The condemnation of the theatre is still universal amongst rigid Calvinists in Scotland. The early reformers would

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have regarded art, in our sense of the word, as largely idolatry, a worshiping of images. Such an attitude as this should not be too hastily condemned. We may view life as an æsthetic spectacle or as a field for energetic action. The latter is the point of view of Calvinism. A scheme of life in which duty, discipline, work, are the paramount conceptions, leaves little room for art and no room for pleasures which insensibly weaken the will, dissipate the attention, and destroy unity of effort. Calvinism, to put it shortly, produced good men of business, it made for efficiency.[4] The religion developed a morality which conducted to material success persons who retained that morality while they abandoned the theological dogmas out of which it arose. The process can easily be traced in Scotland, sometimes even in the same family, the intense religious fervor of a former age finding expression in more recent times in practical energy and worldly success. This austere morality may assume forbidding forms. As the older Puritanism in which a man sought to do God's work was sometimes corrupted into a selfish religion in which he sought only his own salvation, so the more modern Puritanism is sometimes the garb of a narrow, worldly ambition which sacrifices many generous instincts.

There are realms of thought and feeling which Calvinism does not touch. When we survey the ruins of Melrose Abbey, we feel a lingering regret for a religion which admitted art of the most exquisite kind as an essential of worship. Nevertheless a religion such as Calvinism, which in its purest form taught men to seek after the truth without turning to the right or to the left, to adhere with tenacity to convictions once formed and to impress these convictions upon the world as forcibly as possible, to recognize no fine gradations of good and

[4] On this aspect of the subject see articles on "Calvinism and Capitalism," in the June and July, 1910, numbers of the *Contemporary Review*, by the Rev. Dr. Forsyth.

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evil, but to maintain the good and extirpate the evil at all costs, such a religion was well adapted to fulfill its prime function of freeing the human mind from every form of despotism.

Under the heading of liberty we come to what is perhaps the most important aspect of the subject. When we speak of liberty in this connection we mean something very far apart from license. The idea of discipline meets us at every turn. In the early history of the church in Scotland, and up to a recent period, people were compelled to conform to the very rigid code of morality in force, on penalty of church censures, of excommunication, and social ostracism. There was a degree of interference with the private lives of the people which at the present day would not be tolerated, though now we may perhaps say that increasing pressure of work and a higher standard of efficiency exercise a more severe discipline over large masses than any ever exercised by Kirk Sessions. The contribution made by Calvinism to liberty arises out of the doctrine of the final authority of Holy Scripture as the Word of God; the doctrine that this authority overrides all other authority, any other authority being valid only as it is derived from God, and that if any pope or king, church or magistrate, or council, command to do that which is contrary to the Scripture, particularly in matters of faith and worship, the command must be disobeyed. The issues involved being eternal, any earthly penalty which follows such disobedience must be disregarded.

The consequences of this principle are written large in history. It overthrew the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, and the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It helped to bring about the fight between king and parliament in England, and the struggle between presbytery and episcopacy in Scotland. In the end liberty of conscience was established, but this liberty was at first a restricted liberty. A person was still limited by the letter of scripture, as interpreted in such documents as the

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Westminster confession, and these limits were sufficiently narrow to prevent for a time the free development of thought. Nevertheless, the principle of liberty once established was bound to extend, and it has in fact extended.

Such a principle as that enunciated above would seem at first to encourage a rebellious spirit, a want of respect for the grades of authority in government. It certainly encouraged a spirit of independence and a tendency to regard the difference of worth between one man and another as something distinct from a difference of external rank.[5] On the other hand, in the confession and the catechisms of the church of Scotland obedience to the civil magistrate, or, in other words, to any person who exercises authority over others in matters external, is strictly enjoined.[6] The result is an admirable balance, a balance which we often notice in Calvinism in matters relating to the practical side of life. While the duty of obedience is emphasized, it is clearly laid down that if spiritual liberty is threatened, there is a duty of rebellion.

The belief in the Bible as the ultimate standard of reference developed individuality and moral courage. A person who felt himself firmly supported by the authority of Scripture was enabled to pursue his own line of thought and his own line of action without being deflected by public opinion or by any other external cause. Thus supported he might assert himself against the minister of the parish.[7] As the Scriptures may be interpreted by different persons in different ways, the right of independent judgment, when exercised without due regard to common-sense, inevitably led to schism, one

[5] This would also follow from the doctrine of election.

[6] In John Knox's confession obedience is enjoined to those whom God has placed in authority 'while they pass not over the bounds of their office.'

[7] This right of independent judgment and also the presence of laymen in the church courts and councils prevented ministers from forming a dominant caste in Scotland.

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of the most noticeable features of the history of the Scottish church.

We no longer regard the Bible by itself as the ultimate standard of reference. We do not believe that every word of it has been written by the finger of God. The sacred canon is not sufficiently comprehensive. But the individual should still have his standard of reference, broader than the standards of the past, including and reconciling those standards. The encroachments upon spiritual liberty which must now be resisted are less crude and obvious than in the past, and more insidious. They may for the most part be summed up in the phrase,—slavery to the mechanism of life. The grievances for which men formerly sacrificed their lives do not now exist in civilized countries, except in rare cases. Men may be Catholics or Protestants, may worship according to the forms of presbytery or episcopacy as they please; but if their energies of soul and body are entirely expended in discharging some specialized function in relation to the mechanism of life, so that they have no spirit left for worship of any form, they may be in a worse slavery than their forefathers, often without being conscious of the fact. The principle that induced men to fight for liberty in the past still remains, but the issue is not now so clear and distinct, and the motive which formerly induced men to disregard material consequences cannot now be felt with such intensity.

Something has been said above of the abuses or corruptions of Calvinism. It may lead to self-seeking, it may lead to schism, to an incapacity to live and work with other men. The cruelty which we find in such matters as the persecution of witches is not peculiar to Calvinism. In a sense cruelty is not an abuse or perversion, but an inevitable consequence, not of Calvinism only, but of any system which teaches that the Bible presents rules of conduct for all time, and that one part of the Bible is inspired equally with another part, and which includes

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belief in the devil and in eternal punishment.[8] The doctrine of election in its crude form would accentuate the tendency to cruelty in Calvinism. It is often overlooked that Christianity in the form in which it was once presented by the orthodox, was a religion of cruelty no less than a religion of love, perhaps more so. All or most of the above doctrines we can now reject and yet retain much that is of universal value.

Most valuable, perhaps, is the principle of the spiritual liberty of the individual. Calvinism also comprehends much that is best in Stoicism. It presents a Spartan ideal of life, views life as a rigid discipline or an active campaign. Stripped of theological language, its ethic is in many respects the ethic which the practical man, the man of action, consciously or unconsciously, holds. Liberally interpreted, and tempered with elements from more humane and genial creeds, Calvinism is still a religion for Scotsmen.

WILLIAM A. ROSS.

LONDON.

THE PRESENT ALTITUDE.

F. CARREL.

TO what moral and social state have we attained in Europe at the present time? Two answers may be given to this question. It may be affirmed that we have advanced to a high civilization, to a degree of moral and social excellence such as the world has never known, but it may also be asserted that the advance has been largely neutralized by regressive forces and that we have made but little progress.

The first contention is supported by a certain set of

[8] A certain natural sanity and common-sense has preserved Calvinists in Scotland, at all events in more recent times, from accepting these doctrines too literally, and from pursuing them to their logical consequences.

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facts. The second is based upon another series. If we could establish separate numerical values for these facts, we might be able to ascertain if and to what extent the progressive forces exceeded the regressive or *vice versa.* We might, for instance, construct graduated scales on which we should be able to read off the respective heights of good and evil reached in the course of history. But the coefficients for the different elements of good and evil would be of doubtful accuracy. It would be necessary that the valuations to establish them should all be made on the same basis, that is to say, on the same interpretation of right and wrong, and that the meaning of these terms should be settled in advance. If by an average of moralists' judgments, good were defined as the general welfare of the race and evil whatever could be ascertained, by the tests at present at our disposal, to be opposed to it, we might arrive at some results which would not be without interest, but the value of our computation would be impaired by the fact that it would be difficult to decide in which scale many social phenomena should be placed, since out of apparent racial evil may come demonstrable racial good, the converse being also true. A civil war would at first sight have to be placed in the scale of evil, but if it put an end to internal miseries and gave a new life to a nation, it would not be easy to exclude it from the scale of good.

To minimize the risk of error, it would be necessary in constructing the scales, to judge after the knowledge of results, and either to exclude present history which could not be so judged, or to include it by estimating its developments. Both methods would be incomplete. The worth of the system would depend, in a last analysis, upon whether a great well-being of the race is the highest good, or whether such well-being does not contain some elements of disintegration that might, in some contingencies, endanger its existence.

Thus there is much uncertainty; and it is clear that if we are uncertain as to the value of our scales, we are

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hardly in a position to measure by their means. Therefore we must adopt some other method of research, abandoning the hope of finding coefficients. Now the best system of inquiry would seem to be to take the present age as it appears and to consider separately and qualitatively the good influences and the bad, defining good as that effect of social dynamics which in our times and to our own powers of perception is favorable to the physical, mental, and material progress of the race and to the advance of the highest form of civilization which we can conceive; while defining evil as that effect of the same dynamics which is opposed to that progress and civilization. The definition of good is doubtless open to objection, but we must obtain a working definition, and this one is probably as near an approximation to the truth as we can reach at present.

Recalling now the question with which we started, To what moral and social state have we attained? we may consider the times, first from the good, then from the bad standpoint.

We have to-day a society in which the rich and powerful no longer resort to crimes of violence, but make increasing efforts to alleviate poverty and to cure the sick, a society which has abolished slavery and which shows a certain tendency to abolish war. Among the good traits in the sense here accepted may also be included the desire to save life either by careful child-rearing, by hygiene or by other means. There is anxiety to prevent waste of life by suicide and generally to strive toward the attainment of the highest degree of human efficiency. In addition to this there is an immense endeavor to wrest from nature secrets, the possession of which increases the capabilities of human life. Education from unmoral tends to become moral in the secular sense, and there is a prospect of a generation growing up with a specific moral education. The reduction of alcoholic intemperance, especially among the higher classes, is excellent. The incorruptibility of justice in most European countries and

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the efficiency of the police are beneficial factors. There is great security for life and property. Opportunities for the better enjoyment of air and space are provided for the poorer inhabitants of towns. Preventive medicine, prudential diet, and in some countries a desire to maintain population within the limits of available natural resources, are removing much disease and want. We have arrived at a stage when we may venture to hope that the foundations have been laid of a far more satisfactory human state than any that the world has known.

Now let us consider the opposite tendencies to those above enumerated, endeavoring to avoid, as far as possible, the personal equation which is often a potent factor in the estimation of good and evil. The bad characteristics, it must be said at once, are somewhat less easily discernible than the good in our present-day society. A careful scrutiny, however, reveals the following facts. There exists to-day a competition for the necessities and above all for the amenities of life which is so engrossing that the lives of individuals are almost exclusively devoted to it. The desire to possess in order to enjoy is intense, and to gratify it deceit, prevarication, false pretention, hard bargaining are frequently resorted to. Men tend to become valued by each other, not primarily for the qualities, moral and intellectual, which they possess, but for their material means. Where pleasure is the great desideratum, as it is in our society, those who can offer it to others are prized, the more so as pleasure tends to become costly. The exaltation of success in enterprise is carried to lengths which can only be described as unreasonable. Along with this excessive adulation of success there goes a corresponding disregard for the means by which it is achieved, and little or no recognition of the fact that success is very frequently not the result of personal effort alone, but largely of the efforts of the community and of the hazard of events.

Insuccess, on the other hand, which is often due to cir-

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cumstances over which the individual has no control, is punished by contempt, because the solidarity of the race and its responsibility for its less fortunate, less endowed, or, in other words, less fit exponents has not yet been understood. It may be well that the successful should be prized and encouraged to perpetuate, but if those less provided with the particular qualities which lead to success are to be relegated to the worst conditions of existence, cast out from the ranks of the successful, then society becomes endangered by the criminal tendencies which these outcasts frequently develop. If extermination of the less apt, who are sometimes merely the more scrupulous and less acquisitive, is to be the principle of racial policy, then it seems surprising that charity or succor of affliction should ever be practised in the world. It should not be forgotten that the standard of fitness varies with the epoch. The capacities, physical and mental, which are sufficient to qualify an individual for success or fitness in a rude state of society, may be wholly inadequate in a complex one, and we have no knowledge that the human organism will be always capable of standing the increasing strain to which it is subjected. This constant seeking for more than human powers can furnish is undoubtedly an evil. Unless we can ensure by some process of physico-chemistry an equal distribution of mental and physical power, the deficient, having the same faculty of enjoyment as the efficient, are condemned to suffer, because the standard of efficiency has been fixed too high. Therefore the straining for fitness which often ends in incapacity or suicide must be considered an evil unless it can be proved that a portion of the race is destined to develop a power of resistance to its effects, and that this power of resistance is capable of generalization in a not too distant future.

The struggle is for superior and more and more pleasurable conditions of existence, but it should be remembered that the earth, which is the primary source of all human satisfaction, is not unlimited in its resources, and

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that the day may come when these will be exhausted. In such a case the highest 'fitness' would be unavailing.

A concomitant evil is the absolute egoism on which society is based. Let there be no error as to this. It is not maintained that there is no altruism of a collective kind; but this is exercised after the struggle to possess is over and seldom or never while it is taking place. The aim is to obtain the mastery of wealth frequently by displacing others in competition, by ruining them if necessary in their calling or vocation.

What the successful struggler gives away are still the crumbs of the rich man's table, and although, in some instances, these crumbs assume considerable proportions, in the majority of cases they are of relatively small extent. These are the facts of every-day experience. Neither the moral precepts bound up in the religions, nor the doctrines of the moralists, often little known outside academies, have any but the smallest restraining influence upon this form of immorality which, though not openly taught, is tacitly accepted as inseparable not only from human nature, but from the whole of nature. It is in competition and in ruthless competition that the strong reveal themselves and the strong tend to perpetuate the strong. That is the contention. But there exists in the human mind a conception which bears the name of justice, and it is impossible to reconcile with a pure idea of justice a large number of the practices whereby the acquisitive obtain possession of a large share of advantage. Is it or is it not for the benefit of the race that such practices are common? We are told by the upholders of what may be called animalistic action that there is a higher virtue in the dominating man who follows nature's laws and proves himself the rightful owner of the amenities of life by his power of wresting them from others. Such a man becomes a model which others try to imitate, whether his success has been legitimate or not, even according to common notions of morality. In any case, whether successful legitimately or not, the dominating man is gen-

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erally rich, holding in his power a superabundant share of wealth; and the question to be decided is whether it is expedient in the interest of the race that there should be such men. There can be no doubt, of course, that men possessing intellectual gifts of an order above the average are useful to conduct affairs, to be the means of furthering the sciences, and that they should be rewarded; but there is no need to raise them to the rank of demi-gods. These men, however, constitute only a section of the potential class, and their maintenance is plainly beneficial. The case is different with dominants determined to prevail by any means not absolutely banned by law, and who utilize the folly or the ignorance of others to build up their aggrandizement. It cannot be said that it is an advantage to the community at large to possess such men whose principal aim in life is to conquer wealth and to monopolize it in their families. No, their existence is an evil that is borne by the present age with a patience which, though great, at times shows signs of failing. If for legitimate, successful action there should be a reasonable reward, for successful action which is not legitimate, there should be a fitting condemnation. The tendency, however, is to exaggerate the one and to condone the other; and this is an evil of the times.

Whether over-population is harmful or beneficial is a question which involves too many considerations, economic, physiological, and social, to be considered here, but it may be said that, military necessities apart, the Latin countries where restriction of population is practised, generally exhibit far less poverty than those where unlimited paternity obtains, and it is not seen that the physical condition of the inhabitants of these countries is in any way impaired.

It is certain that the acuity of competition is increased or diminished according to the numbers of the competitors. In any case, absolutely irresponsible paternity or the callous production of offspring without reasonable prospect of support, is an evil which cannot but be harm-

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ful, unless the community adopt the progeny thus introduced. Of course, if it were established that uncompromising individualism, the callousness of the lower orders of animal life, were the best and healthiest rule for human beings, then much of what is here held evil would, on the contrary, be reckoned good. But if this were conceded, we should have to admit at the same time, that all philanthropy was wrong, and that there should be no solidarity or mutual responsibility, a proposition which no one, as yet, has openly sustained, because of a conviction that such a contention would be the negation of a system to which the name of civilization is attached, a system which has proved of ascertainable advantage. There seems little reason to doubt that the interests of the race would be best served by the existence of a society so constituted that men had perfect confidence in it, a society from which all the practices that cause mental suffering and disgust of men,—jealousy, deceit, suppression of truth, mendacity, false pretence, and machiavelism generally,—were absent. Life under such conditions would be freer, calmer, happier; and yet who can say that they exist to-day?

No one who looks into his experience can contend that we have now attained to such a state of things. In no class is it reached. Jealousy, though hidden, is yet present; subterfuge, equivocation, are probably as much a part of human nature as at any time before. Cunning is still employed for the furtherance of personal designs. Men experience the old disinclination to act toward others as they would have others act toward them. As ever, the rich are arrogant, the poor depressed.

But one of the most salient facts in the morals of the times, one that is recognized by all, is the reduction to the money value of the issues of existence. When almost every action tends to be directed toward material gain, a standard is established which has the effect of focussing all aims in one direction and precluding effort from taking other paths. This certainly has the merit of call-

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ing forth the acutest powers of the human intellect, but it has also the defect of circumscribing those powers, of destroying the variety which acts as hygiene to the mind, and of limiting the scope of intellectual inquiry to channels where material reward is to be found. In some countries this unification of endeavor is more observable than it is in others, but in whatever degree it manifests itself, it must, from the point of view accepted here, be held to be unfavorable. If it is harmful to occupy the mind with one fixed idea, to be constantly engrossed in the acute anxieties of gain, then this modern tendency cannot be otherwise than bad.

The example of nature is not apposite. It is true that animals in the wild state pass their lives almost exclusively in seeking and obtaining sustenance, but man claims to be superior to the animals; and in any case his complex intellect has greater needs than that of creatures lower than himself in the scale of life. But all cannot be successful in the quest for gain, and it may eventually be discovered that it is inconsistent with the best interests of society that there should be, as there are, a large number of men, not including criminals, who, unsuccessful in this quest, become malcontents without confidence in what is called human nature, indifferent to social things. And when the dominant spirit is that of gain, even the relatively successful are not free from the prevailing malady, since they have not reached the limits of attainment. The resultant of this universal impulse is to be found in cruelty, which men refrain from inflicting upon animals, but which they practice upon one another.

Yes, cruelty is an evil of our present phase,—cruelty not openly displayed, but visited upon the weak and failing by a series of indirect yet puissant agencies, among which are costly justice, high taxation, dearness of existence, inferior treatment in disease, and ostracism from successful spheres. It has been said that this mercenary phase is a passing one, and that a time will come when the evil will disappear. There seems little chance that

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this result will be achieved unless it were by the inauguration of a system of equalization of wealth and education such as the world has not yet witnessed.

But there is another defect of our present state. This is the failure to recognize as evils, practices which reduce the value of existence for the majority. Such are the use of appliances for locomotion which destroy the peace of nature and render it impossible for men to satisfy the instinct for primeval natural conditions which ages of urban dwelling have been unable to destroy. For personal pleasure or for private profit it is wrong to make life ugly for the many, and sooner or later this fact must become apparent.

Yet another evil of our civilization is the failure of the directing classes to recognize the need for a more strict economy in the administration of the State, so that the burdens of taxation may be lightened; but this evil is evidently largely bound up with the questions of military defence, a defence which is apparently inevitable until the nations, not only of the West but also of the East, have lost the notion of belligerence.

But perhaps one of the greatest of all shortcomings, and one that occasionally demands the intervention of the law, is the monopolization of commodities by a class of merchants for the purpose of abnormal gain. No practice is probably more inimical to the mass of the community than this, yet it is of frequent, almost habitual occurrence, and although in some countries laws exist by which it is made criminal, these laws are seldom put in force, and the produce of the fruitful earth is made unduly hard to win.

From whatever moral standpoint this is viewed, except from the brutal one of Nietzsche, it can only be condemned as wrong. This evil, however, is equalled by another of a cognate kind. On the pretext that liberty of contract cannot be interfered with, many traps for the unwary are permitted to be set, such as organizations for speculation or for gaming, which are the causes of social

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suffering. There can be no true sense of social justice as long as these snares exist; and this is an evil which must one day claim attention from legislative bodies which have it in their power to redress most social wrongs.

There are other wrong practices observable at the present time, such as child labor (in some countries), suppression of offspring in the necessitous classes, deceptive advertisement, food adulteration, and above all the unrestricted sale of alcoholic drinks. These last and those already alluded to constitute the body of evil of the present state, so far as we can judge it by the standard here adopted. Numerically the good and the bad tendencies are nearly equal, but as before remarked, numbers in a computation of this kind are of little value. It is useful, however, to place the rival tendencies in opposition to each other, so that we may attempt a mental estimate of the height attained by the one above the other, supposing that one transcends the other.

Well, if we search for a sign of advance of a general character, we shall find it in the indisputable progress in education and well-being of the nations, each considered as a whole. The records of the middle ages, the renaissance, and even of the eighteenth century, show inferior conditions in this respect. Of that there is no doubt, and it must be conceded that this factor in itself appears sufficient to cause the good to exceed the evil. We must remember, however, that general progress is accompanied by an intensive activity which may or may not prove too great a strain, and that the farther we move away from natural conditions, the more liable we are to be exposed to the accidents peculiar to artificial ones.

The importance of this factor may, however, be held to be sufficient to cause the good influences of the times to exceed the evil. The race has its fate in its own hands. If it allows the destructive habits of thought to gain the ascendency, then it sinks below a standard which, by the opposite habits, may be raised. With greater general contentment and more efficient education many of the

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shoals which are now visible may disappear. Science, though capable of being enlisted in the cause of evil, is generally on the side of racial good; and it may be relied upon to effect more and more beneficial changes in the human lot.

At the same time we must not be too sanguine. Retrogressions, even from our present imperfect moral and social states, may at any time occur owing to the temporary predominance of any adverse factor, and it cannot be too much insisted upon that any mixture of the white and colored races might cause great perturbations.

Finally, the moral position appears to be as follows: The good, taken as a whole, exceeds the evil by reason of the factors above alluded to, but not in the degree which might have been expected after four thousand years of western civilization; and there are elements on the side of evil which, if they increased in value, might easily destroy the good attained. Of course, if it were proved that evil is necessary to the production of good, that men should prey upon each other and to a certain extent annihilate each other, then our mode of viewing all the causes of human suffering due to the particular conduct which produces them would have to undergo a change. The moral problem would consist in adjusting, as finely as possible, the evil to the good. But then it would be difficult to continue to apply the name of evil to what would be eventual good, and we should be compelled to adopt an 'all-for-the-best' attitude of mind which could not escape the obligation of holding as salutary, and therefore as legitimate, a certain amount of what we now call crime.

Just as we are apparently better without the devastating scourges of the middle ages, so should we seemingly be better without wars and ruthless competition. The stimulation said to be afforded by these two last features would doubtless be found, ultimately, to be derivable from other sources of invigoration. There is at least a high probability that the aim should be the continual reduc-

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tion of the causes of apparent racial harm, the removal of the hindrances to a more perfect social state.

If the race desire this state it can hardly fail to obtain it, and if it does not desire it, then there probably exists some undiscovered reason why it does not. In any case if the race is to preserve the zest to live, it cannot but be well that it should have confidence in its perfectibility.

F. CARREL.

LONDON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

L'ÉVOLUTION CRÉATRICE. Par Henri Bergson. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910.[1]

This book is the most compendious of the works of M. Bergson. In it he intends, as he himself tells us, to apply to life in general the ideas which he has already elaborated elsewhere, more particularly in his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (Paris, 1889). The book is divided into four parts. The first of these *(l'Évolution de la vie—mécanisme et finalité)* starts from the observation of subjective consciousness. We perceive only a continuum unrolling itself, incessantly modifying itself. This progress of consciousness in the making M. Bergson calls *la durée.* The *durée* in each one of us is our personality. At each moment it 'pushes,' 'shoots,' develops. Each moment is new and cannot be foreseen. No vital experience is lost. As a snowball rolls and gathers, so the personality of each. Our experience of duration is not 'thought': it is 'lived.' Each particular of experience is 'cut out' from the whole of duration by our senses and understanding. By reason, probably, of an unstable equilibrium of internal impulses the ultimate reality in the universe, as in us, 'pushes' and 'explodes' from moment to moment with the incessant development of its *élan vital.*

M. Bergson then discusses what he calls (1) *mécanisme;* by which is meant a metaphysic in which the whole of reality is postulated *en bloc* as eternal, and in which time is an illusion; and (2) *finalité,* a doctrine by which 'things and beings' do nothing but realize a preëxisting plan. Determinism (which for M. Bergson excludes liberty) and teleology 'of the classical type' are found to be untenable. Both are generated by an improper extension or application of certain concepts natural to our intelligence. Originally thought is wholly practical. Plan and mechanical necessity are therefore our familiars and these ideas are improperly carried over from the realm of practical necessity to the realm of speculative philosophy. The

[1] This review has been much delayed owing to the illness of the reviewer.

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dominance of the ideas of determinism and teleology is due solely to the incidence of attention in the field of practice. The intellect is derivative, it is a precipitate of mind: it is characterized by a fundamental incapacity for the apprehension of life. It has to do solely with the static, whereas the 'Becoming' is the only real. For the apprehension of the Becoming we must throw ourselves upon the faculty of intuition, which is the faculty of direct perception.

In the second chapter we consider the three great lines along which evolution has progressed, vegetable, animal, and human life: parallel and complementary each to each. Vegetables are characterized by *torpeur*. They need no movement, but convert directly the inorganic into the organic. Animals through their power of locomotion have developed instinct. Instinct and intelligence are not different degrees of the same power, but differ in kind. Both, however, being differentiations of an original One, each carries with it something of the other. The greater the development, the greater the diversity, and therefore (from M. Bergson's point of view) the less the harmony. It is impossible to seize or adequately express the quality of the original unity in terms of any one of these developments alone.

The third chapter is an endeavor "to seize in itself and follow in its moments" the *cause génératrice, i. e.,* the original unity. Here we find ourselves face to face with the painful dilemma that the intellect alone can ask the questions which the philosopher wants to know, but it never can answer them; while instinct which alone could answer our questions cannot be interrogated. If the intelligence that slumbers in instinct could be made to answer, it could tell us the most intimate secrets of life. The quality by which instinct 'knows' is, M. Bergson apprehends, most akin to the sympathetic insight of the artist. We can, he thinks, by an effort of the will, transcend intelligence and direct this faculty of sympathetic insight on to that which is freest from externality and intellectuality, *viz.,* the inward *durée*. By concentrating our attention on the quick edge of consciousness we shall be aware of incessant movement, of a "mounting and ascending force" which is life itself. Only here do we touch reality. Here the real "makes itself." Here alone is our personality. Here alone freedom. The intellect 'cuts out' from this continuum 'forms,' it relates the like to the like; it is itself fashioned in the process of its functioning;

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that with which it works is dead matter, the static, which belongs to the descending scale of "that which unmakes itself." The material world is a construction of the intellect, which pieces together views taken from the outside of that which moves, but which as moving the intellect cannot apprehend.

In the last chapter M. Bergson endeavors to show how the understanding by submitting to discipline could overcome its limitations and help to produce a philosophy free from the two fundamental errors which have hitherto vitiated philosophy. These errors are (1) the illusion that we can think the unstable by means of the stable, the quick by means of the dead; and (2) the illusion of the void (non-being). Both these illusions arose from the fact that the intellect, a faculty evolved by practical necessity, had become habituated to the concentration of attention solely on what concerned our acts. All those parts of the continuum which came between were as nothing to it. We must try then to observe for the sake of observing and not merely for the sake of acting. If we succeed in doing this, the Absolute itself will reveal itself, very near to us, even in us. Its essence is psychologic, not mathematical or logical.

The philosophy of Forms, of Ideas, has sought ever for the unchangeable, the definite quality, the form or essence, the end. The great line of philosophic development from Plato to Plotinus by way of Aristotle and the Stoics, shows us a construction based on this illusion. So far as we in modern days trust to the cinematograph method natural to our *intellects*, we must arrive at similarly untrustworthy conclusions. There is more in the Becoming than in the Static. But for the conceptualists reality was the static. How could they get change or movement (which could not be denied) save by the degradation of the 'ideas' or by the 'illusive nothings' of space and time which 'creep between' the ideas and create "agitation without end."

Might not a new philosophy install itself on this extra-intellectual matter of knowledge? Might not consciousness by concentrated effort move in two directions at once, and seize from within and not merely observe from without (as hitherto) the two forms of reality? Should we not by this double effort be able to see the intellect springing up of itself and cutting itself out of the Absolute? Would not then the barriers fall between the matter and the form of sensible knowledge and between

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the 'pure forms' of sensibility and the categories of the understanding?

The chapter closes with an analysis of Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy, which is found to be vitiated by the same illusion. It is a patchwork of dead bits: there is no true vision of creative evolution.

M. Bergson's book reads like a romance. As a mighty river overbears all obstacles that might seem to obstruct its course and reaches the ocean of its dreams, so M. Bergson's brilliant pictorial style with wave after wave of metaphor, carries forward his reader, with an extraordinary sense of exhilaration, and almost convinces him for the time being that all difficulties are resolved and all antinomies reconciled. When one closes the book and reflects upon it all,—that perilous and materialistic process!—there emerges a stubborn discontent which had so often been overleaped or shoved aside, and one feels the need, the crying need, for more closely direct logical argument. Or, if one has not the courage to mention logic, after the overwhelming snubbing to which that most princely servant has been subjected,—might not one press upon Intuition, the new chamberlain who ushers us into the court of the king, that he would deliver up to us yet more of his golden gains, especially at that point where he watches the intellect 'cutting out' form and fashioning itself in the process?

Intuition and intellect interpenetrate each other, M. Bergson tells us. Can we be perfectly clear that in the perception exercised by the intuition no faint beginnings of that evil thing, the intellect, make themselves felt? Is the question so radically different from that question to which philosophy is accustomed: 'Is there such a thing as a pure sensation'?

M. Bergson is obliged to confess, though he hates to do it, that *la durée* is at once both a unity and a multiplicity. This is the report of intuition. One wonders why, when intuition is turned on to that living point where the intellect is selecting the materials of form *(lier la même au même)*, it is not aware of difference also? How can the intellect build up the idea of form or essence, as M. Bergson says it does, by a concentration of impressions, if it was unaware of difference as well as of sameness? If there is an identity which persists throughout many changes, many differences, if the perception of that identity is the result of the interaction of intellect and its

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object, why call it an illusion? M. Bergson's account of the genesis of the idea is about as unsatisfactory as anything in his book. One cannot help thinking that he is a little the victim of his own metaphors here as elsewhere. He conceives of the intellect more or less as a material instrument. It 'cuts out' forms. It has 'moulds' into which the same, and nothing but the same, can fit.

Is it correct to say that M. Bergson's idea of 'freedom' is equivalent to "that which cannot be foretold"? Is it therefore true to say "the more unexpected the more free"? Is not this to reduce the quality of freedom very near to the quality of the action of the insane?

But criticism of this kind is perhaps out of place, even if there be anything in it. For what M. Bergson is seeking to do is not to give us a philosophy ready made. Instead he opens his mind to us with an extraordinary frankness, and shows us its working, and draws our attention to those parts of what he finds which seem incongruous with philosophy as he finds it.

Whatever any other school of philosophy may say to him, idealists at least cannot protest when he tells them that truth cannot be found save in the closest touch with the living reality. It is true that the 'life' by which idealists are apt to test their thought is the organic movement of society. It is difficult to believe that this is not life in the making. It is difficult, too, to believe that 'life' thus conceived is less full, less near to reality than is the stream of personal inner consciousness, especially when from that stream there has been ejected as flotsam and jetsam everything having the taint of 'form,' and attention is restricted to the attenuated edge of that twilight consciousness. Is not this edge necessarily twilight, so long as we restrict attention to it? Do we not in restricting attention to it restrict the movement itself; that inevitable movement towards construction, which, while it is for M. Bergson a deterioration, has also for its product—as he sees—the brilliant nucleus of mind?

When a growing dissatisfaction with M. Bergson's treatment of this or that particular point produces in one a sense of estrangement from him, one feels oneself continually plucked back by the sense of warm welcome. For coming, as it does, from the side of physical science, does not his point of view make possible an unprecedented *rapprochement* between all those who

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call themselves idealists and those who, whether they call themselves 'naturalists' or 'materialists' or 'empiricists,' are agreed in finding the structure of 'things' by 'mind' arrant rubbish, and in finding an intellectual agnosticism the only possible attitude towards ultimate Reality? It is true that unless M. Bergson can see his way to the development of his intuitionalism, a development which will give us a really trustworthy bridge between it and intellectualism (if he still is unable to allow their identity at bottom), then his new 'philosophy' must remain esoteric, and be,—even for the inner circle,—a new agnosticism. I think this book contains some intimation of some such possible development (*e. g.*, pp. 326, 389, 390). Idealists, on their side, will not be hurt by being reminded that there may be more things in heaven and earth than are included in their philosophy.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London, England.

CREATIVE EVOLUTION. By Henri Bergson. Translated by Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. viii, 425.

The work of translation, a peculiarly difficult task when French has to be rendered into English, has been in the main very successfully done. The book stands better than most works of the kind, the test of being read by itself without reference to the French; by far the greater part of it might well be taken for a spirited original treatise. It is only here and there that an unidiomatic sentence betrays to a careful eye or ear that one is dealing with a version, and that the book from which the version is made was written in French. Thus I find one instance (p. 384) of the inversion, not uncommon in French, but intolerable in English prose, by which an adjective predicate is made to precede its subject ("Relative, therefore, seemed to be sensuous intuition"). Occasionally French idiom is followed in the use of prepositions with an unfortunate effect. Thus (p. 347), "to dispense us with this effort," meaning "to dispense us from" or "to enable us to dispense with" (p. 233); "What hopeless difficulties philosophy falls into *for* not having undertaken this task," should be, "through not having undertaken," or, better, "because she has not undertaken." Our personality is said to "coast around" space continually in sen-

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sation (p. 212). I am not, indeed, sure of M. Bergson's meaning, but I think "it skirts" it would at least be a more idiomatic rendering of *"elle le côtoie"* than that given by the translator. On page 181 we hear of a musical theme "which had first been transposed, the theme as a whole, into a certain number of tones"; here the words "the theme" look like a printer's or author's accidental repetition; they would be better away, and "tones" is a mistranslation for "keys." In the next sentence *infiniment* has been toned down into a colorless "very." Page 154 there is an ambiguity due to the lack of gender in English, where the French is perfectly clear; "it"—the larva of the Sitaris . . . "seizes the opportunity to pass from the male [bee] to the female, and quietly waits until *it* lays its eggs." One has to learn from the context that the egg-laying "it" is the bee; by English idiom it should be the larva of the Sitaris. Page 103, we are oddly told that when a shell bursts near us we only see "the movements of the pulverized explosions"; Bergson's word is *éclats,* which, of course, has its literal sense, "the splinters." At page 92, the expression used of the *élan vital,* that *il se partage* along different lines of evolution should, in view of M. Bergson's doctrines at large, be rendered "divides itself," not "gets divided." At page 56 the statement that our intellect is "an abstract view of the cause of its own being" is obscure, and hardly represents the original, *"étant elle-même une abstraction opérée sur la cause d'où elle emane.* Page 12, I am not sure whether "eventual actions" is really a proper rendering for *actions virtuelles,* virtual actions, *i. e.,* acts which may or may not be executed according as the proper occasion does or does not present itself. "Eventual" in this sense strikes me as more German than English. So on page 9 *un nombre determiné* should not have been translated "a certain number," since in idiomatic English that phrase always means an *uncertain* number and thus gives the exact reverse of the author's meaning. Page 6, *nous pourrions à la rigeur rayer ce souvenir* should not have been softened down into the translator's "even could we erase this memory." This implies that we cannot actually erase it, whereas Bergson distinctly says that *à la rigeur* we might do so. Page 5, line 13, *sans doute* ought not to be corrected into "probably" (unless, indeed, M. Bergson himself expressly directed such a weakening of his original statement).

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I may add that I have found one or two cases where a preposition has been made exclusive in the English by the insertion of an unwarranted 'only,' and also of the reverse process by which a preposition which is emphatically exclusive in the French has lost its exclusive force in translation. For my own part, I should regard carelessness on so important a point as much more serious than the one or two slips or unidiomatic renderings to which I have referred. Taken all together, these minor blemishes detract little from an excellent piece of work. As is usually the case with Messrs. Macmillan's publications, the paper and type are exceedingly good.

A. E. Taylor.

St. Andrews University.

The Principle of Individuality and Value. The Gifford Lectures for 1911, delivered in Edinburgh University. By B. Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xxxvii, 409.

A new book by Dr. Bosanquet, and especially a series of Gifford Lectures by him, is sure to be welcomed and eagerly read by all who are interested in philosophical discussion. Hence, in writing a review of it, it can hardly be necessary to give any detailed account of its contents,—especially as a very complete analysis of its argument is prefixed to it by the author. It may suffice to say that the present work is a restatement, with some modifications, of the general philosophical position of Mr. Bradley, set forth in a more positive form than that which was given to it by the latter in his "Appearance and Reality," and with more definite indications of the ways in which it may be used in dealing with some of the larger problems of life. This was certainly a work worth doing. Mr. Bradley's great book, fascinating as it is for every lover of profound speculation, has repelled or disappointed many readers by its dialectical form and by the apparently negative or vague character of its main results. The views set forth by him are apt to present themselves, at least to his more superficial or impatient readers, in the form of some such summary as this: (1) All reality is individual, (2) There is only one individual, (3) That one is not an individual; or (1) Reality is a self-consistent whole, (2) Only the Absolute is self-consistent, (3) The

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Absolute cannot really be thought of in a self-consistent way. It may be said, I believe, to be the chief object of Dr. Bosanquet to make it clear that the line of argument pursued by Mr. Bradley does not really land us in any such impasse as this.

In carrying out this work, he makes large use of a conception that he has frequently employed in a very effective way on previous occasions,—*viz.*, that of the essential place of negativity in ultimate reality; or, in other words, that of the necessity of difference in any real identity or of multiplicity in any real unity. If this general principle is granted, it becomes evident that the Absolute cannot be thought of as pure self-identity, or as a simple positive reality standing in opposition to appearance. Rather it must be conceived as an eternal unity or order that involves differentiation in its intrinsic nature, and consequently shows itself in a multiplicity of appearances that have reality, though not a completely independent reality. The sin of the finite, if we may so express it, lies in setting itself up as a *res completa.* It can only save its life by losing it in the life of the whole. According to a view of this kind, the reality of the finite is not simply to be denied or treated as unessential. Everything is real in its own place, and is essential to the completeness of the whole; but its place can only be properly understood in relation to the universal order. Dr. Bosanquet's last lecture, in which he emphasizes the sense in which reality attaches to Nature, is particularly interesting as an exposition of this view; and ought surely, among other things, to make it once for all apparent that modern Idealism is by no means committed to subjectivity.

When this more positive aspect of Mr. Bradley's doctrine is held steadily in view throughout, it becomes apparent that it differs much less from that of Hegel or of Plato than is apt at first to be supposed; and Dr. Bosanquet constantly tends, in the course of his exposition, to treat all these views as being substantially identical. Perhaps he might, with advantage, have recognized more fully that this identity, like others, is an identity in difference; but his method of treatment has at least the advantage of helping to bring together what is best in the teaching of all these writers—and indeed of some others as well. It is hardly necessary to add that the views set forth are admirably illustrated by many concrete applications, and that the book is full of those happy *aperçus* which one has learned to look for

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in the work of Dr. Bosanquet,—sometimes perhaps rather too studiously hidden away in parentheses or foot-notes, but easily enough discoverable by the careful reader. It would be difficult to point to any book in which the mature results of philosophic thought on the great issues of life are so carefully and fully set forth. Readers would, however, find it very profitable to compare it with the new Gifford Lectures by Dr. James Ward, which have almost simultaneously appeared. The two works seem to me to be, to a considerable extent, mutually corrective. The second series of Dr. Bosanquet's lectures, which is now in preparation, may be expected to be even more interesting and important than the first, at least from the point of view of Ethics.

If any defect is to be noted in a work of such high quality and great suggestiveness, it is perhaps to be found in a certain hesitancy which sometimes prevents the main principles from being thoroughly driven home. If the element of negativity or difference is to be taken quite seriously, it seems to involve the reality of process. If there is, in Dr. Bosanquet's phrase, a dissociation of the Absolute, it would appear that we must think also of a process by which its unity is recovered. If so, the reality of time as the general form of any such process ought surely to be more definitely recognized. The conception of a downward and an upward path, which Plato seems to have learned from Heracleitus, may have to be rather more explicitly reintroduced into modern philosophy,—a revised version of 'Paradise Lost' and 'Paradise Regained.' The Absolute, it would appear, has to be thought of as itself 'dying to live,' breaking itself up in order that it may achieve a more perfect wholeness. Some such view seems to be hinted at by Dr. Bosanquet; and it may be that in the second series of his lectures we shall find this suggestion more fully carried out. In the meantime it does not appear to have been thoroughly adopted; and there is, in consequence, a certain vacillation in the treatment of some fundamental problems. The reality of the finite is sometimes too grudgingly acknowledged, while at other times it is recognized in too unqualified a way. What I mean by this can only be very briefly indicated here.

If it is to be seriously maintained that there is a real dissociation of the Absolute, and that it lives in its appearances (as Mr. Bradley himself affirms), it can hardly be right to ascribe to these appearances only a 'degree' of reality. We may rightly

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speak of degrees of adequacy in our apprehension of their reality; but that which is apprehended must, it would seem, be recognized as an absolutely real aspect of the universe. This is, in many places, acknowledged by Dr. Bosanquet. Thus he says (p. 27): "We can have no doubt that there is time in the Absolute. It is a further question whether, and if at all, in what sense, the Absolute is in time." And again: "There cannot be spirit, it would seem, constituted by nothing but pure spiritual centers. Spirit is a light, a focus, a significance, which can only be by contact with a 'nature,' an external world" (p 240). If this is true, surely some qualification is needed in such statements as "I do not doubt that anything which can ultimately *be*, must be of the nature of mind or experience" (p. 135), and "The great enemy of all sane idealism is the notion that the ideal belongs to the future."[1] It seems to me that the reality of that which is the 'other' of mind, and the reality of the 'upward path' in human life, should be more fully recognized.

But if such a criticism as this may be fairly urged, it is perhaps still truer to say that a certain tendency to overemphasize nature as against the finite consciousness is frequently apparent. One is sometimes tempted to urge against Dr. Bosanquet a somewhat similar objection to that which Plato brought against Anaxagoras. He takes mind as his final principle of order, but in detail seems anxious to appeal to anything rather than mind for explanation. Thus, in dealing with the relations between body and mind, he appears to come very near to the affirmation of epiphenomenalism; and, in spite of the careful way in which his position is explained and qualified, I can hardly think that it is fully justified. He says, for instance, taking the example of a pin-prick (p. 198): "Sensation and pain, it is submitted, are what the prick is when the apprehension of it is deepened; they are no additional reaction, but the reaction as apprehended by a certain kind of system. They are what the effect on the sentient organism is like when you come to realize it." An interpretation, he says further, "is not a new happening; it is an appreciation of what is happening." But surely the deepening of an apprehension, the coming to realize what happens, the interpretation or appreciation of what happens, are all happen-

[1] If he said 'belongs *only* to the future,' I should of course not object.

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ings. To read a poem is a happening; to understand it is a happening; to appreciate or criticise it is a happening. Can it be otherwise with a pin-prick? To be aware of its contact is a happening; to apprehend the painfulness of it is a happening; to dislike this painfulness is a happening. These conscious events are no doubt happenings of a different kind from the motion of the pin or the nervous shock; but surely they are no less real. They are something additional that occurs, though they are not spatial movements; and it would seem to be necessary to give them a place in any causal order that we may be led to recognize. Similarly, the familiar saying that 'the statue is found lying in the marble' seems to be taken rather too literally (p. 165). What the saying points to is partly, I should say, a certain *lack* of plasticity in the material. A worker in such material is to some extent *limited* by it.

Dr. Bosanquet is, I think, on firmer ground when he urges (p. 191) that "in apparent cosmic development, whether inorganic, organic, or logical, the rule is for the stream to rise higher than its source"; but this suggests a very different doctrine, and one that does not appear to me to be worked out with sufficient definiteness in this book. There is ample evidence throughout the work that the author has made a profound study of the writings of M. Bergson; but I doubt whether he has done full justice to the conception of 'creative evolution,' which that writer has done so much to popularize. He seems, on the whole, to seek to minimize the importance of the forward movement; and in this I doubt whether he is quite faithful to what is best in the teaching of Hegel, and indeed in that of Plato and Aristotle also,—the writers to whom, next to Mr. Bradley, he most commonly appeals. It is possible, however, that this aspect of the truth will be more fully brought out in the second series of his lectures. In the present series he is anxious to guard against misinterpretations of the idea of development. Certainly, to speak of an *élan vital* is not very enlightening; but I could have wished to see a more definite recognition of a forward movement leading to an intelligible end,—a more definite effort to interpret the world by means of the Form of Good.

I have thought it worth while, in an ethical Journal, to call attention to these apparent defects, because the reality of progress seems to be fundamentally important for Ethics. I am, however, very well aware that Dr. Bosanquet does not really

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mean to deny this. I only suggest that he has not always made his view sufficiently clear. In any case, if there are such blemishes as I have indicated in his work, they are only spots on the sun. His book, on the whole, is a great treasure-house of ripe wisdom.

University College, Cardiff. J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE MESSAGES OF THE POETS. (Vol. VII of The Messages of the Bible, edited by F. K. Sanders and C. F. Kent.) By Nathaniel Schmidt, M.A. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp. xxiv, 415.

Both the religious significance and the artistic value of the old Hebrew poetry have been to a great extent obscured by an unhappy method of exegesis based on a false theory of inspiration. What is needed in order that these writings may come into their full rights is the employment of strictly scientific principles in their interpretation, and this is what Professor Schmidt has done in the present volume. After a description of the motifs of Old Testament poetry and its form (rhythm, metre, parallelism, strophic structure) and a notice of the poets (David is the only one of them who is known by name), he discusses the ethical and religious value of the poems, and then takes up, one by one, the books and fragments that have been preserved, giving his own translations and adding expositions. In the numerous cases in which the Hebrew text calls for emendation his conclusions will, for the most part, commend themselves to scholars, and his expositions are independent and fresh, and are marked by critical insight and constructive ability. He has rich material of literary illustration and comparison, and the dates he assigns to the various pieces are in accordance with the most advanced Old Testament criticism of to-day. In order, he says, to give the impression of poetry, conveying not only the thought but something of the form of the original, his translations are in metre (generally in iambic unrhymed quatrains). There are obvious advantages in this method—the text may gain poetic flavor and the thought becomes more real to the English reader. The metrical versions are very well done—the choice of words is excellent (the predominance of words of one syllable is noteworthy) and the tone of the original is clearly rendered. On the other hand, the employment of metre

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sometimes forces a translator into unnatural forms of expression (as "does God from man profit derive?" "when for it I the limits set"), and it is generally agreed that there are passages in which no metrical version can equal the majestic roll or the pathos or the melody of the King James version. Professor Schmidt recognizes these difficulties, but holds that they are more than counterbalanced by the advantages of the metrical form that he adopts.

In the series of "Messages" separate volumes are given to the Psalmists and the Sages, and for the Poets there remain two books (Job and Canticles), several long poems, and many short pieces. Professor Schmidt's view of the construction of the book of Job is as follows: The essential part of the work is the discussion in the colloquies (chaps. iii-xxxi, probably composed early in the fourth century B. C.); this the author or some one else attached to the folkstory of the prologue (chaps. i, ii), and the epilogue (xlii : 7-17) was added by a later hand; some critic, wishing to respond to Job's desire to see God (xiii : 22; xiv : 15), composed the magnificent speeches put into the mouth of Yahwe (xxxviii-x), and still later the Elihu-discourses (xxxii-xxxvii) were added to suggest explanations of Job's sufferings; chapters xxiv, xxviii, xl : 15-24, xli are interpolations, and there are numerous difficulties in the Hebrew text; the names of the chief disputants seem to have been taken from historical tradition (see Gen. xxxvi : 33-35; Septuagint xxxvi : ii), which would connect the poem with the Edomite region, but it was probably written in Palestine. These conclusions seem to the present reviewer to be just. In the colloquies Job is a Jew, apparently influenced by Greek thought, who stands in despair before the problem of the injustice of the divine government of the world; he offers no solution, and the discourses of Yahwe and Elihu add nothing to what is said on the point in the debate. The poem is an eloquent expression of devout skepticism, as Professor Schmidt brings out in his admirable expository sections.

Canticles stands in sharp contrast with the book of Job—the latter is full of pious thought, the former is absolutely non-religious. To place the two books side by side has the advantage of exhibiting the diversities of the literary output of the late pre-Christian Jews. The critical construction of the "Song of Songs" has suffered many changes, all of which are described

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and explained in the present volume. For some years past a favorite view has been that it is a collection of songs in connection with a wedding. It seems that peasants in Syria and elsewhere celebrate marriages by a series of festivities in which bridegroom and bride are called king and queen respectively, each is praised by the other or by the bystanders, and there are dances and other amusements. Professor Schmidt admits that this hypothesis may explain some descriptions in the Song, but points out that it leaves much unaccounted for; in particular, he remarks, the behaviour of the beloved woman in chapter v : 2-8 is not that of a bride—she wanders through the streets of the city late at night seeking her friend, and is maltreated by watchmen and keepers of the walls, seems, in fact, to be treated as if she were a common street-walker. Other difficulties for the wedding-hypothesis appear, and Professor Schmidt takes the book to be simply a collection of love-songs, in which there may be here and there an allusion to some current popular ceremony. Thus much forced interpretation is avoided, and the Song gains when the hero and heroine are considered to be two young people passionately in love with each other and very frank in the avowal of affection and passion. Professor Schmidt also takes literally certain passages (for example, the invitation to come into the garden, iv : 16) that are interpreted by many commentators to refer to nuptial rites. The language of the book is very free—there are parts of the descriptions of the bodies of the two chief characters that cannot be read aloud in a mixed circle, some that cannot be translated for the general reader; but it is unnecessary to find an erotic sense in all references to natural scenery. The Song (the resemblance of which to the idyls of Theocritus has long been recognized) must be placed in the late Greek period, perhaps, as Professor Schmidt suggests, in the first century B. C. The interpretation of the book adopted in this volume is not new, but the author's forcible exposition will secure a wide hearing for it. The allegorical interpretation of the Song, by ancient and modern writers (for the Jews it came to set forth the love of Jehovah for Israel, for Christians the love of Christ for the Church), though exegetically impossible, has historical interest as an expression of mystical feeling; many of the commentaries devoted to it (that of Madame Guyon, for instance) reveal genuine spiritual experience.

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The shorter poetical pieces are treated by Professor Schmidt with the same care that he gives to the poetical books. The Deborah-song (Judges v), though very early (perhaps the oldest elaborate poem in the Old Testament) shows perfect rhythm and fine imagination; its morals are barbarous, but it is noteworthy that the Hebrews at so early a period (about 1100 B. C.) were capable of such a poetical production; it will be remembered that the desert Arabs, before Mohammed's time, produced poetry of a high order so far as regards form and emotion. The author's comments on the Song of Deborah, the so-called Blessing of Jacob (Gen. xlix), Song of Moses (Ex. xv), Prophecies of Balaam (Num. xxiiif), Song of Moses (Deut. xxxii), Blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxiii), and the smaller pieces give the reader in condensed form the material for a judgment of the worth of these poems. The minor pieces are arranged in the order in which they appear in the English Version; it would perhaps be better, in order to bring out the development of thought, to give them chronologically (so far as the chronology can be fixed); the difference between Ex. xv and Deut. xxxii and that between Gen. xlix and Deut. xxxiii are obvious.

Professor Schmidt's volume is a welcome contribution to the comprehension of old Hebrew literature. In the small space allowed him he has given an illumining survey of the surviving poetry, not in a mere statistical form, but with the documents themselves expounded with broad scholarship, critical insight, and fine appreciation of the æsthetic, ethical, and religious tone and features of the old Hebrew thought thus expressed in poetical form.

C. H. Toy.

Harvard University.

History of Ethics Within Organized Christianity. By Thomas Cuming Hall, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910. Pp. xi, 605.

Jesus, according to Dr. Hall, neither founded a community nor taught a philosophy or an ethics; he set forth an ideal. The history of Christian morality is that of the attempts to embody this ideal, as a fact of Christian experience, in practice. The history of Christian ethics is that of the various efforts to state the theory and principles of this morality. It is with

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the second of these subjects that this book is concerned, and the choice of the phrase, "ethics within organized Christianity," instead of the shorter "Christian ethics," for its title is evidently due to a very precise intention of the author.

In deciding the question of what Jesus himself taught, we must remember that he was a Jew. Metaphysical monotheism, as distinguished from ethical, comes from Plato, as do also much of the later ascetic and aristocratic tone of Christian ethicists, and the emphasis upon an immortal soul. Oriental dualism and the notion of redemption from sin as separation from an evil world are Hellenistic, the political and juristic ideals are Roman. But the proper historical background for the teaching of Jesus is exclusively Jewish. Only the first three gospels can be used as sources of information concerning this teaching in its exact nature, and later 'unfoldings' and 'interpretations' must be excluded, even in these; the details of the 'Kingdom Parables,' for example, and the 'ecclesia' passages in Matthew, are later additions. "*Unity with the purpose of God* rather than *love to God* is the basis of the thought of Jesus. . . . The ethical ideal of Jesus was 'to do the will of God.'" His morality looked to motives rather than conduct as its standard of judgment; it was "deeply compassionate," "non-ascetic," and was to be fully realized in a "Kingdom of God' to be established on the earth, "introduced by calamity to all wrong-doers" and organized "on the old Hebrew democracy basis." "Jesus . . . linked the ethical triumph of the kingdom with the spiritual energy of his own life and nature. . . . At the same time this energy is not magical, but spiritual and ethical." He and his apostles were to be proclaimers rather than founders of this kingdom.

The varied subsequent history of Christian ethics is seen by Dr. Hall as a series of attempts to incorporate this ideal of Jesus in systems of thought,—partly determined by considerations of polity and organization, both secular and ecclesiastical, partly by metaphysical theories,—which are foreign to its original character, often indeed really opposed to it, and which not infrequently almost entirely obliterate that character. God becomes the Pharisaic law-giver again; redemption depends on belief in Greek dogma and the Oriental and Hellenistic "magic of sacraments"; the Kingdom of God is identified with the Roman sacerdotal church. This "elaborate misconstruction" is

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already complete by the opening of the third century, and its consequences pervade the ethics of both Catholicism and Protestantism to the present day. Nevertheless, the force of the original ideal continues to operate through all the centuries, and so much the more powerfully as it is permitted to do so in its proper nature as an inner power in human experience, free from the shackles of an alien tradition. A strong sense of the irony of history will arise in some of Dr. Hall's readers as the liberators of Christian ethics are finally found outside of organized Christianity, in the persons of the Continental and English philosophers, and especially of Kant and Hume. In bringing ethics back to the basis of experience, they freed Protestantism from "scholastic authoritarianism" on the one hand and "ascetic and mystic emotionalism" on the other.

The book shows a vast amount of reading in the original works. So far as the ecclesiastical writers are concerned, little of the discussion seems to be based on secondary authorities. The treatment of Post-Reformation writers is judicially fair. Dr. Hall applies his critical principles to Jesuits, Calvin, and the Independents alike, to name only the more striking examples, and finds that the ethics of all are infected with authoritarian and legalistic ideas. His discussion of the ethical principles of Independency, like his earlier essay on Calvin (largely reproduced here), is really illuminating, since it substitutes a critical examination of the authors themselves as moralists for traditional preconceptions and prepossessions. Those who grant his premises can make little objection to the details of his discussion, which is usually clear and exact. I shall mention only what seems to me perhaps the most serious exception to the general carefulness of this part of the work. The brief section (IV., v.) on "the Cult and its Ethics" is not true to its title. It is ruled throughout by the conception of the cult as "sacramental magic" and as therefore merely a negative factor in the development of Christian ethics. No use whatever is made of the text of the liturgies, either here or elsewhere, as embodying ideals affecting the moral life of Christians, and implying principles which operate in their ethical speculation.

The scope of the subject requires a larger book than this, and it seems to the reader as though the author's material had sometimes been forcibly compressed. Many pages have the staccato style of lecture notes. Under the circumstances, it was

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a mistake to include the "ethics of philosophical Protestantism," which is made to include almost all the important modern philosophers, even to Green and Spencer. A brief statement of general results, with emphasis on the work of Hume and Kant, would have better suited the plan of the book. As it is, all of this matter is inadequate, and not a little of it seriously misleading. The summary of Bishop Butler's ethics, for example, is especially unsatisfactory, allying him as it does with the intuitionists; Hegel is dismissed in half a page; and no account is taken of Schleiermacher's "Christliche Sittenlehre" or of his "Predigten über den christlichen Hausstand," precisely those among his ethical writings which one would have supposed most important for the purpose of this book.

There are many misprints which should be corrected before a second impression.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Butler College.

GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS. By G. W. F. Hegel. Edited by Georg Lasson. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1911. Pp. xcv, 380.

Dr. Lasson has given us a well-printed and convenient edition of the Philosophy of Law. He has, however, reprinted the text as it stood in the edition published by Hegel himself in 1821, and has grouped at the end of the volume all the *Zusätze* collected by Gans from the note-books of attendants at the course. This does not seem an improvement. Each of the *Zusätze* refers to a particular paragraph of the original, and the arrangement of 1833, by which each of them comes immediately after the paragraph to which it refers is more convenient for most readers.

The editor contributes an interesting introduction, which does not perhaps contain much that is absolutely new, but will be very helpful to the student who approaches the Philosophy of Law for the first time.

J. ELLIS MCTAGGART.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

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Il Nuovo Contrattualismo nella Filosofia Sociale e Giuridica. By Prof. Gino Dallari. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1911. Pp. 489.

With the general contentions of this treatise I find myself substantially in complete agreement. No doubt it would be possible by careful searching to find out one or two shades of difference; but this would be hypercriticism. I prefer to set forth as briefly and simply as possible the results of the author's very elaborate inquiry, at once historical, critical, and positive.

I must first observe that the book ought to attract much attention in the English-speaking world. More than half of it is occupied directly with the work of English thinkers (Sir H. S. Maine and Herbert Spencer); and Professor Dallari shows himself intimately acquainted with recent developments in English and American politics. The other thinkers of European reputation dealt with are the French philosopher Fouillée and the Belgian sociologist De Greef. Germany is represented by E. R. Bierling, who has turned the 'new contractualism' to what his countrymen would describe as a 'confessional' purpose. Though of less significance than the other theories dealt with, his position has a certain historical interest, being the last of many attempts to upset the incontestable truth in Hobbes's political theory, recognized as such in modern times by all clear-headed thinkers. Since all law and government rest ultimately on 'consent,' the regulations of all societies,—and consequently also of the church,—are, he argues, as much 'law' as the law of the state. Professor Dallari, who himself pays a tribute to the power with which Hobbes set forth the true position against all such ambiguities (p. 91 note), has no difficulty in showing that the distinctive character of law in the proper sense is to be the command of a State with force behind it.

This, however, takes us no way in a discussion of what the State ought actually to do or what its constitution ought to be; and these are the questions that the 'new contractualism' attempts to solve. What then is this new contractualism? How does it differ from the old, and how did it arise? To all these queries perfectly definite answers are given. The old contractualism is the 'rationalist' theory of the original social

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compact, made use of to different ends by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, by Kant and Renouvier. (As we see, its employment is not limited to those called distinctively 'rationalist' as opposed to 'experiential' thinkers.) Of this doctrine, within its ideal or theoretical sphere, the author does not contest the validity. For construction of the general idea of a legislation to be enforced, no objection can be raised to the notion, formulated in terms of contract, of a will of the community that government should be according to certain norms. The error was not in the contract theory itself as a logical presupposition of the State and its law; but in the identification of this notion of contract with the imagination of an actual compact from which present law was to be derived. Hence the attempt founded on this misapprehension, to overthrow the contract-theory of the basis of government by historical criticism. And, when this seemed to have done its work by showing that early governmental institutions do not usually arise out of a compact, the result was that the contract-theory took its revenge by reappearing, now, however, in a theoretically invalid form, historical or sociological instead of rationalist or ideal. The contractual order was now placed not at the beginning, but at the end of a process, as the result of an evolution. A contractual organization of the State was declared to be the ideal goal to look forward to, instead of the presupposition with which to begin. The starting point of all the new theories was Sir Henry Maine's historical *aperçu,* put in the form of a law of progress "from *status* to contract." This formula was itself generalized from a limited sphere of jurisprudence, that of the Roman 'private law,' and, if duly explained, is valid within its own limits. Taken up by Herbert Spencer, however, it was sweepingly generalized; in the doctrine of Fouillée it became intermixed with the old rationalist theory; and by De Greef it was developed in the interests of a social doctrine which, professing to be founded on a 'law of evolution,' is the most incompatible of all with the actual political drift of the present world. The inspiring thought alike of Spencer, Fouillée, and De Greef was, it is true, that of liberty; but the weakening of the unitary State resulting in varying degrees from all their theories, would, if realized, be most deadly to that individual autonomy which is indeed one end of political life, but which has been wrongly identified with a contractual organization of

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units within society in distinction from their organization on the ground of *status*.

This will become clearer in the light of Professor Dallari's sketch of the historical development of law within European States. He recognizes, as has been said, that Maine's generalization is true if very strictly limited. The early Roman family, taken by itself, was ruled on terms of *status* by its hereditary chief, the *paterfamilias*. Juridical progress brought about the dissolution of this internal order: each individual member of the family, and not merely its head, was brought face to face with the State. Thus in a manner the range of contract was extended. More persons had the legal right to enter into contracts with one another. This, however, is more correctly described as a progress 'from group to individual' or 'from *status* to autonomy.' For by the growth of public law the range of contract within the legal sphere was at the same time restricted. As the power of government increased, that is to say, there was less freedom of contract than had formerly existed for the dominant heads of families as representing their groups. The State by its peremptory law came to determine relations that had hitherto been left to private and 'federal' agreements,—alternating with violence,—among independent powers. It took upon itself, for example, to forbid contracts by which the individual renounced personal autonomy. As long as the unitary State continued to increase in power, this process went on; individuals becoming freer and more equal through emancipation from controlling groups. When the decadence of the State came, in what is called the 'Lower Empire,' groups resumed their power. An oppressive order arose in which free persons found themselves bound in the chains of corporate unions or fixed in hereditary situations unequal by *status*. The Middle Ages, with their corporate groups and their feudal chiefs having power to defy the central government and to wage 'private war,' represent at once *status* within the groups and an elaborate contractual order,—again alternating with violence,—among them. There is formed "a vast contractual tissue which, on the basis of territorial relations, has constituted a series of particular subjections and authorities, withdrawing the great multitude of subjects from the direct *imperium* of the sovereign" (p. 83). As the central government gains power, there follows again an emancipation of the individual and a

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simultaneous restriction of the range of contract. The separate powers, whether feudal chiefs or corporate communities, can no longer, for example, make voluntary alliances in war or peace with one another, but become directly subject to the authority of the State. Passage from the absolute monarchies of the Renaissance to modern democracies, so far as this general process is concerned, has made no difference. Democracy means "increasing authority of the State and of the law" (p. 360). The State has constantly become stronger and has constantly extended its activities. It is true that industry, during one period, needed and gained freedom from vexatious interferences. Contract is at present the rule in two distinct spheres,—between States and among the individuals that are now independent economic units, whereas they were formerly members of groups that governed economic relations by *status*. Yet the disappearance of the old controls has brought with it contentions between capital and labor which in every country have led to increased State action. It is also true that new voluntary organizations,—industrial, trading, professional, etc.,—are constantly arising; but this does not in the least indicate a return to 'particularism,' with extended range for contracts among separate powers, in the political order. These movements are partial movements of specialization within the State, and signify all the more need for central control under general ideas. The spontaneous associative process is real, organic in its way, but subordinate. It must not be allowed to become a dissolvent. If particularist and federalist movements were to gain the upper hand as against the integration which,—as evolutionists ought to see,—must go along with differentiation wherever there is organic growth, the new society would resemble more than anything else the feudal anarchy from which the modern world has emerged. Compared with the tyranny of interests and groups that would then rule in detail, coercion by the State would be as nothing. But there is no indication that the world is moving in any such direction. The predominant movement is quite the other way. 'Local self-government,' rights of particular States within a federation, tend more and more to be reduced or to be recognized only as delegated powers. Sovereignty becomes more visibly concentrated at the center. And this is not to the loss but to the gain of individual autonomy as of all the purposes of social and civilized life.

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Inadequate as this account is, I prefer to leave it so rather than to blur it by trying to include too much detail. The book itself, I must remark, is not at all the kind of book that is made long by mere repetitions of generalities. The doctrines of the thinkers criticized are first effectively expounded, and then examined, not in relation to a standard position set up at the beginning, but to actual movements, social, economic, and political. The whole is pervaded by that clear and positive sense of fact sometimes held to be characteristic of the Italian mind. As an example of this, I may mention the criticism of Spencer's generalization that progress is from militarism to industrialism; each of these phases having a whole set of coördinated features. Professor Dallari notes first that the doctrine is a legacy from Saint Simon and Comte; then that it has, for the present at any rate, been falsified by events, as the philosopher came to see. Next, assigning the causes, he shows that the recent intensification of European militarism would have been impossible without intensified industrialism for its basis, and that this remains its necessary accompaniment. Proceeding afterwards to discuss the prospects for the future, he points out how little there is to confirm De Greef's view that the strong State can be dispensed with because agreements between groups will be peaceful and no longer dependent on readiness for war. When we look at concrete reality, we find a world still full of possible causes of conflict. For each people to hold its own, just as for liberty of internal development, a State fully unified and disposing of the means of rapid action with the minimum of obstruction is more needful than ever. Of course we may speculate on modifications of human nature that would make all requisite agreement spontaneous and all authority of the State unnecessary; but in no future that can be foreseen is the need for the unified State and its order of legal command likely to become less.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND LIFE. By Robert C. Brooks. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1910. Pp. xv, 309.

The purpose of this book is to examine in a more cool and systematic manner the corruption in American politics and

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life which has called out so much literature of exposure and denunciation during the past decade. There is no question as to the need for studies of this sort. We know comparatively little as to the actual moral standards of any groups except the few with which we are immediately connected. The various popular attacks have shown some of the more spectacular types of corruption, but we have no data for knowing how widespread the evil is. The subtler forms elude us. We sometimes mistrust that the cruder and illegal manifestations of corruption are relatively unimportant in comparison with the less obvious types which, for ought we know, lurk in our whole organization of business and government. Many forms of the evil, such as tax-dodging, are so general as scarcely to be regarded as wrong. Others, such as the definite bribery with cash of legislators or other public officials are generally condemned. Is the proper inference that we are corrupt as a people, and only select for condemnation the particular kinds of corruption which do not tempt us, or is there some other interpretation? It is as hard now as it was in the days of Burke to frame an indictment against a whole people. Hence to make an analysis of corruption, of its essence and causes, even though this analysis is only tentative and in many respects sketchy, is an important contribution. Professor Brooks has not attempted a quantitative study, nor has he followed out causes of corruption with great thoroughness. His work is rather a series of essays upon certain broad aspects of the problem.

The first chapter on four "Apologies for Corruption" has already appeared in this JOURNAL. The nature and history of political corruption are treated in the second and third chapters, and these are followed by descriptive studies of certain aspects of corruption in the fields of the professions, journalism, higher education, business, and politics. The question of campaign contributions receives special attention. Corruption in business, on the other hand, is treated rather hastily, and many of the most interesting points are not touched upon. One would like to know, for example, how general the custom is of giving special bonuses to buyers, and how many of the customs condemned in politics are the common methods of business. Some of these are referred to, but it is quite possible that much light would be thrown upon the political situation if we could have more analysis of 'business methods.' It is sometimes said

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by the labor unions that they have learned all their objectionable policies from capitalists' organizations. As a matter of social psychology, and ultimately of social and political reform, it would be desirable to know how much there is of imitation and how much of originality in political life.

Corruption is defined by Professor Brooks (p. 46), as "the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal." The moment that we have thus defined corruption, it is evident why it is in the author's phrase a "persistent problem." It is also evident why the line between legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power is difficult to draw sharply, for most persons act from mixed motives. Few public measures are conceived and promoted purely from interest in the public good. Motives "of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal" enter into every election, and into most legislative measures. And on the theory that society is made up of individuals or groups, it is very plausible that to serve the interest of a given group will serve the interests of the country. Why then should liquor interests hesitate to use power to promote their own prosperity, or railroads to exercise influence for the appointment or election of favorable judges, or insurance companies to defeat hostile legislation? The situation is further complicated, as Professor Brooks points out, by the fact that certain preferences on personal grounds, which are called corrupt in political life, are common and even approved in business and family groups. The current morality does not condemn all forms or degrees of private interest. City elections show that many groups of citizens vote for private or group interests,—some because they compare their own stake in the public welfare and in the smaller group and deliberately prefer the latter; others because they cannot as yet grasp the idea of public welfare in any other sense than as a means of bringing immediate good to themselves or their kinsmen and neighbors. The courts lay down the principle that the taxing power can be used only for what is primarily a public purpose. But that any kind of political power, whether that of legislation, or of administration, or of suffrage, is only to be so used is a position which has yet to gain entrance into the minds of many.

So long as this failure to grasp the conception of a public

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good exists, we shall always have a persistent problem. There is no hard and fast line between rewarding party workers with public jobs,—whether these jobs are in the city street department or in postmasterships,—and rewarding legislators with a sum contributed by business interests. And the notion that we can hold public officials to a distinct code of morality on this matter and require that they alone shall be single-minded servants of the public while private citizens may use a variety of pressures and influences to get public favors, is fatuous. Nevertheless, the author's historical account of certain of the leading forms of corruption in the past, is on the whole encouraging, for it shows how the conception of public interest has gained recognition in many fields, and how several types of corruption at least have been overcome.

It is a welcome sign that ethical analysis and treatment of public morality is not to be left exclusively to the magazines. The part of the academic teacher is doubtless a very different one from that of the popular writer, but thus far there has been a striking lack of publication of the more scientific sort. It is not creditable to teachers of ethics, that the studies which have thus far appeared have come largely from other departments. It is to be hoped that the political scientists and economists will not be left alone in this good work. This volume, the deficiencies of which in point of comprehensiveness and thoroughness the author himself doubtless would be first to admit, should provoke more intensive study, and it is to be hoped that the author will himself contribute such materials.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

University of Chicago.

DEMOCRACY AND THE OVERMAN. By Charles Zueblin. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1910. Pp. 217.

That Mr. Zueblin has the true journalist's instinct for striking headlines is shown in his chapter headings (The Overspecialized Business Man, The Overestimated Anglo-Saxon, The Overcomplacent American, The Overthrown Superstition of Sex, The Overdue Wages of the Overman's Wife, The Overtaxed Credulity of Newspaper Readers, The Overworked Political Platitudes, The Overlooked Charters of Cities) as well as in the general title under which these eight rather disparate essays

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appear. While one is scarcely entitled to form any expectations from the title of a book, I confess to a sense of disappointment upon finding that by the "Overman" the author does not refer to the somewhat grandiose mythical figure with which we are now almost as familiar as we are with the fetich of 'Democracy'; but that by the Overman he merely means the selfish, aggressive, and overspecialized American business man who is now the boss of *hoi Polloi,* but who must be made the servant of Demos. That is the thesis that lends a kind of unity to the author's criticism of contemporary political and social conditions.

Our complaint is not that he expends a needless amount of force and epigram and illustration in proving that the business man is often narrow and selfish, that the average American is too complacent of the superlative merit of his own institutions, that the newspapers are too sensational and too subservient to the moneyed interests, that there is too much greed and too much graft and too little devotion to the common good; but that he glides too lightly and confidently from admitted ills to doubtful remedy. When he says that Mr. Taft is the apostle of the obvious and Mr. Bryan the prophet of the dubious, one is tempted to add that Mr. Zueblin is both. He should know that "the recognition of the emptiness of political platitudes and a clearer demand for constructive statesmanship," is itself an empty political platitude. The question is *how* to cure the ills of the body politic.

The author's own constructive program appears to come to this: We in the United States are handicapped by a written Constitution, the fundamental principle of which is the separation of legislative and executive functions. We must unite the legislative and executive. We must adopt the initiative and referendum and the commission form of government. The hope of American politics lies in the translation of the commission or council form of municipal government into the terms of state and national government. This will coincide with 'the sovereignty of Demos.' If any one is disposed to think that this is a dubious foundation for political optimism, let him remember "that the people will not always remain a mob . . . is illustrated by the election of a Socialist mayor in Milwaukee."

GEORGE S. PATTON.

Princeton University.

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DER SINN DES LEBENS UND DIE WISSENSCHAFT: Grundlinien einer Volksphilosophie. Von Dr. F. Müller-Lyer. München: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1910. Pp. iv, 290.

THE NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: A Study for the Times. By J. H. Harley, M.A. London: P. S. King & Son, 1911. Pp. xxvii, 218.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A Course of Lectures delivered at the University of Padua by Achille Loria. Translated by John Leslie Garnier. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1911. Pp. 156.

"Der Sinn des Lebens" is the first of a series of volumes by the same author bearing the general title "Die Entwicklungsstufen der Menschheit: Eine Gesellschaftslehre in Überblicken und Einzeldarstellungen." The purpose of the series is to provide the general reader with a general view of the course of human institutions and human thought up to the present and to establish on this basis a comprehensive and reasoned program of future development. The present volume has many merits and some irritating faults; but the faults will not, I think, greatly detract from the usefulness of the work. The author is evidently a man of great intelligence and wide information, but without the proper aptitude for exact philosophical speculation. His arguments will accordingly be found by the philosopher to stop short, in general, at the point at which his own interest is most eagerly engaged. Added to this are the inevitable misrepresentations of systems and opinions into which the unprofessional philosopher must fall. Human thought concerning nature is traced through five stages: (1) the naïve-utilitarian; (2) the anthropomorphic or theological; (3) the metaphysical; (4) the critical; (5) the positive. The treatment is often suggestive, but is open at almost every point to attack. The evolution of humanity is traced in a second section in which the author shows more thorough familiarity with his subject, and considerable dialectical power. The aim which he very impressively enforces upon mankind at its present stage is called by him *Kulturbeherrschung*: "the knowledge of the laws of civilization will enable man gradually to interfere purposively with the aimless and meaningless course of development and thus to conquer the most important province of all for consciousness and the conscious will" (p. 56). A third sec-

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tion treats of the development of sociology, and it is worthy of high praise both on its critical and on its constructive side. In particular the various evolutionary schools of sociology, which employ various biological analogies, are effectively criticised, and a new scheme of an independent sociology is propounded. The criticism of Nietzsche's 'superman' deserves special notice by reason both of its own merits and of the widespread profession of Nietzschean views. Further sections deal in an optimistic and generous spirit with the problems of political and industrial organization, the diffusion of happiness, and the moral ideal. The whole work is inspired with a fine enthusiasm for equality and justice, and should inspire the like enthusiasm in its readers: it should help toward the solution of many difficulties, and serve as a source of many acute and well-marshaled arguments. It is, however, rather crude in temper, and it lacks the largeness and self-effacement which the best work of this kind possesses. The conceit of being 'educated' and up to date which has become so characteristic of German learned work is a fault which a reader of this book must observe continually.

Mr. Harley's collection of essays, partly reprinted from periodicals, hardly exhibits the coherence and mutual relevance proper to a book; and the several essays themselves are discontinuous and jerky, written in too great haste to do anything like justice to the author's wide knowledge of books and men or to his powers of critical reflection. 'Social Democracy' is opposed in this work to collectivist and bureaucratic socialism, and the author gives his reasons for expecting the supersession of the traditional policies of the socialist parties by the more comprehensive social democracy. He repudiates the doctrine of the exclusive dominance of economic factors, and claims that the politics of the future must be based on a social science which takes account of all the diverse elements or tissues which enter into the structure of society. "A large part of the burden of this book's message has been the recognition that there is no fatal or necessary economical march toward Social Democracy" (p. 204). He arranges "the different types of association in the following order, from the more simple and general to the more special and complex:" (1) Domestic Associations; (2) Economic; (3) Religious; (4) Artistic; (5) Juristic; (6) Political; (7) Rational. He argues accordingly that the social reformer

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must attack the social problem on all these sides, eschewing any premature simplification or reduction of the one to the other. There is a long criticism of bureaucratic collectivism based principally on the story of the struggles of state employés in France; and the diversities in policy which historical and national differences impose are often very acutely and justly set forth. The book is suggestive and stimulating but conveys on every page the impression of haste and turbidity. The estimates of Burke and of Anatole France are delightful reading.

Justice has hardly been done to Professor Loria's work by this spiritless and evidently very inaccurate translation. It contains an endorsement in all essential points of the socialist criticism of contemporary society; a refutation of Darwinian or pseudo-Darwinian sciology; and a commendation of ameliorative social reforms in the hope of averting a violent overthrow of the existing order, and as certain to produce in any event an ennoblement of human character. The author's explanation of the influences which "are progressively lessening the lucrative employment of capital under our present economic system," would, had he given it, have been interesting and valuable. He devotes the greater part of one lecture to expounding as the great cause of social change the growth of population and the consequent pressure on the means of subsistence. So immense a generalization is incapable of proof, nor does the exclusive position here assigned to it seem to me to agree with reason or experience. The civilization of our own island meets here and there with what seems to me singularly ill-informed and ill-bestowed praise and blame. For example, "The English, who display, even in the most insignificant affairs of life, a profound common sense, appreciate the decadence of the privileged families, and in consequence they require anyone ennobled by the king, as a reward for services performed, immediately to change his name, a wise custom, thanks to which the name of the family is not disgraced later by the degenerate descendants of the noble" (pp. 110, 111). This specimen will serve to indicate the style of the translation; but it is considerably below the general level of thought presented in this book.

W. J. Roberts.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

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UNEMPLOYMENT: A SOCIAL STUDY. By B. Seebohm Rowntree and Bruno Lasker. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. xx, 317.

This is a rare book, and should be widely read. Most studies in social welfare are repellent except to enthusiasts; and there is a tradition that works on economic topics must not or need not, be readable. But here we have a book which enthralls, though not only its bones but its flesh are made of statistics; which is neither popular nor unpopular in style, neither technical nor untechnical; it does not occur to the reader to use such terms; the writing is simple, clear, and easy, with the force that comes of restraint.

It is a study of unemployment in York on June 7, 1910. On that day there were twelve hundred and seventy-eight persons (population, eighty-two thousand) "seeking work for wages, but unable to find any suited to their capacities and under conditions which are reasonable, judged by local standards." An exhaustive inquiry schedule was applied to each person, and the essential facts in the lives of about one thousand were obtained,—a stupendous piece of work for two people to initiate and direct. The bare record of unemployment was completed by the sixty investigators in three days; in six months the detailed case-papers were finished. The cases are grouped in such a way as to throw light on the problem of constructive remedy, and for each group some of the suitable remedies are indicated. For instance, there is a chapter on Belgium's method of keeping about a third of her industrial population living in the country, and supplementing her wages by home-grown vegetables.

To summarize one or two important points: Of unemployed youths under nineteen, about seventy-five per cent. started work in 'blind-alley' occupations, and about twenty-five per cent. lost their work for faults of character. These faults will pull down the man as they pulled down the boy. For fifteen per cent. of adult regular workers, faults of character were the chief handicap in obtaining fresh employment. Of casual workers, fifteen per cent. were out of work for these reasons, but now, after their interval of casual work and loafing, for twenty years and more, moral defects prevent no less than thirty-eight and one half per cent. from getting work,—demoralization to

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the extent of twenty-three and one half per cent. These are one set of facts; to say nothing of physical inefficiency, largely through underfeeding. Industrial fluctuations we have always with us, but these other causes we can sweep away if we will. The authors indicate and summarize with great judgment the suitable methods of treatment within reach; all are needed, and each in its place.

Above all stands the need to educate boys and girls in general adaptability to industry and in the technique of some one industry in particular. Let us start a system of industrial schools to-morrow, not for those already apprenticed to some skilled trade, but for those who hawk newspapers and run errands, only to find themselves economically useless at nineteen. And secondly, let us gradually plough up many of our pastures and use them for intensive vegetable culture. Green grass must give way to cabbages and pigs, there is no help for it. Our present sixteen million acres of pasture are a sheer waste of land. The economic organization of cottage gardens, allotments, and small holdings will not be an easy matter. The undertaking is thick with problems of coöperation, transport, agricultural skill, and provision of capital. But no doubt about it that in this way we can contribute to the country's wealth.

O. P. ECKHARD.

Manchester, England.

YOUTH'S NOBLE TASK. A Volume of Moral Instruction Mainly Based on Eastern Tradition, Poetry and History. By F. J. Gould. Published under the auspices of the Moral Education League (Longmans, Green & Co.), 1911. Pp. xix, 326.

The Moral Education League, which has already done much valuable work in this country, is rapidly extending its influence throughout the world. For some time it has been making serious efforts towards the initiation of moral instruction in the colleges and schools of India, since many of her statesmen and educationists believe that the time is ripe for this reform. The publication of the present volume is a most notable step in this direction. Education in the government schools of British India has hitherto been of a purely secular nature, and there are doubtless many people who consider that the vital and fundamental differences of religion and caste render any other gov-

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ernment system of education impossible. This problem is certainly one that demands careful study. The possibility of separating the teaching of morals from religion in the East by no means follows from any decisions and results, however positive and encouraging, arrived at in the West. In their respective attitudes towards religion we have, perhaps, to deal with the most fundamental difference between Eastern and Western people. In the East religion is, and always has been, not part of life, but the whole of it. The whole universe, both the bad and the good, falls within it. In the West this is not so. True religion, here is something that follows the growth of moral convictions, it is an ideal, a dogma, a belief or a system. The European recognizes the supreme value of the virtues wholly apart from any religious sanctions or fears concerning a future life. Such recognition seems to be almost foreign to the Eastern mind, the external mandate of religion is generally its solitary moral imperative. This is not, of course, in harmony with the teaching of the highest forms of Hinduism, Mohammedanism, and still less of Buddhism, but it is in accordance with these faiths as they survive among the masses in India to-day. If, however, a higher attitude towards morality can, by any means, be fostered, humanity would immeasurably gain. For the achievement of this purpose a book of Moral Lessons, pervaded by the Spirit of the East and written specially for Indian children, is a real necessity. Such a book, by Mr. F. J. Gould, we have now before us. In the selection of material from Hindu, Mohammedan, Parsi, Persian, Arabian, and other sources, and in its reduction to simple and concise narrative, the author has been unsparing of his patience and unprejudiced in his choice. He has fully observed the principle that the most effective illustrations must come from the life and literature of the people themselves.

This very merit of the book, however, opens up a further difficulty. We all know the strife that arises when an effort is made to introduce religion into our own national system of education; those of us who are acquainted with the hatred that exists between Mohammedans and Hindus will thereby, in some measure, realize the feelings of the less educated, but more wholly religious native when he finds that his children are being enlightened concerning stories and traditions sacred to other creeds. To many Anglo-Indians it will, therefore, be unthink-

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able that Hindu parents, more especially of the higher castes, will allow their children to hear stories connected with Mohammed, Buddha, or Christ; or, on the other hand, that Mohammedans will allow their children to hear stories of Brahma, Vishnu, or Siva, however impartially or for whatever purpose they are told.

Hence, we must conclude, that though the book of stories is both admirably selected and arranged, and has within it great possibilities for good, its introduction into government schools and colleges must be attended with the greatest caution and only through the media of teachers possessing long and intimate acquaintance with the people of India.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

Bolton, England.

ENGLAND'S NEED IN EDUCATION. By J. S. Knowlson. London: A. C. Fifield, 1911. Pp. 187.

The avowed purpose of this volume is summed up in the following extract: "The object of this somewhat ambitious little work is not to labor the fact of the deficiencies of our national system of education, but rather to suggest a remedy, or, at any rate, to point out how such a remedy might be obtained: in other words, my object is to furnish a constructive, not destructive criticism." Accordingly, the book falls more or less definitely into two parts, the first of these is mainly a discussion of what the author regards as the defects of our educational system, and the second is a somewhat general account of the remedies that he advocates. In the former, he, like most other educationists, emphasizes the evils of that mere craze for facts and information which has been the bane of so much work in education. He severely criticises the subjects as taught in our schools today, but we cannot help thinking that what he has to say refers to the very worst schools and teachers who yet linger with us, types of both, which we trust are fast becoming obsolete.

We are unable to endorse the views put forward in the more constructive part of the book, either as regards the matter or method of instruction. Many of the general principles put forward are of incontestable validity, but in their application to the needs of the concrete case, we regard the suggestions of

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the author as inferior to what is best in modern practice. His suggested Time-Table strikes us as open to innumerable and unanswerable objections. In place of the 'compartment' arrangement of subjects he substitutes lessons for the training of intellect, feeling, and will. Such a change would surely increase artificiality, for experience falls more naturally into compartments than does the soul. Again, the means whereby we are to train Emotion, daily from 1.30 to 2 P. M., and Will at other stated times, in icy isolation, are but slightly indicated and are no advance on those in actual use.

The main contentions of the book seem to rest upon what the author continually refers to as the 'circle' theory. The meaning of this is nowhere adequately explained. The diagram that is given for this purpose will only confirm psychologists in the view that ideas of this nature are more clear and more true if we do not strive to interpret them in terms of extension. Indeed, it may be that the author's sharp division of the 'ego' into the 'segments' intellect, feeling, and will, is partly responsible for his belief that the intellect receives isolated and injurious exercise under our modern educational system, and is wholly responsible for his Time-Table, in which certain definite periods in the school day are devoted exclusively to the education of the so-called segments of the ego.

Finally, the book lacks internal unity and coherence. This may be mainly due to the great multitude of quotations which it incorporates. In themselves these are excellent, but there are too many of them. They break the continuity of thought both of the writer and the reader.

M. Lightfoot Eastwood.

Bolton, England.

The Child and the State. By Margaret McMillan. The Socialist Library, IX. The National Labor Press, 1911. Pp. xiii, 204.

The author of this book is an enthusiastic worker and a profuse writer for the Workers' Educational Association. We are not surprised, therefore, to receive a book from her upon the proper education of the masses. The earlier chapters are an earnest plea for various reforms in the education of childhood, and the later ones claim the right of higher education for all.

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They are addressed directly to all working people and also to those who are interested in their welfare.

The writer considers that we are at the beginning of a new era in elementary education, in that for forty years educationists have exercised their minds mainly with regard to subjects, and now, at last, they are beginning to think about the child himself. Great weight is given to the truth that the very first charge upon any system of education should be the proper care for the health of its pupils, and in consequence of this school clinics, baths, meals, laundry, and dressmaking are warmly advocated. So much has already been said concerning the effect upon home life, if the State, through the school, were to undertake all these duties that repetition here is unnecessary. No one would deny that the doing of these things is vital to the welfare of the race, but many would dispute that it is advisable for the State to do them. We should, however, expect almost unanimous agreement with the contention that our present system of medical inspection ought to be replaced by universal school medical and dental clinics.

The writer has much to say in favor of raising the school-leaving age to sixteen, but education is not to end then, for university or higher education is to be the right of all. The nature and organization of this higher education is slightly outlined. It is not proposed that there should be a continuous progress from the elementary school to the university, a period of practical and arduous work is to precede theory; nor indeed is it proposed that the mass of the nation should be converted into an army of scholars wholly disinclined for physical toil; but it is proposed that the youth of England should, like the youth of Denmark, be provided with high schools to which it may go when, at the age of about twenty-two, there awakens within it the desire for a larger life and the impulse for higher things. The author gives an interesting account of these Danish high schools, of which there are now over seventy, and through which two hundred thousand men and women have already passed. Higher education in the best sense is probably the only sure means of social reform, for there can be no real elevation of any nation until those who have hitherto been its drudges are made capable of becoming sharers in the highest joys of man upon earth.

The book contains much valuable and interesting informa-

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tion, but it is certainly not lacking in gratuitous discussions. It is difficult to see what good purpose can be served by working out such statistics as the number of ragged children who could be clothed out of the dress allowance of a lady of fashion. The reader will be supplied with material for much thought and perhaps also for criticism. The author is most sincere and earnest, but a tendency to sentimentalize detracts from the health and vigor of her work.

Bolton, England. M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU. By William Boyd, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., Lecturer in Education in the University of Glasgow. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. Pp. xiv, + 368.

Dr. Boyd is already known as a careful and painstaking critic of Rousseau's educational writings. In this book he gives a general account of his author's thought as a whole, in a fairly full treatment of his ideas on social philosophy and of his attitude to educational problems throughout that development; he claims, rightly, that to deal with the "Emile" alone results in a one-sided view of Rousseau's theory, and "an undue emphasis on his opposition to ordinary practice." We are enabled to follow the course of Rousseau's life, to gain a general knowledge of his better-known work, and to dip into many of his minor and fugitive writings.

Dr. Boyd succeeds in rendering with force and sympathy the inconsistencies which never left Rousseau's views on the individual and society, the senses and the intellect, nature and 'freedom,' and the logic of development, an ample justification for his full treatment of the early writings. In chapter VI he treats of "Nature and Society in the Later Writings," chiefly the "Emile," bringing out the same uncertainty of view. He then treats of "The Two Educational Ideals, National and Individual," the latter forming the chief subject-matter of the same work. He concludes with a critical estimate of Rousseau's contribution to educational thought, with some notes on his successors.

The book will be of most service and value to the student of the "Emile" who has not time for such an exhaustive study of Rousseau as this treatise represents. It is not a general essay

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on Rousseau, of course, and it leaves still unaccomplished, as Dr. Boyd himself suggests, the task of giving an adequate exposition of the "Emile." Fortunately enough, the hasty reader of that work who turns to this for a pre-digest of his reading, will be disappointed.

In his exposition, which is of necessity general, Dr. Boyd seems always accurate and fair, and he is perfectly intelligible. In criticism he has two instruments, first, the same use of plain, logical common-sense, and also the philosophical formulæ of such writers as Caird and Professor Henry Jones; to them he has "a deeper indebtedness, which will only be obvious to the philosophical reader." Doubtless it will lull some philosophical consciences and irritate others; but it is rather unfair to the class of reader who is most likely to profit by this work, to say such things as this, as if they were perfectly comprehensible and made everything all right: "The virtue of the idea of a natural society . . . is that it carries with it the implicit recognition that society . . . is a real spiritual unity with a rational personality and a general will different from the individual personalities and wills of its constituent members" (p. 196).

If "feeling is never anything but an individual experience" (p. 177), so that there is no "general feeling," the will which can be a "general will" is not a similar individual experience in any sense.

Again, it seems to me absurd to blame Rousseau for a "hyper-individualism" which makes him assume "that man can never find himself at home in any actual society" (p. 188): this view seems quite plausible to the ordinary mind, in quite an ordinary sense of the words. But Dr. Boyd is ready to invoke the satisfaction of dying for one's country, of course, a reconciliation just as applicable to paying taxes and going to jail.

The reader must always bear in mind Dr. Boyd's philosophical prepossessions, which could be illustrated at great length. But it is fair to add that, though he is conscious,—like all "Hegelians" of this sort,—of his dialetical solution for all troubles, he never obtrudes it so that the uninitiated cannot follow the plain argument as a whole; the mass of the book is based on the common-sense which we may hope is common to all philosophers as well as to ordinary men.

The book is fully furnished with an index, bibliography, and references to Rousseau and the chief criticisms of his thought.

Cambridge, England. RICHARD SMITH.

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A CORRECTION.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller has sent a protest against the review of the second edition of his 'Riddles of the Sphinx,' by Mr. S. Waterlow, which appeared in this JOURNAL in October, 1911. He states that Mr. Waterlow's criticisms are supported by garblings and misquotations. Mr. Waterlow, having had his attention called to these comments, desires to point out the following misprints, for which he offers his apologies.

P. 108, l. 23: 'spirit can be reduced to matter' should read 'matter can be reduced to spirit.' P. 109, l. 25: 'p. 297' should read 'p. 257.' P. 110, l. 11: 'vigorous' should read 'rigorous.'

Dr. Schiller states further that, in the case of the first of these 'misprints,' the reviewer bases a charge of inconsistency upon this transposition of 'matter' and 'spirit.' Mr. Waterlow does not admit this. He explains that his criticism of Dr. Schiller, so far from being based on the verbal error in question, is meaningless unless it is corrected. Dr. Schiller declines to accept this explanation, and points out that his critic's transposition of 'spirit' and 'matter' appears subsequently to form the only ground for the attribution to him of a grotesque view that originally "nothing was real except God and *Matter.*"

It is not for us to pronounce an opinion on the substantial points that are thus in dispute (the further discussion of which would appear to raise metaphysical issues); but we desire to express our regret that any inaccuracies should have appeared; and if Dr. Schiller's views have really been in any way misrepresented or unfairly criticised, we are sincerely sorry.

EDITORS.

INTERNATIONAL MORAL EDUCATION CONGRESS.

This summer the Second International Congress on Moral Education will be held at The Hague, August 22 to August 27. As its invitation announces, it will not advocate the views of any society or party, but will afford to all who are interested in moral education, whatever their religious or ethical conviction, nationality and point of view, an *equal* opportunity of expressing their opinions and comparing them with those of others.

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The First Congress of this sort was held at the University of London, September 25-29, 1908, under the patronage of the ministers of education of Belgium, Bulgaria, China, England, France, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the United States of America. Twenty-one governments were represented at the Congress, and nearly thirty governments assisted in promoting it. A very large number of the leading educationists of the world, without distinction of religion or party, served upon the general committee and acted as vice-presidents.

At the Second Congress, it is planned to give specific attention to such problems as physical training and recreation, the moral care of dependents, delinquents, and defectives, the relation of social environment, industry and the like to character development, besides direct moral instruction. As in the case of the First Congress, the papers will be published in book form.

Persons desiring to attend the Congress will do well to apply for hotel accommodations to the Association for the Promotion of Foreign Intercourse, *Plaats* 1a, The Hague, Netherlands. Messrs. Heldring and Pierson, Korte Vijverberg, The Hague, are the bankers of the Congress. Those who desire to have their names entered as members and receive all the publications must forward a fee of ten shillings, six pence (or seventeen shillings for two delegates) to Dr. E. Hymans van Wadenoyen, 99 Parkstraat, The Hague, Netherlands. For the papers alone a subscription of five shillings is called for. The committee will be grateful for any donations and hopes that many who are interested in moral education will care to subscribe.

The Executive Committee consists of the following:

Prof. J. W. Adamson, President, King's College, London; Fred Charles, Secretary, 22 Park Crescent, Church End, Finchley, London N.; L. J. M. Basquin, LL.D., The Hague; Prof. Felix Adler, New York; M. Léon Bourgeois, Paris; M. Emile Boutroux, Paris; M. Cloudesley Brereton, London; Mrs. Bryant, London; M. Ferdinand Buisson, Paris; Miss Attie G. Dyserinck, The Hague; Prof. Wilhelm Foerster, Berlin; Mr. St. George Lane Fox-Pitt, London; M. Harrold Johnson, London; Dr. G. Kerschensteiner, Munich; Dr. J. Th. Mouton, The Hague; Prof. F. Orestano, Palermo; Prof. M. E. Sadler, Leeds; Mr. R. A. van Sandick, Civil Engineer, The Hague; Mr. G. Spiller, London.

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